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Abstract		This	thesis	examines	the	intersection	of	the	personal	and	professional	lives	of	former	Undersecretary	of	State	Sumner	Welles.	It	argues	that	Welles	sexuality	had	a	formative	influence	on	his	worldview	and,	hence,	his	career	as	a	policymaker,	his	place	in	the	Roosevelt	administration,	and	his	legacy	in	U.S.	political	and	diplomatic	history.	Using	sexuality	as	a	lens	through	which	to	view	his	career,	this	thesis	provides	fresh	interpretations	of	the	major	events	in	Welles’	career	while	offering	new	insights	into	the	contradictions,	ambiguities,	and	continuities	in	Welles’	thinking	and	behaviour.		Welles’	sexuality	permeated	his	entire	life.	It	impacted	the	trajectory	of	his	career,	shaped	his	personality,	and	altered	the	dynamics	of	his	worldview.	Beginning	with	formative	experiences	that	positioned	Welles	as	an	outsider,	Welles’	upbringing	and	sexuality	conditioned	him	with	unique	characteristics	and	beliefs	that	shaped	his	professional	life.	These	characteristics	were	manifested	in	three	ways:	an	aversion	to	military	solutions	to	diplomatic	problems,	a	belief	in	paternalistic	idealism	toward	the	world	outside	the	U.S.,	and	the	development	of	a	close	political	bond	with	a	fellow	outsider	to	conventional	masculinity,	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt.	Through	a	close	reading	of	Welles’	papers,	documents	from	his	formative	years,	accounts	by	his	contemporaries,	and	a	consideration	of	the	broader	political	and	societal	context	in	which	he	operated,	this	thesis	shows	how	examining	Welles’	personal	life	is	crucial	to	understanding	his	impact	on	American	foreign	policy.		This	thesis	is	not	a	straight	diplomatic	history.	Its	primary	focus	is	on	Welles	as	an	individual	and	how	he	embodied	the	intersection	between	sexuality,	power,	and	diplomacy.	It	directly	engages	with	the	existing	historiography	about	Welles	by	challenging	the	portrayals	of	his	sexuality	as	aberrant	and	incidental.	That	said,	while	the	components	of	personality	and	sexuality	are	fundamental	to	this	thesis’	argument,	this	thesis	does	not	argue	Welles’	sexuality	is	the	sole	or	all-encompassing	criterion	by	which	his	career	can	be	understood.	Rather,	this	thesis	highlights	the	salience	of	sexuality	alongside	more	traditional	metrics	of	ideology,	
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politics,	culture,	and	power,	in	order	to	provide	a	richer	understanding	of	Welles’	contributions	to	the	political	and	diplomatic	history	of	the	U.S.,	particularly	with	regards	to	Latin	America,	World	War	Two,	and	the	internal	politics	of	the	Roosevelt	administration.	More	broadly,	it	expands	the	scope	of	analysis	for	historians	studying	foreign	policy	and	diplomacy	by	demonstrating	how	sexuality	shapes	the	attributes	and	outlook	of	foreign	policy	decision	makers.		
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Introduction:	
	 	
	 In	October	1940	two	State	Department	officials,	William	Castle	and	Hugh	Cumming	Jr.,	met	for	lunch.	Castle,	who	had	served	as	Herbert	Hoover’s	Undersecretary	of	State,	noticed	the	current	Undersecretary	of	State	Sumner	Welles	leave	the	room	just	as	they	entered.	“[I]t	was	strange	a	man	as	forbidding	as	he	and	sometimes	almost	repellent,”	Castle	commented	about	Welles,	“should	appeal	so	much	to	the	ladies.”1	His	lunch	companion	echoed	Castle’s	bewilderment	with	foreboding.	“[W]hen	a	man	wanted	to	change	existing	circumstances,	to	remake	the	world,	but	had	no	idea	of	how	it	was	to	be	done	except	as	to	the	destruction,”	Castle	remembered	Cumming	saying	about	Welles,	“he	was	queer	and	exaggerated	in	everything	he	did,	personal	and	physical	as	well	as	mental.”2	Welles’	queerness	was	all	the	worse,	Cumming	added,	because	“his	iconoclasm	was	not	sincere	but	merely	practice	[sic]	because	it	seemed	best	for	the	iconoclast.”3	Few	exchanges	better	encapsulate	the	complexities,	controversies,	ambiguities,	and	prejudices	that	characterized	Sumner	Welles	and	his	career.	His	perplexing	personality,	the	suspicions	of	his	motives,	his	purported	ambitions,	and	the	alleged	deviousness	of	his	character	expressed	through	blatant,	albeit	coded,	sexual	language	all	defined	Welles	during	his	career	and	in	much	of	the	historical	scholarship	studying	it.4	Furthermore,	in	explicitly	linking	Welles’	‘queerness’	to	his	political	ambitions	Castle	and	Cumming	unwittingly	unlocked	a	key	aspect	of	Welles’	professional	life:	the	salience	of	sexuality	to	understanding	it.			 Welles	was	a	key	figure	in	the	creation,	deliberation,	and	execution	of	American	foreign	policy	for	over	a	quarter	of	a	century.	His	career	spanned	pivotal	events	and	epochs,	the	courses	of	which	were	directed,	in	part,	by	his	hand.	The	achievements	he	amassed	as	a	practitioner	of	foreign	policy	were	substantial	and	his	downfall	tragic.	Yet	despite	intensive	historical	inquiry	into	Welles	and	the	key																																																									1	Diary	Entry,	18	October	1940,	Harvard	University,	Houghton	Library,	William	R.	Castle	Diaries,	Vol.	40.	378-9.		2	Ibid.,	379.		3	Ibid.	4	That	all	this	took	place	with	Welles	momentarily	close	by,	literally	behind	his	back,	further	underlined	the	furtive	manner	in	which	Welles	has	been	discussed.	
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moments	in	his	career,	crucial	questions	about	him	have	remained	unanswered.	Was	Welles	an	idealistic	Wilsonian	internationalist	“[o]r	did	he	merely	seek	to	camouflage	his	real	aims	behind	an	idealistic	smokescreen?"5	Was	he	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	“Global	Strategist”	or	was	his	relationship	with	FDR	more	distant	and	supplicatory?6	How	does	one	make	sense	of	the	apparent	contradictions	in	Welles’	career?:	Advocating	non-intervention	in	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	while	calling	for	troops	to	invade	Cuba,	exalting	Anglo-American	wartime	cooperation	while	picking	fights	with	the	British,	or	maintaining	warm	relations	with	foreign	diplomats	while	fomenting	bitter	feuds	with	his	colleagues	in	the	State	Department.		This	thesis	seeks	to	answer	these	and	other	questions	about	Welles’	motivations	and	deliberations	in	order	to	elucidate	his	contributions	to	the	political,	diplomatic,	and	social	history	of	the	United	States.	Crucially,	this	thesis	employs	sexuality	as	a	category	of	analysis	for	Welles’	career.	It	uses	sexuality	as	a	lens	through	which	to	explore	Welles’	professional	life	and	explain	the	controversies	and	idiosyncrasies	of	his	diplomatic	career	as	well	as	the	legacy	he	left	on	American	politics	and	foreign	policy.	Its	central	argument	is	that	Welles	possessed	a	distinctly	queer	persona	that	played	a	formative	role	in	shaping	his	worldview,	his	professional	relationships,	and	ultimately,	the	diplomatic	and	political	history	of	the	United	States.	Specifically,	this	influence	can	be	seen	in	Welles’	aversion	to	militarism,	his	paternalistically	idealistic	worldview,	and	his	close	political	partnership	with	Franklin	Roosevelt.			Importantly,	this	thesis	does	not	argue	that	sexuality	was	the	sole	defining	factor	in	shaping	Welles’	worldview	or	career.	Sexuality	existed	alongside	other	forces	and	factors	that	shaped	Welles	and	his	outlook	over	the	course	of	his	life.	Distinct	from	his	sexuality,	his	upbringing	in	the	elite	world	of	East	Coast	Brahmins	had	a	profound	impact	on	his	worldview	and	the	political	partnership	he	forged	with	Franklin	Roosevelt.	Along	with	many	of	his	contemporaries,	especially	those	who	emerged	out	of	Welles’	cultural	milieu,	Welles	held	deeply	nationalistic	beliefs,																																																									5	Christopher	D.	O’Sullivan,	Sumner	Welles:	Postwar	Planning	and	the	Quest	for	a	New	World	Order	
1937-1943	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2009),	xiv.	6	Benjamin	Welles.	Sumner	Welles:	FDR’s	Global	Strategist	(New	York:	St.	Martin’s	Press,	1997),	xiii.		
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often	expressed	through	imperialistic,	paternalistic,	and	jingoistic	rhetoric;	stemming	from	this,	Welles	demonstrated	a	strain	of	Anglophobia	that	influenced	his	thinking	at	several	key	moments	throughout	his	career.	Welles	was	also	deeply	influenced	by	global	events	and	their	consequences,	in	particular	World	War	One	and	the	advent	of	Wilsonianism	in	its	aftermath.	Welles’	mix	of	idealistic	political	ideology	with	pragmatic	strategizing,	as	well	as	his	persistent	belief	in	the	efficacy	of	multilateral	negotiation,	were	rooted	in	these	transformative	moments.		All	of	these	factors	were	at	play	in	Welles’	career	and	they	hold	great	interpretive	value	as	a	means	of	understanding	the	course	of	his	career	and	the	motivations	behind	specific	decisions.	Nevertheless,	Welles’	sexuality	was	important	too.	Hidden	beneath	the	surface	or	detectable	in	the	subtext	of	many	episodes	in	Welles’	life	was	a	continuity	of	discourses	about	sexuality	and	gender,	especially	as	they	related	to	power,	aggression,	and	politics.	As	they	wended	their	way	through	his	life	these	discourses	shaped	Welles	by	setting	the	parameters	in	which	he	operated	and,	occasionally,	by	directly	altering	the	course	of	his	career	for	better	and	worse.	Most	interestingly,	this	interaction	was	not	unidirectional;	Welles	shaped	these	discourses	as	well.	Because	of	his	prominence,	the	longevity	of	his	career,	and	the	persistence	of	his	sexual	non-normativity	Welles	made	a	significant	(albeit	unintentional)	contribution	to	the	way	that	sexuality,	power,	and	politics	were	perceived	in	the	United	States.	Understanding	that	legacy	requires	tracing	back	the	strands	of	Welles’	sexuality	and	observing	the	places	in	Welles’	career	where	diplomacy,	sexuality,	and	politics	were	first	stitched	together.			
Wellesian	Historiography:			 Several	scholars	have	already	intently	studied	Welles’	career	or	aspects	of	it.	Seven	works	published	as	monographs	or	completed	as	Ph.D.	dissertations	form	the	backbone	of	the	scholarship	about	Welles.	These	works	fall	into	two	categories:	case	studies	focusing	on	specific	events	or	aspects	of	Welles’	career	and	broad	surveys	of	his	entire	life.	All	are	impressive	in	the	own	right	and	collectively	they	have	painted	a	rich	portrait	of	Welles	as	an	individual	and	a	decision-maker.	However,	none	have	
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comprehensively	explored	the	role	that	sexuality	played	in	Welles’	personal	and	professional	lives,	and	some	have	ignored	the	matter	entirely,	a	gap	that	this	thesis	seeks	to	fill.		The	earliest	work	about	Welles	was	Thomas	Millington’s	1965	dissertation,	“The	Latin	American	Diplomacy	of	Sumner	Welles.”7	As	indicated	by	the	title,	Millington’s	focus	was	Welles’	involvement	in	the	Caribbean	and	Latin	America;	conceptually	his	work	was	an	assessment	of	Welles	as	a	diplomat	–	an	approach	echoed	by	all	the	other	close	case	studies	of	Welles	to	follow.	Millington	argued	Welles’	diplomatic	style	was	"fascinatingly	supple	and	protean,"	its	"salient	characteristic	…	was,	in	fact,	its	extraordinary	adaptiveness."8	In	Millington’s	view,	Welles	“tended	to	merge	into	the	modalities	of	the	immediate	situation	and	to	lose	touch	with	policy.”9	In	essence,	Millington	argued	that	Welles	tended	to	get	swept	up	in	events	and	that	this	caused	him	to	overlook	problems	and	ignore	his	superiors,	most	notably	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull.		In	Millington’s	view,	Welles’	policymaking	was	a	strong,	albeit	vague,	style	of	Wilsonian	idealism.10	For	instance,	in	explaining	his	controversial	actions	in	Cuba	in	1933,	Millington	argued	that	for	Welles,	"in	the	best	Wilson	tradition,	recognition	should	be	used	selectively	as	a	lever	to	stimulate	the	growth	of	stable	and	representative	governments	in	that	part	of	the	world."11	This	was	part	of	"a	characteristic	blend	of	genuine	idealism	and	supple	pragmatism"	that	defined	
																																																								7	Thomas	M.	Millington,	“The	Latin	American	Diplomacy	of	Sumner	Welles”	(Ph.D.	Dissertation.	John’s	Hopkins	University,	1965).		8	Ibid.,	273.	9	Ibid.,	iii.		10	Wilsonianism	is	a	slippery	term	that	many	historians	and	political	scientists	have	defined	over	the	years.	Among	the	best	descriptions	is	one	offered	by	Robert	D.	Acceinelli:	"'a	cluster	of	concepts	and	values,	commonly	identified	with	Woodrow	Wilson,	prescribing	American	leadership	in	the	creation	an	growth	of	a	peaceful,	reformed	and	organized	world	order.	The	Wilsonian	persuasion	is	marked	by	an	antipathy	to	authoritarianism	of	both	the	Right	and	Left	as	well	as	to	power	politics	and	imperialism.	Among	its	principal	elements	are	a	belief	in	American	exceptionalism,	global	interdependence,	international	organization,	the	rule	of	law,	collective	security,	the	spread	of	democracy,	liberalized	trade,	and	national	self-determination,'"	Robert	D.	Accinelli,	“Pro-U.N.	Internationalists	and	the	Early	Cold	War:	The	American	Association	for	the	United	Nations	and	U.S.	Foreign	Policy,	1947-1952,”	Diplomatic	History,	Vol.	9,	No.4,	351.	Also	quoted	in	Gail	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System:	The	United	States	in	the	Caribbean,	1920-1940”	(Ph.D.	Dissertation.	State	University	of	New	York	at	Stony	Brook,	1990),	91,	n.4.		11	Millington,	“The	Latin	American	Diplomacy	of	Sumner	Welles”,	111.		
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Welles’	entire	career.12	Welles’	concern	with	the	peoples	of	Latin	America	and	his	prescriptions	for	their	wellbeing	were	“Wilsonesque,”	yet	his	pragmatism	and	willingness	to	accept	compromise	gave	this	Wilsonian	impulse	a	Wellesian	twist.13	Whatever	name	is	given	to	this	dichotomy,	the	tension	between	Welles’	idealism	and	pragmatism	(or	his	nationalism	and	internationalism)	has	been	a	prominent	theme	in	the	historiography	about	Welles	ever	since,	one	that	this	thesis	addresses	by	acknowledging	the	interplay	of	both	these	impulses	in	Welles’	thinking	as	a	function	of	his	upbringing,	his	experiences	as	a	junior	diplomat,	his	relationship	with	FDR,	and	his	sexuality-induced	exceptionality.	Welles’	style	of	Wilsonianism	possessed	a	paternalistic	dimension,	fused	with	genuine	idealism	stemming	from	an	aversion	to	militarism	in	diplomatic	affairs.		Welles’	sexuality	did	not	merit	mention	in	Millington’s	work	but	Millington	did	acknowledge	certain	idiosyncrasies	in	Welles’	diplomatic	style	and	linked	them	to	his	ideology.	"Invariably	correct	in	demeanor	and	impeccable	in	dress,”	Millington	wrote	in	assessing	Welles’	record	in	the	Dominican	Republic,	“Welles'	outward	fastidiousness,	however,	belied	an	extraordinarily	resilient	and	fertile	mind.	These	latter	traits	made	for	a	peculiarly	supple	kind	of	diplomacy."14	Commenting	on	his	whole	career,	Millington	wrote	of	Welles,	"[m]any	of	his	thoughts	and	actions	were	permeated	by	his	sense	of	the	malleability	of	things.	He	was	markedly	given	to	elaborate	attempts	to	contrive	situations	in	accordance	with	his	own	predilections."15		Although	Millington	does	not	acknowledge	sexuality	as	the	link	between	Welles’	‘fastidiousness’	and	‘supple’	diplomacy,	the	analytical	thrust	of	the	argument	is	the	same	as	the	one	taken	by	this	thesis.	Welles’	foreign	policy	decision	making	was	just	as	much	a	function	of	his	personality	as	was	his	demeanour	in	Latin	America	and	elsewhere.	The	fact	that	Welles	chose	diplomatic	routes	in	which	to	be	‘supple’,	and	the	fact	that	he	had	a	relationship	with	his	superiors	(specifically	Roosevelt)	with	whom	he	could	exert	his	‘malleability’,	stemmed	from	learned																																																									12	Millington,	“The	Latin	American	Diplomacy	of	Sumner	Welles”,	112-3.		13	Ibid.,	274.		14	Ibid.,	13-4.		15	Ibid,	v.	
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behaviour	and	assumptions	about	the	world	with	deep	roots	in	Welles’	upbringing.		Understanding	one	requires	analyzing	the	other,	and	vice	versa.			 Such	interplay	is	more	easily	executed	in	works	that	take	a	broad	view	of	Welles’	career	rather	than	being	a	focused	case	study.	However,	this	was	not	attempted	in	the	first	Ph.D-level	work	to	focus	on	Welles’	entire	career.	Published	posthumously	in	1977	by	the	family	of	the	author,	Frank	Warren	Graff’s	Strategy	of	
Involvement:	A	Diplomatic	Biography	of	Sumner	Welles,	surveys	Welles’	career	but	focuses	mostly	on	Welles’	involvement	in	planning	for	war	and	peace	around	World	War	Two.	Graff’s	work	assesses	how	Welles	operated	within	the	State	Department	and	catalogues	his	major	foreign	policy	achievements,	including	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	the	inter-American	system,	and	his	eponymous	mission	to	Europe.	In	that	respect	it	is	an	impressive	index	of	Welles’	life,	tracing	the	arc	of	his	career	from	start	to	finish	and	highlighting	many	of	its	salient	moments.		However,	Graff’s	analysis	was	limited	in	scope	and	depth.	He	drew	no	conclusions	about	Welles’	motivations	or	objectives.	He	offered	few	insights	into	Welles’	personality	or	the	substance	of	his	formative	years	and	relationships.	Most	troublingly,	he	deliberately	ignored	the	role	of	sexuality	in	shaping	Welles’	life	and	career.	As	such,	he	did	not	give	a	full	account	of	the	machinations	behind	Welles’	rise	and	fall,	nor	to	the	real	circumstances	that	led	to	his	resignation.	Indeed,	Graff	dismissed	the	very	notion	of	the	rumour	campaign	that	ousted	Welles,	writing:			"[n]othing	can	be	gained	from	a	discussion	of	these	rumors	and	whispers	about	Welles'	personal	life.	The	only	reason	this	problem	is	mentioned	in	this	study	at	all	is:	first,	the	rumors	prevented	the	President	from	brushing	aside	Hull's	complaints	as	he	had	done	so	many	times	before;	secondly,	once	the	rumors	began	to	spread,	they	impaired	Welles'	effectiveness	as	a	diplomat."16				 Perhaps	part	of	the	reason	for	this	oversight	was	the	lack	of	sources	available	to	Graff	at	the	time.	Critical	sources	of	information	about	Welles’	sexuality,	including	the	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation	(F.B.I.)	report	on	the	Bankhead	Train	incident,																																																									16	Frank	Warren	Graff,	“Strategy	of	Involvement:	A	Diplomatic	Biography	of	Sumner	Welles”	(Ph.D.	Dissertation.	University	of	Michigan,	1971),	419,	n.	68.	
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which	eventually	led	to	his	dismissal,	and	Welles’	F.B.I.	file,	was	not	available	when	Graff	was	writing.17	Furthermore,	the	field	of	LGBT	history	was	in	its	infancy	in	the	1970s	and	few	scholars	would	have	thought	to	take	this	line	of	investigation	in	studying	a	figure	like	Welles.18	Nevertheless,	Graff’s	work	was	the	first	analysis	of	the	broad	scope	of	Welles’	career	and	it	set	the	standard	for	subsequent	scholars	in	its	attempt	to	show	the	ebb	and	flow	of	Welles’	political	fortunes.		That	standard	was	next	taken	up	in	a	1990	Ph.D.	thesis	by	Gail	Hanson	entitled	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System:	The	United	States	in	the	Caribbean,	1920-1940.”	Hanson	argued	Welles’	actions	in	constructing	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	were	rooted	in	the	lessons	he	learned	from	Progressive-era	diplomats	and	policymakers	and	that	this	provided	an	intellectual	bridge	between	the	United	States’	Gilded	Age	Dollar	Diplomacy	in	the	Caribbean	and	the	Cold	War	interventions	of	half	a	century	later.19	Hanson’s	arguments	were	compelling	and	her	documentation	surprisingly	robust	in	light	of	the	lack	of	complete	access	to	Welles’	papers.	Her	contention	that	Welles’	Latin	American	diplomacy	was	informed	by	his	earlier	career	was	a	worthy	one	and	not	in	dispute.	However,	because	the	thesis	was	limited	to	Latin	America	the	extent	of	the	link	between	Welles’	earlier	career	and	his	later	actions	was	not	fully	drawn.		Hanson	did,	though,	touch	on	one	of	the	most	critical	components	of	Welles’	career	and	his	involvement	in	U.S.	diplomacy	–	the	influence	of	key	figures	on	Welles’	foreign	policy	ideation.	Hanson	made	a	case	for	the	role	of	figures	as	diverse	as	Woodrow	Wilson,	Charles	Evans	Hughes,	Theodore	Roosevelt,	and	Elihu	Root	as	guiding	lights	for	Welles’	thinking.	Whoever	the	object	of	his	interest,	Hanson	identified	“Welles's	history	of	forming	close	associations	with	men	who	were	older																																																									17	The	Bankhead	Train	incident	refers	to	the	night	of	17-18	September	1940	when	Welles	was	alleged	to	have	solicited	sex	from	several	male	railway	porters	while	on	a	train	returning	from	the	funeral	of	Speaker	of	the	House	of	Representatives	William	Bankhead.	It	was	the	subject	of	a	subsequent	investigation	by	the	F.B.I.,	the	report	of	which	was	used	as	leverage	by	Welles’	political	enemies	to	force	his	resignation	from	office	in	1943.	A	fuller	discussion	of	this	incident	and	its	significance	can	be	found	in	Chapter	Six.		18	LGBT	stands	for	Lesbian,	Gay,	Bisexual,	Transgender	–	one	of	several	shorthand	terms	used	to	describe	the	sexual	communities	and	subcultures	of	which	great	historical	inquiry	has	been	made	since	the	1970s.			19	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	iii-iv,	7.		
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and	who	occupied	higher	ranks,	such	as	Leo	Stanton	Rowe,	Charles	Evans	Hughes,	Enoch	Crowder	and	Norman	H.	Davis.	This	pattern	indicated	his	faith	in	leadership.”20	The	observation	was	apt	as	it	helped	explain	many	of	the	critical	moments	in	Welles’	career	as	well	as	the	means	by	which	he	was	able	to	ascend	the	hierarchy	of	the	State	Department	as	quickly	as	he	did.	Other	scholars	have	identified	this	same	process	in	a	more	general	way,	as	Robert	Dean	did	in	noting	how	during	the	early	twentieth	century	"[w]ithin	the	government	…	older	powerful	men	used	mechanisms	of	patronage	to	approve	the	inclusion	of	younger	men	into	the	circles	of	power.”21	Building	on	Dean,	this	thesis	introduces	sexuality	as	a	component	of	this	theoretical	approach	and	combines	it	with	Hanson’s	and	others’	specific	observations	about	Welles’	formative	influences.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	One	and	Chapter	Three,	Welles’	relationship	with	Franklin	Roosevelt	was	forged	in	their	shared	elite	background	and	amidst	discourses	about	masculinity	and	sexuality,	and	became	a	critical	component	in	Welles’	decision	making	thereafter.		The	relationship	between	Welles	and	FDR	was	at	the	centre	of	the	two	most	prominent	studies	of	Welles’	career.	Irwin	Gellman’s	1995	book	Secret	Affairs:	
Franklin	Roosevelt,	Cordell	Hull,	and	Sumner	Welles	was	the	first,	followed	two	years	later	by	Sumner	Welles:	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	written	by	Sumner	Welles’	firstborn	son	Benjamin	Welles.	These	books	delved	into	Welles’	life	and	career	as	no	other	works	up	to	that	point	and	their	assessments	have	formed	the	conventional	wisdom	about	Welles	ever	since.		
FDR’s	Global	Strategist	followed	its	subject	from	cradle	to	grave,	exposing	the	highs	and	lows	of	a	“life	…	of	light	and	shadows.”22	This	foray	into	Welles’	life	and	career	was	intensive,	expansive,	and	impressive	in	its	detail	as	to	both	the	personal	and	professional	aspects	of	its	subject’s	life.	Accordingly,	the	work	was	as	much	biography	as	political	history.	Welles	the	younger	recounted	his	father’s	formative	years,	his	marriage	and	the	start	of	his	family,	and	the	advent	of	his	career	in	the	State	Department	during	the	Wilson	administration.	Its	chronological	approach	to																																																									20	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	475.		21	Robert	D.	Dean.	Imperial	Brotherhood:	Gender	and	the	Making	of	Cold	War	Foreign	Policy	(Amherst:	University	of	Massachusetts	Press,	2001),	13.	22	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	380.	
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Welles’	diplomatic	postings	and	major	diplomatic	and	political	campaigns	(the	mission	to	Europe,	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	postwar	planning),	and	post-resignation	decline	made	it	a	useful	reference	guide	to	scholars	of	Welles	and	the	Roosevelt	administration.	Interspersed	with	journalistic	accounts	of	Welles	career	were	entertaining	anecdotes,	often	originating	from	the	author’s	own	recollection.	However,	while	such	anecdotes	gave	a	colourful	perspective	on	events,	they	also	often	raised	far	more	questions	than	they	answered.		This	sole	biography	of	Sumner	Welles	was	marred	by	the	author’s	clear	discomfiture	with	the	seamier	facets	of	Welles’	life.	Benjamin	Welles	made	a	worthy	effort	to	weave	the	non-homosexual	events	of	his	father’s	personal	life	into	the	discussion	of	his	professional	decisions,	such	as	the	birth	of	his	children,	the	death	of	his	second	wife,	and	the	stress	placed	on	his	marriages	by	the	long	work	hours	he	kept.	This	effort	demonstrated	an	encouraging	methodological	approach	to	understanding	Sumner	Welles	and	the	author	executed	it	deftly.	But	when	it	came	to	describing	Welles’	relationships	with	men,	the	author	betrayed	a	noticeable	bias	that	unwittingly	replicated	the	very	homophobia	that	was	the	impetus	for	removing	his	father	from	office	in	1943.		Benjamin	Welles	went	out	of	his	way	to	demonstrate	that	his	father’s	homosexual	desires	were	accidental,	superficial,	or	the	product	of	being	“physically	and	emotionally	exhausted	…[w]eary	in	his	cups”.23	For	example,	Welles’	relationship	with	a	man	in	France	whom	Welles	met	several	times	and	who	sent	him	a	gift	was	portrayed	as	the	unilateral	pursuit	of	Welles	by	a	stalker.24	The	emergence	of	Welles’	“latent	bisexuality”	during	a	posting	to	Argentina	was	interpreted	as	the	influence	of	“a	favorable	environment,”	according	to	a	source	reflecting	later	on	Welles’	behaviour,	adding	“[r]espectable	married	men	of	high	position,	like	himself,	[Welles]	gave	vent	to	deviation	…	his	preference	for	men	was	always	there,	only	controlled	by	shame	and	a	Puritan	ethos.	In	Argentina,	he	found	a	different	attitude	
																																																								23	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	379.		24	Ibid.,	29.	Benjamin	Welles	recounted	the	story	from	a	letter	delivered	to	him	by	Welles’	long-time	friend,	Ives	Gammell.	
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and	he	let	the	reins	slip.”25	An	account	of	Welles’	relationship	with	his	male	“valet”	during	his	later	years	was	explored	almost	entirely	in	the	context	of	his	“malignant	influence”	on	Welles	of	his	companion.26	Conversely,	the	author	never	missed	a	chance	to	expound	on	Welles’	purported	affairs	with	women.	A	contemporary	of	Welles	was	quoted	at	various	intervals	to	assert	Welles	“recoiled	from	anything	even	suggestive	of	homosexuality”	during	his	time	at	Groton	and	carried	on	“multiple	love	affairs,	almost	all	with	women	nine	or	ten	years	older”	while	in	Paris.27	Welles,	“was	repelled	by	the	homosexuality	then	prevalent	among	the	French	upper	classes,”	according	to	his	son,	who	himself	scoffed	at	Argentines	of	this	period	who	“turned	to	drugs	and	homosexuality	for	stimulation.”28		Like	the	rest	of	the	literature	on	Welles,	this	work	deliberately	quarantined	Welles’	queer	sexual	behaviour	away	from	the	rest	of	his	life,	refusing	to	observe	or	engage	with	the	link	between	them.	No	effort	was	made	to	analyze	how	the	rumours	about	Welles	ostracized	him	from	the	professional	networks	he	used	to	advance	his	policy	agenda.	Nor	was	any	analysis	made	of	how	such	ostracizing	attitudes	enhanced	existing	rivalries,	or	frayed	existing	friendships,	and	what	effects	those	changes	had	on	Welles’	political	influence.	By	ignoring	these	episodes,	Benjamin	Welles	drew	an	incomplete	picture	of	his	father	and	the	social	and	political	worlds	he	inhabited.		Although	Benjamin	Welles’	book	was	the	first	biography	of	his	father,	it	was	not	the	first	published	work	to	take	a	biographical	interest	in	Sumner	Welles.	That	distinction	went	to	Irwin	Gellman’s	1995	work	Secret	Affairs:	Franklin	Roosevelt,	
Cordell	Hull,	and	Sumner	Welles.	Gellman	placed	Welles	alongside	President	Franklin	Roosevelt	and	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull,	presenting	them	as	a	triumvirate	whose	deliberations	and	disputes	defined	wartime	foreign	policy	as	well	as	domestic	politics.	Gellman	wove	a	rich	tapestry	of	personal	and	political	events	that	conspired	to	bring	together	these	three	very	different,	yet	in	many	ways	
																																																								25	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	58-59.	26	Ibid,	368,	372.		27	Ibid.,	13,	29.		28	Ibid.,	29,	58.		
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complementary,	men	during	the	epochal	years	of	the	New	Deal	and	the	Second	World	War.		
Secret	Affairs	drew	its	strength	from	the	union	of	personal	and	professional	detail	in	its	depiction	of	high-level	diplomacy	and	bureaucracy	during	the	New	Deal	era.	Countless	studies	of	Roosevelt’s	management	style,	with	which	Gellman	largely	concurred,	showed	the	complicated	interpersonal	factors	underlying	FDR’s	policy-making	process.	But	Gellman	enhanced	the	understanding	of	this	somewhat	peculiar	yet	effective	bureaucratic	universe	by	exploring	how	chaotic	the	professional	lives	of	Welles,	Hull,	and	Roosevelt	had	become.	Equally,	by	delving	into	the	psyche	of	Roosevelt,	Gellman	demonstrated	how	the	chaos	was	managed	and	manipulated.		Where	Secret	Affairs	stumbled	was	over	the	lack	of	clear	focus	on	Welles	and	the	links	between	his	personal	and	professional	lives.	Gellman’s	research	offered	more	than	enough	information	to	analyze	the	impact	of	Welles’	sexuality	on	his	professional	life	but	none	of	it	was	analyzed	critically.	Welles’	marriages	–	all	three	of	them	–	were	addressed	with	brief,	isolated	acknowledgements.29	His	children	receive	no	mention	whatsoever.	Gellman	was	also	troublingly	lopsided	in	his	treatment	of	Welles’	personal	life.	He	expended	considerable	energy	recounting	the	gossip,	innuendo,	and	often	unverified	suspicions	that	swirled	around	Welles	with	regards	to	his	violations	of	sexual	norms.30	This	resulted	in	a	partial	and	highly	judgmental	depiction	of	Welles’	personality.31	The	Sumner	Welles	in	Gellman’s	book	was	a	Jekyll	and	Hyde:	two	wildly	different	co-existing	personalities	in	constant	conflict,	the	latter	disgracing	the	former.	Gellman	lauded	the	sober,	fastidious,	conniving	Sumner	Welles	who	remade	American	diplomacy	in	Latin	America,	promoted	peace	in	Europe,	and	set	the	foundations	of	the	postwar	world.	By	contrast,	Gellman	condemned	the	humiliated,	improvident,	alcoholic	Sumner	Welles	whose	actions	precipitated	the	destruction	of	his	own	career.	Such	a	bifurcated	approach	ignored	broader	theoretical	questions	about	the	role	of	sexuality	in																																																									29	Irwin	F.	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs:	Franklin	Roosevelt,	Cordell	Hull,	and	Sumner	Welles	(Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1995),	60,	62-63,	395.		30	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs,	392,	397,	398.	31	Gellman	wrote	repeatedly	of	Welles’	“clandestine	bisexual	behavior”	and”	homosexual	interludes.”	While	not	inaccurate,	these	descriptions	are	dismissive	and	serve	to	delegitimize	Welles	(while	reinforcing	the	alleged	impropriety	of	queer	sexuality	in	general).	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs,	56.		
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shaping	Welles’	professional	life.	Like	Benjamin	Welles’	biography,	it	unwittingly	replicated	the	homophobic	portrayal	of	Welles’	sexuality	that	precipitated	the	conspiracy	to	remove	him	from	office	and	destroyed	his	career.		Perhaps	because	of	the	controversial	nature	of	Welles’	sexuality,	the	most	recent	historical	scholarship	on	Welles	has	turned	back	to	the	case	study	approach	of	earlier	decades	and	largely	eschewed	biographical	investigations	of	Welles’	life.	Simon	Rofe’s	2007	book	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	Foreign	Policy	and	the	Welles	Mission	examined	the	causes,	development,	and	consequences	of	the	eponymous	high	profile	diplomatic	mission	taken	by	Welles	in	February	and	March	of	1940.	Expanding	on	earlier	scholarly	work	about	the	Welles	mission	by	Stanley	Hinton,	Rofe	argued	the	mission’s	objectives	were	always	variable	and	changed	as	it	became	apparent	how	little	influence	Welles	could	really	have	on	the	course	of	events.32	Rofe	identified	four	key	objectives	of	the	Roosevelt	administration	for	the	mission	–	preserving	Italian	neutrality,	exploring	potential	peace	plans,	gathering	information,	and	“prolonging	the	phony	war.”33	Rofe	expertly	showed	how	these	priorities	shifted	as	news	from	Welles	filtered	back	to	the	United	States,	highlighting	the	salience	of	U.S.	public	opinion	to	the	decision	making	process.	The	book	gave	a	meticulous	account	of	the	conflicting	pressures	Roosevelt	faced.	It	deftly	interpreted	the	byzantine	course	followed	by	Roosevelt	during	these	critical	months.	Rofe’s	insights	into	the	budding	Anglo-American	‘special	relationship’	were	particularly	impressive.	As	a	work	of	diplomatic	history	it	was	exceptionally	detailed	and	prolifically	sourced,	an	essential	text	for	any	Welles	scholar.		As	suggested	by	the	title,	the	object	of	Rofe’s	analysis	was	Roosevelt’s	foreign	policy	and	the	degree	to	which	Welles’	role	helped	explicate	its	ambiguities	and	contradictions.	Because	of	that	focus	the	book	did	not	emphasize	Welles’	personality,	character,	or	overall	political	motivations.	However,	Rofe	did	glean	some	worthy	insights	into	Welles’	political	relationship	with	FDR,	noting	how	“the	two	men	had	shared	a	common	upbringing	typical	of	the	East	Coast	establishment																																																									32	See:	Stanley	E.	Hilton,	“The	Welles	Mission	to	Europe,	February-March	1940:	Illusion	or	Realism?”	
The	Joutnal	of	American	History	Vol.,	58,	No.1	(June	1971).		33	J.	Simon	Rofe,	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	Foreign	Policy	and	the	Welles	Mission	(New	York:	Palgrave	MacMillan,	2007),	2.		
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families	into	which	Franklin	and	Sumner	were	born”	which	“instilled	a	common	set	of	values	that	manifested	itself	in	a	shared	view	of	the	place	of	the	United	States	in	the	world.”34		Most	compellingly,	Rofe	picked	up	on	Welles’	isolation.	His	analysis	that	“Welles	was	happiest	and	most	effective	working	on	his	own	under	broad-ranging	instructions	from	the	President	and	independently	of	the	Secretary	of	State	as	he	had	done	in	Latin	America,”	was	especially	astute.35	For	Rofe,	Welles	was	a	stern	tactician	whose	resolve	to	never	show	emotion	brought	him	success.	This	presented	a	diplomatic	character	sketch	of	Welles	that	helpfully	contributed	to	understanding	this	notoriously	stolid	figure.	It	is	the	contention	of	this	thesis	that	Rofe’s	observations	can	be	taken	further	by	incorporating	sexuality	into	the	analysis	of	how	Welles’	personality	influenced	his	diplomatic	tactics	and	strategies:	Welles’	austere	demeanour	and	prickly	relationships	with	fellow	State	Department	employees	and	their	foreign	counterparts	gains	greater	meaning	when	seen	as	a	by-product	of	a	lifelong	process	to	conceal	his	sexuality.	Similarly,	his	contribution	to	FDR’s	“penchant	for	personal	diplomacy”	gains	greater	nuance	when	placed	in	the	context	of	Welles’	unique	bond	with	Roosevelt	based	on	their	mutual	background	and	respective	alienation	from	hegemonic	masculinity.36	In	this	regard,	Rofe’s	work	left	many	open	avenues	for	further	research.		Bridging	the	gap	between	the	focused	case	studies	of	Welles	and	the	broader	surveys	was	the	most	recent	analysis	about	Sumner	Welles:	the	2009	work,	Sumner	
Welles:	Postwar	Planning	and	the	Quest	for	a	New	World	Order	1937-1943,	by	Christopher	O’Sullivan.	O’Sullivan	made	Welles	out	to	be	a	committed	Wilsonian	internationalist	who	pursued	his	goals	with	ruthless	efficiency.	Briefly	charting	Welles’	upbringing,	his	early	career	forays	in	Latin	America,	and	reorganization	of	the	State	Department,	O’Sullivan	focused	the	most	attention	on	Welles’	efforts	at	devising	plans	for	the	U.S.	in	the	postwar	world,	creating	a	world	organization,	and	managing	international	relations	in	his	new	world	order.	Somewhat	ambivalently,																																																									34	Rofe,	The	Welles	Mission	15.	35	Ibid.,	16.	36	Ibid.,	185.	
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O’Sullivan	pondered	whether	Welles	was	a	champion	of	“the	most	advanced	universal	and	liberal	goals	of	the	[Roosevelt]	administration,”	or	whether	he	sought	“merely	…	to	camouflage	his	real	aims	behind	an	idealistic	smokescreen?”37		However,	although	this	work	was	a	formidable	analysis	of	Welles’	personality,	Postwar	Planning	was	fundamentally	a	work	of	political	and	diplomatic	history.	Its	energies	focused	on	accounting	for	Welles’	influence	on	the	drafting	of	the	Atlantic	Charter,	the	proposed	partition	of	Germany,	and	the	constitution	of	the	United	Nations	Organization	(U.N.O).	To	this	end,	Welles’	contributions	were	highlighted,	but	only	in	reference	to	Welles’	capacity	as	the	Undersecretary	of	State.	O’Sullivan	spent	little	time	assessing	the	impact	of	Welles’	relationship	with	FDR,	or	his	early	career,	or	the	political	rivalries	that	impacted	Welles’	effectiveness.	As	a	character	analysis	this	work	was	impressive	but	incomplete.	It	offered	worthwhile	reflections	on	Welles	as	a	political	figure,	but	stopped	short	of	examining	Welles’	personal	life	in	depth.		Superficially,	this	thesis	bears	a	similarity	to	Postwar	Planning.	Both	works	see	Welles’	later	decision-making	as	a	product	of	formative	experiences	in	Welles’	upbringing	and	early	career.	Both	works	see	Welles’	methods	and	objectives	as	part	of	the	same	overall	worldview	that	shaped	his	political	fortunes	and	diplomatic	praxis.	However,	in	scope,	methodology,	and	concept	this	thesis	and	O’Sullivan’s	book	are	substantially	different.	O’Sullivan	identified	one	component	of	Welles’	worldview	–	his	“passion	for	order”	–	and	used	it	to	explicate	only	one	aspect	of	Welles’	career,	his	involvement	in	postwar	planning.38	This	thesis	by	contrast	examines	multiple	motivating	factors	in	Welles’	psyche	including	his	aversion	to	militarism,	his	relationship	with	FDR,	and	his	paternalistic	cum	idealistic	worldview,	and	applies	them	to	the	entire	breadth	of	his	career.	More	importantly,	this	thesis	uses	sexuality	as	a	critical	lens	through	which	to	understand	Welles’	motivations	and	actions.		Although	O’Sullivan’s	treatment	of	Welles’	sexuality	was	the	best	out	of	the	existing	scholarship	it	still	followed	the	pattern	of	quarantining	sexuality	to	the																																																									37	O’Sullivan,	Postwar	Planning,	xiv.	38	Ibid.,	xv.		
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margins,	in	particular	to	the	incident	on	the	Bankhead	Train	that	led	to	Welles’	resignation	in	1943.	For	O’Sullivan	and	all	the	authors	studying	Welles	before	him,	Welles’	sexuality	was	relevant	for	only	this	one	episode	and	only	insofar	as	it	helped	destroy	him.	This	thesis	offers	evidence	to	show	that	Welles’	sexuality	was,	in	fact,	a	salient	feature	throughout	his	life	and	that	its	influence	on	him	was	more	than	merely	tragedy.		Nevertheless,	O’Sullivan’s	work	blazed	the	trail	for	this	thesis	in	its	attempt	to	unite	an	assessment	of	Welles’	personality	with	the	conduct	of	his	professional	career.	O’Sullivan	described	Welles	as	“a	figure	of	immense	contradictions,	a	deeply	troubled	man	who	wore	different	faces	for	different	occasions	and	different	people.”39	He	captured	the	pathos	of	Welles	as	a	man	who	“concealed	himself	behind	an	exaggerated	fastidiousness	and	propriety”	and	whose	“human	frailties,	which,	coupled	with	his	certitude,	elitism,	and	arrogance,	aided	in	his	downfall.”40	This	approach	was	refreshing,	though	as	seen	in	Chapters	One	and	Six	of	this	thesis,	those	‘frailties’	were	less	an	aspect	of	Welles’	personality	and	more	a	product	of	a	much	broader	series	of	discourses	about	sexuality	in	the	twentieth	century	United	States.	Moreover,	the	contradictions	in	Welles	that	O’Sullivan	observed	are	less	baffling	when	a	fuller	treatment	of	Welles’	sexuality	is	used	to	interpret	them.	O’Sullivan	all	but	conceded	this	point	with	his	comment	that	“the	lurid	nature	of	the	real	reasons	behind	his	abrupt	resignation	in	August	1943”	had	resulted	in	a	“muted”	approach	to	scholarship	about	him	and	his	contributions.	The	silence	of	historians	on	the	interplay	of	sexuality	and	politics	in	Welles’	career	gives	urgency	to	the	necessity	of	scholarship	that	speaks	out	about	it.	41				
Further	Background:		
	
	 Besides	works	specifically	focusing	on	him,	Welles	has	been	discussed	to	varying	extents	in	literature	about	the	events	on	which	his	career	had	an	impact,	be																																																									39	O’Sullivan,	Postwar	Planning,	x.	40	Ibid.,	xii,	xi.		41	Ibid.,	x.		
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it	U.S.	foreign	policy,	the	Roosevelt	administration,	Latin	American	foreign	relations,	or	LGBT	history.	Despite	the	more	cursory	nature	of	the	mentions	of	Welles,	the	historiography	of	these	subjects	provides	additional	context	and	information	about	Welles’	career.			Looking	at	Welles	from	the	perspective	of	that	region,	historians	of	Latin	America	have	examined	Welles	in	the	context	of	broader	patterns	of	relations	between	the	U.S.	and	the	rest	of	the	Americas.	The	historical	debates	that	have	ensued	focus	mainly	on	to	what	extent	the	United	States’	policies	toward	Latin	America	or	specific	countries	within	it	were	imperialistic	and	to	what	extent	this	changed	under	the	Roosevelt	administration.42	Curiously,	when	viewed	from	the	Latin	American	perspective,	historians	tend	to	invert	the	traditional	interpretations	of	Welles’	foreign	policy	legacy.	In	Cuba,	for	example,	Welles’	efforts	to	oust	General	Machado,	prop	up	the	government	of	Manuel	de	Cespedés,	and	undermine	the	government	of	Ramón	Grau	San	Martín	are	seen	less	as	a	spectacular	failure	and	contradiction	and	more	of	a	predictable,	albeit	disappointing,	episode	in	a	long	history	of	failed	U.S.	attempts	to	exert	influence	in	Cuba.43	With	varying	degrees	of	condemnation	and	ascription	to	Welles	of	imperialistic	motivations,	historians	of	Cuba	and	Cuban-American	relations	have	cast	Welles’	actions	in	1933	in	an	ambivalent	light	and	relegated	him	to	playing	an	important	but	more	marginal	role	in	a	relationship	with	deep	and	complicated	roots.	This	controversy	is	addressed	in	Chapter	Four	of	this	thesis	as	a	means	of	demonstrating	the	salience	of	Welles’	paternalistic	predilection	for	constitutional	solutions	to	diplomatic	problems	as	well	as	his	unique	relationship	with	FDR.		
																																																								42	Such	judgments,	it	should	be	noted,	are	not	limited	to	scholars	of	Latin	America.	William	Leuchtenburg	noted,	for	instance,	“Roosevelt’s	first	months	in	office	actually	marked	a	retreat	toward	imperialism”	in	Latin	America.	William	E.	Leuchtenburg,	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	and	the	New	Deal	1932-
1940	(New	York:	Harper	Torchbooks,	1963),	207.		43	Louis	A.	Perez	Jr.,	Cuba	and	the	United	States:	Ties	of	Singular	Intimacy	(London:	University	of	Georgia	Press,	2003);	Louis	A.	Perez	Jr.,	Cuba	Under	the	Platt	Amendment,	1902-1934	(London:	University	of	Pittsburgh	Press,	1986);	David	Bernell,	“The	Curious	Case	of	Cuba	in	American	Foreign	Policy”.	Journal	of	Interamerican	Studies	and	World	Affairs,	Vol.	36,	No.	2	(Summer,	1994);	Edmund	O.	Smith,	Yankee	Diplomacy:	U.S.	Intervention	in	Argentina	(Dallas:	Southern	Methodist	University	Press,	1953);	Irwin	F.	Gellman,	Roosevelt	and	Batista:	Good	Neighbor	Diplomacy	in	Cuba,	1933-1945	(Albuquerque:	University	of	New	Mexico	Press,	1973).		
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	 Conversely,	many	of	these	same	historians	interpret	Welles’	ostensible	triumph,	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	with	much	more	scepticism	than	those	focusing	solely	on	Welles	or	U.S.	foreign	policy	in	general.	"The	Good	Neighbor,”	wrote	historian	Lester	Langely,	“had	sought	to	bridge	the	gap	between	North	and	South	in	the	Americas	and	had	succeeded	in	ameliorating	their	historically	troubled	diplomatic	relations,	forging	economic	bonds	that	had	not	existed	before	the	war,	and	fashioning	a	cosmetic	cultural	understanding.”44	Langley	hastened	to	add,	however,	that	“[t]he	wartime	alliance	…	required	Latin	America's	accommodation	to	Washington's	priorities."45		In	general,	historians	writing	about	Welles	and	Latin	American	relations	tend	to	betray	their	origins	in	diplomatic	history	by	glossing	over	most	of	the	biographical	information	about	Welles,	limiting	references	to	his	sexuality	to	brief	mentions.46	Nevertheless,	there	have	been	exceptions	to	this	case.	Writing	about	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	in	general,	Frederick	Pike	interpreted	Welles’	sexual	nonconformity	as	a	sign	of	genuine	policy	shifts,	observing:			 “many	Americans...	dreamed	of	liberation	not	necessarily	from	the	old	sexual	taboos	but	certainly	from	the	sort	of	channeling	of	the	libido	into	the	pursuit	of	private	wealth	as	commanded	by	the	Protestant	Ethic.	Sumner	Welles	…	was	a	person	of	private	means	who	saw	little	need	to	channel	the	libido	into	the	pursuit	of	additional	private	wealth.	And,	when	it	came	to	hemispheric	policy,	so	far	as	he	was	concerned	much	more	was	involved	than	the	defense	of	hard-bitten,	rough-edged	Yankee	capitalists	…	Bisexual	and	something	of	a	hedonist	himself,	Welles	brought	to	his	evaluation	of	Latin	American	affairs	an	entirely	different	perspective	than	Hull’s.”47			 Regardless	of	Welles’	role,	the	works	on	Latin	American	history	that	mention	him	raise	questions	about	the	trajectory	of	and	motivations	for	the	expansion	of	U.S.																																																									44	Lester	D.	Langley.	America	and	the	Americas:	The	United	States	in	the	Western	Hemisphere	(London:	The	University	of	Georgia	Press,	1989),	156.	45	Ibid.		46	Frederick	B.	Pike,	FDR’s	Good	Neighbor	Policy:	Sixty	Years	of	Generally	Gentle	Chaos	(Austin:	University	of	Texas	Press,	1995),	202-3,	262;	Irwin	F.	Gellman,	Good	Neighbor	Diplomacy:	United	
States	Policies	in	Latin	America,	1933-1945	(Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1979),	176-8.		47	Frederick	B.	Pike,	FDR’s	Good	Neighbor	Policy:	Sixty	Years	of	Generally	Gentle	Chaos	(Austin:	University	of	Texas	Press,	1995),	6.	
	 24	
power	abroad	during	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century.	How	much	this	was	due	to	specific	events	like	World	War	Two	or	long-term	instability	in	U.S.-Latin	American	relations,	and	how	much	was	due	to	Welles	or	FDR’s	personal	influence,	is	an	ongoing	discussion.	This	thesis	interjects	in	that	discussion	by	using	a	new	interpretive	framework	for	Welles’	motivations	as	well	as	providing	greater	texture	to	the	pivotal	events	around	which	U.S.	expansion	revolved.	It	argues	Welles’	contributions	to	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	were	an	expression	of	a	combination	of	factors	and	impulses:	a	heartfelt,	albeit	somewhat	paternalistic,	idealism,	Welles’	unique	relationship	with	FDR,	and	Welles’	instinct	for	multilateral,	consensus-focused	approaches	to	diplomatic	problems,	linking	back	to	an	aversion	to	militarism	that	was	born	out	of	Welles’	formative	experiences	as	an	outsider	to	traditional	masculinity	and	heterosexuality.		The	second	major	arena	for	historiographic	consideration	of	Welles	beyond	his	own	career	comes	from	the	fields	of	U.S.	foreign	policy	history,	specifically	during	the	administration	of	Franklin	Roosevelt.	This	literature,	which	is	vast,	addresses	Welles	in	two	principal	ways:	his	contribution	to	the	deliberation	and	execution	of	U.S.	foreign	policy	and	his	relationships	within	the	Roosevelt	administration.	With	respect	to	the	former	Welles	has	been	portrayed	to	varying	degrees	as	a	policy	specialist	and	something	of	a	foreign	policy	Svengali	to	Roosevelt.48	In	the	words	of	Susan	Dunn,	Ted	Morgan,	and	Jonathan	Fenby,	Welles	was	Roosevelt’s	“trusted	envoy,”	a	“loyal	friend,”	and	“Roosevelt’s	favourite	diplomat.”49	His	involvement	in	the	negotiations	over	the	Atlantic	Charter	and	his	selection	by	Roosevelt	for	a	personal	trip	to	Europe	during	the	Phoney	War	stand	out	as	exemplars	of	the	close	relationship	between	the	two	men	as	well.	In	this																																																									48	Specific	examples	of	Welles’	intimate	involvement	in	Roosevelt’s	decision-making	process	can	be	found	in	Frederick	W.	Marks	III,	Wind	Over	Sand:	The	Diplomacy	of	Franklin	Roosevelt.	(Athens:	University	of	Georgia	Press,	1988.),	155;	William	Langer	and	Everett	Gleason,	The	Undeclared	War	(New	York:	Harper	&	Brothers	Publishers,	1953),	919;	Doris	Kearns	Goodwin,	No	Ordinary	Time:	
Franklin	and	Eleanor	Roosevelt:	The	Home	Front	in	World	War	II.	(New	York:	Simon	&	Schuster,	1994),	67,	142;	David	Reynolds,	From	Munich	to	Pearl	Harbor:	Roosevelt's	America	and	the	Origins	of	
the	Second	World	War	(Chicago:	Ivan	R.	Dee,	2001),	146-7.		49	Susan	Dunn,	1940:	FDR,	Willkie,	Lindbergh,	Hitler	–	the	Election	amid	the	Storm	(New	Haven	&	London:	Yale	University	Press,	2013),	96;	Ted	Morgan,	FDR:	A	Biography	(New	York:	Simon	and	Schuster,	1985),	684;	Jonathan	Fenby,	Alliance:	The	Inside	Story	of	How	Roosevelt,	Stalin	and	Churchill	
Won	One	War	and	Began	Another	(London:	Simon	&	Schuster,	2006),	12.		
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manner,	few	deny	Welles	a	central	role	in	Roosevelt’s	decision-making	structure,	though	some	like	John	Lewis	Gaddis	observed	the	limitations	of	Welles’	influence,	demonstrated	most	prominently	by	his	removal	from	office	in	1943.50	Besides	his	role	in	shaping	Roosevelt’s	thinking,	scholars	have	noted	the	degree	to	which	Welles	infiltrated	all	aspects	of	foreign	policy	making,	especially	during	his	time	as	Undersecretary.51	Whether	through	meeting	with	outside	lobby	groups	or	by	manipulating	the	bureaucratic	structure	of	the	State	Department,	Welles	worked	his	way	into	the	fabric	of	U.S.	foreign	policymaking	enough	for	him	to	become	the	de	facto	Secretary	of	State	by	the	early	1940s.	Welles’	bureaucratic	position	has	often	been	discussed	in	the	context	of	wider	institutional	disorder	during	the	Roosevelt	administration.	Most	authors	writing	about	this	subject	noted	the	haphazard	and	often	chaotic	bureaucratic	organization	overseen	by	the	president;	this	situation	was	particularly	acute	in	the	State	Department	where	Welles’	austere	demeanour	earned	him	few	friends	and	where	he	butted	heads	with	Hull.52		This	thesis	builds	on	these	arguments	by	adding	explanatory	context	for	the	origins	of	Welles’	peculiar	position	in	the	State	Department,	his	close	relationship	with	Roosevelt,	and	the	resulting	feuds	and	tensions.	Welles’	enigmatic	relationship	with	FDR	was	no	mere	by-product	of	childhood	familiarity.	As	argued	in	Chapter	Three,	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	unique	partnership	was	grounded	in	their	mutually	felt	detachment	from	the	social	worlds	they	each	inhabited,	further	strengthening	the	bonds	of	their	common	upbringing.	As	outsiders	to	hegemonic	masculinity	–	for	Welles	due	to	his	sexuality,	for	Roosevelt	due	to	his	disability,	Welles	and	Roosevelt																																																									50	John	Lewis	Gaddis,	The	United	States	and	the	Origins	of	the	Cold	War,	1941-47	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1972),	19.	51	Examples	of	Welles’	involvement	in	dimensions	of	foreign	policy	decisions	at	this	time	beyond	Roosevelt	himself	include:	Jason	Berger,	A	New	Deal	for	the	World:	Eleanor	Roosevelt	and	American	
Foreign	Policy	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1981),	16,	17;	Andrew	Johnstone,	Dilemmas	of	
Internationalism:	The	American	Association	for	the	United	Nations	and	US	Foreign	Policy,	1941-1948	(Burlington:	Ashgate	Publishing	Limited,	2009),	53-4,	68-9;	52	Warren	F.	Kimball,	The	Most	Unsordid	Act:	Lend	Lease,	1939-1941	(Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	Press,	1969),	34;	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Roosevelt	and	the	Isolationists	(London:	University	of	Nebraska	Press,	1983),	340;	Morgan,	FDR:	A	Biography,	681;	Warren	F.	Kimball,	The	Juggler:	Franklin	Roosevelt	as	
Wartime	Statesman	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1991),	242,	n.45;	Jean	Edward	Smith,	FDR	(New	York:	Random	House,	2008),	582.		
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shared	an	uncommon	sympathy	with	one	another.	As	shown	in	Chapter	Four	and	Chapter	Five,	this	undergirded	a	level	of	trust	between	the	two	men	that	would	have	direct	effects	on	the	foreign	policy	they	created	together	and	that	Welles	was	often	tasked	to	enact.		A	final	area	of	broader	historiographic	consideration	of	Welles	has	been	in	the	literature	on	sexuality	and	gender	in	the	United	States	during	the	twentieth	century.	Because	of	the	queer	elements	of	the	scandal	that	pushed	him	from	office	Welles	has	merited	mention	in	several	contexts,	ranging	from	LGBT	cultural	histories,	to	investigative	exposés	on	the	F.B.I.,	to	legal	briefs.53	Historians	mentioning	Welles	typically	do	so	as	part	of	a	narrative	about	LGBT	people	in	general,	invoking	Welles	within	the	context	of	the	political,	social,	and	intellectual	changes	regarding	sexuality	during	this	era	in	U.S.	history.	These	works	are	less	concerned	with	Welles’	involvement	in	foreign	affairs	and	more	focused	on	his	behaviour	and	interpersonal	relationships,	especially	with	Roosevelt	and	Hull.54	In	that	respect	they	echo	much	of	the	more	traditional	literature	on	Welles.			However,	there	are	important	differences	in	how	this	literature	understands	Welles	and	his	historical	significance.	A	key	undercurrent	of	these	works	is	the	portrayal	of	Welles	as	a	queer	person.	Welles’	actions	on	the	Bankhead	Train	and	his	other	episodes	of	sexual	non-conformity	are	treated	more	sympathetically	than	in	traditional	diplomatic	history.	They	tend	to	avoid	the	judgmental	histrionics	of	other	works	describing	Welles’	sexuality.55	Such	works	also	identify	Welles	and	his	sexuality	as	part	of	a	broader	evolution	of	sexual	mores.	David	Johnson,	for	instance,																																																									53	John	Loughrey.	The	Other	Side	of	Silence:	Men’s	Lives	and	Gay	Identities:	A	Twentieth-Century	History	(New	York:	Henry	Holt	and	Company,	1998),	100,	200;	Richard	Hack,	Puppetmaster:	The	Secret	Life	of	
J.	Edgar	Hoover	(Beverly	Hills:	New	Millennium	Press,	2004),	224-6;	Kenneth	O’Reilly,	Hoover	and	the	
Un-Americans:	The	FBI,	HUAC,	and	the	Red	Menace	(Philadelphia,	Temple	University	Press,	1983),	326;	William	N.	Eskridge,	Jr.	“Privacy	Jurisprudence	and	the	Apartheid	of	the	Closet,	1946-1961”	
Florida	State	University	Law	Review	Vol.	24:703	(1997).		54	Allan	Bérubé,	Coming	Out	Under	Fire:	The	History	of	Gay	Men	and	Women	in	World	War	Two	(New	York:	The	Free	Press,	1990),	134;	Loughrey,	The	Other	Side	of	Silence,	153;	Charles	Kaiser,	The	Gay	
Metropolis:	1940-1996	(London:	Weidenfeld	&	Nicolson,	1997),	17-8;	David	K.	Johnson,	The	Lavender	
Scare:	The	Cold	War	Persecution	of	Gays	and	Lesbians	in	the	Federal	Government	(Chicago:	Chicago	University	Press,	2004),	65-7.	55	By	contrast,	Jean	Smith	refers	to	Welles’	“homosexual	advances”,	Smith,	FDR,	582;	Ted	Morgan	refers	to	“lewd	homosexual	advances”,	Morgan,	FDR:	A	Biography,	678;	Christopher	O’Sullivan	repeatedly	refers	to	Welles’	scandal	as	“lurid”,	O’Sullivan,	x,	224;	further	examples	can	be	found	in	the	discussions	of	works	by	Benjamin	Welles	and	Irwin	Gellman	above.		
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demonstrated	how	Welles	“seemed	to	foreshadow”	the	much	wider	persecution	of	homosexuals	in	the	federal	government	during	the	Cold	War.56	Johnson’s	observation	was	apt,	and	one	that	this	thesis	elaborates	upon	by	showing	the	longevity	of	Welles’	marginalization	due	to	his	sexuality.		Nevertheless,	this	literature	possessed	some	theoretical	and	methodological	problems.	The	definitional	discussions	related	to	Welles’	sexuality	have,	thus	far,	been	less	nuanced	than	the	historical	record	demands.	Applying	to	Welles	terms	like	‘homosexual’	and	‘bisexual’,	as	several	scholars	have	done,	has	imposed	historically	anachronistic	and	contextually	inappropriate	concepts	on	an	individual	who	did	not	identify	with	those	definitions	during	his	life	nor	use	them	to	describe	his	relationships.	Thus	far,	no	study	has	taken	the	time	either	to	investigate	the	contours	of	Welles’	sexuality	or	used	it	as	a	means	of	interpreting	his	behaviour	in	a	comprehensive	way.	This	thesis	provides	that	comprehensive	look	and	discusses	theoretical	considerations	of	how,	why,	and	with	what	implications	they	interacted	with	larger	historical	patterns.	Welles’	sexual	history,	though	in	many	ways	indicative	of	broader	trends,	was	also	exceptional	and	exceptionally	problematic	given	his	contemporary	setting.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	Six,	the	unique	characteristics	of	Welles’	profession,	his	individual	demeanour,	and	the	intersections	of	race	and	class	created	an	altogether	different	sort	of	queer	history,	one	that	complicates	existing	narratives	about	LGBT	people	during	this	time.					
Methodology:		Any	work	of	history	focusing	on	a	single	person	must	grapple	with	certain	conceptual	questions:	how	to	examine	that	person’s	beliefs;	how	to	place	an	individual	in	their	broader	historical	context;	and	how	to	assess	the	role	of	personality	and	personal	relationships	against	structural	and	ideational	forces.	This	thesis,	with	its	focus	on	sexuality	and	policymaking,	must	tackle	further	conceptual																																																									56	Johnson,	The	Lavender	Scare,	67.	See	also:	John	D’Emilio,	Sexual	Politics,	Sexual	Communities:	The	
Making	of	a	Homosexual	Minority	in	the	United	States	1940-1970	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1983),	50-53.		
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problems	over	how	the	above	stated	factors	intersect	with	socially	constructed,	contextually	contingent	concepts	like	sexual	orientation,	gender,	and	masculinity,	as	well	as	how	much	an	individual,	admittedly	a	very	powerful	one,	influenced	the	broader	bureaucratic	and	political	apparatus	around	him.	At	the	heart	of	this	thesis	is	a	fresh	conceptual	approach	to	understanding	these	complex	interactions.	It	takes	as	its	starting	point	the	premise	that	sexuality	is	a	critical	component	in	the	psychological	and	behavioural	makeup	of	any	decision-maker.	Welles’	sexuality	shaped	him,	and	therefore	his	diplomacy,	in	fundamental	ways.	“Homosexuality	is	not	merely	a	personal	characteristic	to	be	alternatively	ignored	or	celebrated,”	argued	historians	George	Chauncey,	Martin	Duberman,	and	Martha	Vicinus.	It	is	“a	significant	influence	on	the	lives	of	individuals	and	on	patterns	of	cultural	organization	in	ways	historians	need	to	explore."57	Though	Welles’	sexuality	was	notoriously	hard	to	define	(‘homosexual’	was	merely	one	of	the	terms	applied	to	him	during	his	life	and	afterwards)	Welles’	sexual	non-conformity	shaped	him	in	profound	ways	merely	by	existing.58	The	sexual	paradigm	of	the	times	Welles	lived	in	made	his	sexuality	automatically	suspect,	or	in	the	words	of	historian	John	Loughrey:	“[h]ow	one	reacts	to	loving	or	sexually	desiring	members	of	one’s	own	sex	does	matter	in	twentieth-century	America	because	society	has	made	it	matter	by	means	of	repressive	laws,	by	condoning	violence	and	discrimination,	and	by	its	own	incessant	style	of	classifying	and	naming.”59		In	Welles’	case,	because	of	his	job,	these	social	pressures	and	patterns	played	out	in	the	arena	of	national	politics	and	international	diplomacy.	They	were	manifested	in	his	professional	relationships	with	other	bureaucrats	and	diplomats.	They	shaped	how	Welles	perceived	his	role	as	a	diplomat,	his	country’s	place	in	the	world,	and	the	diplomatic	options	available	to	him	at	any	given	moment,	with	profound	implications	for	U.S.	foreign	policy.	Although	this	process	applied	to																																																									57	Martin	Duberman,	Martha	Vicinus	and	George	Chauncey	Jr.,	“Introduction”,	in	Martin	Duberman,	Martha	Vicinus	and	George	Chauncey	Jr.	(eds.)	Hidden	from	History:	Reclaiming	the	Gay	and	Lesbian	
Past	(New	York:	Penguin	Books,	1989),	3.		58	Besides	‘homosexual’	Welles	has	been	referred	to	as	‘bisexual’,	‘queer’,	and	a	myriad	of	other	euphemisms	describing	sexual	non-conformity.	A	fuller	discussion	of	this	definitional	ambiguity	as	it	applied	to	Welles	can	be	found	toward	the	end	of	this	introduction	and	in	chapters	1	and	6.		59	Loughery,	The	Other	Side	of	Silence,	xvii.		
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Welles	it	was	not	specific	to	him.	As	Robert	Dean	has	argued,	when	it	comes	to	foreign	policy	“the	men	who	make	the	decisions	are	complex,	socially	constructed	beings,	who	act	from	a	repertoire	of	possibilities	that	are	a	product	of	their	experience.	Foreign	policy	reason	too,	is	thus	culturally	constructed	and	reproduced.”60	Thus,	to	fully	comprehend	the	motivations	and	intentions	of	Welles’,	or	any	diplomat,	scholars	must	examine	the	ways	that	diplomacy	was	shaped	by	sexuality.		Gender	and	sexuality	as	definitional	concepts	are	both	fundamental	and	highly	unstable.	Like	race	or	class,	they	are	"[s]ocial	identities	[that]	are	not	simply	foisted	on	people	from	the	outside,	as	it	were,	but	are	more	properly	understood	as	sites	from	which	we	perceive,	act,	and	engage	with	others.”	61	At	its	most	basic	level	“[g]ender,”	argued	Raewyn	Connall,	“is	a	way	in	which	social	practice	is	ordered.”62	It	pervades	virtually	every	aspect	of	life.	“[T]he	gender	configuring	of	practice	[can	be	found]	however	we	slice	the	social	world,	whatever	unit	of	analysis	we	choose.”63	It	is	intimately	tied	to	the	body	and	in	that	sense	defines	every	individual.	In	the	same	manner,	sexuality	is	both	pervasive	and	yet	often	invisible	to	historical	actors	and	the	historians	who	study	them.	"The	development	of	sexual	identity	always	occurs	in	a	particular	social	and	culture	location”	and	impacts	upon	the	individual	in	a	multiplicity	of	ways.64	Queer	theorist	Eve	Kosofsky	Sedgwick	has	gone	so	far	as	to	argue	"an	understanding	of	virtually	any	aspect	of	modern	Western	culture	must	be,	not	merely	incomplete,	but	damaged	in	its	central	substance	to	the	degree	that	it	does	not	incorporate	a	critical	analysis	of	modern	homo/heterosexual	definition”65	Whether	or	not	such	a	sweeping	statement	holds	up	to	scrutiny,	it	is	undeniable	that	sexuality	is	more	than	just	the	concern	of		"a	small,	distinct,																																																									60	Dean,	Imperial	Brotherhood,	3.		61	Linda	Martín	Alcoff,	Visible	Identities:	Race,	Gender,	and	the	Self	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2006),	287.		62	R.W.	Connell.	Masculinities	(Oxford:	Polity,	1995),	71.		63	Connell,	Masculinities,	72.		64	Bertram	J.	Cohler	and	Phillip	L.	Hammack.	"Lives,	Times,	and	Narrative	Engagement:	Multiplicity	and	Meaning	in	Sexual	Lives.",	453-63,	453	quoted	in	Phillip	L.	Hammack	and	Bertram	J.	Cohler	(eds.)	
The	Story	of	Sexual	Identity:	Narrative	Perspectives	on	the	Gay	and	Lesbian	Life	Course	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009)	65	Eve	Kosofsky	Sedgwick,	Epistemology	of	the	Closet	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1990),	1.		
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relatively	fixed	homosexual	minority"	but	rather	"an	issue	of	continuing,	determinative	importance	in	the	lives	of	people	across	the	spectrum	of	sexualities."66	Despite	this	centrality,	diplomatic	history	as	a	field	has	been	somewhat	late	to	embrace	gender	and	sexuality	as	critical	components	of	analysis.		On	issues	as	fundamental	as	subject	matter,	methodology,	and	sources	these	two	fields	have	had	profound	disagreements	over	what	are	legitimate	areas	of	historical	interest	(as	recently	as	1994	a	prominent	diplomatic	historian	derided	discursive	analysis	as	“the	mental	equivalent	to	eating	at	McDonald’s.”)67	Meanwhile,	historians	of	sexuality	and	LGBT	history	have	made	few	attempts	at	engaging	with	international	diplomacy	as	an	arena	for	their	investigations	of	the	past.68	Yet	over	the	past	two	decades	scholars	from	many	fields	have	demonstrated	the	insights	to	be	gained	into	foreign	relations	by	examining	discourses	of	sexuality	and	gender,	and	vice	versa,	laying	a	methodological	foundation	for	this	thesis.	Chief	among	this	effort	are	recent	works	by	Frank	Costigliola.69	In	analyses	of	the	career	of	George	F.	Kennan	and	the	formation	of	the	Anglo-American-Soviet	alliance	during	World	War	Two,	Costigliola	has	argued	“how	huge	policy	issues	…	were	filtered	through	highly	personal	relationships,	intense	desires	and	disappointments,	and	deep	flaws	of	body	and	personality”	in	the	personal	lives	of	the	decision	makers	involved.70	In	this	case,	Costigliola	was	referring	to	Franklin	Roosevelt,	Winston	Churchill,	and	Joseph	Stalin	in	their	deliberations	over	the	future	of	the	United	Nations	during	World	War	Two,	but	the	analysis	is	applicable	to	any	historical	figure,	including	Welles.		
																																																								66	Sedgwick,	Epistemology	of	the	Closet,	1.		67	Bruce	Kuklick,	“Commentary:	Confessions	of	an	Intransigent	Revisionist	about	Cultural	Studies”	
Diplomatic	History,	Vol:	18,	No.	1,	122		68	Dean,	Imperial	Brotherhood,	3-4.		69	See:	Frank	Costigliola.	Roosevelt’s	Lost	Alliances:	How	Personal	Politics	Helped	Start	the	Cold	War	(Oxford:	Princeton	University	Press,	2012);	“Broken	Circle:	The	Isolation	of	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	in	World	War	II”	Diplomatic	History,	Vol.:	32,	No.	5	(November	2008);	“After	Roosevelt's	Death:	Dangerous	Emotions,	Divisive	Discourses,	and	the	Abandoned	Alliance”	Diplomatic	History	Vol.:	34,	No.	1	(January	2010).	70	Costigliola,	Roosevelt’s	Lost	Alliances,	20.		
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Costigliola’s	scholarship	underlined	how	sexuality	shapes	the	interpersonal	interactions	that	form	the	basis	of	institutional	relationships,	diplomatic	contacts,	and	political	discourses.	“Only	by	including	the	overlooked	private	lives	of	public	statesmen,	the	emotional	stakes	of	their	diplomacy,	and	the	cultural	context	of	their	ideology,”	Costigliola	argued,	“can	we	arrive	at	a	more	holistic	picture”	and	appreciate	“the	nexus	between	public	and	private”	that	“helps	us	see	the	messy	way	that	history	really	happens.”71	For	Welles,	the	nexus	of	public	and	private	had	profound	effects	on	the	trajectory	of	his	career.	It	forced	him	to	resign	from	office	twice	and	dramatically	shaped	the	ways	Welles	was	perceived	by	his	colleagues.	It	also	was	intimately	bound	up	with	his	partnership	with	FDR,	emerging	from	their	shared	cultural	upbringing	and	social	marginalization	and	shaped	by	the	dispositions	and	strategies	employed	by	both	to	acquire	political	power.		Costigliola’s	work	also	opens	up	a	methodological	avenue	for	interpreting	Welles’	foreign	policy	decision	making	as	a	component	of	his	sexuality.	The	policy	issues	Welles	dealt	with	were,	indeed,	interpreted	through	the	‘personal	relationships’	and	‘intense	desires’	that	Costigliola	identified	for	FDR,	Stalin,	and	Churchill.	But	more	than	that,	Welles’	sexuality	set	the	psychological	and	attitudinal	boundaries	within	which	his	policymaking	took	place.	The	options	Welles	considered	when	facing	a	diplomatic	dilemma	or	political	negotiation,	and	the	tactics	employed	by	him	were	products	of	his	psychological	disposition	–	a	disposition	that	had	been	profoundly	influenced	by	his	experience	growing	up	with	a	sexuality	that	was	outside	the	norm.		This	interpretive	schema	has	been	employed	extensively	by	Robert	Dean	to	analyze	U.S.	foreign	policymakers	in	his	2001	work	Imperial	Brotherhood.	It	was	Dean’s	contention	that	the	policymakers	who	embroiled	the	United	States	in	the	Vietnam	War	did	so	in	part	due	to	their	being	unwittingly	shaped	by	the	discourses	about	masculinity	and	sexuality	they	had	imbibed	as	young	men	during	their	formative	years.	Dean’s	conception	of	an	‘Imperial	Brotherhood’	specifically	invoked	the	concept	of	hegemonic	masculinity	to	articulate	how	policymakers	interpreted																																																									71	Costigliola,	Roosevelt’s	Lost	Alliances,	20.	
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aggression,	power,	and	strength	in	their	deliberations	over	how	to	respond	to	diplomatic	problems	and	opportunities.	The	inculcation	of	these	policymakers’	values	began	in	their	formative	years	and	shaped	their	entire	worldview,	or	as	Dean	put	it,	"social	systems	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	operate[d]	to	favor	'hegemonic'	ideologies	of	masculinity."72		In	Welles’	case,	interaction	with	hegemonic	discourses	of	masculinity,	power,	and	sexuality	were	just	as	important	to	shaping	his	worldview.	However,	Welles’	sexuality	added	a	further	complication	to	the	mix.	Excluded	from	the	hegemonic	discourses	about	masculinity	and	sexuality	on	account	of	his	queerness,	Welles	traversed	alternative	routes	to	political	power.	Similarly,	Welles’	position	outside	the	dominant	patterns	of	masculinity	and	heterosexuality	shaped	his	worldview,	downplaying	the	importance	of	aggression	and	militarism,	and	priming	him	to	place	greater	emphasis	on	beneficent	paternalism	toward	the	rest	of	the	world	and	idealistic	rhetoric	to	articulate	it.	How	Welles’	positionality	as	a	queer	individual	impacted	his	worldview,	and	how	this	unique	situation	altered	the	course	of	U.S.	foreign	affairs,	is	one	of	the	central	investigations	of	this	thesis.		Although	Dean	and	Costigliola	have	been	relatively	novel	in	their	placement	of	discourses	about	gender	and	sexuality	at	the	forefront	of	their	analyses,	the	conceptual	framework	upon	which	they	based	their	investigations	has	a	much	wider	acceptance	in	international	history	and	related	fields.	Analyzing	the	belief	systems	and	cognitive	biases	of	an	individual,	and	assessing	the	salience	of	those	beliefs	on	the	decisions	based	on	them,	has	long	been	a	staple	of	international	history.73	Such	analyses	draw	on	both	intimate	biographical	details	and	broad	societal	forces	over	which	the	individual	has	little	control.		In	their	work	assessing	the	‘mental	maps’	of	decision	makers,	Steven	Casey	and	Jonathan	Wright	asserted	the	influence	of	factors	as	varied	as	“family	backgrounds,	education,	political	values,	the	domestic	and	external	constrains	within	which	[decision-makers]	conceived	and	tried	to	implement	their	policies,																																																									72	Dean,	Imperial	Brotherhood,	6.		73	Steven	A.	Yetiv,	National	Security	through	a	Cockeyed	Lens:	How	Cognitive	Bias	Impacts	U.S.	Foreign	
Policy	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	2013).		
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sometimes	the	incidents	of	mere	chance	that	opened	or	closed	an	opportunity."74	In	this	way,	it	became	“possible	to	explore	the	underlying	political,	cultural	and	social	environments	in	which	various	leaders	developed	and	rose	to	influence	[and]	...	to	shed	light	on	the	broader	pressures	at	work	when	the	leaders	were	confronted	with	a	range	of	policy	problems.”75		In	a	similar	vein,	political	scientist	Avi	Shlaim	emphasized	“the	need	to	explore	the	belief	systems”	of	those	practicing	foreign	policy.76	In	his	estimation,	the	justification	for	such	an	approach	“stems	from	the	simple	fact	that	decision-makers	act	in	response	to	their	perception	of	reality,	not	in	response	to	reality	itself.”77	In	this	view,	a	decision	maker’s		“belief	system	predisposes	them	to	act	in	a	particular	way,	to	choose	one	course	of	action	from	a	range	of	perceived	options.”78	Building	on	these	methodological	forbearers,	this	thesis	asserts	that	whatever	form	a	decision	maker’s	belief	system,	mental	map,	or	cognitive	biases	take,	they	are	inextricably	linked	to	his	or	her	sexuality	and	that	sexuality	ought	to	be	considered	alongside	other	psychosocial	factors	in	assessing	the	motivations	and	actions	of	decision	makers	–	especially	in	the	case	of	Sumner	Welles.		This	contention,	it	should	be	noted,	is	not	an	argument	for	deterministic	essentialism	–seeing	a	single	overriding	category	like	sexuality	as	explaining	all	aspects	of	a	person’s	life.	Nor	is	studying	the	early	childhood	experiences	of	a	decision	maker	an	effort	at	constructing	an	explanatory	bildungsroman.	An	individual’s	sexuality	operates	under	the	auspices	of	broader	structural	and	ideational	factors	that	have	their	own	explanatory	value;	no	consideration	of	sexuality	is	complete	without	an	acknowledgement	of	these	factors.	In	Welles’	case,	the	worldview	that	was	shaped	by	his	sexuality	emerged	in	a	specific	time	and	place	for	the	diplomatic	history	of	the	United	States.	Expanding	global	power	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	and	the	enormous	impact	of	World	War	One	and	the																																																									74	Steven	Casey	and	Jonathan	Wright,	eds.	Mental	Maps	in	the	Era	of	Two	World	Wars	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2008),	xii.		75	Ibid.,	xii-xiii.		76	Avi	Shlaim,	“Truman’s	Belief	System:	Russia	and	the	Berlin	Blockade,”	quoted	in	Richard	Little	and	Steve	Smith,	eds.,	Belief	Systems	and	International	Relations	(Oxford:	Basil	Blackwell,	1988),	229.	77	Ibid.		78	Ibid.		
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Wilsonian	tradition	that	came	out	of	it	established	certain	parameters	for	action	and	set	certain	events	in	motion	that	would	have	played	out	regardless	of	Welles’	sexuality.	Similarly,	the	longstanding	tensions	between	Latin	America	and	the	United	States	and	the	extraordinary	refashioning	of	the	world	brought	about	by	the	New	Deal	and	World	War	Two	played	out	around	Welles	in	ways	well	beyond	his	ability	to	manipulate,	even	accounting	for	his	particularly	prominent	role	in	those	processes.		However,	ranking	the	relative	prominence	or	position	of	sexuality	vis	à	vis	these	other	levels	of	analysis	is	beside	the	point.	Structural	and	ideational	explanations	operated	alongside	Welles’	own	agency,	not	in	competition	with	it.	The	interaction	between	these	factors	synthesized	a	mixture	in	which	no	one	component	was	solely	at	work.	Welles’	sexuality	was	a	part	of	this	mixture,	at	times	prominently,	in	ways	that	historians	have	hitherto	ignored	or	denied.	Acknowledging	sexuality	as	a	component	of	Welles’	psyche	and	life	experience	offers	a	fresh	perspective	for	understanding	the	forces	that	shaped	U.S.	foreign	policy	during	Welles’	time	and	afterward.			
Sources:		
	 In	some	respects,	the	sources	necessary	to	analyze	the	intersection	of	the	public	and	private	lives	of	Sumner	Welles	are	plentiful.	With	the	opening	of	his	personal	files	to	the	public	in	1996,	the	Welles	Papers	at	the	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	Presidential	Library	offered	enormous	quantities	of	personal	correspondence,	diaries,	and	memoranda,	in	which	the	implicit	influence	of	sexuality	was	clearly	evident.	Newly	uncovered	documents	from	Welles’	formative	years	at	Groton	and	Harvard	contained	in	this	thesis	have	added	to	this	already	large	corpus	of	material.	Welles’	personal	recollections	and	writings,	especially	when	viewed	in	their	totality	so	as	to	better	identify	the	key	themes,	are	particularly	apt	for	the	close	reading	and	discursive	analyses	that	evoke	the	salience	of	sexuality	and	masculinity	in	matters	as	diverse	as	Welles’	relationship	with	FDR,	his	1933	posting	to	Cuba,	and	the	public	perception	of	the	reasons	for	his	resignation	in	1943.	These	sources	complement	
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other	government	documents	that	address	Welles’	career	in	the	State	Department,	principally	those	contained	in	the	State	Department	archives	at	the	National	Archives	and	Records	Administration	II	complex	in	College	Park,	Maryland.		It	is	often	the	case	that	inquiries	into	the	personal	lives	and	sexuality	of	historical	figures	suffer	from	a	comparative	dearth	of	documentation.	Indeed,	in	Welles’	case,	documents	pertaining	to	his	sexuality	and	inner	life	are	not	as	plentiful	as	official	correspondence	and	memoranda.	In	part	this	was	due	to	the	social	taboo	about	non-normative	sexuality	that	was	so	pervasive	during	Welles’	life,	as	well	as	due	to	Welles’	reserved	personality.	However,	in	Welles’	case	there	is	a	notable	and	notorious	exception.	Copies	of	Welles’	F.B.I.	file	and	the	confidential	files	of	F.B.I.	Director	J.	Edgar	Hoover	contain	extensive,	and	often	explicit,	descriptions	of	Welles’	sex	life.	Less	dramatically,	files	of	the	State	Department	Social	Secretary	provide	context	to	Welles’	behind-the-scenes	manipulations	of	diplomatic	affairs.		Discursive	analysis	of	these	documents	helps	illuminate	the	salience	of	sexuality	in	Welles’	career,	and	can	be	used	to	trace	the	intersections	of	sex	and	politics	in	Welles	life	when	augmented	with	the	diaries	and	reminiscences	of	Welles’	contemporaries,	particularly	men	like	William	Castle,	Adolf	Berle,	and	others	who	wrote	extensively	about	Welles.		Altogether,	these	sources,	in	combination	with	extensive	use	of	traditional	sources	on	diplomatic	history	such	as	the	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States	and	the	Decimal	File	of	the	State	Department,	demonstrate	how	Welles’	career	was	suffused	and	shaped	by	his	sexuality.	In	this	manner,	this	thesis	implicitly	follows	Robert	Dean’s	recommendation	for	the	success	of	such	analyses	(in	his	review	of	a	recent	article	by	Frank	Costigliola):	a	"[p]ersistence,	and	a	willingness	to	piece	together	a	wide	variety	of	materials	as	historical	evidence.”79																																																													79	Robert	Dean,	'The	Personal	and	the	Political:	Gender	and	Sexuality	in	Diplomatic	History',	
Diplomatic	History,	Vol.	36,	No.	4	(September	2012),	764.	
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Outline:			 This	thesis	is	divided	into	seven	chapters,	arranged	roughly	chronologically,	that	examine	the	major	epochs	in	Welles’	life	and	career.	It	begins	by	analyzing	Welles’	formative	experiences,	including	his	upbringing,	his	early	diplomatic	career,	and	his	relationship	with	FDR.	The	first	three	chapters	lay	the	groundwork	for	the	interpretive	explanations	of	Welles’	motivations	and	actions	as	a	foreign	policy	practitioner	that	follow,	demonstrating	the	link	between	Welles’	sexual	non-normativity	and	his	worldview	and	professional	relationships,	particularly	with	FDR.	The	three	subsequent	chapters	apply	this	analytical	framework	to	the	major	arenas	of	Welles’	foreign	policymaking	career,	specifically	Latin	America	and	World	War	Two.	This	framework	is	also	applied	to	the	final	chapter	of	this	thesis	on	Welles’	post-resignation	career.	An	additional	chapter,	Chapter	Six,	deepens	the	discussion	of	the	influence	of	Welles’	sexuality	in	his	life	by	analyzing	the	circumstances	of	his	resignation	from	office	in	1943,	noting	the	broader	social	and	political	trends	at	play.		 Chapter	One	explores	the	early	years	of	Welles’	life	and	career	from	his	birth	until	his	entry	into	the	State	Department.	It	analyzes	his	formative	years	and	identifies	the	salience	of	sexuality	in	Welles’	early	life	experiences,	demonstrated	through	same-sex	relationships	and	friendships,	social	ostracizing,	and	the	broader	context	of	the	social	worlds	he	inhabited.	It	argues	the	discourses	about	sexuality	in	Welles’	life	interacted	with	broader	discourses	about	masculinity,	power,	and	nationhood	endemic	in	Welles’	social	caste.	These	forces	shaped	his	worldview	and	set	the	mould	for	his	future	diplomatic	thinking	and	praxis.		Continuing	the	discussion	of	Welles’	emergent	worldview,	Chapter	Two	focuses	on	Welles’	first	decade	as	a	diplomat	from	1915-1925.	This	chapter	identifies	two	key	aspects	of	Welles’	diplomatic	praxis:	a	paternalistic	idealism,	especially	toward	the	countries	of	Latin	America,	and	an	aversion	to	militaristic	aggression	that	went	hand	in	hand	with	a	preference	for	idealistic	multilateral	consensus-driven	solutions	to	diplomatic	problems.	These	characteristics	were	evident	in	specific	instances	during	Welles’	first	decade	in	the	State	Department,	
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notably	his	postings	in	Argentina	and	the	Dominican	Republic,	along	with	briefer	sojourns	in	Japan	and	Washington	D.C.	Building	upon	the	analysis	of	the	cultural	and	psychological	interpretations	of	Welles’	motivations	in	Chapter	One,	this	chapter	elaborates	further	on	the	formative	political	and	diplomatic	experiences	in	Welles’	early	career,	most	notably	the	influence	of	World	War	One	and	the	diplomatic	legacy	of	Charles	Evans	Hughes.	It	demonstrates	how	Welles’	worldview	came	into	focus	during	this	period,	and	how	it	manifested	in	specific	policies	and	attitudes,	such	as	qualified	support	for	the	League	of	Nations	and	a	resentment	toward	the	British.	The	ideals	Welles	began	to	articulate	during	these	years	–Wilsonianism,	hemispheric	nationalism,	and	an	idiosyncratic	aversion	to	aggression	–	he	would	carry	through	the	rest	of	his	career.		Chapter	Three	continues	the	investigation	of	the	formative	influences	on	Welles’	career	but	shifts	focus	to	the	role	of	one	particularly	important	individual:	Franklin	Delano	Roosevelt.	This	chapter	shows	how	Welles	ingratiated	himself	with	Roosevelt	and	cultivated	a	homosocial	bond	that	provided	prodigious	access	to	the	corridors	of	power	as	well	as	political	protection	against	potential	enemies.	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	storied	friendship	was	founded	on	a	shared	cultural	background	among	the	rarefied	social	circles	of	late	nineteenth	century	East	Coast	aristocracy.	Their	respective	eccentricities,	particularly	with	regard	to	their	respective	relationships	with	masculinity	and	sexuality,	complemented	one	another	and	resulted	in	an	unusually	close	collaboration	that	would	influence	Welles’	foreign	policy	praxis	thenceforth.	This	opened	up	unlikely	avenues	for	political	and	diplomatic	affairs	to	unfold	and	transformed	Welles	from	a	mid-level	bureaucrat	to	a	top-level	presidential	confidant.	It	laid	the	groundwork	for	the	enormous	influence	of	Welles	and	his	worldview	on	U.S.	diplomacy	later	in	his	career.		Chapters	Four	and	Five	shift	the	discussion	of	the	intersection	of	the	personal	and	political	in	Welles’	career	to	the	arena	of	foreign	policy	praxis,	specifically	the	two	major	areas	of	Welles’	foreign	policy	legacy:	Latin	America	and	World	War	Two.	Along	with	Chapter	Seven,	they	demonstrate	the	salience	of	the	themes	identified	in	the	first	three	chapters	–	aversion	to	militarism	and	preference	for	multilateral	
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action,	paternalistic	idealism,	and	patronage	by	FDR	–	and	apply	them	to	the	major	events	in	Welles’	career.		Chapter	Four	looks	at	how	Welles	enacted	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	highlighting	two	main	examples:	his	disastrous	turn	as	Ambassador	to	Cuba	in	1933	and	his	later	much	more	successful	efforts	to	forge	inter-American	unity	through	multilateral	conferences.	In	both	efforts	Welles	again	demonstrated	the	worldview	and	diplomatic	strategies	that	had	defined	his	earlier	work	in	Latin	America	during	his	early	life.	In	Cuba,	Welles’	idealistic	and	paternalistic	belief	in	the	wisdom	of	his	own	policies	blinded	him	to	the	situation	around	him,	resulting	in	his	orchestrating	the	fall	of	one	government,	the	installation	of	another,	and	the	slow	suffocation	of	a	third.	This	episode	also	showed	his	reliance	upon	the	patronage	of	high-ranking	figures,	specifically	Franklin	Roosevelt,	when	he	did	not	get	his	way.	However,	Cuba	also	demonstrated	the	limited	effectiveness	of	these	approaches	and	tactics	and	how	they	could	just	as	easily	backfire.		Welles’	efforts	to	forge	inter-American	unity	met	with	more	success	and	more	prominently	displayed	his	political	views,	professional	style,	and	ideological	perspective.	Welles’	ordered	multilateral	approach	to	inter-American	cooperation	was	his	brainchild,	embodying	all	the	idiosyncratic	themes	of	Welles’	diplomatic	style	discussed	above.	Moreover,	the	specific	applications	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	reflected	Welles’	idiosyncratic	influence	with	tangible	results	for	U.S.	foreign	policy.	Because	of	factors	specific	to	Welles	–	his	close	relationship	with	FDR	and	his	aversion	to	militarism/paternalistic	idealism,	in	particular	–	the	U.S.	response	in	Latin	America	to	the	growing	threats	emanating	from	Europe	and	Asia	took	a	distinctively	Wellesian	form.			Chapter	Five	examines	Welles’	involvement	in	wartime	foreign	policy,	including	his	prewar	attempts	at	a	negotiated	peace,	his	mission	to	Europe,	his	involvement	in	forging	the	Anglo-American	alliance,	and	his	contributions	to	postwar	planning.	It	argues	that	Welles’	pursuit	of	peace	in	an	increasingly	belligerent	world	reflected	the	tension	between	his	aversion	to	military	solutions	to	diplomatic	problems	and	the	growing	dangers	overseas.	This	was	on	display	in	Welles’	failed	attempts	to	convene	a	disarmament	conference	in	1937	and	1938.	
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Welles’	desire	to	forge	consensus	and	avoid	confrontation	was	incompatible	with	the	vicissitudes	of	a	world	sliding	toward	war.		As	war	approached,	Welles’	professional	collaboration	with	FDR	reached	its	peak	and	exerted	an	ever-greater	influence.	This	was	seen	most	especially	his	Welles’	1940	mission	to	Europe.	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	partnership	infused	the	mission	with	a	personal	dimension	and	was	at	the	core	of	the	way	the	mission	was	conceived,	perceived,	and	executed.	It	also	gave	a	glimpse	into	the	dynamics	of	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	personal	relationship	and	how	Welles	fit	into	the	firmament	of	the	Roosevelt	White	House	at	the	time,	as	Welles’	status	rose	relative	to	other	members	of	the	State	Department	and	administration.			As	Welles’	career	approached	its	height	the	significance	of	his	worldview	assumed	greater	relevance	to	U.S.	foreign	affairs,	particularly	with	regards	his	desire	to	imprint	his	characteristic	blend	of	paternalism	and	idealism	on	wartime	and	postwar	planning.	This	desire	was	manifested	in	two	main	ways:	a	recurrence	of	the	Anglophobia	that	had	emerged	in	Welles’	worldview	during	his	earlier	career;	and	the	development	of	plans	for	a	postwar	organization	that	reflected	his	desire	to	maintain	U.S.	hegemony	in	the	Western	Hemisphere	and	his	paternalistic	attitudes	toward	international	affairs	in	general.			Chapter	Six	returns	to	domestic	politics	and	personality	with	an	analysis	of	the	process	by	which	Welles	was	forced	to	resign	as	Undersecretary	in	1943.	Welles’	sexuality	became	an	increasing	liability	during	his	last	years	in	office	due	to	changing	mores	about	sexuality	occasioned	by	World	War	Two,	growing	political	opposition	to	Welles,	and	Welles’	own	behaviour,	specifically	his	solicitation	of	sex	from	male	railway	porters	on	a	presidential	train	in	September	1940.	Welles’	behaviour	on	the	Bankhead	Train	violated	many	taboos	about	race,	sex,	and	class.	Although	it	was	not	inevitable	that	his	actions	would	have	resulted	in	semi-public	scandal,	Welles’	idiosyncratic	positionality	created	circumstances	in	which	it	was	possible.	Nevertheless,	it	took	the	actions	of	jealous	and	homophobic	colleagues	to	launch	the	conspiracy	to	oust	Welles	and	to	initiate	a	sequence	of	events	that	would	have	a	dramatic	impact	on	Welles	and	discourses	about	sexuality	in	the	U.S.	thereafter.	
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The	final	chapter	of	this	thesis	examines	a	largely	overlooked	aspect	of	Welles’	career	–	his	post-resignation	activities.	Though	he	achieved	some	measure	of	success	as	a	public	intellectual,	Welles’	post-resignation	career	was	a	case	study	in	Welles’	gradual	marginalization	from	public	discourse	following	his	resignation	from	the	State	Department.	Despite	being	out	of	office,	Welles’	worldview	continued	to	be	characterized	by	those	key	themes	that	had	defined	him	from	the	outset.	However,	relegated	to	the	sidelines,	Welles’	found	his	beliefs	increasingly	discordant	with	the	world	around	him.	In	the	immediate	aftermath	of	his	resignation	Welles’	paternalistic	idealism	led	him	to	embrace	the	United	Nations	Organization	(U.N.O.)	and	cooperation	with	the	Soviets.	However,	as	plans	for	the	U.N.O.	changed	and	the	Cold	War	commenced	Welles	found	it	difficult	to	maintain	his	enthusiasm	and	increasingly	seemed	out	of	step.	Meanwhile,	Welles’	ability	to	influence	events	was	greatly	reduced	by	the	death	of	Franklin	Roosevelt	in	April	1945,	a	testament	to	how	reliant	Welles	had	been	upon	Roosevelt’s	benefaction	for	his	own	power.	
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Chapter	One:	
	The	Outsider:	Welles’	Formative	Years,	1892-1915			 In	the	summer	of	1944	Drew	Pearson,	Francis	Biddle,	and	an	assortment	of	other	Washington	dignitaries	attended	a	dinner	held	by	former	Undersecretary	of	State	Sumner	Welles.	Following	the	dinner,	Biddle	quipped	to	Pearson	“[w]hat	a	nice	dinner	we	had	at	Sumner’s.	Do	you	realize	that	there	were	six	graduates	of	Groton	present,	and	six	divorced	couples?”	Somewhat	surprised,	Pearson	later	recounted	“I	wasn’t	quite	sure	whether	he	was	aiming	a	barb	at	Groton	or	a	barb	at	divorce.	But	insomuch	as	he	was	from	Groton	and	the	only	couple	there	not	divorced	I	assumed	it	was	just	friendly	Biddle	conversation.”1		Friendly	or	not,	Biddle’s	banter	spoke	to	an	undercurrent	about	status,	reputation,	and	gender	norms	in	Washington	political	circles	at	that	time,	particularly	as	they	related	to	the	far	reaching	legacy	of	Groton	Preparatory	School.	Like	Biddle,	Welles	had	attended	Groton	in	his	youth	and	the	impact	it	had	on	his	later	life	was	substantial.	The	lessons	he	was	taught	by	his	instructors	shaped	his	outlook	on	the	world,	imbuing	him,	along	with	his	classmates,	with	a	patriotic	pride	and	portentous	expectations	for	their	own	and	their	country’s	ambitions.	However,	Welles’	experience	at	Groton	was	not	entirely	typical,	and	his	upbringing	was,	in	many	important	respects,	unusual.	In	large	part	on	account	of	his	sexuality	Welles	was	conditioned	by	distinct	experiences	that	had	a	profound	impact	upon	his	personality,	outlook	and,	ultimately,	his	future	career.		This	chapter	examines	the	formative	years	of	Sumner	Welles,	from	his	schoolboy	days	at	Groton	to	the	start	of	his	career	as	a	diplomat.	It	investigates	how	Welles’	early	experiences	shaped	his	worldview	and	approach	to	diplomacy,	arguing	that	this	process	was	intimately	tied	to	his	sexuality.	Taking	Welles’	sexual	non-normativity	as	a	starting	point,	this	chapter	uses	sexuality	as	an	interpretive	framework	to	uncover	salient	themes	in	Welles’	life	that	first	became	evident	in	the	early	stages	of	it.	Despite	his	growing	up	among	the	East	Coast	aristocracy	of	turn-																																																								1	Pearson	to	Welles,	18	August	1944,	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	Presidential	Library	(FDRL),	Sumner	Welles	Papers	(SWP),	Box:	147,	Folder	1.		
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of-the-century	America,	Welles’	sexuality	positioned	him	as	an	outsider	to	the	dominant	social	order.	Excluded	from	full	membership	in	hegemonic	masculinity	and	heterosexuality	and	the	worldview	that	inculcated	–	what	Robert	Dean	has	called	“Imperial	Manhood”	–	Welles	developed	a	distinctive	persona	and	an	alternate	perspective	on	the	expansion	of	American	power	and	its	role	in	the	world	that	he	would	carry	with	him	throughout	the	rest	of	his	life	and	career.2		In	laying	the	groundwork	for	this	prosopographical	analysis	of	Welles’	career,	this	chapter	offers	the	first	comprehensive	historical	analysis	of	the	queer	elements	of	Welles’	early	life,	focusing	on	his	relationships,	his	demeanour,	and	the	broader	social-sexual	context	with	which	Welles	interacted	during	this	period.	To	demonstrate	the	salience	of	sexuality	in	Welles’	life	this	chapter	employs	three	approaches.	First,	there	is	a	general	assessment	of	the	effects	of	sexuality	on	the	development	of	personality	traits	of	youths	and	adolescents	using	sociological	and	psychological	literature	to	establish	the	methodological	basis	for	interpreting	Welles’	life	in	this	way.	Second,	historical	literature	examining	how	masculinity,	sexuality,	and	power	were	intertwined	in	political	and	pedagogic	discourses	during	these	years	and	how	these	applied	to	Welles	in	particular	is	explored.	Finally,	and	most	importantly,	previously	unused	material	from	archives	at	Groton	and	Harvard	University,	personal	recollections	and	accounts	from	Welles	himself	and	others	during	his	formative	years,	are	used	to	that	demonstrate	his	sexual	non-normativity	and	its	implications	for	Welles’	future.3	Directly	refuting	the	contentions	of	other	authors	who	have	looked	at	this	period	in	Welles’	life,	this	chapter	shows	how	Welles’	sexuality	deviated	from	the	norm	from	a	very	early	age,	dramatically	influencing	his	personality,	his	worldview,	and	as	a	result,	his	future	conduct	as	a	diplomat.			
																																																								2	Robert	D.	Dean.	Imperial	Brotherhood:	Gender	and	the	Making	of	Cold	War	Foreign	Policy.	(Amherst:	University	of	Massachusetts	Press,	2001),	17	3	The	material	used	for	this	section	was	obtained	from	several	sources	including	the	Houghton	Library	and	Pusey	Library	at	Harvard	University	as	well	as	through	personal	correspondence	between	the	author	and	the	Chief	Archivist	at	Groton	Preparatory	School,	Massachusetts,	USA,	during	the	summer	of	2015.	Besides	copies	of	specific	documents,	the	author	obtained	summaries	of	additional	materials	compiled	and	transcribed	by	the	Groton	School	Archivist.	A	copy	of	the	transcribed	pages	can	be	found	at	the	end	of	this	thesis	in	Appendix	A.			
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Background:		 Despite	their	formative	influence,	Welles’	early	years	have	attracted	surprisingly	little	attention	among	historians.	To	the	extent	that	they	have	examined	Welles’	early	years	most	historians	have	drawn	conclusions	based	on	his	formal	education	and	a	general	impression	of	his	social	caste.	For	instance,	Frank	Graff	noted	the	relationship	Welles	formed	with	Groton	Headmaster	Endicott	Peabody	(“If	I	ever	achieve	anything	in	this	world,”	Welles	wrote	to	Peabody,	“it	will	be	due	very	greatly	to	you").4	Christopher	O’Sullivan	noted	how	Welles’	“upbringing	within	the	cloistered	and	privileged	world	of	the	New	York	elite	shaped	him	by	reinforcing	his	feelings	of	superiority	over	others	and	contributing	to	his	inability	to	relate	well	with	those	from	different	backgrounds."5	This	assessment	echoed	Irwin	Gellman’s	description	of	Welles	during	his	first	stint	in	the	State	Department	where	he	developed	"certain	characteristic	approaches	to	issues	…	[that]	…	would	be	hallmarks	of	his	future	career”	including	an	independent	streak,	an	appeal	to	higher	bureaucratic	authority,	and	a	disinclination	“to	understand	or	accommodate	other	viewpoints.”6		However,	there	is	much	more	to	be	gained	from	analyzing	Welles’	formative	years	than	identifying	him	as	a	snob,	and	much	more	to	his	personality	than	snobbishness.	As	evidenced	in	the	two	works	that	explore	Welles’	early	life	in	considerable	depth	–	Benjamin	Welles’	biography	of	his	father	and	Gail	Hanson’s	dissertation	on	Welles’	Caribbean	diplomacy	–	worthwhile	insights	can	be	gained	into	Welles’	psyche	and	the	milieu	in	which	he	operated	by	examining	these	most	crucial	years.7																																																											4	Welles	to	Peabody,	4	January	1915,	Endicott	Peabody	Papers,	Houghton	Library,	Harvard	University	quoted	in	Frank	Warren	Graff,	“Strategy	of	Involvement:	A	Diplomatic	Biography	of	Sumner	Welles”	(Ph.D.	Dissertation.	University	of	Michigan,	1971),	2.	
5	Christopher	D.	O’Sullivan.	Sumner	Welles:	Postwar	Planning	and	the	Quest	for	a	New	World	Order	
1937-1943	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2009),	2.	6	Irwin	F.	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs:	Franklin	Roosevelt,	Cordell	Hull,	and	Sumner	Welles	(Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1995),	62.		7	Benjamin	Welles.	Sumner	Welles:	FDR’s	Global	Strategist:	A	Biography	(New	York:	MacMillan	Press,	1997);	Gail	Hanson.	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System:	The	United	States	in	the	Caribbean,	1920-1940.”	(Ph.D.	Dissertation.	State	University	of	New	York	at	Stony	Brook,	1990).		
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In	the	first	major	work	looking	at	Welles’	early	years,	Gail	Hanson	adopts	an	expansive	scope	that	affords	a	predictive	value	for	interpreting	Welles’	later	diplomatic	career.	Hanson	argued	for	the	primacy	of	Progressive	Era	thinkers	Elihu	Root	and	Theodore	Roosevelt	on	Welles’	later	foreign	policy	ideation.8	This	influence	was	rooted,	at	least	in	part,	in	some	of	Welles’	earliest	formative	experiences.	For	Hanson,	Welles’	"patrician	background	drove	much	of	his	commitment	to	legal	and	tutelary	strategies	for	maintaining	the	United	States's	influence	and	control.”9	She	credits	Groton	with	teaching	Welles	“self-restraint	and	antipathy	to	what	[Welles]	later	termed	'narrow	selfishness'”	as	well	as	a	pattern	of	Anglophilia,	“affinity	to	British-style	liberalism”,	and	“moral	absolutism.”10	Similarly,	at	Harvard	University	Hanson	noted	"Welles's	major	subjects	denoted	a	leaning	toward	order	and	balance	in	his	patrician	world."11		Though	accurate,	Hanson’s	argument	lacked	an	analysis	of	the	generative	forces	underlying	Welles’	search	for	order.	Welles’	isolation	as	a	youth	was	taken	for	granted,	with	little	effort	expended	to	interrogate	the	nature	of	Welles’	ostracizing	or	the	psychological	impact	it	may	have	had	given	the	broader	social	and	pedagogic	context.	Similarly,	no	explanation	was	offered	for	why	Progressive	figures,	as	opposed	to	more	conservative	ones,	would	have	been	especially	attractive	to	Welles.	Although	Hanson	did	try	to	incorporate	the	personal	and	political	elements	of	Welles’	character	during	his	formative	years	–	his	“passive”	father	may	have	inspired	Welles	to	seek	leadership	from	other	figures	–	there	was	no	cohesive	analysis	of	Welles’	personality	as	an	originator	for	his	ideological	or	professional	motivations.12	Greater	acknowledgement	of	Welles’	intimate	life	and	the	impact	that	had	on	his	personality	and	positionality,	vis	à	vis	his	contemporaries,	and	the	implications	this	had	for	him	later	in	life,	is	required.		Benjamin	Welles	made	some	attempt	at	such	a	link	in	his	biography	of	his	father.	The	younger	Welles	devoted	the	first	three	chapters	of	his	book	to	the	elder																																																									8	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	iii.	9	Ibid.,	8.	10	Ibid.,	38,	37.		11	Ibid.,	41.	12	Ibid.,	41,	n.32.	
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Welles’	formative	years.	He	traced	their	mutual	lineage	back	to	the	colonial	era	in	“a	family	molded	for	three	centuries	by	New	England’s	harsh	climate	and	its	Puritan	values.”13	Along	with	descriptions	of	Welles’	education	at	Groton	and	Harvard,	and	colourful	journalistic	accounts	evoking	the	spirit	of	the	age,	Benjamin	Welles’	depiction	emphasized	the	aristocratic	genteel	qualities	of	Sumner’s	upbringing,	as	well	as	the	fecklessness	and	shortcomings	he	often	exhibited.	Welles’	family	circulated	in	the	highest	rungs	of	New	York	society	–	his	father	was	one	of	twenty-five	men	called	the	“Patriarchs,”	a	group	founded	to	“‘create	and	lead’	New	York	society”	–	yet	Welles	was	“dominated”	by	his	overbearing	mother.14	Friends	remembered	Welles	as	“’very	sophisticated’”	but	also	“[n]ever	a	fellow	you	could	get	close	to.’”15	His	time	at	Harvard	and	in	Paris	involved	long	periods	of	isolation	punctuated	by	episodes	of	drunkenness	and	ribaldry.	The	overall	impression	was	that	Welles	was	groomed	for	success	and	received	all	the	advantages	that	status,	wealth,	and	privilege	could	bestow	–	factors	that	made	his	various	misfortunes	and	subsequent	downfall	all	the	more	tragic.		However,	this	juxtaposition	was	not	utilized	as	part	of	any	systematic	interrogation	of	Welles’	character	or	the	broader	forces	influencing	its	development.	Benjamin	Welles	did	not	knit	the	various	instances	of	Sumner’s	isolation	as	a	youth	into	any	larger	pattern,	or	the	episodes	of	turmoil	into	insights	about	Welles’	inner	life.	Welles’	social	marginalization	at	Groton	was	never	tied	to	any	deeper	psychological	(or	sexual)	factors.	Broad	sweeping	influences,	like	Welles’	interactions	with	Theodore	Roosevelt	at	Groton	or	his	observations	of	the	outbreak	of	World	War	One	while	travelling	Europe,	were	employed	only	as	anecdotes.	Moreover,	there	was	a	troubling	tendency	to	deemphasize	–	or	castigate	–	the	non-heterosexual	elements	of	Welles’	early	life.	The	author	described	how	headmaster	Peabody’s	“iron	vigilance	had	largely	spared	Groton	the	blight	of	adolescent	homosexuality”	and	how	a	friend	remembered	“Sumner	‘recoiled	from	anything	
																																																								13	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	7.			14	Ibid.,	8.		15	Ibid.,	12,	9.		
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even	suggestive	of	homosexuality.’”16	Somewhat	contradictorily,	he	acknowledged	Welles’	later	displays	of	homosexuality,	but	derided	them	as	“personal	weakness.”17	Conversely,	Welles’	heterosexual	relationships	and	alleged	exploits	with	women	were	expounded,	or	speculated,	upon	repeatedly	and	at	length.18		Both	Welles	and	Hanson	overlooked	evidence	of	queer	intimacy	and	homosocial	patterns	of	interaction	and	isolation	in	their	retelling	of	Sumner	Welles’	early	life.	Such	omissions	can	be	explained	in	part	by	limitations	on	access	to	sources	and	prioritizing	of	information,	but	they	also	speak	to	a	resistance	to	writing	histories	about	queer	people.	Even	a	cursory	examination	of	Welles’	life,	whether	in	its	formative	years	or	later,	demands	acknowledgement	of	the	existence	of	non-heterosexual	sexual	object	choice	by	Welles.	Furthermore,	it	is	undeniable	that	Welles’	non-normative	sexuality	operated	within	a	society	that	was	variously	suspicious	and	hostile	to	such	deviations	from	established	norms.	Exploring	the	interplay	of	these	two	inextricable	facets	of	Welles’	formative	experiences	is	a	necessary	prerequisite	to	understanding	the	mind	of	the	man	who	would	go	on	to	shape	so	much	of	U.S.	foreign	policy.			
Concealable	Stigma:		
	
	 In	order	to	conduct	an	investigation	of	the	influence	of	sexuality	upon	Welles’	life,	or	anyone	else’s,	it	is	necessary	to	establish	the	scientific	and	intellectual	basis	for	considering	sexual	orientation	as	a	defining	personal	characteristic.	The	exact	role	that	sexuality	plays	in	the	development	of	an	individual’s	personality	and	worldview	has	been	a	matter	of	considerable	scholarly	investigation.	Almost	from	the	moment	sex	became	a	subject	for	scientific	inquiry	in	the	later	nineteenth	century,	psychiatrists,	sociologists,	and	sexologists	have	attempted	to	ascertain	what	implications	result	from	possessing	a	sexual	orientation	that	deviates	from	the	
																																																								16	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	13.	17	Ibid.,	7.		18	Ibid.,	19,	33	
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societal	norm.19	To	that	end,	researchers	have	made	extensive	observations	and	identified	discrete	characteristics	about	the	lived	experience	of	queer	people,	some	of	which	hold	particular	salience	in	understanding	the	challenges	faced	by	Sumner	Welles.		Beginning	in	the	1960s	sociologists	identified	sexual	orientation	as	an	example	of	a	psychosocial	phenomenon	known	as	‘concealable	stigma’.	Concealable	stigma	was	defined	as	“a	socially	marginalized	characteristic	not	readily	apparent	to	observers.”20	Examples	included	sexual	orientation,	membership	in	a	marginalized	religious	group,	immigrant	status,	HIV	status,	and	many	other	characteristics.	Those	possessing	a	concealable	stigma	faced	the	unique	and	ongoing	challenge	of	“manag[ing]	information	about	their	stigmatized	status	in	social	interactions”	in	an	unremittingly	hostile	world.21		The	dilemmas	associated	with	concealing	one’s	sexual	orientation	in	a	hostile	world	could	leave	a	particularly	lasting	impact	upon	an	individual’s	disposition,	demeanour,	and	psyche.	In	multiple	studies	on	individuals	possessing	a	concealable	stigma,	researchers	have	found	“individuals	with	a	concealable	stigma	continually	face[d]	a	dilemma	of	disclosure,	which	force[d]	them	to	regularly	interpret	ambiguous	social	situations	and	adapt	to	the	threat	of	potential	discovery.”22	For	those	possessing	a	concealed	stigma,	heightened	awareness	of	social	cues,	of	one’s	own	comportment,	and	the	interaction	between	them	becomes	a	predominating	psychological	and	social	concern.																																																									19	The	literature	on	sexology	and	its	epistemological	heritage	is	substantial;	excellent	examples	for	further	reading	on	the	subject	include:	Elena	Mancini.	Magnus	Hirschfeld	and	the	Quest	for	Sexual	
Freedom:	A	History	of	the	First	International	Sexual	Freedom	Movement	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2010);	Lucy	Bland	and	Laura	Doan,	eds.	Sexology	Uncensored:	The	Documents	of	Sexual	
Science	(Cambridge:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1998);	Jeffrey	Weeks,	Making	Sexual	History	(Oxford:	Polity	Press,	2000);	Sarah	Toulalan	and	Kate	Fisher,	eds.	The	Routledge	History	of	Sex	and	the	
Body	(New	York:	Routledge,	2013);	Jeffrey	Weeks,	Sex,	Politics	and	Society:	The	Regulation	of	Sexuality	
Since	1800	(London:	Longman,	1981).		20	Alexandra	Sedlovskaya,	Valerie	Purdie-Vaughns,	Richard	P.	Eibach,	Marianne	LaFrance,	Ranier	Romero-Canyas	and	Nicholas	P.	Camp,	“Internalizing	the	Closet:	Concealment	Hightens	the	Cognitive	Distinction	Between	Public	and	Private	Selves"	Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	2013,	Vol.	104,	No.	4,	696.	21	András	Tilcsik,	Michel	Anteby,	and	Carly	R.	Knight,	“Concealable	Stigma	and	Occupational	Segregation:	Toward	a	Theory	of	Gay	and	Lesbian	Occupations”	Administrative	Science	Quarterly,	2015,	2.	22	Ibid.,	6.	
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	The	psychological	impact	of	this	ongoing	struggle	could	be	profound.	According	to	recent	work	investigating	the	psychological	impacts	of	concealed	stigma	on	LGBT	people,			 “…	concealment	entails	active	self-monitoring	of	the	success	of	one’s	efforts	at	concealment	and	vigilance	for	risks	of	self-exposure	associated	with	public	settings.	As	a	consequence	of	this	monitoring	in	public	versus	private	contexts,	the	public	setting,	where	the	identity	is	concealed,	becomes	psychologically	distinct	from	a	more	private	setting,	where	expression	of	the	stigmatized	identity	is	less	constrained."23				 In	other	words,	because	of	the	mental	efforts	deployed	in	the	effort	to	successfully	conceal	oneself,	those	with	concealable	stigma	demonstrate	detectably	different	cognitive	behaviours	and	patterns,	with	ramifications	for	every	cognitive	process	and	function	as	a	result.		Furthermore,	the	consequences	of	these	psychological	stresses	can	be	tracked	to	specific	locations	and	contexts,	most	significantly	the	workplace.	Research	focusing	on	LGBT	people	attempting	to	remain	concealed,	i.e.	in	the	closet,	found	specific	behavioural	and	dispositional	consequences	to	the	experience.	"Forced	to	manage	information	about	a	stigmatized	attribute	on	a	daily	basis	from	an	early	age,	many	gay	men	and	lesbians	seem	to	adapt	to	their	stigmatized	role	by	developing	an	increased	sensitivity	and	diagnostic	accuracy	with	regard	to	others'	reactions,”	strategies	that	have	specific	impacts	upon	the	work	environment	and	the	behaviour	an	individual	with	a	concealed	stigma	exhibits	in	the	workplace.24	Thus,	for	LGBT	people	attempting	to	hide	their	sexual	orientation	from	their	friends,	family,	and	colleagues,	the	mere	existence	of	their	efforts	creates	a	distinct	psychological	profile.	By	concealing	their	sexuality,	LGBT	people	develop	a	sharp	distinction	between	their	public	and	private	selves,	a	pattern	that	“represent[s]	a	
																																																								23	Sedlovskaya,	et	al.,	“Internalizing	the	Closet”,	697.	The	authors	of	this	paper	refer	to	this	psychological	divergence	as	the	‘public-private	schematization’,	see:	Ibid.,	695.		24	Tilcsik,	Anteby,	and	Knight,	“Concealable	Stigma	and	Occupational	Segregation”,	6.		
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meaningful	axis	that	informs	the	architecture	of	their	self-concept	and,	thus,	influences	their	psychological	functioning.”25	When	applied	to	a	specific	individual	in	a	specific	time	and	place,	this	profile	can	help	reveal	otherwise	unaccounted	for	themes	in	that	person’s	professional	interactions,	personal	demeanour,	motivations,	and	decision-making.	In	Welles’	case,	the	fact	of	his	sexual	non-normativity	set	in	motion	a	series	of	conscious	and	unconscious	social	perceptions	and	interactions	that	shaped	his	personality	from	the	earliest	stages	of	life	and	were	carried	with	him	into	adulthood	and	his	career.	The	realization	of	difference	from	most	of	his	classmates,	as	well	as	the	implications	of	the	particular	kind	of	difference	realized	in	this	case	(homosexuality),	conditioned	Welles	with	a	specific	set	of	psychologically	formative	experiences.	This	process	shaped	how	Welles	conducted	himself	in	his	professional	life.	The	decisions	Welles	took,	the	options	he	considered	or	rejected,	and	the	methods	by	which	he	implemented	them	were	all	shaped	by	the	psychological	foundation	from	which	they	emerged.	That	foundation	was	laid	during	Welles’	formative	years	at	Groton	and	Harvard	and	contained	as	part	of	its	aggregate	the	impact	of	Welles’	sexuality.			
Cui	servire	est	infernum:	Welles’	Isolated	Youth	
	
	 To	gain	a	deeper	understanding	of	Welles’	actions	and	behaviour	requires	examining	the	specific	conditions	in	which	those	formative	experiences	of	concealing	his	stigmatized	sexuality	unfolded.	The	process	by	which	Welles	realized	and	reacted	to	his	sexuality-induced	marginalization	began	early	in	life,	but	it	became	particularly	noticeable	after	enrolling	at	Groton.	It	was	there	that	Welles	first	displayed	characteristics	and	formed	relationships	that	would	place	him	outside	the	bounds	of	heterosexuality.	The	interplay	of	Welles’	gradual	realization	of	his	sexuality	with	the	necessity	of	concealing	that	otherness	from	those	around	him	shaped	his	personality	in	profound	ways.		
																																																								25	Sedlovskaya,	et	al.,	“Internalizing	the	Closet”,	710.	
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	 Among	the	most	defining	features	of	Welles’	early	life	was	his	awkward	fit	with	his	social,	cultural,	and	institutional	surroundings.	His	difficulty	socializing	with	his	peers	and	fitting	in	at	the	schools	he	attended,	a	common	experience	among	queer	people	during	youth	and	adolescence,	was	painfully	evident.26	Despite	the	enormous	wealth	and	privilege	of	his	family,	Welles’	early	years	were	not	especially	happy	ones.	Welles	was,	in	the	words	of	one	historian,	a	"sickly	child,	dominated	by	his	mother	throughout	his	early	years;"	tragically,	Welles’	mother	died	1911	when	Welles	was	only	nineteen.27	He	was	subject	to	frequent	eye	infections	and	a	persistent	ocular	dysfunction	that	kept	him	from	away	from	Groton	for	an	entire	semester	when	he	was	fourteen.28	Welles’	eye	problems	were	severe	enough	for	Welles’	doctor	to	recommend	he	not	“study	by	the	light	in	the	school	room	at	night”	and	for	his	mother	to	request	clemency	for	Headmaster	Peabody	to	“excuse	Sumner	from	written	examinations.”29	An	oft-told,	possibly	apocryphal,	but	nonetheless	revealing,	story	about	Welles	from	this	period	in	his	life	described	him	as	having	worn	white	gloves	to	play	when	he	was	a	child.30			 When	he	did	attend	school	Welles	still	had	difficulties	fitting	in.	He	was	described	as	"a	loner”	and	a	“misfit”	and	was	seldom	recognized	beyond	scholastic	achievements.31	“He	was	not	an	athlete,	nor	a	joiner,”	wrote	one	historian,	an	observation	that	seemed	to	echo	the	impressions	of	those	who	knew	Welles	later	in	life.32	According	to	his	son,	Welles	was	“[g]angling,	fast-growing	and	ill-coordinated;”	“[i]solated	by	his	ineptitude	at	–	and	indifference	to	–	sports,	Sumner	vented	his	hurt	in	sarcastic	witticisms	at	the	expense	of	classmates	–	thus	isolating	himself	all	the	more.”33	The	only	acknowledgments	of	athletic	prowess	in	his	record	were	for	a	one-term	stint	as	a	second	rower	in	his	final	year	and	as	a	football																																																									26	See:	Paul	Flowers	and	Katie	Buston,	“’I	was	terrified	of	being	different’:	exploring	gay	men’s	accounts	of	growing-up	in	a	heterosexist	society”	Journal	of	Adolescence	(2001),	Vol.	24,	Issue	1.	27	O’Sullivan,	Postwar	Planning,	2;	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	18.		28	B.S.	Welles	to	Endicott	Peabody,	6	January	1906,	Groton	Preparatory	School	Archives	(GPSA),	Groton,	MA;	Correspondence	between	the	author	and	Douglas	Brown,	Chief	Archivist	at	Groton	Preparatory	School.	29	Frances	Welles	to	Endicott	Peabody,	18	September	1907,	GPSA.		30	“The	Diplomat's	Diplomat”	11	August	1941,	Time	Magazine.		31	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	33;	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,13.	32	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	34	33	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	11.	
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manager	during	his	penultimate	year.34	Welles’	father	took	note	of	his	son’s	seeming	disinterest	in	sports,	writing	to	Peabody	his	displeasure	of	finding	out	that	Sumner	had	“been	taking	drawing	+	boxing	lessons”	which	he	had	specifically	not	authorized.35	“I	am	most	anxious	that	his	leisure	hours	should	be	spent	out	of	doors,”	Welles’	father	explained.36	Welles’	father	managed	to	get	his	way	elsewhere,	enrolling	Sumner	in	a	cadet	corps,	though	Sumner’s	own	son	later	recalled	“[f]ew	were	less	cut	out	for	close-order	drill	than	Sumner	Welles.”37	Meanwhile,	Welles	served	as	a	chapel	usher	in	his	penultimate	year	at	the	school,	a	fact	that	Peabody	picked	up	on;	he	later	recommended	to	the	then-seventeen	year	old	Welles	that	he	join	the	priesthood.38	Even	Welles	himself	seemed	to	concur	with	these	assessments	of	his	early	life.	When	asked	as	an	adult	if	he	liked	his	experience	at	Groton,	Welles	replied,	“'[o]h,	Lord	no;	I	was	a	worm.'"39		 Welles	also	displayed	characteristics	that	set	him	apart	in	his	scholastic	endeavours.	Initially,	he	was	not	a	stellar	student,	usually	occupying	the	middle	and	lower	third	of	his	class	in	terms	of	grades	after	his	first	year,	though	he	did	rank	at	top	his	class	in	his	first	semester	at	the	school.40	Just	prior	to	his	term-long	absence	due	to	poor	health,	he	was	placed	on	the	“Black	list,”	presumably	for	academic	underachievement,	a	record	that	Welles	went	on	to	repeat	at	Harvard	several	years	later.41	Yet,	Welles	clearly	possessed	great	academic	potential	and	showed	signs	of	growth	over	time.	In	his	final	year	his	performance	was	rated	as	“better”	and	“doing	well,”	and	Endicott	Peabody	himself	writing	“[t]here	has	been	a	marked	
																																																								34	Correspondence	between	the	author	and	Douglas	Brown,	Chief	Archivist	at	Groton	Preparatory	School.		35	B.S.	Welles	to	Peabody,	10	May	1906,	GPSA.		36	Ibid.		37	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	9.		38	Correspondence	between	the	author	and	Douglas	Brown,	Chief	Archivist	at	Groton	Preparatory	School;	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	13;	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	34-5.		39	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	34	40	Correspondence	between	the	author	and	Douglas	Brown,	Chief	Archivist	at	Groton	Preparatory	School.	41	Ibid.;	Transcript	of	Sumner	Welles	Class	of	’14,	Student	Folders	and	Transcripts,	c1895-1932	of	the	Biographical	Research	section	of	the	Harvard	University	Archives	(HUA):	the	folder	and	transcript	of	Sumner	Welles	(graduated	1914).	Pusey	Library,	Harvard	University	Archives	(PLHUA),	Cambridge,	MA.		
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development	in	character,	which	I	have	noted	much	satisfaction.”42	Welles	won	the	Reading	Prize	(likely	given	to	the	student	who	had	read	the	most	books),	indicating	both	a	degree	of	intellectual	curiosity	and	a	bookish	personality	that	aligned	with	his	interest	in	drawing	and	a	withdrawn	approach	to	athletic	activities.43			 This	pattern	of	artistic	appreciation	was	replicated	several	years	later	when	Welles	matriculated	to	Harvard.	There,	Welles	gained	“high	praise	for	a	play	which	he	wrote”	and	gained	permission	from	his	tutors	to	spend	his	final	year	studying	at	l’École	des	beaux	arts	in	Paris.44	He	showed	a	budding	interest	in	poetry,	writing	to	a	friend	in	his	sophomore	year	“how	much	I	liked	your	Titanic	poems	which	I	read	for	the	first	time	the	other	day.	I	thought	them	very	strong	and	very	beautiful.”45	When	Welles’	mother	died	in	1911	he	found	solace	in	the	lachrymose	poetry	of	Lord	Alfred	Tennyson.46	Elsewhere,	he	took	out	a	subscription	to	the	Architectural	Quarterly	of	Harvard	University,	and	seemed	to	be	keen	on	pursuing	architecture	as	a	career.47	His	course	selection	at	Harvard	also	indicated	a	student	with	a	more	artistic	bent.	Welles	opted	to	take	four	language	courses	–	Latin,	Greek,	German,	and	French	–	and	advanced	courses	in	Greek,	Latin,	and	German.48	In	order	to	aid	him	in	his	ostensible	future	career	as	an	architect,	Welles	also	took	Plane	Geometry,	Elementary	Physics,	and	Algebra,	though	in	an	indication	of	the	degree	to	which	the	abstraction	rather	than	the	tactile	nature	of	this	craft	appealed	to	him,	Welles	opted	not	to	take	courses	in	Solid	Geometry,	Machine	Work,	Woodworking,	Chipping,	or	Blacksmithing.49			 Although	Welles’	creative	sensibilities,	his	disinterest	in	athletics,	and	his	cloistral	habits	set	him	somewhat	apart	from	his	classmates	during	these	years,	his																																																									42	Correspondence	between	the	author	and	Douglas	Brown,	Chief	Archivist	at	Groton	Preparatory	School.	Emphasis	original.		43	Correspondence	between	the	author	and	Douglas	Brown,	Chief	Archivist	at	Groton	Preparatory	School.	44	B.S.	Welles	to	Julian	Coolidge,	4	March	1911,	HUA;	Sumner	Welles	to	Dean	Hulbert,	27	September	1913,	HUA.		45	Sumner	Welles	to	Corrine	Roosevelt	Robinson,	undated,	Papers	of	Corrine	Roosevelt	Robinson,	Series	I,	Container	1470,	Houghton	Library,	Harvard	University,	Cambridge,	MA.		46	Sumner	Welles	to	Endicott	Peabody,	25	May,	GPSA.	Specifically,	Welles	wrote	the	he	had	read	Tennyson’s	elegiac	In	Memoriam	A.H.H.	over	and	over	while	mourning	the	loss	of	his	mother.		47	Transcript	of	Sumner	Welles	Class	of	’14,	PLHUA;	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	24.		48	Transcript	of	Sumner	Welles	Class	of	’14,	PLHUA	49	Ibid.		
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ostracism	was	not	total.	Despite	the	regimented	lifestyle	at	Groton,	Welles	found	solace	and	companionship	in	the	form	of	a	“small	artistic	boy”	named	Ives	Gammell.50	Gammell	and	Welles	met	at	Groton	when	they	were	both	students	and	according	to	Gammell	“discussed	everything:	the	Rector,	the	masters,	schoolmates,	courses,	sports,	colleges,	politics,	life	–	even	sex.”51	They	shared	mutual	interests	including	a	love	of	French,	music,	and	the	arts;	the	arts	provided	many	outlets	for	Welles’	frustrations	at	the	time,	most	notably	witnessed	by	his	portrayal	in	full	drag	of	a	Spanish	senorita	during	a	school	play.52	Gammell	seems	to	have	been	Welles’	only	close	confidant	during	these	years.	When	Welles’	mother	died,	Gammell	was	one	of	the	few	people	who	“offer[ed]	haven	in	a	sunless	world.”53	After	graduating	from	Groton	they	attended	different	schools	in	Boston,	but	made	plans	to	move	to	Paris	together	after	graduation,	where	they	would	study	fine	arts.	This	they	did	in	1914	and	Gammell’s	recollections	from	the	time	depict	Welles	pursuing	a	variety	of	different	relationships	with	women	and	men,	exchanging	gifts	and	notes	with	them,	and	commiserating	with	Gammell.54			Gammell’s	close	relationship	with	Welles	was	at	times	tempestuous	but	their	intense	emotional	bond	and	tight	camaraderie	were	profound.	As	they	grew	older	and	their	lives	went	in	separate	directions,	Welles	and	Gammell	continued	to	correspond,	with	Gammell	paying	close	attention	to	Welles’	career.	Although	the	correspondence	was	conventional	for	the	most	part,	telling	references	cropped	up	from	time	to	time	that	indicated	an	atypical	subtext	to	the	relationship.	Upon	hearing	the	news	of	Welles’	resignation	in	1943,	Gammell,	wrote	a	long	maudlin	letter	to	Welles	expressing	his	sympathy	and	commiserating	over	the	isolation	that	Welles	now	suffered.	The	letter	included	Gammell’s	wistful	reflections	on	his	early	years	with	Welles	in	Provincetown	and	Paris	–	“the	first	hint	that	there	existed	a	world	into	which	I	might	fit”	–	and	his	discovery	that	“the	things	I	cared	about	
																																																								50	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	12.	51	Ibid.,	13.	52	Ibid.,	photographic	pages.		53	Ibid.,	18.	54	Ibid.,	29.	
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mattered	to	other	people.”55	In	the	same	letter	Gammell	used	a	tellingly	mixed	metaphor	to	express	confidence	in	Welles,	writing,	“I	picture	you	resting	on	your	laurels	and	waiting	to	move	into	the	next	square	–	I	suppose	you	are	a	queen	now	and	can	move	in	any	direction	across	the	board.”56	Welles’	relationship	with	Gammell	was	not	the	only	one	during	his	youth	that	hinted	at	experiences	that	deviated	from	the	norms	of	masculinity	and	heterosexuality.	At	Harvard,	Welles	shared	a	room	and	was	a	“close	personal	friend”	with	Harden	de	Valson	Pratt.	Welles	and	Pratt	struck	up	what	would	become	a	lifelong	friendship.57	They	roomed	together	at	Harvard	and	devised	a	“‘gentleman’s	agreement’”	wherein	they	frequented	each	other’s	social	clubs	in	the	Boston	area.58	Although	their	friendship	was	not	commented	upon	at	the	time,	a	later	investigation	into	Welles’	sexual	behaviour	identified	Pratt	as	a	“sexual	pervert”	with	whom	Welles	corresponded.59	Pratt’s	friendship	with	Welles	may	have	been	little	more	than	grasping	at	straws	by	the	F.B.I.,	but	the	association	demonstrated	how	Welles’	experiences	during	his	formative	years	included	a	distinctive	queerness,	one	that	was	detectable	even	decades	later.		Welles’	relationships	with	Gammell	and	Pratt	clearly	established	Welles’	sexuality	as	being	outside	the	definitions	of	strict	heterosexuality.	He	developed	close	relationships	with	men	his	age	that,	at	the	time	or	later	on,	would	indicate	clear	signs	of	sexual	non-conformity.	His	experiences	on	the	margins	of	his	schools’	social	life	mirrored	the	experiences	of	other	queer	individuals	in	similar																																																									55	Letter,	Gammell	to	Welles,	15	December	1943,	SWP,	Box:	146,	Folder:	7.	Provincetown,	Massachusetts	(likely	what	Gammell	was	referring	to)	had	by	this	time	not	fully	earned	its	reputation	as	a	mecca	for	gay	men,	but	it	did	have	a	well-established	art	colony	centred	around	the	Cape	Cod	School	of	Art	founded	by	Charles	Webster	Hawthorne	and,	with	it,	a	nascent	queer	community.	For	further	reading	see:	Karen	Christel	Krahulik,	Provincetown:	From	Pilgrim	Landing	to	Gay	Resort	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2005),	69-105.		56	Ibid.		57	Memorandum	For	the	Director,	4	September	1942,	NARA,	RG	65,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[1	of	2].	58	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	24-5.		59	Memorandum	For	the	Director,	4	September	1942,	NARA,	RG	65,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[1	of	2].	
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circumstances.60	He	was,	in	essence,	a	queer	youth	grappling	with	the	challenges	and	obstacles	inherent	in	that	identity.		Unsurprisingly,	his	personality	evolved	in	response	to	these	experiences.	Buffeted	by	the	twin	onslaughts	of	social	marginalization	and	perceived	stigmatization,	Welles	learned	to	conceal	his	emotions	from	public	view	at	all	costs.	He	developed	a	tough	outer	shell	while	still	maintaining	an	intimate	private	life,	learning	to	get	by	on	his	own	while	simultaneously	maintaining	a	few,	close	relationships	with	carefully	chosen	individuals.	With	such	a	pattern	established	so	early	and	ingrained	so	deeply	in	his	personality,	this	“public-private	schematization”	left	a	lasting	imprint	on	Welles’	demeanour	and	personality.61	Once	the	lasting	legacy	of	these	efforts	to	separate	the	stigmatized	aspects	of	his	private	life	from	his	outward	public	persona	during	his	formative	years	is	acknowledged,	aspects	of	Welles’	later	career	as	a	diplomat	begin	to	take	on	a	new	light.		Notoriously,	during	his	time	as	a	diplomat	Welles	adopted	an	austere	demeanour	as	a	professional	persona.	He	became	an	expert	at	concealing	his	emotions	from	public	view	while	maintaining	an	immaculate	public	facade.	Contemporary	observers	of	Welles	almost	exclusively	highlighted	his	austere	manner.	Interior	Secretary	Harold	Ickes	called	him	“glacially	top-lofty,”	while	Dean	Acheson	called	him	“formal	to	the	point	of	stiffness.”62	During	his	eponymous	peace	mission	to	Europe	in	1940	he	earned	the	nickname	“‘Sumner	the	Silent’.”63	Journalists	Joseph	Alsop	&	Robert	Kintner	depicted	him	as	“looking	like	a	man	with	a	bit	of	bad	fish	caught	in	his	mustache”	while	another	journalist	extended	the	simile,	saying	Welles	was	a:			 “cold	fish.	He	was	brought	up	in	…	cold-fish	ways	…	went	to	cold-fish	schools	…	entered	a	cold-fish	calling.	His	hero	is	a	slightly	warmed-over	cold	fish,	
																																																								60	See:	Peter	M.	Nardi,	David	Sanders,	and	Judd	Marmor	(eds.)	Growing	Up	Before	Stonewall:	Life	
Stories	of	Some	Gay	Men	(London:	Routledge,	1994).		61	Sedlovskaya,	et	al.,	Internalizing	the	Closet,	695.	62	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs,	197,	106.	63	J.	Simon	Rofe,	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	Foreign	Policy	and	the	Welles	Mission	(New	York:	Palgrave	MacMillan,	2007),	114.	
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Charles	Evans	Hughes.	He	is	as	reserved	as	a	box	at	the	opera	…	Even	his	blond	mustache	looks	cold.”64			 Though	many	of	these	descriptions	could	be	attributed	to	professional	jealousy	or	gossipy	name-calling,	they	contained	more	than	a	grain	of	truth	about	how	Welles	mediated	his	interactions	with	an	outside	world	that	was	profoundly	hostile	to	a	key	element	of	his	life.	Welles’	severity	can	be	seen	as	an	implicit	understanding	that	as	a	sexual	outsider	in	the	corridors	of	power	he	had	to	remain	eternally,	and	conspicuously,	above	reproach.	It	was	a	defense	mechanism	employed	to	overcome	the	psychological	strain	he	endured	on	account	of	his	concealed	stigma	and	the	isolation	it	caused	him	at	Groton	and	elsewhere	in	his	youth.	Interestingly,	in	one	of	his	recollections	of	Welles,	former	Vice	President	Henry	Wallace	seemed	to	perceive	this	inner	tension.	In	a	description	of	Welles	Wallace	said:	“I	had	the	feeling	looking	at	him	behind	that	rather	impressive	exterior,	there	was	inside	a	soul	of	a	rather	badly	frightened	small	boy.”65	The	division	of	Welles’	psyche	into	distinct	public	and	private	personas	helped	him	navigate	the	treacherous	terrain	of	social	customs	in	a	society	of	oppressively	hegemonic	masculinity	and	heteronormativity.	As	an	adult,	it	helped	him	construct	a	persona	of	dignified	reserve	that	would,	paradoxically,	earn	him	respect	while	simultaneously	isolating	him.	Either	way,	Welles’	demeanour	was	a	defining	characteristic	in	his	diplomatic	career;	its	roots	stretched	back	to	his	earliest	and	most	intimate	experiences.		
Imperial	Masculinity:		If	Welles’	austere	demeanour	can	be	traced	to	the	legacy	of	his	formative	experiences	as	an	outsider	at	Groton	and	Harvard,	then	it	stands	to	reason	those	institutions	also	left	an	impression	on	his	attitudes	and	broader	outlook	on	the	
																																																								64	“The	Diplomat’s	Diplomat”,	11	August	1941,	Time	Magazine.		65	Graham	White	and	John	Maze.	Henry	A	Wallace:	His	Search	for	a	New	World	Order.	(London:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1995),	161.	
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world.66	Perceptible	in	his	recollections	of	these	years	and	in	the	larger	pattern	of	his	career	was	the	influence	on	Welles’	outlook	of	institutional	and	ideological	factors	endemic	to	these	elite	bastions,	particularly	Groton.	Their	example	taught	Welles	lessons	about	power,	politics,	and	the	wider	world	that	would	set	the	parameters	within	which	his	later	decision-making	would	operate.	However,	although	Welles	imbibed	these	lessons	and	was	shaped	by	them,	Welles’	sexuality	prevented	him	from	unequivocal	adoption	of	these	values.	Welles’	sexuality	acted	as	a	filter,	allowing	some	aspects	of	Groton’s	ethos	through	but	blocking	others,	the	result	of	which	was	the	distillation	of	a	peculiar	mix	of	attitudes	and	beliefs	that	would	become	quintessentially	Wellesian.		At	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century	Groton	was	more	than	a	stuffy	boarding	school	for	the	scions	of	great	wealth.	It	was	a	site	of	indoctrination	for	a	specific	set	of	values	including	muscular	Christianity,	noblesse	oblige,	and	American	nationalism.	According	to	historian	Edwin	Hoyt,	"[t]he	announced	purpose	of	the	school	was	'to	cultivate	manly,	Christian	character,	having	regard	to	moral	and	physical	as	well	as	intellectual	development.’"67	This	ethos	was	born	as	well	out	of	fears	of	national	weakness,	imperial	overstretch,	and	social	upheaval;	Groton	instructed	their	students	with	the	expressed	purpose	of	the	“perpetuation	of	a	ruling	caste.”68		At	Groton	the	indoctrination	of	these	values	and	the	grooming	of	pupils	for	greatness	stemmed	directly	from	its	headmaster,	Endicott	Peabody,	whom	Welles	would	cite	specifically	as	a	guiding	influence	later	in	life.	Peabody	was	renowned	for	his	rigid	instruction,	haughty	demeanour,	and	high	expectations	for	his	students.	In	an	assessment	of	the	entirety	of	Peabody’s	career,	his	biographer	wrote	"[o]ne	may	take	issue	with	Peabody.	One	may	use	words	like	'aristocratic,'	'old-fashioned,'	'Victorian.'	He	believed	in	old-fashioned	things;	quality,	smallness,	personal	integrity,	the	family,	the	League	of	Nations,	goodness	resting	on	strength."69																																																									66	Groton’s	influence	upon	major	figures	in	American	politics	and	diplomacy	can	be	found	in	works	studying	many	of	its	alumni.	For	a	particularly	relevant	example	see:	Graham	Cross,	The	Diplomatic	
Education	of	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt,	1882-1933	(London:	Palgrave	MacMillan,	2012).	6.		67	Edwin	P.	Hoyt,	The	Peabody	Influence:	How	a	Great	New	England	Family	Helped	to	Build	America	(New	York:	Dodd,	Mead	&	Company,	1968),	246.	68	Dean,	Imperial	Brotherhood,	18-9,	21.		69	Frank	D.	Ashburn,	Peabody	of	Groton:	A	Portrait	(New	York:	Coward	McCann,	inc.,	1944),	xii.		
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The	inclusion	of	the	League	of	Nations	as	an	example	of	what	Peabody	stood	for	was	no	playful	coincidence.	Ingrained	into	the	fabric	of	Peabody’s	strict	discipline	was	an	explicit	political	project;	Peabody	instilled	in	his	students	a	directive	to	strive	for	achievement,	struggle	with	adversity,	and	through	so	doing	remake	the	world	into	a	better	place.	In	the	words	of	one	observer,	“the	idea	of	Endicott	Peabody	was	to	exert	an	influence	on	the	world	through	these	boys,	by	instilling	in	them	a	capacity	for	leadership	and	service.”70	In	Peabody’s	own	words,	"...	in	the	absence	of	interest	there	was	determination	that	the	work	should	be	done	as	a	matter	of	duty	...	These	should	be	component	parts	of	the	education	of	one	who	was	preparing	for	service	in	the	world."71	Peabody’s	appeal	was	more	than	a	general	call	to	service.	It	was	an	exhortation	to	a	specific	set	of	values,	ideological	beliefs,	and	even	political	opinions	that	Welles	and	his	classmates	imbibed.	Assessing	Peabody’s	vision	for	Groton	at	length,	Frank	Ashburn	wrote:			 "Peabody	and	Groton	were	Hamiltonian	and	not	Jeffersonian.	He	was	a	patrician	and	believed	in	patricians.	If	it	is	not	the	popular	kind	of	democracy	today,	it	is	a	very	genuine	kind	from	which	the	modern	fashion	originated.	It	would	have	been	understood	by	Sir	Harry	Vane	or	Washington	or	the	Adamses	or	Gladstone	or	Winston	Churchill.	It	was	a	theory	of	democracy	which	holds	that	all	men	are	entitled	to	justice	before	the	law,	with	equal	opportunity	for	equal	talents	as	an	unrealized	goal	rather	than	a	realized	fact.	It	made	no	pretense	of	considering	all	men	equal,	since,	it	held,	experience	and	common	sense	proved	they	were	not.	It	believed	that	democracy	was	the	hope	of	the	world,	with	free	speech	and	the	rights	of	conscience,	but	it	also	believed	that	the	only	hope	of	democracy	was	its	ability	to	produce	an	ever	devoted	and	intelligent	and	honest	aristocracy.	It	objected	to	the	theory	that	the	average	or	mediocre	is	as	good	as	the	best."72			 Implicitly	and	explicitly	Welles	incorporated	these	principles	into	his	value	system.	In	his	final	year	at	Groton	Welles	opted	into	a	stream	that	studied	Virgil’s	
																																																								70	Hoyt,	The	Peabody	Influence,	246.	71	Ashburn,	Peabody	of	Groton,	72.	Emphasis	original.		72	Hoyt,	The	Peabody	Influence,	250		
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Aeneid,	a	text	that	emphasized,	among	other	things,	duty	and	devotion.73	His	academic	interests	after	Groton,	notably	his	brief	desire	to	study	architecture,	also	denoted	an	appreciation	of	order	and	structure.	In	his	comportment,	too,	Welles	emulated	Peabody’s	example.	After	a	brief	period	of	youthful	gallivanting	in	Europe,	he	decided	on	a	career	devoted	to	public	service.	Once	in	that	role	he	showed	extraordinary	dedication	to	the	offices	in	which	he	served,	eschewing	overt	politicking	and	personal	aggrandizement,	in	essence	living	out	Ashburn’s	description	of	Peabody’s	hope	for	a	‘devoted	and	intelligent	and	honest	aristocracy’.		Groton	also	served	as	the	template	for	what	Welles	viewed	as	the	proper	course	of	upbringing.	He	retained	close	contacts	with	the	school	for	decades	through	the	alumni	association.74	Tellingly,	when	it	came	time	to	decide	the	educational	futures	of	his	own	children	he	insisted	that	both	his	sons	attend	Groton,	going	so	far	as	to	insist	during	custody	negotiations	with	his	ex-wife	Esther	Slater	that	no	change	could	be	made	to	their	children’s	educational	plans	“except	with	my	prior	consent.”75	The	focus	on	Groton	was	not	just	parental	fussing	over	academic	opportunities	and	potential;	it	was	specifically	concerned	with	the	formative	elements	of	the	Groton	experience.	Writing	to	a	friend	about	his	sons’	education,	Welles	believed	Groton	was	instrumental	in	the	development	of	his	eldest	son’s	“self	assurance	and	self	control”	and	wondered	whether	Groton	would	have	the	same	effect	on	his	younger	son,	too.76		However,	Peabody’s	lofty	goals	and	pompous	rhetoric	had	an	ulterior	dimension,	one	that	Welles	could	not	integrate	as	easily.	Welles	attended	Groton	at	a	moment	when	the	United	States	was	in	a	uniquely	imperialistic	and	expansionistic	phase.	The	closing	of	the	frontier	in	1890	and	the	acquisition	of	overseas	territories	at	the	end	of	the	Spanish-American	War	a	decade	later	had	changed	the	country’s	
																																																								73	According	to	the	Groton	Course	of	Study	for	Welles’	Sixth	Form,	selections	from	books	VII-XII	of	the	Aeneid	were	assigned	to	the	class.	Whether	Welles	noted	the	presence	of	the	same-sex	relationship	between	Nisus	and	Euryalus	in	book	IX	is	not	known.	See:	Groton	School	Curriculum,	1909-1910,	GPSA,	Groton,	MA	74	S.	Sloan	Colt	to	Sumner	Welles,	28	November	1950,	FDRL:	SWP:	Box	141:	Woodrow	Wilson	Foundation,	1949	-	G,	1950,	Folder	9:	G,	1950.		75	Chandler	P.	Anderson	to	William	S.	Gordon,	9	May	1927,	FDRL,	SWP,	Box:	19,	Folder:	1.	76	‘Sumner	Welles	Diary’,	27	March	1930,	FDRL,	SWP,	Box:	265.		
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attitude	toward	the	rest	of	the	world.77	This	shift	was	occasioned,	or	enhanced,	by	a	sense	of	cultural	dominance	and	chauvinistic	swagger	with	deep	undertones	of	racial	superiority,	masculine	pride,	and	aggression;	the	paragon	and	exemplar	of	this	new	attitude	was	Theodore	Roosevelt,	a	man	whose	life	story	embodied	the	spirit	of	conquest,	virility,	and	individuality	that	characterized	the	age.78	Roosevelt	and	others	like	him	set	an	example	for	the	younger	generation,	particularly	for	those	being	bred	for	positions	of	power.	Integral	to	these	values	was	a	particular	kind	of	collective	masculine	ethos,	dubbed	by	historian	Robert	Dean	as	“Boarding-School	Masculinity.”79	Elite	private	institutions	like	Groton	had	long	been	engaged	in	the	process	of	"melting	down	the	refractory	material	of	individualism	into	the	solid	metal	of	elite	collectivism,"	but	at	Groton	under	Peabody	it	assumed	greater	proportions	and	held	deeper	implications.80	“Boys	at	Groton	and	other	boarding	schools,”	Dean	wrote,	“were	systematically	taught	how	to	imagine	manhood.”81	Inculcated	through	rigid	discipline,	Spartan	conditions,	and	‘character	building’	exercises	of	sport	and	other	competitive	games	(often	approximating	war	or	combat),	students	at	Groton	and	other	similar	institutions	were	taught	to	emulate	a	particular	ideal	of	manhood.	"Conformity	to	the	standards	of	the	brotherhood	was	compulsory;	and	the	penalty	for	any	conspicuous	deviation	was	becoming	the	target	of	ostracism,	ridicule,	and	ritual	physical	abuse;”	“Failure	to	adhere	to	an	explicit	ideal	resulted	in	painful	consequences:	social,	psychological,	and,	frequently,	physical."82	For	Welles,	a	self-described	‘worm’	and	a	‘loner’,	such	failure	was	all	but	inevitable	and	the	consequences	severe.83		
																																																								77	George	C.	Herring,	From	Colony	to	Superpower:	U.S.	Foreign	Relations	since	1776	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2008),	299-336.		78	For	an	in	depth	exploration	of	the	racialized	and	sexualized	language	of	conquest	and	power	in	the	United	States	through	the	persona	of	Theodore	Roosevelt,	see:	Sarah	Watts,	Rough	Rider	in	the	White	
House:	Theodore	Roosevelt	and	the	Politics	of	Desire	(Chicago:	Chicago	University	Press,	2003).		79	Dean,	Imperial	Brotherhood,	22.		80	Peter	W.	Cookson,	Jr.	and	Caroline	Hodges	Persell,	Preparing	for	Power:	America's	Elite	Boarding	
Schools	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	Inc.,	Publishers,	1985),	124.	81	Dean,	Imperial	Brotherhood,	24.	82	Ibid.,	25,	24.		83	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	33-4.		
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The	implications	of	this	brutally	enforced	hegemonic	masculinity	for	the	individuals	it	was	foisted	upon	went	far	beyond	beliefs	about	gender	roles.	It	instilled	Grotonian	boys	with	a	belief	in	the	primacy,	indeed	the	nobility,	of	adversarial	confrontation,	competitiveness,	and	combat.	“[T]he	prescriptions	of	‘manliness’	compel[led]	men	to	defend	their	society	against	internal	and	external	threat”	and	to	perceive	those	threats	in	the	first	place.84	More	profoundly,	these	processes	of	socialization	affected	how	these	future	“decision	makers	understood	threats,	and	which	responses	they	considered	legitimate	or	even	conceivable.”85	Valourizing	“courage	and	‘toughness’,”	the	men	inculcated	in	this	way	opted	for	aggression	over	compromise	and	bullheadedness	over	collaboration	forming,	in	Dean’s	words,	an	“Imperial	Brotherhood.”86		Dean’s	conception	of	an	imperial	brotherhood	provides	a	useful	template	for	understanding	the	way	discourses	about	gender	and	sexuality	influence	foreign	policymakers.	However,	it	can	also	be	expanded	to	understand	how	alternative	perspectives	on	power	can	be	learned	among	those	who	were	inculcated	in	the	same	fashion	but	whose	personality	and	positionality	inoculated	them	against	some	of	its	lessons.	In	Welles’	case,	although	he	was	immersed	in	Groton’s	regimented	lifestyle	and	the	ethos	it	exuded,	because	of	his	social	and	sexual	marginalization	he	learned	different	lessons	about	manhood,	and	hence	formed	different	ideas	about	power,	aggression,	and	its	use	in	the	wider	world.	Dean	tacitly	acknowledged	the	possibility	of	people	like	Welles	who	interpreted	their	experiences	with	this	cultural	indoctrination	differently,	noting	how	"[a]	few	alumni,	particularly	those	of	an	artistic	bent,	looked	back	on	their	experience	with	dismay	and	a	sense	that	the	brutalities	of	boarding	school	had	damaged	them	(and	their	classmates)	or	had	interfered	with	healthy	adjustment	to	life."87		 	For	Welles	the	aggressive	masculinity	idealized	at	Groton,	with	which	he	did	not	identify	and	by	which	he	was	likely	victimized,	was	separate	from	the	obligations	to	patriotic	duty,	class-conscious	noblesse	oblige,	and	maintenance	of																																																									84	Dean,	Imperial	Brotherhood,	241.		85	Ibid.		86	Ibid.	87	Ibid.	28.	
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social	order.	Clues	to	Welles’	disposition	against	aggression	were	evident	in	his	reminiscences	of	this	period.	Recalling	his	reactions	as	a	child	to	the	dangers	of	the	outside	world,	Welles	later	wrote	in	The	Time	For	Decision	“I	can	well	remember	as	a	child	looking	with	trepidation	at	the	flaming	cartoons	prevalent	in	the	nineties	after	the	Bulgarian	and	Armenian	massacres.”88	Closer	to	home,	Welles	emphasized	the	non-belligerent	aspects	of	figures	he	admired,	despite	their	reputation	for	aggression.	This	was	most	evident	in	his	appreciation	for	Theodore	Roosevelt	himself,	with	whom	Welles	was	familiar	both	by	reputation	and	through	correspondence	with	Roosevelt’s	sister,	Corrine.	In	a	pair	of	letters	between	Welles	and	Corrine	Roosevelt	in	1912,	Welles	expounded	on	his	admiration	for	Theodore,	but	conspicuously	without	making	mention	of	his	martial	or	chauvinistic	prowess.	Reflecting	on	the	importance	of	then-Presidential	candidate	Theodore	Roosevelt,	Welles	opined	that	Roosevelt	was	“the	greatest	force	for	good	that	the	United	States	has	ever	known.”89	In	contemplating	Roosevelt’s	potential	demise,	Welles	emphasized	how	such	a	“tremendous	disaster”	would	bring	“ruin”	and	be	compounded	by	the	“great	social	crisis”	at	hand.90	In	a	subsequent	letter,	Welles	passed	along	a	short	list	of	translations	of	articles	originating	in	Latin	America	written	about	Roosevelt.	Welles	sought	to	underline	“how	truly	he	was	appreciated	in	Latin	America	not-withstanding	the	political	capital	made	by	his	opponents.”91		Thus,	Welles’	perception	of	Roosevelt	centred	more	on	his	appreciation	of	Roosevelt’s	beatific	reputation	and	his	hopeful,	progressive	leadership;	he	overlooked	the	martial	aspects	of	Roosevelt’s	record.	It	was	an	indication	that	Welles’	values	were	not	perfectly	aligned	with	the	Grotonian	ethos	of	manly	Christian	aggression.	Combined	with	his	reserved	and	pacifistic	manner	(Peabody	had,	after	all,	recommended	him	for	the	clergy),	there	was	an	identifiable	departure	
																																																								88	Sumner	Welles,	The	Time	For	Decision	(London:	Harper	&	Brothers	Publishers,	1944),	243-4;	See	also:	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	33-34.		89	Sumner	Welles	to	Corrine	Roosevelt	Robinson,	undated,	Papers	of	Corrine	Roosevelt	Robinson,	Series	I,	Container	1470,	Houghton	Library,	Harvard	University,	Cambridge,	MA.		90	Ibid.		91	Sumner	Welles	to	Corrine	Roosevelt	Robinson,	29	May,	Papers	of	Corrine	Roosevelt	Robinson,	Series	I,	Container	1470,	Houghton	Library,	Harvard	University,	Cambridge,	MA.	
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in	Welles’	personality	from	the	swaggering	masculinity	that	imbued	so	much	of	the	political	and	social	culture	in	which	he	was	being	inculcated.		However,	despite	the	fact	that	Welles	developed	attitudes	toward	aggression	and	force	that	were	atypical	of	most	of	his	classmates,	the	Groton	experience	left	a	distinct	impression.	Welles	imbibed	the	paternalistic	sense	of	duty	and	belief	in	the	superiority	of	American	civilization	that	Groton	taught	him	but	eschewed	the	belligerent	tone	and	tactics.	For	Welles,	American	imperial	expansion	was	less	of	a	struggle	for	global	domination	against	implacable	foes	and	more	of	a	constructive	endeavour,	eliding	confrontation	and	using	alternative	means	to	achieve	power.	Throughout	the	rest	of	his	career,	Welles’	approach	to	diplomatic	matters	and	foreign	affairs	was	consistently	tinged	with	this	balance	of	aversion	to	militarism	and	belief	in	the	beneficence	and	superiority	of	American	power.	In	Latin	America	he	encouraged	“multilateralization”	of	U.S.	foreign	policy;	in	Europe	he	proposed	collaborative	disarmament	agreements	even	in	the	face	of	imminent	war;	his	plans	for	a	postwar	organization	were	described	as	a	“quest	for	a	new	world	order,”	and	he	pursued	it	all	through	a	“supple	and	protean”	diplomacy.92	That	predisposition	would	shape	Welles’	later	decision	making	just	as	the	emphasis	on	manliness	and	aggression	had	shaped	those	of	his	contemporaries.	It	would	emerge	gradually	during	the	early	phases	of	his	career	and	mature	into	a	cohesive	worldview	by	the	time	he	became	Undersecretary	of	State	in	the	later	1930s	and	1940s.93	More	immediately,	it	would	spur	Welles	to	take	certain	decisions	and	choose	certain	paths	in	life	that	were	more	amenable	to	the	application	of	his	particular	sensibility	and	less	hostile	to	the	queer	elements	of	his	personality,	starting	with	his	entry	into	the	State	Department.																																																													92	Graff,	“Strategy	of	Involvement”,	52;	O’Sullivan,	Postwar	Planning,	94;	Thomas	M.	Millington,	“The	Latin	American	Diplomacy	of	Sumner	Welles”	(Ph.D.	Dissertation:	Johns	Hopkins	School	of	Advanced	International	Studies,	1966),	273.	93	See	Chapters	Two,	Four,	and	Five	for	fuller	elaboration	of	this	collaborative	paternalistic	idealism	worldview.		
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Robust	and	Extravagant:	Gender	Norms	and	Welles’	Early	Career		 Although	Welles	never	gave	a	specific	reason	why	he	decided	on	a	diplomatic	career	and	applied	to	the	State	Department	in	1915,	his	decision	to	do	so	would	have	come	as	little	surprise	to	anyone	aware	of	Welles’	personality	and	the	State	Department’s	reputation.	The	State	Department	and	Welles	were	a	perfect	match.	Both	were	predisposed	to	prioritizing	diplomatic	solutions	over	militaristic	ones	in	resolving	disputes,	both	were	concerned	with	the	importance	of	public	service,	and	both	carried	with	them	a	reputation	for	skirting	the	edges	of	norms	of	behaviour	with	regards	to	gender	and	sexuality.		Notwithstanding	its	venerable	position	in	the	auspices	of	American	governing	traditions,	the	State	Department	was	often	the	object	of	suspicion	and	derision	as	a	manifestation	of	federal	power	and	alleged	subversion.	As	early	as	the	nineteenth	century,	critics	attacked	civil	servants	(including	those	in	the	State	Department)	for	being	“effeminate”	and	“’political	hermaphrodites’.”94	The	State	Department	came	under	particular	attack	for	its	elitism	and	because	of	the	perception	of	anything	foreign	as	being	necessarily	potentially	un-American	–	what	historian	David	Johnson	described	as	“long-standing	rumors	that	the	diplomatic	corps	was	a	haven	for	effete	intellectuals.”95	On	account	of	their	demeanor,	background,	and	comportment	diplomats	(including	Welles)	were	portrayed	as	being	part	of	a	“diplomatic	aristocracy”	that	was	perceived	to	exist	apart	from	the	experiences	and	perspectives	of	most	Americans.96	This	separateness	derived	in	part	from	suspicion	by	those	who	feared	foreign	influences	corrupting	the	integrity	of	the	U.S.	and	was	often	expressed	in	gendered	language.	Politicians	and	journalists	fretted	about	“diplomats	[who]	might	succumb	to	European	foppishness	and	manners”	and	compromise	the	nation’s	interests	as	a	result.97	In	this	view,	“[i]f	
																																																								94	Rung,	Margaret	C.,	Servants	of	the	State:	Managing	Diversity	&	Democracy	in	the	Federal	Workforce,	
1933-1953	(Athens:	University	of	Georgia	Press,	2002),	9,	14.	95	Johnson,	Lavender	Scare,	69.		96	Barry	Rubin,	Secrets	of	State:	The	State	Department	and	the	Struggle	Over	U.S.	Foreign	Policy	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1985),	27.		97	Ibid.,	6.	
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American	diplomacy	itself	was	a	practice	designed	to	quarantine	foreign	contagions,	those	on	the	front	lines	were	deemed	particularly	prone	to	corruption.”98		By	the	twentieth	century,	such	anxieties	had	mutated	into	the	slightly	less	virulent,	but	no	less	pervasive	stereotype	of	the	“cookie	pushers	in	striped	pants”	whose	defining	characteristics	included	cosmopolitanism,	gregariousness,	sophistication,	and	homosexuality.99	Although	often	exaggerated	and	not	uniformly	applicable	to	every	gay	man	or	diplomat,	the	stereotype	was	widely	known	and	its	presence	was	a	matter	of	concern	for	anyone	working	in	the	State	Department.	Thus,	the	mere	fact	that	Welles	was	working	in	the	State	Department	meant	that	discourses	about	gender	and	sexuality	were	applied	to	his	professional	life	automatically.		Even	if	this	had	not	been	the	case	Welles	did	little	to	dispel	such	associations.	In	his	initial	annual	performance	evaluation	by	the	State	Department	in	1918,	following	a	successful	posting	to	Japan,	the	State	Department	assessed	Welles’	capacity	as	a	diplomat.	The	report	rated	as	“excellent”	Welles’	“dignity”	and	“discretion”	while	noting	his	“particular	forte”	was	his	“judgment	&	willingness	to	assume	responsibility.”100	In	the	euphemistic	parlance	of	the	State	Department	of	the	time,	these	descriptors	indicated	a	highly	talented	diplomat	with	the	ability	to	sway	opinions	and	manage	social	settings	to	his	advantage.	They	were	also	indicators	of	Welles’	preternatural	reserve	and	a	sign	that	Welles’	efforts	to	conceal	his	private	persona	while	constructing	a	more	socially	amenable	public	one	were	well	underway.	Welles’	early	performance	reviews	had	further	telling	comments	that	indicated	the	influence	of	discourses	about	gender	and	sexuality.	Welles	was	described	as	having	an	“extravagant”	scale	of	living.101	When	describing	Welles’	capacity	for	entertainment	of	local	dignitaries,	it	emphasized	the	“rather	expensive”	
																																																								98	Rubin,	Secrets	of	State,	6.	99	Johnson,	Lavender	Scare,	65,	70,	quoting	Philip	Wylie,	Generation	of	Vipers	(New	York:	Rinehart,	1942;	reprint,	New	York:	Pocket	Books,	1960),	232-60.	100	‘Sumner	Welles	Performance	Evaluation’,	SWP,	Box:	261,	Folder:	3.	101	Ibid.	
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attire	worn	by	his	wife	at	various	occasions.102	Such	descriptions	reveal	as	much	about	the	priorities	of	the	State	Department	as	they	do	about	Welles:	‘extravagant’	and	‘rather	expensive’	were	pre-selected	terms	on	the	evaluation	sheet.	Nevertheless,	the	report	singled	out	Welles	for	his	conspicuous	social	deportment.	It	implicitly	linked	together	Welles’	success	in	diplomatic	affairs	with	his	sophisticated	tastes	in	clothes	and	dining	and	the	ability	such	tastes	gave	him	to	manipulate	diplomatic	situations	to	his	advantage.		The	State	Department’s	assessment	of	Welles	at	this	early	stage	also	recalled	many	of	the	characteristics	identified	earlier	in	this	chapter	as	those	indicative	of	an	individual	who	possessed	a	concealed	stigma.	Welles’	exquisite	comportment	and	attention	to	detail,	particularly	in	social	settings,	was	a	textbook	example	of	the	“careful	reading	of	social	cues”	and	“increased	sensitivity	and	diagnostic	accuracy	with	regard	to	others'	reactions”	that	were	the	result	of	the	psychological	effort	to	conceal	a	stigma.103	Like	Welles’	austere	demeanour,	itself	a	consequence	of	the	psychological	effort	of	hiding	his	sexual	orientation,	Welles’	immaculate	deportment	and	conspicuous	propriety	were	integral	parts	of	his	personality	and	critical	components	of	his	diplomatic	profile.				
Conclusion:		
	 	The	diplomat	Sumner	Welles	became	at	the	height	of	his	career	was	shaped	by	the	personality	and	perspectives	he	forged	as	a	young	man.	Exceptionally,	the	crucible	of	Welles’	formative	years	involved	navigating	the	extraordinarily	difficult	social	and	psychological	path	introduced	by	his	sexuality.	Traversing	it	successfully	or	without	incurring	disaster	left	a	profound	mark	on	his	temperament,	comportment,	and	attitude.	The	legacy	of	these	years	shaped	his	personality	and	set	many	of	the	psychological	parameters	in	which	Welles	would	operate	throughout	the	rest	of	his	life,	which	on	account	of	his	later	stature	and	power,	had	significant	consequences	for	U.S.	politics	and	global	affairs.																																																									102	Sumner	Welles	Performance	Evaluation’,	SWP,	Box:	261,	Folder:	3.	103	Tilcsik,	Anteby,	and	Knight,	“Concealable	Stigma”,	11,	6.		
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The	process	by	which	Welles	realized	and	reacted	to	his	social	marginalization	began	with	his	time	at	Groton	Preparatory	School.	From	an	early	age	Welles	developed	an	acute	sense	of	being	an	outsider,	primarily	because	of	his	deviation	from	established	norms	and	ideals	of	masculinity	and	sexuality.	Welles’	inhabiting	of	a	social	space	outside	the	heterosexist	norms	of	his	time	was	inescapable,	as	his	relationships	with	Ives	Gammell	and	others	attested	to.	Excluded	from	full	participation	in	the	“symbolizations,	and	exhortations	of	masculinity”	that	were	so	important	to	the	social	world	he	inhabited,	Welles	developed	specific	coping	mechanisms	to	protect	himself	from	conspicuous	attention	and	insulate	himself	from	potential	attack.104	The	aloof	personality	and	austere	demeanour	that	resulted	from	these	efforts	became	one	of	the	hallmarks	of	Welles’	persona	as	an	adult	and	a	diplomat.		Welles’	queer	positionality	had	wider	implications	too.	Welles’	location	on	the	margins	of	masculinity	isolated	him	from	prevalent	social	and	political	discourses	that	sanctified	violence	and	aggression	in	the	name	of	nationalism.	Suspicious	of	the	bullish	and	clannish	exhortations	to	struggle	for	greatness,	but	still	convinced	of	the	righteousness	of	his	class	and	his	country,	Welles	eschewed	the	overt	aggression	and	adversarial	mentality	of	others	from	his	class	and	background	while	embracing	a	more	idealistic	view.	That	disposition	eventually	led	him	into	a	career	in	the	State	Department,	where	his	impulses	were	channelled	into	specific	policies,	ones	that	still	operated	within	the	parameters	set	by	the	attitudes	forged	in	his	youth.	Along	with	subsequent	experiences	after	he	came	of	age,	explored	in	the	next	chapter,	these	instincts	led	Welles	to	form	a	unique	perspective	to	diplomatic	problem	solving	later	in	life.		
																																																								104	David	D.	Gilmore,	Manhood	in	the	Making:	Cultural	Concepts	of	Masculinity	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1990),	3.		
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Chapter	Two:	
Emerging	Patterns:	Paternalistic	Idealism,	Anti-Militarism,	and	Welles’	
Diplomatic	Style,	1915-1925	
	Reflecting	on	his	career	in	his	1944	memoir	The	Time	for	Decision,	Sumner	Welles	wistfully	recalled	“[t]he	exuberant	hope	and	confident	optimism	that	was	so	general	in	the	United	States”	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	World	War	One.1	“[W]e	were	headed	toward	a	new	and	better	world.	We	were	confident	that	the	errors	of	the	past	were	to	be	valiantly	corrected;	that	human	wrongs	would	all	be	righted,”	Welles	enthused,	and	that	“war,	in	this	new	dawn	breaking	over	the	earth,	was	now	a	nightmare	of	the	past.”2	Of	particular	importance	was	that	“our	United	States	had	asserted	leadership	in	this	great	crusade;”	“We	had	been	thrilled	to	the	depth	of	our	emotional	and	intellectual	being	by	the	vision	that	Woodrow	Wilson	had	held	out	to	us	of	a	world	order	founded	on	justice	and	on	democracy.”3	Yet,	as	Welles	himself	conceded	only	a	few	paragraphs	later,	“the	wave	of	idealism	which	had	swept	the	world	…	lasted	a	short	time	indeed.	And	…	the	dreams	and	hopes	of	humanity	vanished.”4	The	world’s	postwar	optimism	may	have	dissipated	only	a	few	months	after	the	Armistice	of	11	November	1918,	but	the	idealism	and	confidence	it	inspired	in	Welles	endured	far	longer.5	As	he	launched	his	career	as	a	diplomat	in	the	second	half	of	the	1910s	Welles	was	imbued	with	an	optimistic	belief	in	the	improvement	of	the	moral	and	material	wellbeing	of	mankind,	and	the	role	the	United	States	could	play	in	bringing	it	about.	This	belief	would	place	Welles	solidly	on	the	side	of	Wilsonianism	and	internationalism	in	foreign	policy	matters	for	the	rest	of	his	career;	by	the	1940s	he	would	become	one	of	the	most	forceful	and	erudite	advocates	for	that	particular	strain	of	foreign	policy	thinking.																																																									1	Welles,	Sumner.	The	Time	for	Decision	(New	York:	Harper	&	Brothers	Publishers,	1944),	3.		2	Ibid.	3	Ibid.		4	Ibid.,	4.		5	For	a	survey	of	the	political	and	ideological	shifts	following	World	War	One,	see:	Adam	Tooze,	The	
Deluge:	The	Great	War	and	the	Remaking	of	Global	Order,	1916-1931	(New	York:	Penguin	Books,	2014).		
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However,	Welles’	beliefs	were	far	more	sophisticated	and	ambiguous	than	his	Pollyannaish	remembrances	might	imply.	Though	optimistic	about	the	ability	of	peoples	and	nations	to	improve	their	lot,	Welles	consistently	stressed	the	need	for	American	involvement;	he	articulated	a	vision	that	was	highly	paternalistic	toward	countries	outside	Western	Europe	and	highly	suspicious	of	those	inside	it.		Furthermore,	Welles’	embrace	of	Wilsonian	principles,	such	as	non-intervention	and	multilateral	cooperation,	reflected	much	older	and	deeper	strands	of	Welles’	thinking,	born	out	of	the	prejudices	of	his	class	and	innate	misgivings	about	aggression	and	belligerence.		This	chapter	examines	the	emergence	of	Welles’	outlook	and	foreign	policy	ideology	during	his	first	stint	in	the	State	Department	in	the	years	1915-1925.	It	investigates	how	Welles	matured	as	policymaker,	articulating	a	more	sophisticated	understanding	of	global	affairs	and	a	comprehensive	worldview	during	his	early	career.	That	worldview	was	defined	by	two	key	components:	paternalistic	idealism	toward	the	outside	world,	particularly	Latin	America,	and	an	aversion	to	using	military	solutions	to	solve	diplomatic	problems,	preferring	constitutional	and	multilateral	options	instead.	Building	on	arguments	presented	in	Chapter	One,	which	established	the	socio-cultural	and	psychological	basis	for	Welles’	behaviour	and	attitudes,	this	chapter	shows	how	Welles’	worldview	came	into	focus	through	a	combination	of	idiosyncratic	preferences	and	prejudices	and	the	impact	of	broader	forces	in	international	politics,	ultimately	emerging	with	a	distinctive	Wellesian	approach	to	diplomacy.				
Early	Career	Significance:		 	The	origins	and	contours	of	Welles’	worldview	constitute	perhaps	the	richest	vein	of	scholarly	debate	about	him.	Historians	studying	Welles	have	disagreed	on	the	most	fundamental	of	matters.	According	to	Welles’	biography,	he	was	“a	benevolent	imperialist	in	tune	with	his	times.”6	Conversely,	Irwin	Gellman	believed																																																									6	Benjamin	Welles,	Sumner	Welles:	FDR’s	Global	Strategist	(New	York:	St.	Martin’s	Press,	1997),	75	
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one	of	Welles’	“greatest	faults	[was	his]	ignorance	of	or	lack	of	sympathy	with	others'	feelings”	–	hardly	benevolent.7	The	first	book-length	assessment	of	Welles’	career	praised,	"Welles'	success	in	communicating	his	belief	in	the	Good	Neighbor	approach	[as	being]	due	to	his	open	and	candid	attitude	in	conversations	with	Latin	American	officials."8	Yet	the	most	recent	work	analyzing	Welles’	career	wondered	whether	he	masked	his	real	beliefs	“behind	an	idealistic	smokescreen?”9		On	his	demeanour	and	behaviour,	too,	scholars	have	reached	little	consensus.	Assessing	his	assignment	to	Cuba	in	1933,	one	scholar	wrote	how	Welles	"demonstrated	the	rigid,	dogmatic,	and	opinionated	characteristics	that	would	persist	for	the	rest	of	his	career”	while	another	praised	the	government	Welles	helped	set	up	in	that	country	for	being	"the	most	intricate	and	contextualistic	diplomacy	Welles	had	yet	employed."10	In	her	attempt	at	a	more	systematic	assessment	of	Welles’	beliefs,	Gail	Hanson	convincingly	argued	Progressive-era	lawmakers,	especially	Elihu	Root,	Philander	Knox,	and	Enoch	Crowder,	provided	a	template	for	Welles’	diplomatic	career	and	outlook.	Yet	even	she	had	to	concede	"the	absence	of	psychological	insights	into	Welles	himself”	her	study	could	provide.11		Clearly,	there	is	little	harmony	over	what,	if	anything,	motivated	Welles’	thinking	or	characterized	his	diplomatic	style.	What	can	be	said	is	that	Welles’	approach	to	diplomacy	did	not	chime	with	any	singular	motivation	or	ideology.	A	confluence	of	factors	including,	but	not	limited	to,	the	impact	of	World	War	One,	the	failure	of	the	League	of	Nations,	the	reconfiguration	of	American	involvement	in	the	Caribbean,	and	Welles’	own	upbringing	pushed	him	to	follow	paths	and	adopt	positions	that	would	have	a	formative	influence	on	his	career	and,	eventually,	a																																																									7	Irwin	F.	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs:	Franklin	Roosevelt,	Cordell	Hull,	and	Sumner	Welles	(Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1995),	62.		8	Frank	Warren	Graff,	“Strategy	of	Involvement:	A	Diplomatic	Biography	of	Sumner	Welles”	(Ph.D.	Dissertation.	University	of	Michigan,	1971),	146.		9	Christopher	D.	O’Sullivan,	Sumner	Welles:	Postwar	Planning	and	the	Quest	for	a	New	World	Order	
1937-1943	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2009),	xiv.	10	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs,	84.	Thomas	M.	Millington.	“The	Latin	American	Diplomacy	of	Sumner	Welles”	(Ph.D.	Dissertation:	Johns	Hopkins	School	of	Advanced	International	Studies,	1966),	276.	11	Gail	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System:	The	United	States	in	the	Caribbean,	1920-1940”	(Ph.D.	Dissertation:	State	University	of	New	York	at	Stony	Brook,	1990),	479.		
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lasting	impact	on	the	foreign	policy	of	the	United	States.	Identifying	these	factors,	assessing	their	interactions	with	one	another,	and	determining	their	ramifications	are	essential	steps	to	understanding	how	Welles	became	such	a	prominent	figure	in	U.S.	foreign	policy.		Examinations	of	policymakers’	formative	experiences	have	provided	a	wealth	of	scholarship,	particularly	in	recent	years.	Graham	Cross’s	analysis	of	the	“diplomatic	education”	of	Franklin	Roosevelt	offered	a	particularly	relevant	example	of	this	historiographic	approach.12	Cross’s	attempt	to	“bring	clarity	and	precision	to	the	many	existing	shorthand	descriptions	of	[FDR’s]	early	life”	elucidated	many	key	themes	that	defined	Roosevelt’s	later	foreign	policy,	including	his	relationship	with	military	power,	his	sense	of	geography,	and	his	particular	strain	of	internationalism.13	Cross	contended	FDR	“found	at	least	some	of	the	answers”	to	the	questions	about	how	to	forge	an	U.S.-led	global	hegemony	“in	his	appreciation	of	the	limitations	of	both	physical	and	ideological	power	stemmed	from	the	experiences	of	his	prepresidential	life	and	career.”14	A	similar	approach	to	Welles	can	yield	insights	about	his	future	worldview,	how	he	conducted	himself	as	a	diplomat,	and	what	were	the	salient	features	of	his	diplomatic	thinking	throughout	his	career.			
The	League,	the	Union,	and	the	Republics:	Welles’	Paternalistic	Idealism				 The	first	major	characteristic	of	Welles’	worldview	that	came	into	focus	during	his	first	decade	as	a	diplomat	was	a	paternalistically	idealistic	attitude	toward	the	rest	of	the	world,	particularly	Latin	America.	Welles	articulated	a	view	that	envisioned	collaboration	and	cooperation	among	the	nations	of	Latin	America	under	the	benevolent	guardianship	of	the	United	States.	This	view,	which	manifested	itself	in	many	forms	was	most	evident	Welles’	attitudes	toward	the	League	of	Nations,	his	opinions	about	the	British,	his	efforts	to	help	facilitate	the	
																																																								12	Graham	Cross,	The	Diplomatic	Education	of	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt,	1882-1933	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2012),	6.		13	Ibid.,	6,	154-5,	166-7.		14	Ibid.,	167.		
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creation	of	a	union	of	the	nations	of	Central	America,	and	his	emulation	of	the	rhetoric	of	Charles	Evans	Hughes.		The	origins	of	Welles’	paternalistic	idealism	stemmed	both	from	his	own	idiosyncratic	upbringing	and	broader	social	and	political	currents	of	thought	in	the	U.S.	during	his	formative	years.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	One,	the	noblesse	oblige	of	his	East	Coast	aristocratic	social	milieu	and	the	muscular	Christianity	of	Groton	Preparatory	School	had	specifically	inculcated	him	with	a	sense	of	obligation	and	the	nobility	of	United	States	leadership.	Endicott	Peabody’s	directive	to	instil	in	Grotonian	students	a	drive	for	leadership	compelled	Welles	from	an	early	age	to	view	the	outside	world	as	a	place	in	need	of	reordering	and	improvement,	by	his	hand	if	necessary.	As	he	could	not	embrace	the	aggressive	masculinity	behind	Groton’s	ethos	on	account	of	his	sexuality	Welles	sublimated	it	into	a	beneficent	idealistic	paternalism.		Paternalistic	attitudes	toward	Latin	America	among	people	from	the	United	States	had	multiple	sources.	Throughout	its	history,	but	especially	after	the	Spanish-American	War,	many	in	the	U.S	viewed	the	countries	of	Latin	America	with	a	combination	of	covetousness	and	protectiveness.	“American	middle-class	men,”	wrote	Fredrick	Pike,	“esteemed	the	so-called	manly	qualities,	as	opposed	to	feminine	weakness	and	emotionalism	and	childish	fecklessness	and	fantasizing.	Qualities	that	Americans	admired,	they	consistently	failed	to	find	among	Latin	Americans.”15	This	highly	gendered	and	sexualized	attitude,	extended	beyond	Latin	America,	suffused	Americans’	understanding	of	their	nation,	its	role	in	the	world,	and	its	view	of	outsiders.	Writing	of	the	Cold	War	era	Lavender	Scare,	historian	Naoko	Shibusawa	wrote:	“[s]exuality	was	…	an	elemental	way	in	which	hierarchies	of	power	were	rationalized	in	an	imperialist	framework:	who	was	civilized/uncivilized	or	worthy/unworthy.”16	Welles	was	not	immune	to	these	perspectives.	Such	views	were	detectable	in	him	even	before	he	entered	the	State	Department.	Gail	Hanson	speculated	upon	a	paternalistic	streak	in	Welles’	thinking																																																									15	See:	Fredrick	B.	Pike,	The	United	States	and	Latin	America:	Myths	and	Stereotypes	of	Civilization	and	
Nature	(Austin:	University	of	Texas	Press,	1992),	48	16	Naoko	Shibusawa,	‘The	Lavender	Scare	and	Empire:	Rethinking	Cold	War	Antigay	Politics’,	
Diplomatic	History,	Vol.	36,	No.	4	(September	2012),	751.	
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about	the	world	beyond	the	U.S.	in	her	observations	of	Welles’	interest	in	the	writings	of	art	historian	Ernest	F.	Fenellosa.	According	to	Hanson,	Welles	may	have	"retained	a	core	of	belief	in	Fenellosa's	views	on	the	'feminine'	East	and	'masculine'	West	and	his	advocacy	of	world-wide	cooperation."17		Wherever	they	originated,	Welles’	attitudes	during	his	early	life	showed	susceptibility	toward	seeing	the	rest	of	the	world	through	a	paternalistic	lens.	However,	these	views	were	not	fully	formed	by	the	time	he	entered	the	State	Department	in	1915.	They	emerged	gradually	over	the	subsequent	decade,	evolving	in	response	to	his	experiences	at	his	diplomatic	postings	and	worldwide	events	of	great	significance.	Reflecting	the	confluence	of	both	longstanding	paternalistic	views	of	Latin	America	by	people	from	the	U.S.	and	the	impact	of	the	aftermath	of	World	War	One,	the	first	indication	of	Welles’	evolving	worldview	came	during	his	posting	to	Argentina	(1917-1920)	amid	discussions	about	the	recently	proposed	League	of	Nations.		Argentine-American	relations	were	in	flux	at	the	end	of	the	1910s.	Up	to	that	time	“the	policy	of	the	United	States	towards	Argentina	…	[was]	merely	a	specific	application	of	its	general	Latin	American	policy,”	thus	lacking,	in	other	words,	any	special	attention	or	consideration.18	Argentina,	for	its	part,	“defined	its	relationship	with	the	United	States	in	terms	of	autonomy.”19	This	stance	of	mutual	disinterest	did	not	make	for	warm	relations	between	the	two	countries	but	economic	opportunities	stemming	from	the	war	led	to	renewed	mutual	interest.	American	investment	in	Argentina	grew	rapidly	after	World	War	One	as	did	trade	between	the	countries,	with	American	products	constituting	over	one	quarter	of	Argentina’s	imports	by	the	end	of	the	1920s,	a	transformation	to	which	Welles	was	a	firsthand	witness	as	Commercial	Affairs	Officer	at	the	American	Embassy	in	Buenos	Aires.20		
																																																								17	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	48,	n.40.		18	Arthur	P.	Whitaker,	The	United	States	and	Argentina	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1954),	88.	19	Deborah	L.	Norden	and	Roberto	Russell,	The	United	States	and	Argentina:	Changing	Relations	in	a	
Changing	World	(New	York:	Routledge,	2002),	1.	20	Harold	F.	Peterson,	Argentina	and	the	United	States,	1810-1960	(New	York:	State	University	of	New	York,	1964),	342.		
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Argentina’s	place	in	the	United	States’	conception	of	postwar	international	affairs	also	depended	upon	forces	beyond	their	bilateral	relationship,	namely,	the	League	of	Nations.	By	February	1919	the	preliminary	outlines	for	the	League	of	Nations	drawn	up	at	the	Paris	Peace	Conference	had	become	public	knowledge.21	Drawing	on	Progressive	politics,	a	highly	moralistic	worldview,	and	robust	patriotism,	President	Woodrow	Wilson	articulated	lofty	new	goals	for	American	foreign	policy,	emphasizing	the	moral	obligation	of	Americans	to	spread	the	benefits	of	democracy	to	all	the	peoples	of	the	world,	the	main	vehicle	of	which	was	to	be	the	League	of	Nations.22		However,	the	setup	of	the	League	had	yet	to	be	agreed	upon	and	a	significant	backlash	was	brewing.	A	contingent	of	Republican	lawmakers,	led	by	Senator	Henry	Cabot	Lodge,	began	speaking	out	against	the	League,	and	opposition	in	the	United	States	Senate	as	well	as	within	the	general	population	began	to	grow.23	Although	the	proposal	was	popular	among	the	many	Democrats	who	shared	Wilson’s	idealism,	many	worried	that	the	League	might	trump	American	foreign	policy	prerogatives	in	key	areas,	in	particular	with	respect	to	the	Monroe	Doctrine,	the	defensive	proclamation	against	European	incursion	into	the	Western	Hemisphere.24		In	was	in	this	context	that	Welles	began	to	formulate	his	blend	of	idealism	and	paternalism.	Argentina’s	place	within	the	League	was	a	matter	of	intensive	debate	in	that	country.	In	recollections	of	his	daily	activities	at	the	time,	Welles	recorded	in	detail	the	thoughts	of	several	prominent	Argentine	politicians	who																																																									21	John	Milton	Cooper,	Jr.	Breaking	the	Heart	of	the	World:	Woodrow	Wilson	and	the	Fight	for	the	
League	of	Nations	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001),	11.		22	Lloyd	E.	Ambrosius,	Wilsonianism:	Woodrow	Wilson	and	His	Legacy	in	American	Foreign	Relations	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2002),	7;	Arthur	S.	Link,	Wilson	the	Diplomatist:	A	Look	at	His	Major	
Foreign	Policies	(New	York:	Viewpoints,	1957),	12-16.	The	literature	on	the	origins	and	characteristics	of	Wilsonianism	is	voluminous.	In	addition	to	the	texts	listed	above	excellent	titles	include,	but	are	not	limited	to:	Norman	A.	Graebner	and	Edward	M.	Bennett,	The	Versailles	Treaty	and	
Its	Legacy:	The	Failure	of	the	Wilsonian	Vision	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2011);	Lloyd	E.	Ambrosius,	Woodrow	Wilson	and	the	American	Diplomatic	Tradition:	The	Treaty	Fight	in	
Perspective	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1987);	John	Milton	Cooper,	Jr.,	Breaking	the	
Heart	of	the	World:	Woodrow	Wilson	and	the	Fight	for	the	League	of	Nations	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001).	23	Link,	Wilson	the	Diplomatist,	127-9,	135.	24	Herbert	F.	Margulies,	The	Mild	Reservationists	and	the	League	of	Nations	Controversy	in	the	Senate	(London:	University	of	Missouri	Press,	1989),	12;	Merlo	J.	Pusey,	Charles	Evans	Hughes,	Vol.	1	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1963),	396.	
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expressed	opinions	about	the	League.	In	so	doing	he	revealed	a	great	deal	about	his	own	beliefs.	Welles’	views	about	the	League	reflected	a	tension	over	the	proper	role	of	the	League	and	the	prerogatives	of	the	United	States	in	Latin	America	respectively.	He	broadly	agreed	with	the	idealistic	sentiment	and	internationalist	bent	behind	Wilson’s	proclamations,	but	detectable	in	Welles’	support	for	the	League	was	a	vein	of	nationalistic	self-interest	and	a	paternalistic	prioritizing	of	American	hegemony	over	genuine	multilateralism.		Welles	expressed	his	ambivalence	in	the	context	of	discussing	the	Monroe	Doctrine.	In	a	long	talk	with	former	Foreign	Affairs	Minister	Jose	Luís	Murature	in	April	1919,	Welles	discussed	the	relationship	between	the	Monroe	Doctrine	and	the	League’s	structure.	In	his	diary	Welles	noted	Murature	was	“in	entire	accord	with	that	portion	of	public	opinion	in	the	United	States	which	demands	the	definite	inclusion	of	the	Monroe	Doctrine	in	the	League.”25	A	few	days	later	over	dinner	with	Dr.	Carlos	Ibarguren,	a	progressive	Conservative	deputy,	Welles	recalled	Ibarguren	expressing	the	opinion	that	the	inclusion	of	the	Monroe	Doctrine	in	the	structure	of	the	League	“was	not	a	mere	selfish	insistence	on	the	right	to	exclude	others	from	the	material	advantages	of	the	continent,	but	was	rather	a	declaration	to	all	the	world	that	for	all	purposes	of	international	right	the	continent	was	not	divided,	but	would	stand	together.”26	Though	these	opinions	were	those	of	the	Argentine	officials	with	whom	Welles	met,	the	detail	with	which	he	recorded	these	sentiments,	and	the	frequency	with	which	they	appear	in	his	diaries	suggests	Welles	was	not	giving	an	unfiltered	account	of	any	view	expressed	to	him	about	the	League,	but	to	some	degree	was	expressing	his	own	views	instead.	To	wit,	on	those	occasions	that	Welles	recorded	his	own	views	alongside	those	of	his	Argentine	counterparts,	the	views	expressed	fit	together	seamlessly.	When	challenged	by	Senator	Diego	Molinari	about	the	potential	upset	to	hemispheric	relations	portended	by	the	League	of	Nations,	Welles	stated	that	he	believed	Americans	would	“confin[e]	ourselves	in	our	dealings	with	Europe	and	with	Asia	merely	to	the	intercourse	and	relations	which	our	obligations	under																																																									25	‘Welles	Diary’,	12	April	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	1.		26	‘Welles	Diary’,	14	April	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	1.		
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the	League	of	Nations	imposed,	and	to	the	obligations	which	commercial	interests	demanded.”27	In	essence,	Welles	was	expressing	his	belief	that	the	relations	between	the	United	States	and	the	rest	of	the	Americas	were	to	remain	sacrosanct,	notwithstanding	American	involvement	in	the	League	of	Nations.	Similarly,	in	a	discussion	with	opposition	politician	Sanchez	Sorondo	in	August	1919,	Welles	espoused	the	view	that:			“	…	I	felt	that	by	adherence	to	the	League	of	Nations	it	was	possible	for	the	immense	and	almost	dormant	moral	force	which	is	contained	in	the	political	spirit	of	the	American	republics	to	assert	itself	and	to	become,	as	it	should	be,	the	greatest	factor	in	the	world	today,	by	opposing	itself	to	the	imperialism	of	the	far	East	and	the	chaos	threatening	Europe.”28					 Two	intertwined	strains	of	Welles’	thinking	were	evident	in	this	passage.	Firstly,	the	degree	to	which	his	outlook	at	the	time	was	essentially	idealistic	and	optimistic.	The	‘moral	force’	and	‘spirit	of	the	American	republics’	of	which	Welles	spoke	were	his	own	formulations,	expressed	in	utopian	terms,	of	how	he	envisioned	relations	within	the	Western	Hemisphere,	themes	to	which	Welles	would	return	frequently	during	his	subsequent	career.	The	second	characteristic	evident	in	Welles’	reflection	was	the	undeniable	self-interested	formulation	of	his	idealistic	pronouncements.	Though	ostensibly	altruistic,	Welles’	depiction	of	the	League	was	couched	in	his	understanding	of	how	it	might	be	employed	to	serve	U.S.	interests,	in	this	case	countering	imperialism	in	the	Western	Hemisphere.	Calling	out	the	dangers	posed	by	the	Far	East	and	the	chaos	threatening	Europe	served	as	a	rallying	cry	for	opposing	non-American	intrusion	into	that	portion	of	the	globe	that	Welles	had	identified	as	a	critical	component	of	U.S.	foreign	policy,	as	opposed	to	areas	outside	the	Western	Hemisphere	which	would	require	attentiveness	only	out	of	obligation.	Thus	barely	concealed	behind	Welles’	ostensible	support	for	the	League	was	a	clear	intention	to	use	it	as	a	means	of	achieving	specific	goals.	Welles	revealed	a	
																																																								27	‘Welles	Diary’,	13	August	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	3.		28	‘Welles	Diary’,	7	August	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	3.		
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multifaceted	understanding	of	U.S.	relations	with	Latin	America,	with	Wilsonian	utopianism	tempered	by	a	desire	to	maintain	U.S.	hegemony	in	Latin	America,	even	under	the	auspices	of	a	world	organization.	It	also	mirrored	the	deeper	tension	within	Welles’	personality	between	his	Groton-instilled	noblesse	oblige	and	his	more	sentimental	qualities.			
Perfidious	Albion		Another	dimension	of	Welles’	paternalistic	desire	to	maintain	U.S.	hegemony	over	the	countries	of	Latin	America	as	a	means	of	bringing	about	its	advancement	and	progress	can	be	seen	in	his	resentful	attitude	toward	potential	rivals	to	the	U.S.	in	that	region.	Consistently	evident	in	Welles’	writings	while	in	Argentina	was	a	persistent	and	palpable	resentment	of	rival	European	powers,	particularly	Great	Britain.	This	dislike	did	not	reflect	official	American	policy	nor	was	it	an	obvious	reaction	to	deliberately	provocative	policies	on	the	part	of	the	British.	Rather,	Welles’	antipathy	reflected	his	own	beliefs	about	the	role	of	the	United	States	in	the	world	and	the	future	of	Latin	America.		To	some	degree	Welles	had	reason	to	resent	the	British	in	Argentina.	Britain	had	long	held	a	“special	relationship”	with	the	Argentines,	stemming	from	immense	economic	investment	in	the	country	during	the	middle	and	late	nineteenth	century.29	By	the	early	twentieth	century	Britain	had	become	“‘the	Argentine	Republic's	banker,	stockbroker,	railway	builder	and	supplier’."30	For	its	own	part,	American	policy	toward	Britain	following	the	conclusion	of	World	War	One	was	ambivalent;	“there	were	no	violent	quarrels	during	the	twenties,	little	active	argument,	but	just	indifference	to	each	other’s	point	of	view,”	as	witnessed	by	the	encroachment	of	American	business	into	British	interests	in	Argentina.31		
																																																								29	Jeremy	Adelman,	Essays	in	Argentine	Labour	History,	1870-1930	(London:	MacMillan	Press	Ltd.,	1992),	6.	30	James	Scobie,	quoted	in	Eduardo	Crawley,	A	House	Divided:	Argentina,	1880-1980	(London:	C.	Hurst	&	Company,	1984),	10.	31	Bruce	M.	Russett,	Community	and	Contention:	Britain	and	America	in	the	Twentieth	Century	(Cambridge:	The	M.I.T.	Press,	1963),	13,	citing	William	Clark,	Less	Than	Kin,	New	York,	1957,	129-130.	
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However,	while	challenging	British	dominance	in	Argentina,	American	diplomats	after	April	1917	had	calibrated	their	language	carefully	to	avoid	opening	a	rift	in	their	wartime	alliance.	This	was	evident	even	in	Argentine	affairs.	In	a	telegram	to	the	Secretary	of	State	detailing	an	attempt	by	the	British	to	seek	the	annulment	of	a	telegraph	concession	given	to	a	company	by	the	Argentine	government,	the	American	Ambassador	advised	a	yielding	and	carefully	worded	response	from	the	State	Department	that	would	“bring	the	attention	of	the	British	Government	to	the	manner	in	which	the	British	authorities”	had	acted.32	Welles	exhibited	no	such	niceties.	Instead,	he	displayed	an	attitude	of	antipathy	toward	the	British	that	extended	beyond	any	understandable	spirit	of	competition	or	feelings	of	national	rivalry.	He	was	consistently	dismissive	and	condescending	about	British	diplomats	and	British	people	in	general,	never	missing	an	opportunity	to	deride	them	for	what	he	perceived	as	incompetence	or	arrogance.		He	blamed	the	British	for	difficulties	and	disruptions	that	arose	in	various	sectors	of	Argentina’s	economy.	According	to	Welles,	a	general	strike	in	1919	was	instigated	by	the	poor	treatment	of	a	sailor	by	a	British	ship	captain	and	its	escalation	two	weeks	later	a	consequence	of	poor	treatment	of	Argentine	workers	by	British-owned	companies.33	Conversely,	a	British	offer	to	end	an	earlier	strike	with	a	payment	of	200	000	pesos	to	the	labour	unions	was	dubbed	by	Welles	“a	typically	stupid	piece	of	British	diplomacy	in	South	America.”34		Little	about	the	British	legation	assigned	to	Buenos	Aires	impressed	Welles.	He	noted	that	the	British	Minister,	Sir	Reginald	Tower,	had	“upon	every	possible	occasion	gone	out	of	his	way	to	offend”	a	prominent	Argentine	politician,	and	had	“undoubtedly	injured	the	Allied	cause	by	doing	so.”35	The	actions	of	an	agent	of	the	British-owned	Central	&	South	American	Telegraph	Company,	identified	as	Mr.																																																									32	‘Telegram	from	Stimson	to	the	Acting	Secretary	of	State’,	10	December	1918,	U.S.	Department	of	State,	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States	(FRUS),	1919,	Vol.	I,	(Washington,	D.C.:	GPO,	1934),	172.	33	‘Welles	Diary’,	10	April	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	1;	‘Welles	Diary’,	22	April	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	2.	34	‘Welles	Diary’,	17	March	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	1.	Historical	and	contemporary	accounts	do	not	support	Welles’	interpretation	of	events.	It	is	generally	agreed	that	the	dockworkers	strike	stemmed	from	deep	fissures	in	Argentine	politics	and	economic	pressures	following	the	end	of	World	War	One.	See:	Rock,	David,	Argentina	in	the	Twentieth	Century	(London:	Duckworth,	1975),	157-158.	35	‘Welles	Diary’,	24	April	1919,	SWP,	1919-1943,	Box:	167,	Folder:	2.		
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Irland,	was	described	by	Welles	as	“about	as	perfect	a	specimen	of	the	narrow-minded	Britisher	as	one	could	find.”36		For	their	part,	the	British	took	little	notice	of	Welles’	hostility.	British	diplomatic	and	consular	officers	posted	to	Argentina	at	the	same	time	as	Welles	cooperated	easily	with	other	representatives	of	the	United	States	on	a	variety	of	matters.	The	U.S.,	for	example,	acquiesced	to	a	British	request	to	divert	a	shipment	of	coal	bound	for	Argentina	to	a	British-owned	railway	line	that	was	running	short.37	In	a	note	to	Foreign	Secretary	Arthur	Balfour,	British	Ambassador	to	Argentina	Sir	Reginald	Tower	reported	on	a	thoughtful	consultation	between	himself	and	Ambassador	Stimson	over	finding	a	resolution	to	the	ongoing	dockworkers	strike	in	Buenos	Aires.38	British	economic	concerns	in	Argentina,	which	were	substantial,	and	a	topic	of	frequent	discussion	in	diplomatic	correspondence,	rarely	mentioned	the	U.S.	and	never	approached	the	level	of	rivalry	imagined	by	Welles.		Welles’	desire	to	undercut	the	British	pushed	him	to	seek	out	allies	in	kind.	In	January	he	met	with	two	businessmen	who	told	him	anecdotally	of	increased	British	competition	with	American	commerce	across	South	America.39	Only	a	few	weeks	later,	he	recommended	curtailing	cooperation	with	British	(and	French)	legations	on	matters	stemming	from	the	end	of	hostilities	in	Europe.40	Welles	also	made	a	point	of	establishing	connections	with	members	of	the	Argentine	political	elite	who	were	suspicious	or	resentful	of	British	investment	in	their	country.	By	doing	so,	Welles	tapped	into	a	deep	divide	in	Argentine	political	circles	over	the	course	their	foreign	policy	should	take.	Proponents	of	closer	ties	with	the	United	States	advocated	for	“American	regionalism”	while	those	who	supported	closer	ties	with	Europe	(or	weaker	ties	with	the	U.S.)	pushed	for	“Europe	and	universalism.”41	Still	
																																																								36	‘Welles	Diary’,	13	February	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	1.		37	‘Telegram	to	Lord	Grey’,	22	December	1919;	‘Decypher.	Mr.	Lindsay	(Washington)’,	30	January	1920	BNA,	FO	368/2051.	38	Dispatch	to	Balfour,	22	April	1919,	British	National	Archives	(BNA),	FO	371/3504.	39	‘Welles	Diary’,	22	January	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	1.	40	‘Welles	Diary’,	6	February	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	1.	41	Whitaker,	The	United	States	and	Argentina,	95.	
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others	advocated	for	pan-Hispanic	alternatives	to	provide	a	bulwark	against	the	United	States.42	Welles	met	frequently	with	members	of	the	American	regionalist	group,	among	them	Diego	Molinari,	a	man	whom	Welles	noted	believed	the	aforementioned	dockworkers	strike	was	“entirely	due	to	British	influence.”43	Welles	and	Molinari	quickly	became	close	friends	and	the	two	shared	further	mutual	criticisms	of	the	British	over	the	duration	of	Welles’	tenure.	Welles	also	met	with	various	deputies	and	local	officials	close	to	President	Irigoyen	who	expressed	to	Welles	the	latter’s	resentment	of	the	“commercial	system	of	domination”	(in	Welles’	words)	established	by	Britain	during	the	preceding	decades	and	of	recent	actions	by	the	British	Legation.44	Indeed,	much	to	Welles’	delight,	Irigoyen	himself	seemed	to	share	some	of	these	opinions,	with	Welles	reporting	in	January	1919	that	Irigoyen	“had	no	confidence	in	and	disliked	extremely”	British	Minister	Sir	Reginald	Tower.45		In	fairness,	although	Welles’	antipathy	for	the	British	was	paramount,	his	jealousy	toward	potential	rival	powers	in	Latin	America	was	not	entirely	exclusive	to	that	country.	The	French	legation,	Welles	complained,	was	comprised	of	“retired	consular	officers	who	have	nothing	to	recommend	them	to	either	official	or	social	circles.”46	Though	a	perfectly	reasonable	criticism	to	make,	the	motivation	for	this	critique	may	have	been	jealousy,	as	Welles	noted	resentfully	that	despite	the	lack	of	attention,	there	is	“no	country	more	affectionately	regarded	by	the	Argentines	in	general”	than	France.47	Conversely,	Welles	was	reassured	when	President	Irigoyen	assured	him	that	the	war	had	precluded	any	rapprochement	with	German	businesses	“for	years	to	come”	and,	on	a	separate	occasion,	when	informed	by	a	Japanese	diplomat	that	Japan’s	interests	in	Argentina	were	unlikely	to	improve	in	the	near	future.48																																																										42	John	Milton	Cooper	Jr.,	Reconsidering	Woodrow	Wilson:	Progressivism,	Internationalism,	War,	and	
Peace	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	2008),	179.	43	‘Welles	Diary,’	24	February	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	1.	44	‘Welles	Diary’,	23	January	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	1.	45	Ibid.	46	‘Welles	Diary’,	15	July	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	3.	47	Ibid.	48	‘Welles	Diary’,	23	January	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	1;	‘Welles	Diary’,	9	April	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	1.		
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But	Britain	was	the	most	powerful	non-American	presence	in	Argentina	and	for	that	reason	it	garnered	the	lion’s	share	of	Welles’	ire.	He	identified	it,	correctly,	as	the	greatest	obstacle	to	American	penetration	into	Argentina,	and	hence	to	the	hemispheric	solidarity	he	sought.	Welles’	Anglophobia	was	a	reaction	to	the	challenge	posed	by	the	British	to	the	righteous	American	leadership	Welles	had	been	taught	during	his	formative	years	and	now	sought	to	effect.	Like	his	conditional	support	for	the	League	of	Nations,	it	reflected	a	deep-seated	desire	for	U.S.	hegemony	over	Latin	American	countries,	and	the	paternalistic	obligation	Welles	believed	Americans	had	toward	its	southern	neighbours.	Welles’	experience	in	Argentina	facing	off	against	the	British	gave	his	worldview	a	tinge	of	Anglophobia	that	he	would	carry	with	him	for	the	rest	of	his	career.				
Grander	Strategy:	The	Central	American	Union			When	Welles’	assignment	in	Argentina	came	to	an	end	in	1920,	and	he	returned	to	Washington	D.C.	to	take	up	the	post	of	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	for	Latin	American	Affairs,	his	worldview	was	beginning	to	come	into	focus.49	Increasingly	confident	in	his	ability	to	bring	about	the	hemispheric	cooperation	and	solidarity	he	so	desperately	sought,	Welles	looked	for	opportunities	to	enact	his	peculiar	mix	of	paternalistic	idealism	and	a	desire	to	expand	American	influence.	His	first	chance	to	do	so	came	soon	after	his	promotion	in	the	form	of	a	quixotic	plan	to	forge	a	political	union	among	the	countries	of	Central	America.	During	the	first	decades	of	the	twentieth	century	the	nations	of	Central	America	briefly	considered	(not	for	the	first	time)	forming	a	federal	union	among	themselves.50	Although	idea	eventually	fell	through	due	to	the	reluctance	of	Nicaragua	to	join	the	project,	instability	in	Guatemala,	and	the	perception	of																																																									49	Welles	was	reassigned	to	Washington	following	his	return	from	Argentina	in	early	1920.	He	was	assigned	to	the	Division	of	Latin	American	Affairs	in	May,	made	Assistant	Chief	of	the	Division	in	June,	and	promoted	again	to	Acting	Chief	in	September.	Norman	Davis	to	Sumner	Welles,	1	September	1920,	NARA,	RG	59,	Central	Decimal	File,	Decimal	File	1910-1929,	Box	1724:	123	W	45/69	-	123	W	523	–	48,	123W451/25a.		50	See	Thomas	L.	Karnes,	The	Failure	of	Union:	Central	America,	1824-1960	(Chapel	Hill:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1961),	204-28.		
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meddling	by	the	U.S.,	in	the	brief	period	when	the	union	was	still	a	possibility	Welles	was	one	of	its	most	enthusiastic	supporters.51	Here	again	Welles’	methods	and	rhetoric	for	supporting	the	idea	exhibited	the	same	mix	of	idealism	and	paternalism	that	had	characterized	his	support	for	the	League	of	Nations	and	antipathy	to	British	involvement	in	Argentina.	For	the	short	time	the	Central	American	Union	was	being	considered,	Welles	looked	for	any	way	he	could	think	of	to	sculpt	it	in	his	own	image.	Early	on	he	recommended	the	State	Department	propose	moving	the	site	of	a	conference	on	the	proposed	union	to	Washington	D.C.	His	reasoning	for	doing	so	–	to	make	“any	attempt	to	foster	anti-American	sentiment	…	impossible”	–	explicitly	invoked	the	need	to	preserve	American	influence	over	the	proceedings.52	Later	on,	during	a	visit	of	delegates	from	some	of	the	proposed	member-countries	of	the	Union	to	Washington	D.C.,	he	personally	arranged	and	shepherded	the	delegates	of	the	provisional	union	into	a	meeting	with	the	Secretary	of	State.53		Welles’	efforts	to	play	midwife	to	the	union’s	creation	reflected	the	degree	to	which	he	was	thinking	strategically	about	U.S.	influence	in	Latin	America.	In	a	memo	to	the	Secretary	of	State	elucidating	a	specific	concern	about	a	U.S.	treaty	with	Nicaragua	that	was	holding	up	negotiations	Welles	wrote,	“I	can	see	no	valid	reason	why	Central	American	Union	should	not	be	energetically	supported	by	the	Government	of	the	United	States.”54	Tellingly,	Welles	justified	his	recommendation	by	underlining	how	it	“will	be	a	very	distinct	advance	in	the	progress	of	the	Central	American	peoples	and	will	simplify	to	a	great	extent	our	dealings	with	Central	America.”55	He	saw	such	a	union	as	a	potential	“buffer	state	between	Mexico	and	the	other	Latin	American	countries	and	would	prevent	to	a	great	extent	the	infiltration																																																									51	Karnes,	The	Failure	of	Union:	Central	America,	213,	219,	221.		52	Memorandum	Re:	Proposed	Central	American	Conference,	20	August	1920,	NARA,	RG	59,	Central	Decimal	File,	Decimal	File	1910-1929,	Records	of	the	Department	of	State	Relating	to	Internal	Affairs	of	Central	America,	1910-29,	Microcopy	No.	672,	Roll	No.3.		53	Welles	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	19	November	1921,	NARA,	RG	59,	Central	Decimal	File,	Decimal	File	1910-1929,	Records	of	the	Department	of	State	Relating	to	Internal	Affairs	of	Central	America,	1910-29,	Microcopy	No.	672,	Roll	No.6.	54	Welles	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	11	May	1921,	NARA,	RG	59,	Central	Decimal	File,	Decimal	File	1910-1929,	Records	of	the	Department	of	State	Relating	to	Internal	Affairs	of	Central	America,	1910-29,	Microcopy	No.	672,	Roll	No.6.	55	Ibid.		
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of	anti-American	sentiment	emanating	from	Mexico	throughout	the	rest	of	the	continent.”56		Though	Welles	was	not	alone	in	his	support	for	the	idea	of	a	Central	American	Union	he	was	singular	in	his	advocating	for	it	from	the	perspective	of	both	increasing	U.S.	esteem	in	Latin	America	and	the	wellbeing	of	the	Central	American	people.	In	Welles’	emergent	worldview,	these	two	concepts	were	inseparable	and	complementary,	whether	under	the	auspices	of	an	indigenously	conceived	multinational	union	or	a	global	effort	of	assembling	a	league	of	nations.	Notably,	this	formulation	was	in	stark	contrast	to	that	of	Welles’	superior,	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	Fred	Morris	Dearing,	who	viewed	the	project	as	misguided.	In	a	memo	circulated	in	December	1921,	Dearing	argued	the	proposed	union	was	ill	conceived,	unstable,	and	likely	to	foster	anti-American	sentiment,	comparing	the	project	unfavourably	to	the	failed	government	of	the	Articles	of	Confederation.57	As	it	happened,	such	pessimism	proved	prescient,	as	the	Central	American	Union	collapsed	almost	as	quickly	as	it	was	formed.	Nevertheless,	Welles	had	made	clear	his	enthusiasm	for	such	a	project	and,	in	laying	bare	his	reasons	for	doing	so,	further	demonstrated	his	unique	blend	of	paternalism	and	idealism	in	Latin	American	affairs.			
Patronizing	Paternalism:	Charles	Evans	Hughes	and	Welles’	Emergent	Worldview		 Besides	the	experiences	he	gained	from	specific	postings	during	his	early	career,	Welles’	foreign	policy	outlook	was	also	shaped	by	the	people	he	worked	with	in	the	State	Department	during	the	1920s,	specifically	Secretary	of	State	Charles	Evans	Hughes.	Although	they	worked	together	for	only	four	years,	Welles	and	Hughes	developed	a	close	partnership.	Hughes	nurtured	Welles’	career,	helping	
																																																								56	Welles	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	11	May	1921,	NARA,	RG	59,	Central	Decimal	File,	Decimal	File	1910-1929,	Records	of	the	Department	of	State	Relating	to	Internal	Affairs	of	Central	America,	1910-29,	Microcopy	No.	672,	Roll	No.6.	57	Memorandum	from	the	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	to	Mr.	Fletcher,	7	December	1921,	NARA,	RG	59,	Central	Decimal	File,	Decimal	File	1910-1929,	Records	of	the	Department	of	State	Relating	to	Internal	Affairs	of	Central	America,	1910-29,	Microcopy	No.	672,	Roll	No.6.	
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Welles	hone	his	skills	as	a	diplomat	and	allowing	his	emerging	paternalistic	and	idealistic	beliefs	to	crystallize	into	a	more	coherent	worldview.		Charles	Evans	Hughes	provided	a	worthy	model	for	Welles	to	attempt	to	imitate.	He	was	one	of	the	United	States’	most	accomplished	political	figures	even	before	he	became	Secretary	of	State;	his	biography	points	to	certain	clues	as	to	why	Welles	developed	a	professional	affinity	for	him.	Like	Welles,	Hughes	was	born	in	New	York,	albeit	not	raised	among	privilege	as	Welles	was.	He	scaled	the	political	and	legal	worlds	of	turn-of-the-century	America	with	surprising	speed,	graduating	from	Columbia	Law	School	and	becoming	partner	in	a	New	York	law	firm	by	the	age	of	twenty-five.58	Like	Welles,	he	made	a	name	for	himself	as	an	indefatigable	worker.	As	a	litigator	he	earned	a	reputation	as	an	impressive	trial	lawyer,	possessed	of	substantial	intellect	and	operating	with	"the	vigor	of	a	dynamo."59	“When	he	rose	to	argue,”	historian	Merlo	Pusey	wrote,	“it	was	always	a	tour	de	force.”60	These	attributes	served	him	well	in	court	as	well	as	on	the	political	stage,	which	he	entered	somewhat	reluctantly	in	1906	as	the	Republican	candidate	for	governor	of	New	York.61	His	election	brought	him	a	national	profile,	culminating	in	his	unsuccessful	run	for	president	in	1916	against	Woodrow	Wilson.	His	selection	as	Secretary	of	State	in	Warren	Harding’s	cabinet	five	years	later	surprised	no	one;	President	Harding	and	Vice-President	Calvin	Coolidge	were	said	to	be	“in	awe”	of	the	former	governor.62	In	Hughes	Welles	could	see	an	example	of	the	work	ethic	and	career	trajectory	he	hoped	to	follow:	tireless	effort,	backed	by	a	brilliant	mind,	and	ultimately	rewarded	with	appointment	to	high	political	office.			 Unsurprisingly,	once	the	two	men	met	they	got	along	rather	well.	From	the	beginning	of	their	collaboration	in	the	State	Department	Welles	and	Hughes	developed	a	good	working	relationship.	Hughes	was	impressed	with	Welles’	performance	as	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	for	Latin	American	Affairs	and	kept	him	on	in	the	post	for	over	a	year	before	selecting	him	to	serve	as	Commissioner	to	the																																																									58	Betty	Glad,	Charles	Evans	Hughes	and	the	Illusions	of	Innocence:	A	Study	in	American	Diplomacy	(Urbana,	IL:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	1966),	59.	59	Pusey,	Charles	Evans	Hughes,	Vol.	1,	384.	60	Ibid.,	385.	61	Glad,	Charles	Evans	Hughes,	64.	62	Ibid.,	138.	
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Dominican	Republic.	In	this	manner,	Welles	was	the	beneficiary	of	Hughes’	changes	to	the	administration	of	the	State	Department,	specifically	ending	the	tradition	of	promoting	diplomats	more	for	economic	or	political	stature	than	talent	or	accomplishment.63	Hughes’	willingness	to	promote	Welles	despite	his	young	age	“reflected	[his]	concern	with	merit,”	and	foreshadowed	the	overhaul	of	the	diplomatic	and	consular	services	that	Hughes	initiated,	culminating	in	the	passage	of	the	1924	Rogers	Act.64		The	confidence	Hughes	placed	in	Welles	was	rewarded	on	multiple	occasions.	Welles’	performance	in	the	Dominican	Republic	earned	him	special	commendation	from	Hughes,	as	did	shorter	missions	to	Haiti	and	Honduras,	where	Welles	handled	himself	ably.	Upon	successful	completion	of	his	mission	to	the	Dominican	Republic,	Hughes	cabled	Welles	saying	the	Department	“congratulates	and	commends	you	for	the	very	important	part	that	you	have	played	in	bringing	about	this	result.”65	Welles	made	such	a	good	impression	that	he	was	selected	to	personally	accompany	Hughes	to	the	Pan	American	Conference	in	Panama	in	1924.	Here	Welles	again	impressed	Hughes,	this	time	with	his	“special	aptitude	for	negotiations	with	Latin	Americans.”66	Reflecting	in	his	diary	later	in	life,	Hughes	wrote	that	Welles	was	“a	diplomat	of	‘exceptional	ability,	poise,	and	force	of	character’."67			 Hughes’	favourable	impressions	of	Welles’	were	gladly	reciprocated.	Welles	respected	Hughes	even	before	his	appointment	as	Secretary	of	State,	evidenced	by	his	being	“dismayed”	when	Hughes	lost	the	1916	election	to	Wilson.68	Welles’	admiration	for	Hughes	continued	after	their	work	together	in	the	State	Department	ended	too.	In	the	policy	papers	he	wrote	for	Franklin	Roosevelt	during	the	years	of																																																									63	It	should	be	noted	that	although	Welles	was	promoted	for	his	abilities,	he	also	possessed	substantial	financial	and	proprietary	resources	courtesy	of	his	first	wife,	Esther	Slater.		64	Glad,	Charles	Evans	Hughes,	135.	65	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	101,	quoting	NARA	RG	59,	State	Department	Decimal	File,	Hughes	to	SW,	22	March	1924,	839.00/2812.		66	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	94;	quoting	Hughes’	memoirs,	David	J	Danelski	and	Joseph	S.	Tulchin,	eds.	The	Autobiographical	Notes	of	Charles	Evans	Hughes	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1973),	269.		67	Merlo	J.	Pusey,	Charles	Evans	Hughes,	Vol.	2	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1963),	531,	quoting	CEH	Notes,	p.327.		68	Welles	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	49.	
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political	exile,	Welles	wrote	approvingly	of	Hughes’	policies	while	in	office.69	Reflecting	on	Hughes	later	in	life,	Welles	wrote	"the	Government	of	the	United	States	was	singularly	successful	so	long	as	Mr.	Hughes	was	Secretary	of	State"	with	regards	to	disputes	in	Latin	America.70	Hughes’	Latin	American	policy	had	a	profound	influence	on	Welles.	Over	the	subsequent	years	Welles	would	repeatedly	invoke	Hughes’	example	as	a	guiding	light	for	his	own	policies	and	rhetoric.	This	was	most	obvious	over	the	topic	of	the	Monroe	Doctrine.	Beginning	in	1921	Hughes	delivered	a	series	of	speeches	about	the	Monroe	Doctrine	that	advocated	for	a	general	reassessment	of	American	hemispheric	policy.	Other	Secretaries	of	State	before	him,	including	Elihu	Root	and	others,	had	attempted	to	rehabilitate	the	Monroe	Doctrine,	but	few	achieved	very	great	success.71	Coming	in	the	wake	of	World	War	One,	where	the	United	States	saw	its	involvement	in	world	affairs	take	on	a	new	dimension,	and	in	the	shadow	of	the	League	of	Nations,	which	many	Americans	saw	as	a	threat	to	their	traditional	prerogatives,	Hughes	set	out	to	reinterpret	the	Monroe	Doctrine	for	a	new	age.	According	to	one	historian,	Hughes	“recognized,	the	meaning	of	the	[Monroe]	Doctrine	had	become	obscured.”72	He	blamed	this	on	the	“tendency	to	use	it	as	a	cover	for	‘extravagant	utterances	and	pretensions	which	are	foreign	to	the	purposes	of	our	Government,	the	demands	of	our	security,	and	the	sentiment	of	our	people’."73		Hughes	spoke	frequently	on	the	matter	in	public	forums	in	the	United	States	and	at	conferences	in	Latin	America.	As	Marlo	Pusey	noted,	Hughes	argued	“‘[t]he	Monroe	doctrine	…	is	not	a	policy	of	aggression;	it	is	a	policy	of	self-defense’."74	Giving	a	speech	on	the	100th	anniversary	of	the	declaration	of	the	Doctrine,	Hughes	spoke	of	“the	equality	of	the	American	republics”	and	“the	duty	of	protecting	the	
																																																								69	Welles	to	Roosevelt,	20	January	1928,	SWP,	Box:	148,	Folder	8.	70	Sumner	Welles,	Naboth’s	Vineyard:	The	Dominican	Republic,	1844-1924	(Payson	&	Clarke,	1928),	934.	71	Gaston	Nerval,	Autopsy	of	the	Monroe	Doctrine:	The	Strange	Story	of	Inter-American	Relations	(New	York:	Macmillan	Company,	1934),	155.	72	Glad,	Charles	Evans	Hughes,	237.	73	Ibid.,	quoting	Our	Relations	to	the	Nations	of	the	Western	Hemisphere	(Princeton,	N.J.:	1928),	p.17.		74	Pusey,	Charles	Evans	Hughes,	Vol.	2,	535.	
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rights	which	citizens	of	other	states	have	acquired	under	its	laws.”75	The	lofty	rhetoric	was	backed	up	by	renewed	pledges	by	Hughes	for	peaceful	resolution	of	outstanding	disputes	between	Latin	American	nations,	limitation	of	armaments,	and	honest	participation	by	the	United	States	in	Pan	American	conferences,	among	other	promises.76	Welles	took	note	of	Hughes’	pronouncements	and	frequently	invoked	them	when	it	came	time	to	articulate	his	own	views.	In	a	series	of	articles	and	speeches	he	wrote	or	co-authored	between	1924	and	1931	Welles	borrowed	Hughes’	rhetoric	about	the	Monroe	Doctrine	and	inter-American	relations	and	repurposed	it	to	help	him	enunciate	his	unique	blend	of	idealism	and	paternalism.	In	an	article	in	The	
Atlantic	Monthly	published	in	1924,	Welles	echoed	Hughes’	insistence	that	the	U.S.	was	not	imperialistic	by	arguing	“our	Government	is	responsive	solely	to	the	desire	to	promote	good	understanding	and	to	remove	discord,	using	its	powerful	influence	at	all	times	on	the	side	of	right	and	justice”	and	extolled	“the	sincerity	and	unselfishness	of	our	purpose.”77	Quoting	Woodrow	Wilson	and	Charles	Evans	Hughes,	Welles	proclaimed,	“no	imperialistic	policy	will	ever	be	supported	by	the	American	people.”78	Welles	continued	to	invoke	Hughes’	rhetoric	when	he	began	working	for	Franklin	Roosevelt	after	1928.	In	a	campaign	speech	that	year	Welles	all	but	quoted	Hughes	when	he	wrote	that	the	Monroe	Doctrine	was,	in	fact,	not	"an	unselfish	declaration	of	this	Government	intended	to	preserve	republican	institutions"	but	rather	a	"policy	of	self-defense."79	In	another	speech,	Welles	diagnosed	the	problem	of	Latin	American	relations	by	arguing	“[t]he	basic	difficulty	is	that	there	has	never	yet	been	demanded	by	the	American	people	from	their	Government	a	policy	towards	Latin	America	which	recognizes	the	absolute	equality	in	sovereignty	of	the	Latin	American	nations,”	clearly	echoing	Hughes’	statements	from	five	years	
																																																								75	Pusey,	Charles	Evans	Hughes,	Vol.	2,	536.	76	Ibid.	77	Sumner	Welles,	“Is	America	Imperialistic?,”	The	Atlantic	Monthly,	September	1924,	422-3,	422.		78	Ibid.,	423.		79	Campaign	Speech,	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	Presidential	Library	(FDRL),	Sumner	Welles	Papers	(SWP),	Box:	194,	Folder,	2,	p.9.		
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earlier.80	Similarly,	in	an	article	Welles	ghostwrote	for	Norman	Davis	during	the	lead	up	to	the	1932	presidential	campaign,	Welles	insisted	the	Monroe	Doctrine	had	"insured	throughout	a	century	the	security,	liberty	and	independence	of	all	the	Americas”	and	that	it	was	"the	opposite	of	aggressive."81	By	invoking	Hughes’	rhetoric	in	this	fashion	Welles	added	gravitas	to	his	writing	while	crystallizing	his	own	paternalistically	idealistic	approach	to	Latin	American	relations.	By	the	time	his	first	decade	as	a	diplomat	was	over,	and	the	next	stage	of	his	career	as	an	advisor	to	Franklin	Roosevelt	was	beginning,	Welles	could	articulate	a	forceful	argument	that	combined	the	necessity	of	U.S.	leadership	in	Latin	America	with	idealistic	pronouncements	about	the	need	to	respect	the	sovereignty	of	Latin	American	countries.		However,	as	Welles’	paternalism	emerged	more	clearly,	he	exhibited	a	startlingly	naïve	view	of	his	country’s	actions.	He	described	U.S.	lordship	over	the	Dominican	Republic	as	“nothing	more	nor	less	than	the	lending	by	the	United	States	of	its	credit	to	the	Dominican	people,”	noting	later	that	the	act	“was	welcomed	not	only	by	the	Dominican	Government	but	by	the	Dominican	people.”82	Assessing	the	contention	that	the	U.S.	had	placed	the	countries	of	Ecuador,	Peru,	and	Colombia	into	economic	dependency,	Welles	insisted	“[c]ommercial	development	…	cannot	be	considered	economic	domination.”83	This	same	characteristic	of	Welles’	thinking	was	detectable	in	his	rhetoric	about	the	Monroe	Doctrine	during	this	period	as	well.	Reflecting	a	conflation	of	paternalism	toward	Latin	America	with	U.S.	national	interest,	Welles	recommended	the	U.S.	"invite	its	sister	American	republics	to	proclaim	those	principles	as	an	integral	part	of	their	own	national	policy."84	Later,	after	Roosevelt’s	election	to	the	presidency,	Welles	repeated	the	same	line	in	a	policy	paper	he	drew	up	for	Roosevelt	on	Latin	American	relations.	In	another	call	back	to	Hughes’	rhetoric,	Welles	singled	out	“erroneous	interpretations”	of	the	Monroe	Doctrine	for	poor																																																									80	Welles	to	Roosevelt,	undated,	SWP,	Box:	148,	Folder:	8.		81	Norman	H.	Davis,	“Wanted:	A	Consistent	Latin	American	Policy,”	Foreign	Affairs,	July	1931,	565,	566.		82	Davis,	“Wanted:	A	Consistent	Latin	American	Policy,”	557.		83	Welles,	“Is	America	Imperialistic?,”,	421-2.		84	Davis,	“Wanted:	A	Consistent	Latin	American	Policy,”	566-7.		
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relations	between	Latin	America	and	the	United	States	and	suggested	the	Doctrine’s	“adoption	by	every	American	republic	as	a	portion	of	its	national	policy.”85	In	this	proclamation	Welles	echoed	his	efforts	to	rehabilitate	the	League	of	Nations	during	his	posting	in	Argentina	by	aligning	it	with	the	Monroe	Doctrine.	It	also	laid	the	groundwork	for	his	future	efforts	to	draw	together	the	republics	of	Latin	America	in	the	form	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	and	later	still,	his	proposed	regional	framework	for	the	a	post-World	War	Two	international	organization.	Welles’	paternalism	had	an	uglier	side	to	it	as	well.	More	than	once	in	these	articles	Welles	expressed	sentiments	that	reflected	a	racialist	interpretation	of	international	affairs.	In	a	speech	he	wrote	for	Franklin	Roosevelt,	Welles	spoke	of	the	familiarity	among	Latin	American	countries	due	to	their	“similar	racial	origin.”86	This	echoed	an	earlier	article	in	which	Welles	issued	a	caveat	to	his	own	argument	that	Latin	American	esteem	of	the	U.S.	was	improved	“notwithstanding	the	occasional	difficulty	of	the	Latin	to	comprehend	the	Anglo-Saxon	mentality.”87	True	to	the	cognitive	dissonance	Welles	was	capable	of	in	these	matters,	Welles	in	the	same	article	castigated	anti-American	voices	in	Latin	America	by	comparing	them	to	“those	groups	in	our	own	country	who	promote	racial	or	religious	antagonism	for	personal	or	political	ends.”88	Despite	the	apparent	hypocrisy	in	Welles’	positions	there	was	an	internal	logic	to	his	pronouncements.	For	Welles,	paternalism	and	idealism	in	Latin	America	were	synonymous	so	long	as	he	was	the	one	advocating	them.	Because	the	United	States	had	only	the	highest	aims	for	its	sister	republics	–	at	least	when	Welles	and	those	he	supported	were	in	charge	–	it	was	not	possible	for	U.S.	intervention	to	be	anything	but	beneficent.	Perhaps	unwittingly,	Welles	summed	up	this	worldview	in	an	introductory	paragraph	written	for	the	Foreign	Affairs	article	he	penned	for	Norman	Davis	in	1931:				
																																																								85	Welles	to	Hull,	12	January	1933,	SWP,	Box:	149,	Folder:	1.	86	Campaign	Speech,	SWP,	Box:	195,	Folder,	2,	p.8.	87	Welles,	“Is	America	Imperialistic?,”,	422.		88	Ibid.,	412.	
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"The	Latin	American	peoples	unquestionably	have	the	right	and	duty	to	regulate	their	own	national	affairs	and	to	determine	their	own	destiny;	but	the	political	and	economic	power	of	the	United	States	is	such	that	the	policies	of	this	Government	and	the	activities	and	interests	of	its	nationals	must	necessarily	have	a	considerable	effect	on	the	political	and	economic	life	of	the	other	peoples	of	this	hemisphere.	It	therefore	is	part	of	the	duty	and	interest	of	this	nation	to	wield	its	power	with	justice	and	wisdom	and	to	extend	a	friendly	and	helpful	hand	to	its	sister	republics,	to	which	it	is	bound	by	so	great	a	community	of	interest."89		By	synthesizing	high-minded	idealistic	pronouncements	with	paternalistic	insistence	on	maintenance	of	order,	Welles	was	able	to	rhetorically	overcome	the	evident	contradiction	in	his	view	that	Latin	American	sovereignty	must	be	respected	but	that	the	United	States	must	retain	its	leading	role	in	the	hemisphere.	It	was	a	blend	of	ideologies	that	Welles	concocted	out	of	his	experiences	as	a	diplomat	and	the	prejudices	of	his	class	held	over	from	his	formative	years.	The	pattern	of	thinking	that	he	established	in	his	early	career	would	hold	through	subsequent	decades,	and	projected	onto	the	world	stage	as	his	stature	and	power	grew.		
Naboth’s	Vineyard:	Welles’	Anti-Militarism	and	Anti-Interventionism90			 		 While	Welles’	paternalistic	idealism	provided	the	complexion	for	his	worldview,	other	facets	of	his	diplomatic	style	and	outlook	also	took	shape	during	these	early	years.	The	most	prominent	and	significant	of	these	facets	was	a	pervasive	skepticism	of	the	military	and	militaristic	solutions	to	diplomatic	problems.	Growing	out	of	predilections	and	prejudices	formed	during	his	youth,	and	then	reinforced	by	experiences	as	a	young	diplomat,	Welles	eschewed	aggression	as	an	aspect	of	his	diplomatic	praxis.	This	characteristic	would	last	throughout	his	
																																																								89	Davis,	“Wanted:	A	Consistent	Latin	American	Policy,”	548.		90	Naboth’s	vineyard	refers	to	a	parable	in	the	Hebrew	Scriptures	in	which	the	Samarian	King	Ahab,	at	the	urging	of	his	wife	Jezebel,	contrives	the	death	of	a	neighbour,	Naboth,	whose	vineyard	(garden)	he	coveted.	When	confronted	by	a	Tishibite	named	Elijah	who	tells	him	the	Lord	will	smite	Ahab’s	family	and	country	for	taking	Naboth’s	vineyard,	Ahab	abdicates	and	becomes	a	hermit,	prompting	God	to	delay	His	wrath	until	Ahab’s	son	takes	the	throne.	1	Kgs	21:1-29.	It	was	also	the	title	of	Welles’	1927	book	on	the	history	of	the	Dominican	Republic	and	a	useful	exegesis	for	Welles’	skepticism	about	the	use	of	aggression.			
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career	and	shape	the	sorts	of	problems	he	perceived	and	the	solutions	he	devised	for	them.			 Welles’	distaste	for	militarism	was	evident	from	his	earliest	days	as	a	diplomat.	Welles’	first	diplomatic	posting	upon	entering	the	State	Department	was	to	Japan.	The	posting	overlapped	with	the	escalation	of	World	War	One,	culminating	in	the	entry	of	the	United	States	into	the	conflict	in	April	1917.	Unsurprisingly,	the	issue	that	occupied	most	of	his	attention	during	his	two	years	there	was	a	direct	consequence	of	the	war	–	the	treatment	of	German	prisoners	of	war	(POWs)	captured	by	the	Japanese.	As	it	was	his	first	diplomatic	post,	Welles	was	neither	in	a	senior	position	nor	delegated	much	responsibility.	Nevertheless,	he	proved	remarkably	adept	and	valuable.	Fluent	in	German,	Welles	inspected	the	POW	camps	and	compiled	a	report	on	the	treatment	of	the	prisoners	there.	The	memoranda	Welles	wrote	greatly	impressed	his	superiors,	who	commended	him	for	his	“thorough	and	painstaking”	investigation	and	“comprehensive	and	temperate	report.”91	In	the	words	of	one	historian,	“Welles	brought	a	genteel	point	of	view	to	the	Japanese	Empire	during	the	Great	War.”92	However	impressive	Welles’	performance	of	his	duties	may	have	been,	the	experience	seemed	not	to	have	impressed	Welles.	Though	he	befriended	some	of	the	more	progressive-minded	Japanese	leaders	and	later	wrote	highly	of	the	“unique	body	known	as	the	Genro,	or	Elder	Statesman”,	Welles	was	troubled	by	what	he	called	“a	primeval	military	instinct,	and	[the	fact]	that	the	basic	reality	of	Japan	rested	in	the	war	machine	which	had	been	created.”93	Benjamin	Welles,	writing	about	his	father’s	time	in	Japan,	observed	how	Welles	“had	returned	from	Japan	deeply	disturbed	by	its	growing	militarism,”	no	doubt	a	reflection	of	Welles’	interactions	with	German	POWs	and	the	Japanese	military	officials	guarding	them.94	Conversely,	in	her	assessment	of	Welles’	time	in	Japan,	historian	Gail	Hanson	called	
																																																								91	George	W.	Guthrie	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	11	April	1916,	NARA	II,	Decimal	File	1910-1929,	State	Dept.	Records	Re	World	War	I	and	Its	Termination,	1914-29,	Apr.-May	1916,	763.72114/1491.		92	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	48.		93	Sumner	Welles,	The	Time	For	Decision	(New	York:	Harper	&	Brothers	Publishers,	1944),	274,	275.		94	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	53.		
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Welles’	reaction	to	the	country	as	one	of	“ambivalence.”95	Ambivalent	or	not,	Welles’	experience	in	Japan	underlined	a	central	characteristic	that	would	stay	with	him	for	the	rest	of	his	career:	an	aversion	to	the	military.	Though	he	may	have	performed	his	diplomatic	duties	to	the	best	of	his	ability,	the	military	matters	with	which	he	was	concerned	left	him	cold.			 	Welles’	suspicion	of	the	military	persisted	over	time,	but	it	was	only	with	his	reassignment	to	the	Dominican	Republic	that	it	emerged	in	its	fullest	form.	From	1	July	1922	to	13	July	1924	Welles	served	as	the	American	Commissioner	to	the	Dominican	Republic,	invested	with	the	rank	of	Envoy	Extraordinary	and	Minister	Plenipotentiary.	He	had	specific	instructions:			“	…	for	the	purpose	of	investigating	and	reporting	upon	political	conditions	in	the	Dominican	Republic,	and	for	the	purpose	of	ascertaining	the	views	of	the	Dominican	people	with	respect	to	an	appropriate	agreement	with	the	Government	of	the	United	States	as	a	result	of	which	the	military	forces	of	the	United	States	may	be	withdrawn	from	the	Dominican	Republic.”96			In	theory,	Welles	had	a	free	hand	to	facilitate,	with	the	full	support	and	authority	of	the	Military	Government,	the	peaceful	transfer	of	power	from	the	American	military	occupation	to	Dominican	authorities	that	had	been	agreed	to	the	previous	March.	In	practice,	his	authority	was	constantly	challenged	and	undermined	by	overlapping	jurisdictions,	jealous	colleagues,	and	squabbling	Dominican	politicians.		The	country	to	which	Welles	was	assigned	in	1922	was	if	not	chaotic,	then	at	least	in	desperate	shape.	"The	Dominican	pattern”	one	historian	wrote,	“had	been	one	of	recurrent	periods	of	utter	chaos	and	of	absolute	despotism"	wherein	“no	tradition	of	democratic	and	representative	government	had	been	established.”97	Six	years	had	passed	since	Woodrow	Wilson	had	authorized	a	military	occupation	of	the	island,	“with	the	greatest	reluctance,”	in	response	to	continued	delinquency	of	the	
																																																								95	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	51.		96	Telegram	Hughes	to	Welles,	National	Archives	and	Record	Administration	II,	College	Park,	Maryland	(NARA),	RG	59,	Central	Decimal	File,	Decimal	File	1910-1929,	Box	1157,	839.00/2539a.	97	Howard	J.	Wiarda,	The	Dominican	Republic:	Nation	in	Transition	(London:	Pall	Mall	Press,	1969),	32-33.	
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Dominican	government	to	its	creditors.98	Wilson’s	1916	intervention	stemmed	from	mounting	concern	over	German	penetration	into	the	Caribbean,	which	many	feared	might	be	a	prelude	to	an	attack	on	the	Panama	Canal.99	Justifications	for	the	action	derived	in	part	from	legal	precedent,	specifically	a	1907	treaty	giving	the	United	States	control	over	the	distribution	of	the	country’s	import	duties.100		Concomitantly,	the	ascendance	in	Washington	of	progressive	lawmakers,	exemplified	by	but	not	limited	to	Wilson,	imbued	the	occupation	with	a	missionary	zeal	that	increasingly	characterized	American	foreign	policy	at	the	time.	Progressives	believed	political	instability	in	the	Dominican	Republic,	as	elsewhere	in	Latin	America,	was	caused	by	“lack	of	progress	toward	‘constitutional	democracy’”	and	that	the	United	States	“had	the	responsibility,	even	the	moral	duty	to	foster	democracy	in	Latin	America,	by	force	if	needs	be.”101	Historian	Bruce	Calder	noted	of	the	Dominican	occupation	that	"some	occupation	officials	acted	not	only	as	agents	of	imperialism	but	also	as	representatives	of	U.S.	domestic	political	currents,	particularly	the	then	popular	Progressive	movement."102	Even	after	the	election	of	Warren	Harding	in	1920	on	the	promise	of	a	“‘return	to	normalcy’”	Welles’	dual	task	of	extricating	the	U.S.	from	its	Latin	American	dependencies	and	bequeathing	them	something	like	stable	democracy	remained	politically	charged.103			Welles’	assignment	to	the	Dominican	Republic	was	the	culmination	of	several	years’	effort	to	initiate	a	withdrawal	of	American	marines	and	re-establish	an	indigenous	Dominican	government.	Continued	nationalist	resistance	to	the	American	presence	had	convinced	even	the	most	altruistic	progressives	that	the	United	States	had	to	leave.104	Moreover,	a	highly	successful	international	public	relations	campaign	by	Dominican	nationalists	caused	problems	for	American																																																									98	Welles,	Naboth’s	Vineyard,	792	quoted	in	G.	Pope	Atkins	and	Larman	C.	Wilson,	The	United	States	
and	the	Trujillo	Regime	(New	Brunswick:	Rutgers	University	Press,	1972),	30.		99	Bruce	J.	Calder,	The	Impact	of	Intervention:	The	Dominican	Republic	during	the	U.S.	Occupation	of	
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	 94	
diplomats	and	politicians	abroad,	further	enhancing	support	for	withdrawal.105	Previous	attempts	by	Wilson,	and	after	1921	by	Harding,	to	agree	on	a	timetable	for	withdrawal	had	failed,	in	part	due	to	a	standoff	between	Dominican	demands	for	immediate	withdrawal	and	the	U.S.	government,	which	did	not	want	to	leave	with	“no	strings	attached.”106	Welles’	arrival	marked	a	shift	in	policy	reflecting	“renewed	control	of	the	State	Department	over	the	Dominican	situation,	as	well	as	the	department's	concern	to	improve	the	disastrous	relationship	which	had	developed	between	the	Dominican	people	and	the	military	government.”107		The	American	occupation	of	the	Dominican	Republic	had	always	been	an	ungainly	creation,	characterized	by	overlapping	jurisdictions,	unclear	lines	of	authority,	and	a	tense	bureaucratic	standoff	between	the	Department	of	the	Navy,	Department	of	War,	and	Department	of	State.	Through	a	process	of	happenstance	and	bureaucratic	inertia,	the	Department	of	the	Navy	had	assumed	primary	control	of	the	Dominican	Republic	following	the	invasion	in	1916,	despite	having	“‘no	internal	organization	for	administering	a	foreign	government’."108	Welles’	arrival	signalled	an	end	to	that	control	and	the	officers	assigned	to	the	country	were	understandably	resentful	of	what	appeared	to	be	a	usurpation	of	their	authority.		Thus	in	one	respect,	some	sort	of	confrontation	was	inevitable.	However,	Welles’	experiences	with	the	military	governor	in	the	Dominican	Republic	went	deeper	than	a	clash	of	institutional	prerogatives.	Welles	developed	a	persistently	antagonistic	relationship	between	himself	and	the	Military	Government	administering	the	occupation,	exemplified	by	his	constant	quarrelling	with	the	U.S.	military	governor	in	the	country,	admiral	Samuel	S.	Robison.		Welles	and	Robison	fought	over	every	aspect	of	the	transfer	of	American	power,	from	the	timing	of	elections,	to	the	deployment	of	marines,	to	the	treatment	of	the	(re)emerging	Dominican	political	class.	In	a	letter	to	Secretary	of	State	Hughes																																																									105	Calder,	The	Impact	of	Intervention,	199.	106	Ibid.,	205-206.	107	Ibid.,	217.	108	Valentina	Peguero,	The	Militarization	of	Culture	in	the	Dominican	Republic	(Lincoln,	NE:	University	of	Nebraska	Press,	2004),	34,	quoting	Robert	D.	Crassweller,	Trujillo:	The	Life	and	Times	of	a	
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dated	October	1922,	Welles	complained	about	the	“attitude	taken	by	the	Military	Governor	and	the	majority	of	the	members	of	this	administration	toward	the	Dominican	Commission	and	the	Dominican	people	as	a	whole”	stemming,	according	to	Welles,	from	their	“inability	to	understand	the	character	and	temperament	of	the	people.”109		Welles	singled	out	Robison	personally	for	criticism.	He	thought	Robison	paranoid,	exaggerating	threats	of	political	upheaval	due	to	a	prejudice	against	Latin	American	countries	and	their	peoples.	“Like	most	military	men,	he	tends	to	exaggerate	the	importance	of	such	conspiracies	in	a	Latin-American	country	of	this	character,”	Welles	wrote	to	Francis	White,	referring	to	a	Secret	Service	report	on	recent	nationalist	activities.110	Welles	faulted	Robison	for	being	unable	to	understand	“that	the	very	fact	that	the	American	Forces	of	Occupation	are	here	…	is	bitterly	resented	by	almost	every	Dominican.”111	Welles	later	expressed	concern	that	the	military,	if	given	a	free	hand,	would	completely	undermine	the	Plan	of	Evacuation	setting	out	the	process	of	American	withdrawal	that	had	been	agreed	to	prior	to	Welles’	arrival.	He	also	suggested	the	military	officers,	“owing	to	their	training	and	the	nature	of	their	profession”	were	overly	eager	to	employ	military	options	and	unwilling	to	make	concessions	to	popular	opinion.112	Welles	learned	to	view	the	military	authorities	as	counterproductive	at	best,	and	at	worst,	adversaries	with	whom	he	had	to	fight	for	supremacy.		Many	of	the	officers	also	viewed	the	end	of	the	occupation	as	a	usurpation	of	the	military’s	authority,	relegating	it	to	“second-class	status”	behind	the	State	Department.113	This	inevitably	produced	tensions,	particularly	as	the	two	organizations	fought	for	supremacy	over	policymaking.	In	June	1922	Welles	had	received	a	letter	from	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	Francis	White	outlining	relevant	recent	developments	in	the	negotiations	with	Dominican	leaders.	White	noted	that	
																																																								109	Welles	to	Hughes,	3	October	1922,	SWP,	Box:	157,	Folder:	3.	110	Welles	to	Francis	White,	23	November	1923,	SWP,	Box:	157,	Folder:	4.	111	Welles	to	Hughes,	3	October	1922,	SWP,	Box:	157,	Folder:	3.	112	Ibid.	113	Calder,	The	Impact	of	Intervention,	229.		
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he	recommended	“reserv[ing]	the	right	to	the	Department	(I	advisedly	did	not	say	of	
‘the	Military	Government’)	to	modify”	the	draft	Convention.114	One	major	clash	between	Welles	and	Robison	centred	on	the	plan	to	transfer	power	from	the	U.S.	military	to	a	Dominican	provisional	government.	Despite	months	of	effort	by	Welles	to	ease	the	transition	of	power	as	set	out	by	the	Plan	of	Evacuation	of	14	June	1921,	Robison	persisted	in	proposing	amendments	and	revisions	of	his	own	at	the	last	minute,	much	to	Welles’	consternation.	The	revisions,	which	included	provisions	to	maintain	American	military	presence	and	patrols	and	for	the	U.S.	to	reassume	control	of	the	Dominican	Government	should	the	plan	fall	apart,	ran	directly	counter	to	what	had	been	negotiated	by	Welles	and	to	the	process	of	withdrawal	in	general.115	Welles	bitterly	resented	the	action	and	wrote	to	the	State	Department	to	explain	how	“the	plan	proposed	by	the	Military	Governor	…	will	inevitably	destroy	all	the	work	of	the	United	States.”116	In	order	for	the	withdrawal	to	be	successful,	Welles	insisted,	“the	disposition	of	the	Military	Government	must	…	be	adapted	to	conform	to	the	provisions	of	the	plan	as	now	constituted.”117	Whatever	the	response,	Welles’	hope	for	a	resolution	did	not	materialize,	as	he	reported	little	over	a	month	later:	“Robison	is	in	accord	neither	with	the	plan	nor	the	Military	dispositions	rendered	necessary	by	the	carrying	out	thereof.”118	As	elections	scheduled	by	the	Plan	of	Evacuation	drew	closer,	Welles’	clash	with	the	military	authorities	escalated.	In	August	1923	Welles	made	an	official	request	for	the	rescinding	of	a	decree	issued	by	Robison	several	months	earlier	that	had	closed	several	Dominican	newspapers.	Insisting	that	“the	Dominican	people	should	have	the	right	freely	to	express	their	views	regarding	the	steps	which	it	is	proposed	shall	shortly	be	taken,”	Welles	specifically	requested	that	Hughes	tell	the	Department	of	the	Navy	to	tell	Robison	“to	issue	no	further	orders	of	this	nature	without	the	consent	of	the	Department	of	State.”119	Later	in	October,	with	the																																																									114	White	to	Welles,	30	June	1922,	SWP,	Box:	157,	Folder:	3.	Emphasis	added.		115	‘The	Commissioner	in	the	Dominican	Republic	(Welles)	to	the	Secretary	of	State’	9	August	1922,	
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elections	only	two	weeks	away,	Robison	irked	Welles	by	refusing	to	withdraw	marines	deployed	throughout	the	country	during	election	day,	despite	a	request	by	the	Dominican	Commission.120	By	this	point	Welles	had	run	out	of	patience	with	Robison	and	was	skeptical	of	every	move	made	by	the	Military	Government	to	assert	its	authority.	In	a	long	telegram	to	Secretary	Hughes	in	early	October,	Welles	explained	“[s]ince	the	arrangement	proposed	by	Admiral	Robison	is	not	satisfactory	to	me,	I	am	forced	to	submit	this	matter	for	your	consideration,	with	the	hope	that	you	may	share	my	views.”121	This	tactic	of	appealing	to	higher	bureaucratic	authority	with	whom	he	had	a	direct	connection,	and	who	agreed	with	Welles’	objectives	and	methods	was	another	hallmark	of	Welles’	diplomatic	style	and	would	be	used	to	great	effect	later	in	career.		But	in	the	context	of	the	Dominican	Republic	the	move	was	a	definitive	statement	by	Welles	that	he	had	no	regard	for	the	role	of	the	military	in	participating	in	diplomatic	matters.	From	Welles’	perspective,	the	military	only	made	things	more	difficult.	Specifically,	and	significantly,	it	was	the	belligerence,	narrow-mindedness,	and	arrogance	of	the	military	that	Welles	found	most	distasteful.	It	offended	his	instincts	for	seeking	consensus	and	directly	undermined	Welles’	efforts	to	facilitate	cooperation	and	build	lasting	relationships	with	Dominican	leaders.	Welles’	experiences	with	the	military	in	the	Dominican	Republic	reinforced	the	suspicions	of	aggression	inculcated	by	his	exclusion	from,	and	victimization	by,	the	macho	aesthetic	of	the	‘imperial	brotherhood’	during	his	youth.	Furthermore,	it	reinforced	his	belief	in	the	righteousness	and	power	of	his	own	more	collaborative	approach	to	diplomatic	affairs.	The	legacy	of	Welles’	experience	in	the	Dominican	Republic,	and	the	degree	to	which	it	crystallized	his	suspicions	of	belligerence	and	militarism,	became	evident	in	the	years	following	the	conclusion	of	his	assignment.	In	his	1924	article	Is	
America	Imperialistic?	Welles	articulated	publically	for	the	first	time	his	distaste	for	military	involvement	in	diplomatic	affairs,	specifically	in	his	denunciations	of	U.S.																																																									120	Welles	to	Hughes,	2	October	1923,	SWP,	Box:	157,	Folder	6.	121	The	Commissioner	in	the	Dominican	Republic	(Welles)	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	2	October	1922,	
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intervention	in	Latin	American	countries.	He	railed	against	the	Taft	era	interventions	in	Cuba,	Haiti,	the	Dominican	Republic,	as	well	as	in	the	countries	of	Central	America,	calling	them	“an	artificial	method	of	restoring	outward	tranquility.”122	In	the	same	article	Welles	boasted	about	“[t]he	very	notable	improvement	in	the	feeling	existing	in	the	Central	American	republics	toward	the	United	States,	which	has	taken	place	during	the	past	few	years,	[that]	has	been	largely	due	to	this	spirit	of	helpful	cooperation	–	as	distinguished	from	intervention	or	imposition.”123		 	As	time	passed,	this	anti-militarist	opposition	to	intervention	view	expanded	to	include	tacit	acquiescence	of	hostility	within	Latin	American	countries.	In	his	1931	article	in	Foreign	Affairs	Welles	excoriated	the	Hoover-era	policy	of	recognizing	governments	even	if	they	had	come	to	power	by	revolutionary	means	(as	opposed	to	gaining	democratic	legitimacy	–	a	Wilson-era	policy	Welles	supported)	for	denying	“the	benefits	of	ordered	liberty	and	of	security	of	life	and	property”	to	the	countries	of	Latin	America.124	By	this	point,	Welles	argued	"[m]ilitary	intervention	in	Latin	America	can	be	justified	upon	only	one	ground,	namely,	our	national	safety,"	with	the	only	real	possibility	of	this	being	a	clear	threat	to	American	control	of	the	Panama	Canal	Zone.125	Indeed,	the	truest	expression	of	Welles’	distaste	for	the	military	may	have	been	in	the	reluctance	by	which	he	acknowledged	that,	on	rare	occasions,	force	was	sometimes	necessary.	Not	wishing	to	come	off	as	a	complete	pacifist,	Welles	begrudgingly	conceded	the	need	for	military	intervention	at	times,	but	only	in	the	most	extreme	circumstances.	If,	he	pondered	in	1924,	“material	assistance	...	had	substituted	the	benefits	of	civilization	(without	the	impairment	of	ultimate	sovereignty)	for	a	condition	of	anarchy	and	chaos,	who	could	claim	that	our	policy	had	not	been	wise?"126	Though	patently	self-serving,	Welles’	view	held	the	
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demonstrably	extreme	condition	of	‘anarchy	and	chaos’	to	be	the	threshold	at	which	point	American	intervention	could	be	justified.		Welles	again	drew	on	that	sentiment	seven	years	later	when	he	wrote	that	"[i]f	the	safety	of	the	United	States	requires	that	non-American	Powers	be	kept	from	intervening	on	the	American	Continent,”	then,	“justice	requires	that	reasonable	grounds	for	such	intervention	be	removed."127	Tellingly,	Welles’	formulation	for	when	military	action	might	be	permissible	coincided	with	his	conviction	that	only	the	United	States	–	not	European	countries	–	possessed	the	ability	to	safeguard	the	wellbeing	of	the	Latin	American	republics.			 In	his	first	decade	as	a	diplomat,	Welles’	ingrained	distaste	for	belligerence	and	skepticism	of	militarism	evolved	into	a	full-throated	denunciation	of	military	intervention	in	Latin	America.	His	evolution	was	spurred	on	by	forces	that	affected	everyone	at	the	time,	such	as	the	worldwide	reaction	against	militarism	in	the	wake	of	the	slaughter	of	World	War	One,	as	well	as	by	his	own	experiences	in	Japan	and	the	Dominican	Republic	and	his	inherent	dislike	of	belligerence	generally	held	over	from	his	youth.	Tasked	with	analyzing	and	defending	his	record	in	the	Caribbean	toward	the	close	of	his	involvement	there	in	the	mid-1920s,	Welles	took	the	opportunity	to	enunciate	increasingly	pointed	criticisms	of	intervention,	militarism,	and	the	policies	that	supported	them.	By	the	time	the	1920s	ended,	the	twin	strands	of	Welles’	worldview	–	paternalistic	idealism	and	anti-militarism	–	were	fully	intertwined,	just	in	time	for	the	major	portion	of	his	diplomatic	career	to	begin.						
Conclusion:		 During	his	early	career	Welles	developed	a	worldview	that	blended	paternalistic	idealism	and	an	aversion	to	overt	aggression	into	a	coherent	outlook.	The	contours	of	Welles’	paternalism	toward	Latin	America	were	shaped	by	many	factors.	Broad	forces	in	international	politics,	namely	World	War	One	and	its	consequences,	played	their	part	by	providing	a	general	scope	for	his	plans	for	Latin																																																									127	Davis,	“Wanted:	A	Consistent	Latin	American	Policy,”	558.		
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America,	most	notably	in	the	form	of	his	early	support	for,	albeit	in	qualified	form,	the	League	of	Nations.	But	specific	encounters	to	which	Welles	was	witness,	including	his	tussling	with	the	British	in	Argentina	and	an	abortive	attempt	to	help	create	a	Central	American	Union,	shaped	his	thinking	as	well.	Welles	became	convinced	that	economic	interdependence	and	multilateral	cooperation	were	necessary	and	indispensable,	both	for	the	maintenance	of	American	hegemony	in	the	region	and	the	benefit	of	the	Latin	American	countries	themselves.	Individuals	like	Charles	Evans	Hughes	helped	Welles	crystallize	his	beliefs	by	providing	the	rhetorical	precedents	that	Welles	would	draw	upon	to	articulate	his	vision.	By	the	1930s	Welles	emerged	from	the	first	chapter	of	his	career	professing	an	idiosyncratic	style	of	idealistic	paternalism	that	he	would	carry	with	him	for	the	rest	of	his	career.			As	Welles’	diplomatic	education	progressed	salient	aspects	of	his	thinking	and	style	began	to	emerge.	Alongside	his	growing	enthusiasm	for	American-led	multilateral	leadership	in	the	Western	Hemisphere,	Welles	demonstrated	a	consistent	aversion	to	belligerence	and	aggression	in	diplomatic	affairs.	This	attitude	manifested	in	persistent	skepticism	of	the	military	and	its	role	in	executing	diplomacy.	In	his	first	posting	in	Japan	and	again	during	his	lengthy	mediation	in	the	Dominican	Republic,	Welles	showed	a	tendency	to	eschew	aggression	and	militarism	in	favour	of	a	more	collaborative	cooperative	multilateralism.		Whatever	Welles	became	during	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	second	and	third	terms	was	founded	upon	the	attitudes	and	tactics	evolved	during	the	first	decades	of	his	life.	Welles	was	no	pie-eyed	idealist	nor	was	he	a	cynical	realist.	His	embrace	of	progressive	internationalism	was	consistently	in	service	of	paternalistic	and	nationalistic	aims.	However,	he	genuinely	believed	that	U.S.	leadership	could	bring	peace	and	prosperity	to	the	world,	or	at	least	to	Latin	America.	That	belief	pushed	him	to	advance	American	interests	in	a	multitude	of	ways,	including	developing	an	intense	dislike	of	the	main	competitor	for	Latin	American	hegemony	at	the	time,	Great	Britain.	These	convictions	were	expressed	in	a	preference	for	multilateral,	consensus-based	diplomatic	institutions	that	facilitated	negotiation,	cooperation,	and	collaboration	between	parties,	whether	individuals	or	states.	This	approach	was	
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a	tacit	rejection	of	–	and	a	specific	reaction	to	–	the	more	belligerent	expansionism	of	most	of	his	compatriots.	Though	only	partially	successful	in	this	early	stage	of	his	career,	this	approach	set	the	mould	for	Welles’	later	endeavours,	beginning	with	his	political	resurrection	in	partnership	with	Franklin	Roosevelt	after	1928.			
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Chapter	Three:	
Acolyte:	Franklin	Roosevelt	and	Sumner	Welles’	Homosocial	Patronage,	1921-
1937			 By	August	1943	Franklin	Roosevelt	was	out	of	options.	For	nearly	three	years	he	had	tried	to	suppress	the	F.B.I.	report	about	his	friend	and	close	advisor	Undersecretary	of	State	Sumner	Welles,	with	ever	decreasing	success.	Enemies	of	Welles,	primarily	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull	and	former	Ambassador	William	“Bill”	Bullitt,	had	successfully	circulated	rumours	about	Welles’	sexuality	widely	enough	to	reach	a	tipping	point.	Faced	with	the	prospect	of	a	Senate	investigation	into	Welles’	behaviour,	Roosevelt	asked	Welles	to	submit	his	resignation.	This	Welles	did	on	16	August	1943.1			 Not	long	after,	Bullitt,	brimming	with	confidence	from	his	victory,	asked	Roosevelt	for	his	support	in	a	bid	for	the	mayoralty	of	Philadelphia.	Roosevelt,	who	was	not	known	for	outbursts	of	anger,	told	Bullitt	in	reply:		 “If	I	were	the	Angel	Gabriel	and	you	and	Sumner	Welles	should	come	before	me	seeking	admission	into	the	Gates	of	Heaven,	do	you	know	what	I’d	say?	I	would	say:	‘Bill	Bullitt,	you	have	defamed	the	name	of	a	man	who	toiled	for	his	fellow	men,	and	you	can	go	to	hell.’	And	that’s	what	I	tell	you	to	do	now.”2			 Roosevelt’s	florid	excoriation	of	Bullitt	came	in	response	to	the	termination	of	a	political	partnership	that	had	lasted	nearly	thirty	years.	It	was	a	heartfelt	tribute	to	a	man	Roosevelt	respected	and	admired,	both	as	a	friend	and	as	a	senior	foreign	policy	advisor.	Yet	despite	his	passionate	defense,	Roosevelt	had	nonetheless	acquiesced	to	Welles’	resignation.	It	was	the	price	he	was	willing	to	pay	for	the	restoration	of	tranquility	in	the	State	Department,	so	necessary	as	wartime	events	accelerated	and	thoughts	turned	toward	the	postwar	settlement.	The	threat	of	a	political	scandal	at	that	crucial	moment	was	too	important	to	risk,	even	if	it	did	mean	the	end	of	Welles’	political	career.	Despite	Roosevelt’s	power	as	president,																																																									1	Welles	to	Roosevelt,	16	August	1943.	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	Presidential	Library	(FDRL),	Sumner	Welles	Papers	(SWP),	Box:	152,	Folder:	4.		2	Ted	Morgan,	FDR:	A	Biography	(New	York:	Simon	and	Schuster,	1985),	686.		
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despite	his	reliance	on	Welles’	advice,	and	despite	years	of	close	personal	friendship,	Roosevelt	was	unable	to	protect	Welles	from	Bullitt’s	homophobic	onslaught.		Besides	highlighting	the	quarrelling	within	the	Roosevelt	administration	in	the	early	1940s,	this	sudden	end	to	a	long	professional	collaboration	underlined	the	remarkable	relationship	that	Welles	and	Roosevelt	had	with	each	other.	As	a	key	member	of	the	president’s	already	shrinking	inner	circle,	Welles	played	a	vital	role	keeping	Roosevelt	informed	about	diplomatic	affairs,	State	Department	politics,	and	plans	for	postwar	peace.	That	Welles,	who	was	technically	only	second-in-command	at	the	State	Department,	assumed	so	a	prominent	place	in	the	staff	of	such	a	complex	man	during	such	a	momentous	period	in	U.S.	history,	and	was	kept	in	that	position	for	years	after	Roosevelt	became	aware	of	the	potentially	explosive	political	liability	Welles	represented,	indicated	that	he	was	something	more	than	just	a	valuable	adviser.		This	chapter	examines	the	political	partnership	of	Sumner	Welles	with	Franklin	Roosevelt.	It	explores	how	these	two	men	forged	a	relationship	based	on	cultural	affinity	and	mutual	sympathy	that	was	born	of	their	respective	exclusions	from	hegemonic	masculinity,	and	how	that	affected	their	own	careers	and	the	diplomatic	history	of	the	United	States.	As	in	previous	chapters,	this	chapter	uses	sexuality	as	an	analytical	lens.	It	argues	that	to	understand	the	origins	and	contours	of	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	partnership	it	is	necessary	to	analyze	how	sexuality	shaped	each	man’s	political	career	and	how	that	process	facilitated	their	compatibility.	From	this	analysis	this	chapter	offers	new	insights	into	many	of	the	salient	aspects	of	about	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	relationship	and	the	significance	of	their	collaboration:	the	degree	to	which	Welles	was	the	originator	or	mere	executor	of	Roosevelt’s	foreign	policy	ideas	and	the	peculiar	situation	Welles’	occupied	vis	à	
vis	the	rest	of	Roosevelt’s	inner	circle	and	how	that	contributed	to	the	bureaucratic	disorganization	that	characterized	Roosevelt’s	administration,	and	the	reasons	why	Roosevelt	protected	and	promoted	Welles	despite	the	liabilities	associated	with	his	sexuality.				
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The	Missing	Man:	Welles	in	Rooseveltian	Historiography		 The	conventional	wisdom	for	explaining	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	relationship,	shared	by	historians	and	contemporaries	alike,	has	relied	on	two	main	themes:	personal	affinity	and	political	expediency.	Those	stressing	the	personal	affinity	explanation	observed	Welles	and	Roosevelt	“had	attended	the	same	schools	and	moved	in	similar	social	circles,”	to	explain	their	close	collaboration.3	In	his	recent	work	on	FDR’s	personal	relationships,	Frank	Costigliola	noticed	the	undertones	to	this	bond,	recounting	speculation	that	Welles’	close	attachment	to	Roosevelt	might	have	been	romantic	in	nature,	stemming	from	“impulses	that	might	prove	disturbing	if	‘put	into	words’.”4	Gail	Hanson	observed	a	degree	of	intimacy	in	her	estimation	of	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	relationship	as	well,	noting	the	“timely	relationship	with	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	…	resembled	one	of	mentor	and	pupil.”5	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	Breckinridge	Long	echoed	this	sentiment,	noting	“Welles	was	a	boyhood	friend	of	Roosevelt	and	Roosevelt	sticks	by	his	friends.”6	Whatever	the	case,	the	general	conclusion	of	this	interpretation	was	that	Welles	was	a	member	of	Roosevelt’s	‘old	boy’	club	and	was,	therefore,	given	preferential	treatment	and	deferential	influence	over	foreign	policy.		However,	others	have	emphasized	the	professional	aspect	of	Welles’	and	Roosevelt’s	partnership,	characterizing	it	as	a	union	of	mutual	interdependence	and	support.	David	F.	Schmitz	noted	that	“Roosevelt	relied	on	the	advice	of	Sumner	Welles	…	an	old	friend”	who	was	like-minded	about	policy	prescriptions.7	Similarly,	J.	Simon	Rofe	wrote,	“Roosevelt	made	sure	Welles	was	promoted	[to	Undersecretary],”	because	of	the	background	they	shared	and	Welles’	extensive	
																																																								3	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Roosevelt	and	the	Isolationists	(London:	University	of	Nebraska	Press,	1983),	340.		4	Frank	Costigliola,	Roosevelt’s	Lost	Alliances:	How	Personal	Politics	Helped	Start	the	Cold	War	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2012),	47.	5	Gail	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System:	The	United	States	in	the	Caribbean,	1920-1940”	(Ph.D.	Dissertation.	State	University	of	New	York	at	Stony	Brook,	1990),	475.		6	Fred	L.	Israel,	ed.,	The	War	Diary	of	Breckinridge	Long:	Selections	from	Years	1939-1944	(Lincoln:	University	of	Nebraska	Press,	1966),	325.		7	David	F.	Schmitz,	The	Triumph	of	Internationalism:	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	and	a	World	in	Crisis,	1933-
1941	(Washington	D.C.:	Potomac	Books	Inc.,	2007),	26.		
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diplomatic	experience.8	Steven	Casey	and	Warren	Kimball	emphasized	Welles’	and	Roosevelt’s	close	alliance	in	contrast	to	the	terse	relationship	Roosevelt	had	with	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull,	or	with	the	State	Department	generally.9	So	too	did	Thomas	Fleming,	observing:	“Roosevelt	had	no	confidence	in	Hull	or	anyone	else	in	the	State	Department	except	reserved,	ultra-dignified	Undersecretary	of	State	Sumner	Welles.”10		In	these	writings	as	in	many	others,	the	like-mindedness	between	the	two	men	is	taken	for	granted.	Little	effort	is	expended	trying	to	determine	what	were	the	foundations	upon	which	the	underlying	relationship	was	based.	Studies	focusing	directly	on	Welles	tend	to	hint	at	a	more	complexly	layered	relationship	with	Roosevelt.	Benjamin	Welles’	account	of	his	father’s	relationship	with	Roosevelt	portrayed	the	two	men	as	intimate	political	partners.	Welles	gave	credit	to	both	his	father’s	upbringing	and	his	work	ethic	for	sustaining	the	relationship	with	Roosevelt.	Welles	was	Roosevelt’s	right	hand	man,	so	professionally	devoted	that	he	“broke	his	health”	for	Roosevelt,	but	also	inured	to	a	fraternal	devotion,	forged	in	their	childhood	experiences	together.11	Irwin	Gellman	also	depicted	a	symbiotic	relationship,	wherein	“Roosevelt	respected	the	younger	man’s	[Welles’]	experience	and	ability	to	translate	ideas	into	action;	Welles	reciprocated	with	genuine	affection	and	admiration.”12	Though	incomplete,	the	analytical	thrust	of	these	arguments	is	correct:	Welles	and	Roosevelt	shared	a	complex	relationship	that	was	based	on	both	personal	and	professional	factors,	neither	of	which	can	be	understood	without	taking	account	of	both.	In	his	analysis	of	Welles’	postwar	planning	activities,	Christopher	O’Sullivan	explained	how	“Welles	considered	himself	more	than	a	mere	executor	of	Roosevelt’s																																																									8	J.	Simon	Rofe,	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	Foreign	Policy	and	the	Welles	Mission	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2007),	14.	9	Steven	Casey,	Cautious	Crusade:	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt,	American	Public	Opinion,	and	the	War	Against	
Nazi	Germany	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001),	138.	Warren	Kimball,	The	Juggler:	Franklin	
Roosevelt	as	Wartime	Statesman	(Princeton:	Princeton	UP,	1991),	242,	n.45.		10	Thomas	Fleming.	The	New	Dealers’	War:	FDR	and	the	War	Within	World	War	II	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	2001),	15.	11	Benjamin	Welles,	Sumner	Welles:	FDR’s	Global	Strategist	(New	York:	St.	Martin’s	Press,	1997),	7.	12	Irwin	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs:	Franklin	Roosevelt,	Cordell	Hull,	and	Sumner	Welles	(Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1995),	69.		
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will	and	aims,”	vaguely	describing	him	as	“something	more	than	a	traditional	adviser.”13	O’Sullivan	accounted	for	the	“difficulty	in	tracing	the	seams	or	connections	in	the	Welles-Roosevelt	partnership”	by	citing	a	combination	of	factors,	including	Roosevelt’s	chaotic	managerial	system,	Welles’	tight-lipped	demeanor,	and	the	“loyalty	and	depth	of	commitment”	that	stemmed	from	their	pre-political	social	interactions.14	O’Sullivan’s	connection	between	the	professional	and	personal	circumstances	that	the	two	men	shared	provided	the	most	sophisticated	account	of	their	extraordinary	partnership.		This	chapter	contends	that	this	link	can	be	extended	further.	By	acknowledging	the	queer	context	of	Welles’	perspective,	and	taking	a	fuller	account	of	the	peculiarities	of	both	men’s	masculinity,	the	seams	and	connections	between	Welles	and	Roosevelt	become	easier	to	trace.	Because	of	their	respective	marginalized	positionality	vis	à	vis	sexuality	and	hegemonic	masculinity	Welles	and	Roosevelt	created	a	dynamic	between	themselves	that	actually	caused	the	opacity	O’Sullivan	identified.	Welles’	anomalous	position	in	the	Rooseveltian	firmament,	the	rivalries	that	provoked,	and	the	symbiotic	collaboration	between	the	two	men	on	matters	of	policy	were	all	to	some	extent	products	of	interpersonal	dynamics,	as	well	as	social	and	cultural	patterns,	that	were	responses	to	how	sexuality	had	shaped	the	personalities	and	experiences	of	both	men.			
The	Seeds	of	Partnership	–	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	Shared	Background			 Exploring	the	interpersonal	dynamics	between	two	key	individuals	in	order	to	elucidate	broader	themes	in	politics,	society,	or	diplomacy	has	a	long	tradition.	Presidential	advisers,	particularly	foreign	policy	gurus,	have	long	been	fodder	for	historical	analysis.	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	partnership	echoed	such	venerable	pairings	as	Woodrow	Wilson	and	Colonel	House,	and	foreshadowed	the	fateful	
																																																								13	Christopher	D.	O’Sullivan,	Sumner	Welles:	Postwar	Planning	and	the	Quest	for	a	New	World	Order	
1937-1943	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2009),	xiii.		14	O’Sullivan,	Postwar	Planning,	xiv.		
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collaborations	of	McGeorge	Bundy	with	Lyndon	Johnson,	Henry	Kissinger	with	Richard	Nixon,	and	George	W.	Bush	with	Dick	Cheney.15		In	all	of	these	cases,	the	relationship	between	the	two	men	was	as	important	as	the	two	men	individually	when	trying	to	comprehend	the	policies	they	conceived	and	enacted	together.	Delineating	the	contours	of	such	relationships,	including	their	boundaries	and	texture,	is	necessary	to	fully	comprehend	the	impact	these	men	had	and	the	personalities	that	defined	them.	However,	in	most	cases,	analyses	of	interpersonal	dynamics	among	decision	makers	has	tended	to	elide	the	influence	of	gender,	sexuality,	and	other	socially	constructed	characteristics.	Indeed,	diplomatic	historians,	particularly	those	studying	Franklin	Roosevelt,	have	often	treated	their	subject	as	a	rational	actor	with	clearly	identifiable	and	consistent	goals	in	mind	while	formulated	policy	and	responding	to	events,	often	overlooking	important	psychological	and	idiosyncratic	attributes	in	the	process.16			 With	a	relative	paucity	of	clear	analogues	within	diplomatic	history,	an	analysis	of	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	relationship,	and	the	role	discourses	of	sexuality	had	in	shaping	it,	must	look	further	afield.	Historians	of	LGBT	history	have,	obviously,	made	a	greater	account	for	sexuality	in	analyzing	historical	figures.	Historians	writing	about	figures	as	varied	as	J.	Edgar	Hoover	and	Clyde	Tolson,	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.	and	Bayard	Rustin,	and	Duke	Ellington	and	Billy	Strayhorn	have	shown	how	paying	fine-grained	attention	to	the	tenor	as	well	as	the	content	of	the	relationships	between	historical	actors	can	reveal	hitherto	unnoticed	dimensions	to	historical	events	and	actors.	17																																																										15	See:	Shirley	Anne	Warshaw,	The	Co-presidency	of	Bush	and	Cheney	(Stanford:	Stanford	Politics	and	Policy,	2009);	Alexander	L.	George	and	Juliette	L.	George,	Woodrow	Wilson	and	Colonel	House:	A	
Personality	Study	(New	York:	New	York	Publishing,	1964);	Henry	L.	Stimson	and	McGeorge	Bundy,	On	
Active	Service	in	Peace	and	War	(London:	Hutchinson,	1949);	Robert	Dallek,	Nixon	and	Kissinger:	
Partners	in	Power	(London:	Allen	Lane,	2007);	Seymour	M.	Hersh,	Kissinger:	The	Price	of	Power.	Henry	
Kissinger	in	the	Nixon	White	House	(London:	Faber,	1983).		16Graham	Cross,	The	Diplomatic	Education	of	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt,	1882-1933,	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2012),	5.	Exceptions	to	this	rule	exist.	Robert	Dean’s	Imperial	Brotherhood,	extensively	cited	in	the	Introduction	and	Chapter	One,	deliberately	acknowledges	the	social	construction	of	gender	as	an	influence	on	decision	makers’	approaches	to	foreign	policy.	So,	too,	does	Frank	Costigliola	in	his	various	works	on	Franklin	Roosevelt,	George	Kennan,	and	the	start	of	the	Cold	War.		17	See:	John	D'Emilio,	Lost	Prophet:	The	Life	and	Times	of	Bayard	Rustin	(New	York:	Free	Press,	2003);	Harvey	G.	Cohen,	Duke	Ellington's	America	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2010);	Claire	Bond	Potter,	“Queer	Hoover:	Sex,	Lies,	and	Political	History”	Journal	of	the	History	of	Sexuality,	Vol.	
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For	Welles	and	Roosevelt,	such	an	approach	begins	by	analyzing	their	cultural	similarities	and	shared	upbringing.	Welles	and	Roosevelt	belonged	to	the	“cloistered	and	privileged	world”	of	turn	of	the	century	East	Coast	American	aristocracy.	18	They	were	both	scions	of	wealthy,	well-established	families	whose	fortunes	and	lineage	were	significant.	Interestingly,	Welles	had	a	more	direct	claim	to	American	aristocratic	heritage	than	did	Roosevelt.	Sumner	Welles	was	a	descendant	of	Thomas	Welles,	one	of	the	first	Europeans	to	arrive	in	New	England	in	the	early	seventeenth	century	and	the	third	governor	of	the	Colony	of	Connecticut.	He	could	also	trace	his	ancestry	to	the	fiery	nineteenth	century	abolitionist	Senator	Charles	Sumner,	whose	name	he	bore.19	The	Roosevelts,	by	contrast,	arrived	later	and	though	wealthy	were	considered,	until	the	rise	of	Theodore	and	Franklin,	to	be	a	“‘dynasty	of	the	mediocre’.”20	In	both	cases,	the	generation	preceding	Sumner	and	Franklin	was	extremely	wealthy	and	firmly	established	among	the	institutions	and	customs	of	America’s	Gilded	Age	elite.		Based	in	New	York,	the	Roosevelts	and	the	Welleses	were	members	of	an	increasingly	self-conscious	aristocratic	elite,	self-defined	as	being	apart	from	both	common	people	and	the	upper	class.21	Members	of	this	aristocracy	“knew	that	they	belonged	and	had	an	acute	sense	of	their	entitlement	to	a	position	in	‘society’.”22	Anglophilic,	decadent,	and	imbued	with	a	sense	of	noblesse	oblige,	the	society	in	which	Welles	and	Roosevelt	circulated	was	very	small	in	size,	likely	no	more	than	a	thousand	families	at	its	height	in	the	1890s.23	This,	combined	with	the	highly	formal	system	of	etiquette,	protocol,	and	obligation,	helps	explain	why	separate	childhood	experiences	between	Welles	and	Roosevelt,	occurring	decades	before	they	worked																																																																																																																																																																						15,	No.	3	(Sep.,	2006).	Coincidentally,	Welles’	nemesis	William	Bullitt	could	be	added	to	this	list	on	account	of	his	close	partnership	with	his	assistant	and	friend	Carmel	Offie.		18	O’Sullivan,	Postwar	Planning,	2.	19	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	30		20	Jean	Edward	Smith,	FDR	(New	York:	Random	House,	2008),	3.	It	should	be	noted	that	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	maternal	side,	the	Delano’s,	stretched	back	into	colonial	lore	at	least	as	far	as	the	Welles’	–	they	arrived	on	the	Mayflower	in	1621	–	and	were	prominent	in	American	high	society	for	centuries.	21	Eric	Homberger,	Mrs.	Astor’s	New	York:	Money	and	Social	Power	in	a	Gilded	Age	(London:	Yale	University	Press,	2002),	3.		22	Ibid.,	3.		23	David	C.	Hammack,	Power	and	Society:	Greater	New	York	at	the	Turn	of	the	Century	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1987),	72.		
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together,	could	produce	such	fondness	and	camaraderie.	Coming	from	this	background	was	a	unique	and	exclusive	experience	that	few	others	shared,	even	among	the	highest	echelons	of	power.		The	two	men	were	also	acquainted	on	a	personal	level.	Welles	spent	part	of	his	summers	on	Campobello	Island,	New	Brunswick,	Canada,	where	Roosevelt	also	vacationed,	although	how	much	they	interacted	there	is	not	precisely	known.24	However,	they	were	on	good	enough	terms	for	Roosevelt	to	ask	Welles	to	be	one	of	the	pages	at	his	wedding	to	Eleanor	Roosevelt.25	Both	men	followed	the	same	educational	and	social	course	in	early	life	attending	Groton	Preparatory	School	then	matriculating	to	Harvard	University.	Although	Welles	was	ten	years	Roosevelt’s	junior,	these	elite	institutions	and	the	rarefied	social	atmosphere	that	went	with	them	meant	Welles	and	Roosevelt	shared	friends	and	common	experiences,	and	developed	a	nascent	familiarity	with	one	another’s	social	circles.	Their	contact	during	this	period	led	directly	to	future	professional	collaboration.	In	1915	Welles	asked	then	Assistant	Secretary	of	the	Navy	Roosevelt	for	a	letter	of	recommendation	to	the	diplomatic	service.26	Thus,	the	first	professional	encounter	between	Welles	and	Roosevelt,	the	one	that	launched	Welles’	diplomatic	career,	was	built	on	almost	two	decades	of	close,	albeit	infrequent,	social	interaction	among	the	rich	socialites	of	their	respective	families.		However,	the	personal	affinity	between	the	two	men	was	not	the	sole	basis	for	their	close	partnership,	nor	for	Welles’	unusual	position	vis	à	vis	the	rest	of	Roosevelt’s	entourage.	Both	men	had	a	history	of	transgressing	norms	of	sexuality	and	social	propriety	with	regard	to	romantic	matters	and	both	men	had	been	profoundly	shaped	by	experiences	that	set	them	apart	from	the	dominant	hegemonic	discourses	of	masculinity.	Their	shared	marginalization	was	the	crucible	for	a	common	sympathy	and	understanding	that	would	have	a	palpable	effect	on	their	interactions	with	each	other.																																																										24	Bullitt	Memorandum,	15	January	1943,	Yale	University	Archives,	William	C.	Bullitt	Papers	(WCBP),	Box	210,	Folder	218.		25	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	1.	26	Sumner	Welles	to	Franklin	Roosevelt,	13	April	1915,	FDRL,	FDR	Papers	as	Assistant	Secretary	of	the	Navy	1913-1920,	Box:	61,	Folder:	Correspondence:	Welles,	Sumner.		
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In	the	mid-1920s	Welles	and	Roosevelt	found	their	careers	in	serious	jeopardy,	albeit	for	different	reasons.	In	1921,	while	vacationing	at	Campobello	Island	Roosevelt	contracted	poliomyelitis.	The	resulting	paralysis	brought	Roosevelt’s	political	career	to	an	abrupt	halt	and	profoundly	transformed	his	persona	and	outlook.	Dealing	with	the	disease,	in	Frances	Perkins’	estimation,	“altered	his	relations	with	other	politicians	and	the	voters.”27	This	“one	and	only	major	experience	with	failure”	for	FDR	“helped	make	him	a	more	compassionate	person”	but,	ironically,	also	made	him	more	isolated	and	dependent	on	a	close	circle	of	trusted	advisers.28	“Trapped	in	a	chair,”	wrote	Hugh	Gregory	Gallagher,	“he	had	to	rely	upon	others	to	do	things	for	him.	Thus,	whether	to	order,	beg,	or	cajole,	he	was	caused	to	be	manipulative	to	get	things	done,	to	enforce	his	will.”29According	to	Frank	Costigliola,	because	Roosevelt	was	“[r]elatively	immobile	because	of	polio,	he	maneuvered	others	to	revolve	around	him	…	His	manipulations	made	administration	politics	emotional,	competitive,	and	unstable.”30	Living	with	polio	also	altered	Roosevelt’s	style	of	leadership,	a	process	that	mirrored	the	one	that	Welles	underwent	as	a	child,	where	the	marginalization	caused	by	his	queer	positionality	influenced	the	public-private	schema	of	his	psychological	profile.	“In	most	of	his	battles,	FDR	preferred	to	manipulate	rather	than	confront.”31		This	approach	to	leadership,	moreover,	was	part	of	the	genesis	of	the	close	bond	that	he	and	Welles	developed	during	their	years	working	together.	As	Costigliola	observed:		“With	an	unknowable	degree	of	conscious	intent,	Roosevelt	chose	talented	people	who	defied	disability.	LeHand	was	plagued	by	insecurity	and	a	tendency	toward	depression.	Howe	suffered	asthma,	emphysema,	and	facial	scarring.	Hopkins	endured	near	starvation	from	gastrointestinal	problems.	Welles	harbored	a	closeted	desire	for	homosexual	acts	with	men	he																																																									27	Hugh	Gregory	Gallagher,	FDR’s	Splendid	Deception:	The	Moving	Story	of	Roosevelt’s	Massive	
Disability	–	and	the	Intense	Efforts	to	Conceal	it	from	the	Public	(St.	Petersburg,	FL:	Vandamere	Press,	1994),	74	28	Ibid.,	215.		29	Ibid.,	215.		30	Frank	Costigliola,	“Broken	Circle:	The	Isolation	of	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	in	World	War	II”	
Diplomatic	History,	Vol.:	32,	No.	5	(November	2008),	679.	31	Ibid.,	680.	
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otherwise	disdained	…	Like	FDR,	these	aides	demonstrated	that	in	facing	down	“disability,”	one	could	hone	extraordinary	ability.”32	
	 Although	Welles’	sexuality	was	not	a	‘disability’	in	the	same	way	as	Roosevelt’s	polio,	it	was	a	characteristic	that	put	him	at	a	disadvantage,	socially	and	emotionally	–	something	Roosevelt	could	recognize	and	sympathize	with.		Besides	a	general	sympathy	Roosevelt	had	had	for	people	who	were	disadvantaged,	Roosevelt	also	had	reason	to	see	Welles	as	someone	whom	he	could	relate	to	on	matters	of	social	status.	In	1923	Welles	began	divorce	proceedings	from	his	wife	Esther	Slater.33	Welles’	courting	of	another	woman,	Mathilde	Townsend,	the	wealthy	daughter	of	a	New	England	Senator,	prompted	the	divorce.	Adultery	still	being	taboo,	and	divorce	illegal	in	the	United	States,	Welles	faced	serious	obloquy	for	his	actions.	This	was	initially	expressed	only	in	non-professional	settings,	becoming	a	matter	of	gossip	among	the	Washington	elite.	However,	the	death	of	President	Warren	Harding	changed	the	political	landscape	and	Welles’	fortunes.	The	elevation	of	Calvin	Coolidge	to	the	presidency	brought	with	it	a	decidedly	less	tolerant	attitude	toward	personal	indiscretions,	particularly	ones	involving	the	still	taboo	subject	of	divorce.		This	attitude	coincided	with	a	turnover	of	personnel	in	the	State	Department,	wherein	Coolidge	and	his	ally	Senator	(now	vice	president)	Charles	Curtis	sought	to	nominate	a	diplomat	named	Thomas	Kelly	as	General	Receiver	for	the	Dominican	Republic.34	Upon	learning	of	this	Welles	wrote	a	memo	criticizing	Kelly	for	possessing	neither	“‘experience	nor	demonstrated	capacity’”	for	the	job.35	The	memo	accidentally	made	its	way	to	Coolidge	who	was	already	infuriated	at	Welles	due	to	recent	press	coverage	of	Welles’	divorce.	The	memo	was	all	the	excuse	he	needed	to	fire	Welles,	but	rather	than	doing	so	Coolidge	chose	a	more	indirect	route.	Coolidge	endeavoured	to	force	Welles	to	resign	by	making	things	“so	consistently	
																																																								32	Costigliola,	“Broken	Circle”,	680.		33	Untitled.	SWP,	Box	19,	Folder:	1.	34	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs,	65.		35	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	113.	
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uncomfortable	for	Welles,”	that	he	would	have	no	choice.36	He	refused	to	appoint	him	to	a	panel	of	the	Central	American	court	alongside	every	other	officer	who	had	been	proposed	for	the	role,	a	serious	humiliation.37	When	his	acting	Secretary	of	State	wrote	a	memo	suggesting	Welles	deliver	a	letter	to	the	president	of	the	Dominican	Republic,	Coolidge	wrote	in	the	margin	“I	think	Mr.	Welles	better	retire	from	the	service.”38	Welles’	resignation	came	only	days	later,	effectively	casting	him	into	the	political	wilderness.		The	episode	was	an	eerie	foreshadowing	of	how	Welles’	personal	behaviour	could	negatively	impact	his	professional	life,	and	how	the	interaction	between	the	personal	and	the	political	was	a	prominent	factor	in	Welles’	career	from	its	earliest	days.	It	was	also	fortuitous	in	that	it	placed	Welles	in	the	position	of	needing	political	patronage	from	someone	who	would	be	willing	to	overlook,	or	sympathize	with,	his	plight.	Struck	down	at	almost	the	same	moment,	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	determination	to	rebuild	their	respective	careers	was	galvanized	by	their	mutual	struggle	to	regain	social	standing	along	with	political	power.		Roosevelt’s	sympathy	with	the	difficulties	faced	by	Welles	specifically	was	undoubtedly	further	deepened	by	another	episode	in	his	early	career:	the	Newport	Scandal.	During	his	last	months	as	assistant	secretary	of	the	navy	Roosevelt	received	accounts	from	governor	Livingston	Beekman	of	Rhode	Island	of	prostitution	and	homosexuality	around	the	Newport	naval	training	station.	Roosevelt	authorized	an	investigation	that	involved,	among	other	things,	enlisting	young	naval	recruits	to	entrap	men	around	Newport	by	soliciting	and	often	engaging	in	male-male	sexual	activity.	The	investigation	floundered	when	its	attempt	to	prosecute	a	local	Reverend	produced	more	revulsion	at	the	tactics	used	to	entrap	him	than	the	sex	acts	themselves,	prompting	a	Senate	inquiry	that	shocked	the	nation.39	Roosevelt																																																									36	‘National	Affairs’,	Time	Magazine,	11	August	1941.			37	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs,	65.		38	Joseph	C.	Grew	to	Coolidge,	10	July	1925,	SWP,	Box:	261,	Folder:	6.	39	For	a	full	discussion	of	the	Newport	Scandal	see:	George	Chauncey,	Jr.,	'Christian	Brotherhood	or	Sexual	Perversion?	Homosexual	Identities	and	the	Construction	of	Sexual	Boundaries	in	the	World	War	I	Era',	in	Martin	Duberman,	Martha	Vicinus	and	George	Chauncey	Jr.	(eds.)	Hidden	from	History:	
Reclaiming	the	Gay	and	Lesbian	Past	(New	York:	Penguin	Books,	1989);	Ted	Morgan,	FDR:	A	
Biography	(London:	Grafton	Books,	1985),	234-245;	Lawrence	R.	Murphy,	Perverts	by	Official	Order:	
The	Campaign	Against	Homosexuals	by	the	United	States	Navy	(London:	The	Haworth	Press,	1988);	
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was	forced	to	testify	to	his	knowledge	of	the	matter,	significantly	tarnishing	his	political	reputation.		Tellingly,	Roosevelt’s	behaviour	in	the	Newport	Scandal	hinted	at	a	degree	of	indifference	to	sexual	non-normativity.	Though	he	referred	to	the	homosexuality	in	Newport	as	“contaminating	influences”	and	“horrible	practices,”	FDR	shied	away	from	the	antigay	witch-hunt	some	other	officials	sought.	Quoting	an	interview	with	psychologist	C.A.	Tripp,	historian	Laurence	Murphy	noted	“Roosevelt	'repeatedly	went	out	of	his	way'	to	protect	homosexuals	from	discovery	and	disgrace.	Any	homophobia	manifested	in	the	navy	department,	according	to	Tripp,	'is	sharply	at	variance	with	his	later	attitudes	and	actions.'”40	Reflecting	on	this	scandal,	later	historians	have	argued	that	because	of	the	Newport	Scandal	"Roosevelt	came	to	see	that	homosexuality	was	not	necessarily	an	impediment	to	effective	government	service"	a	fact	that	was	tied	directly	to	his	protection	of	Welles	after	1940.41	Combined	with	Roosevelt’s	sympathy	for	those	who	did	not	conform	to	societal	norms	of	masculinity	and	virility,	on	account	of	his	polio,	as	well	as	his	pursuit	of	extra-marital	relationships	with	Lucy	Mercer,	Missy	LeHand,	and	Daisy	Suckley	that	violated	social	taboos	in	their	own	right,	Roosevelt’s	ability	to	appreciate	Welles	–	to	see	his	strengths	despite	his	ostensible	weaknesses,	and	to	recognize	a	kindred	spirit	struggling	with	setbacks	despite	having	all	the	advantages	of	a	privileged	upbringing	–	was	undoubtedly	enhanced.			
Back	in	the	Game:	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	Pre-Presidential	Collaboration			The	setbacks	for	Roosevelt	and	Welles	in	the	1920s	were	short	lived.	Their	respective	attempts	at	professional	rehabilitation	and	reintroduction	into	public	life	coincided	with	their	renewed	collaboration	together	on	diplomatic	affairs.	Beginning	in	1928	Welles	and	Roosevelt	developed	a	close	professional	relationship	that	was	founded	upon	Welles’	provision	of	invaluable	expertise	to	Roosevelt	on																																																																																																																																																																						and	John	Loughery,	The	Other	Side	of	Silence:	Men's	Lives	and	Gay	Identities:	A	Twentieth-Century	
History	(New	York:	Henry	Holt	and	Company,	1998),	chapter	one.		40	Murphy,	Perverts	by	Official	Order,	292.		41	Loughrey,	The	Other	Side	of	Silence,	12.		
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Latin	American	affairs.	However,	from	the	outset	the	queerness	of	Welles’	relationship	to	Roosevelt	was	apparent.	Welles	occupied	a	position	in	Roosevelt’s	entourage	that	was	not	like	any	other,	a	reflection	of	the	unique	sympathy	the	two	men	shared	on	account	of	their	shared	past	and	marginalization.			The	people	surrounding	Roosevelt	during	his	political	ascent	and	time	as	president	served	many	roles	and	supplied	many	demands,	occupying	an	ever-changing	and	often	ambiguous	orbit	around	him.	Among	the	closest	and	most	important	of	these	valences	was	Roosevelt’s	inner	circle.	This	consisted	of	Roosevelt’s	immediate	family,	most	prominently	his	wife	Eleanor	Roosevelt,	as	well	as	a	select	group	of	highly	trusted	personal	aides.	His	personal	secretary	Missy	LeHand	(later	replaced	by	Grace	Tully),	attorney	Thomas	Corcoran,	press	secretaries	Marvin	McIntyre	and	Steve	Early,	and	longtime	political	adviser	Louis	Howe	occupied,	at	one	time	or	another,	this	most	intimate	of	sanctums.42	These	individuals’	entire	lives	revolved	around	Roosevelt,	often	to	the	detriment	of	their	own	independence	and	good	health.	Most	of	them	lived	in	the	White	House	for	at	least	a	short	time,	and	their	interactions	with	Roosevelt	extended	from	intimate	personal	contact	to	heady	affairs	of	state.	In	one	telling,	they	were	compared	to	“courtiers	in	the	court	of	Pascal’s	king.”43	Welles	was	clearly	not	part	of	this	group.	He	maintained	his	independence	from	Roosevelt,	physically	and	socially,	throughout	their	time	as	colleagues.	There	was	none	of	the	quotidian	interaction	that	characterized	Roosevelt’s	closest	relationships.		Another	set	of	individuals	that	held	sway	in	Roosevelt’s	firmament	were	the	succession	of	highly	skilled,	deeply	influential	advisers	whom	Roosevelt	relied	upon	at	various	points	to	provide	political	support	and	execute	policies.	Men	like	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	Henry	Morgenthau,	Postmaster	General	James	Farley,	Secretary	of	Commerce	and	later	vice	president	Henry	Wallace,	and	even	later	additions	such	as	Secretary	of	War	Henry	Stimson,	all	assumed	outsized	positions	of	influence	in	Roosevelt’s	administration	at	various	points	and	in	various	contexts,	depending	on	Roosevelt’s	immediate	needs.	Whether	the	task	was	getting	Roosevelt																																																									42	See,	Gallagher,	FDR’s	Splendid	Deception,	125;	Costigliola,	“Broken	Circle”.	683.		43	Gallagher,	FDR’s	Splendid	Deception,	125.		
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elected,	tackling	the	Depression,	or	fighting	World	War	Two,	Roosevelt	collaborated	closely	with	key	individuals	to	help	him	devise	policies	and	see	them	enacted,	giving	them	extraordinary	access	and	influence	in	the	process.				Among	the	most	famous	of	such	advisers	was	the	so-called	“Brains	Trust”	that	Roosevelt	recruited	during	the	run	up	to	his	first	presidential	campaign.	This	group	included	several	bright,	educated,	progressive	minds	that	Roosevelt	brought	into	his	inner	circle	from	Ivy	League	Universities,	particularly	Columbia	and	Harvard,	as	well	as	bright,	young	intellectuals	working	in	progressive	causes	around	the	country.44	Figures	such	as	Raymond	Moley,	Adolf	Berle,	and	Rexford	Tugwell	provided	academic	heft	to	Roosevelt’s	policies	and	speeches	and	helped	give	the	New	Deal	much	of	its	intellectual	drive	and	vigour.45	Within	the	context	of	this	entourage,	Welles	did	not	quite	fit	the	mould	either.	Although	educated	at	Harvard,	his	strengths	had	never	been	as	much	academic	as	organizational.	He	lacked	the	spark	of	more	rigorous	thinkers	like	Adolf	Berle	and	Raymond	Moley,	both	of	whom	would	join	Welles	in	the	State	Department	after	Roosevelt’s	election.	Roosevelt	himself	seemed	to	endorse	the	view	that	Welles	was	not	a	Brain	Truster	when,	in	1937	while	considering	appointing	Adolf	Berle	alongside	Welles	in	the	State	Department,	“Roosevelt	told	him	that	it	was	the	State	Department	that	needed	a	Brain	Truster!”46		Thus,	Welles’	precise	place	in	the	firmament	surrounding	Roosevelt	remained	somewhat	uncertain	during	the	period	before	and	after	Roosevelt’s	election.	As	an	old	friend	and	a	confidant	on	domestic	political	matters,	Welles	recalled	the	likes	of	Louis	Howe,	Sam	Rosenman,	or	James	Farley,	whose	relationships	stretched	back	decades	and	whom	Roosevelt	considered	intimate	friends.47	As	a	policy	specialist,	Welles	was	akin	to	the	Brain	Trusters,	but	evidently	not	fully	part	of	them.		
																																																								44	See:	Rexford	Tugwell,	The	Brains	Trust	(New	York:	Viking	Press,	1968).	45	Morgan,	FDR:	A	Biography,	347.	46	Jordan	A.	Schwarz,	Liberal:	Adolf	A.	Berle	and	the	Vision	of	an	American	Era	(New	York:	The	Free	Press,	Inc.,	1987),	111.		47	Steve	Neal,	Happy	Days	Are	Here	Again:	The	1932	Democratic	Convention	,	the	Emergence	of	FDR	–	
and	How	America	Was	Changed	Forever	(New	York:	William	Morrow,	2004),	2.	
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The	anomaly	of	Welles’	position	held	only	one	real	analogue	in	the	multiple	competing	valences	of	Roosevelt’s	entourage:	Harry	Hopkins.	Like	Welles,	Hopkins	occupied	something	of	a	middle	ground	between	these	two	groups,	in	that	he	was	a	close	friend	of	Roosevelt’s	who	nonetheless	was	relied	upon	extensively	for	policy	advice.	As	with	Roosevelt	and	Welles,	on	policymaking,	“the	fine	line	between	Roosevelt	and	Hopkins	remained	a	matter	privy	only	to	them.”48	Hopkins,	too,	developed	“a	special	bond”	with	Roosevelt	over	the	physical	disadvantages	they	faced,	specifically	“the	fact	that	both	men	had	fought	with	death	at	close	range.”49		However,	to	call	Welles	an	equivalent	to	Hopkins	would	be	inaccurate.	Their	personalities	were	vastly	different.	Welles	was	austere	and	dignified,	Hopkins	was	“thoroughly	and	gloriously	unpompous.”50	As	well,	they	served	different	functions	in	Roosevelt’s	political	machinations.	Welles’	role	was	often	to	give	a	patina	of	gravitas	to	matters	he	was	assigned;	meanwhile	Roosevelt	once	said	he	admired	Hopkins	because	he	“doesn’t	even	know	the	meaning	of	the	word	‘protocol’.”51	Though	both	men	could	operate	within	the	highest	echelons	of	Roosevelt’s	entourage,	Hopkins	did	so	as	a	matter	of	course,	while	Welles	only	did	so	occasionally.		However,	this	did	not	mean	that	Welles	was	not	important	or	that	his	relationship	with	Roosevelt	was	not	uniquely	intimate.	On	the	contrary,	the	very	fact	that	Welles	traversed	these	boundaries	was	a	key	characteristic	of	the	anomalous	position	he	held	within	Roosevelt’s	entourage	and,	more	importantly,	a	sign	that	the	forces	that	governed	his	place	within	that	entourage	were	different	than	the	ones	that	applied	to	most	of	the	rest	of	Roosevelt’s	close	advisers.	This	ambiguity	was	one	of	the	more	salient	features	of	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	relationship,	frustrating	Welles’	opponents	and	supporters	alike,	and	it	stemmed	from	the	peculiar	bond	that	Welles	shared	with	Roosevelt.	No	other	policy	adviser	of	Roosevelt’s	had	a	personal	history	stretching	so	far	back,	bearing	so	many	similarities	to	his	own,	and	none	shared	in	Roosevelt’s	exclusion	from	hegemonic	masculinity	as	Welles	did.	Welles																																																									48	Christopher	D.	O’Sullivan,	Harry	Hopkins:	FDR’s	Envoy	to	Churchill	and	Stalin	(New	York:	Rowman	&	Littlefield,	2015),	14-5.		49	Robert	E.	Sherwood,	Roosevelt	and	Hopkins:	An	Intimate	History	(New	York:	Harper	&	Brothers,	1948),	3.		50	Ibid.,	9.		51	Ibid.,	4.		
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was	an	oddity	and	an	outlier,	but	nevertheless	operated	within	a	close	orbit	of	Roosevelt.	Welles’	access	to	power	(i.e.	Roosevelt)	was	simultaneously	more	direct	and	more	obscure	than	that	of	Moley	or	Berle.	Similarly,	Welles’	relationship	with	Roosevelt	was	as	professionally	defined	and	personally	sympathetic	as	those	of	Hopkins,	LeHand,	or	McIntyre.	The	sympathy	of	an	elite	upbringing	combined	with	the	crucible	of	shared	social	marginalization	forged	a	unique	partnership	between	Roosevelt	and	Welles	that	would	fundamentally	define	their	political	interactions	thenceforth.		
	
Meeting	of	Great	Minds:	Welles’	Advice,	Foreign	and	Domestic	
	 The	unique	characteristics	of	Welles’	and	Roosevelt’s	partnership	was	made	manifest	in	the	variety	of	roles	he	filled,	the	diversity	of	settings	in	which	he	was	consulted,	and	in	the	texture	of	their	mutual	collaboration	on	matters	of	international	affairs	during	Roosevelt’s	pre-presidential	years.	Initially,	the	most	prominent	role	Welles	played,	and	the	first	record	of	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	renewed	professional	collaboration,	came	over	Welles’	advising	of	Roosevelt	on	foreign	affairs.		In	early	1928	Roosevelt	wrote	Welles	to	solicit	his	advice	on	the	general	state	of	Latin	American	affairs.52	Welles	responded	to	Roosevelt’s	request	with	two	long	letters	in	January	and	March	detailing	the	“picture,	as	I	see	them,	of	the	relations	of	the	United	States	with	the	Latin	American	Republics.”53	The	letters	were	a	comprehensive	account	of	internal	Latin	American	politics,	American	diplomatic	relations,	and	State	Department	bureaucratic	gossip.	They	reflected,	too,	the	degree	to	which	Welles	felt	comfortable	sharing	his	views	with	Roosevelt	and	the	extensive	remit	Welles	felt	entitled	to	address	in	his	recommendations.	Welles	called	for	a	“new	policy	of	cooperation”	with	the	Latin	American	republics	and	a	“preventative	policy	[of]	…	effective	diplomacy.”54	Anticipating	the	rhetorical	and	policy	shift	in																																																									52	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	123-5.	53	Welles	to	Roosevelt,	15	March	1928,	SWP,	Box:	148,	Folder:	8.	54	Roosevelt	to	Welles,	20	January	1928,	SWP,	Box:	148,	Folder:	8.	
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Latin	American	affairs	that	would	later	be	dubbed	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	Welles	advocated	greater	economic,	specifically	agricultural,	openness	between	Latin	American	nations	and	the	United	States	as	a	means	of	fostering	intraregional	cooperation.	He	argued	the	United	States	had	to	take	a	leading	role	in	fostering	this	sort	of	cooperation	and	had	to	set	an	example	for	other	Latin	American	nations	to	follow.	Most	importantly,	he	called	for	a	recalibration	of	the	United	States’	entire	approach	to	Latin	American	relations,	insisting	that	“a	constructive,	and	continuous	policy,	to	be	carried	out	day	by	day	by	the	Department	of	State	in	its	dealings	with	the	Latin-American	Governments,	with	an	ever-present	view	to	the	future,	and	not	in	what	is	said	or	signed	at	occasional	Pan-American	conferences,	useful	as	these	may	be	in	their	way,	that	the	truer	interest	of	this	country	lies.”55		In	his	replies	to	Welles,	Roosevelt	indicated	his	broad	concurrence	with	Welles’	proposals.	He	wanted	to	continue	discussing	these	matters	and	arranged	for	the	two	of	them	to	meet	in	person	at	a	later	date,	which	they	did	periodically	for	the	next	four	years.	Evident	in	their	correspondence	was	the	degree	of	accord	between	Roosevelt	and	Welles	on	the	substance	of	Welles’	analysis	and	recommendations.	Roosevelt	praised	Welles’	writing	as	“most	interesting	and	constructively	useful”	with	regards	to	Latin	American	affairs.56	Roosevelt	continued,	stating	that	what	Welles	wrote	was	“something	along	the	line	of	what	you	and	I	are	both	agreed	is	a	new	and	proper	policy”	and	he	hoped	that	it	“will	be	adopted	by	those	who	come	into	power	in	the	near	future.”57		Roosevelt’s	reaction	to	Welles’	ideas	pointed	to	a	meeting	of	minds	and	a	level	of	symbiotic	thinking	between	the	two	men	that	hinted	at	the	depth	of	their	partnership	and	how	that	partnership	influenced	the	crafting	of	policy.	In	a	letter	to	Roosevelt	on	Latin	American	affairs	in	January	1928,	Welles	wrote	“[i]t	[was]	unnecessary	to	detail	what	I	mean	by	a	preventive	policy,	since	you	undoubtedly	appreciate	that	by	an	effective	diplomacy,	which	suggests	rather	than	commands”	
																																																								55	Welles	to	Roosevelt,	15	March	1928,	SWP,	Box:	148,	Folder:	8.	56	Roosevelt	to	Welles,	24	February	1928,	SWP,	Box:	148,	Folder:	8.	57	Ibid.	
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the	United	States	would	improve	its	position	in	Latin	America.58	Welles’	phrasing	was	telling.	He	believed	he	understood	Roosevelt’s	thinking	well	enough	to	know	that	he	would	implicitly	appreciate	what	he	was	suggesting.	When	Welles	did	offer	an	example	of	his	‘preventive	policy’,	it	came	in	the	form	of	a	single	mention	of	the	Central	American	Conference	of	1923,	with	no	explanation	of	what	decisions	or	context	the	Conference	held	that	would	illustrate	Welles’	views.		The	subtext	to	Welles’	recommendation	revealed	the	symbiotic	way	the	two	men	discussed	and	deliberated	upon	policy:	they	required	collaboration	with	each	other	to	determine	what	policies	they	would	enact.	This	dynamic	was	seen	in	a	letter	dated	5	May	1932	in	which	Welles	raised	the	topic	of	the	World	Court	by	confessing	he	had	“not	had	the	opportunity	in	our	talks	during	the	past	few	years	to	obtain	an	impression	of	what	your	own	views	may	be.”59	Crucially,	this	dynamic	was	not	one	of	deference,	with	Welles	kowtowing	to	whatever	Roosevelt	believed;	Welles	gave	his	opinion	on	the	World	Court	in	the	memo	quoted,	despite	not	knowing	Roosevelt’s	views.	Roosevelt’s	respect	for	Welles	was	genuine;	it	was	based	on	an	appreciation	of	Welles’	mind	and	independence	and	how	it	could	help	elucidate	complex	problems	in	a	way	Roosevelt	could	understand.	This	could	be	seen	elsewhere	in	Roosevelt	specifically	soliciting	opinions	from	Welles	on	matters	of	current	events,	such	as	the	1928	Havana	Conference,	without	any	indication	of	Roosevelt’s	own	thinking	to	guide	him.60		As	the	accord	between	the	two	men	grew	Welles’	involvement	in	Roosevelt’s	political	circle	expanded	and	the	collusion	of	their	outlooks	deepened.	In	September	1928	Roosevelt	recruited	Welles	to	write	“a	magazine	article	or	a	pamphlet”	on	foreign	affairs;	Roosevelt	suggested	“‘The	Crime	Against	our	American	Neighbors’”	as	a	potential	title.61	This	showed	Welles’	usefulness	to	Roosevelt	on	a	practical	matter	of	politics,	rather	than	merely	offering	advice,	and	brought	the	two	men	
																																																								58	Roosevelt	to	Welles,	20	January,	1928,	SWP,	Box:	148,	Folder:	8.	59	Welles	to	Roosevelt,	5	May	1932,	SWP,	Box:	148,	Folder:	11.		60	Roosevelt	to	Welles,	7	March,	1928,	SWP,	Box:	148,	Folder:	8.	61	Roosevelt	to	Welles,	8	September	1928,	SWP,	Box:	148,	Folder:	8.	
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closer	together.	In	the	following	months,	Roosevelt	continued	to	solicit	Welles’	opinions	and	thoughts,	deepening	their	political	cooperation	in	the	process.62		This	dynamic	provided	the	blueprint	for	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	professional	collaboration	over	the	subsequent	years	while	Roosevelt	served	as	governor	of	New	York	and	planned	his	campaign	for	the	Democratic	nomination	for	president	in	1932.	In	response	to	a	speech	attacking	the	record	of	the	Wilson	administration	by	Secretary	of	State	Henry	Stimson,	Welles	wrote	to	Roosevelt	recommending	“the	necessity	of	some	outstanding	and	representative	individual	in	the	Democratic	party	replying	to	the	address.”63	What	resulted	was	an	expansive	and	widely	disseminated	article	published	(again)	in	Foreign	Affairs	the	following	July,	this	time	ostensibly	written	by	Wilson’s	former	Undersecretary	of	State	Norman	Davis,	a	friend	of	Welles’.	Welles	supplied	much	of	the	text	as	well	as	the	overall	thesis	of	the	argument	and	suggested	that	Davis	was	the	best	figure	for	this	occasion.64		Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	collaboration	on	the	articles	in	1928	and	1931	showed	the	evolution	of	Welles’	role	in	Roosevelt’s	entourage.	Graduating	from	adviser	to	ghostwriter,	Welles	could	count	himself	as	Roosevelt’s	principal	source	of	information	on	Latin	American	matters.	Furthermore,	the	collaboration	that	preceded	and	produced	these	articles	reflected	a	complex	and	subtle	relationship	between	the	two	men.	It	was	not	as	simple	as	Welles	acting	as	Roosevelt’s	cipher	or	Welles	acting	as	Roosevelt’s	Svengali.	Their	mutual	efforts	to	craft	policy	statements	were	symbiotic,	a	symbiosis	made	possible	by	the	bedrock	of	trust	formed	by	mutual	sympathy	about	their	respective	personal	lives.		The	unique	character	of	Welles’	partnership	with	Roosevelt	and	place	within	his	entourage	was	further	underlined	by	his	inclusion	in	discussions	well	outside	his	area	of	expertise.	Throughout	Roosevelt’s	terms	as	governor	and	for	most	of	the	first	term	as	president,	Welles	served	as	a	political	informant	and	emissary	for	Roosevelt	in	Maryland,	where	Welles	resided.	Welles	made	himself	useful	to	Roosevelt	in	a	multitude	of	ways.	He	fed	information	about	unfolding	dramas	involving	major																																																									62	Roosevelt	to	Welles,	20	July	1928,	SWP,	Box:	148,	Folder:	8.		63	Welles	to	Roosevelt,	17	February	1931,	SWP,	Box:	148,	Folder:	10.	64	Ibid.	
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political	players	in	Maryland,	gauged	support	for	Roosevelt	during	the	lead	up	to	his	run	for	the	Democratic	nomination,	and	advised	him	on	the	progress	of	the	Democratic	campaign	in	the	state	during	elections.	On	more	than	one	occasion,	he	gave	Roosevelt	the	use	of	his	luxurious	home	at	Oxon	Hill	Manor	in	Maryland	to	meet	with	important	Democratic	Party	figures.65		Discussions	of	domestic	politics	began	very	soon	after	Welles	and	Roosevelt	began	working	together	in	1928.	Amidst	their	deliberations	about	Latin	American	politics,	Welles	fed	Roosevelt	a	steady	stream	of	updates	about	Democratic	fortunes	in	Maryland	and	the	progress	of	the	presidential	campaign	of	Al	Smith.	Through	the	summer	and	fall	of	1928	Welles	made	informal	political	reports	about	the	Smith	campaign	in	his	correspondence	with	Roosevelt.	These	reports	included	updates	about	the	“dry	[anti-Prohibition]	and	usually	Republican”	Eastern	shore,	the	likelihood	of	winning	the	“negro	vote,”	and	the	relative	unpopularity	of	the	state’s	senior	Senator	William	Bruce.66		However,	the	pamphlet	was	unable	to	stop	the	landslide	victory	of	Herbert	Hoover	in	November,	a	blow	that	came	as	a	“bitter	disappointment”	to	Welles.67	However,	he	also	noted	that	the	“one	bright	spot”	was	Roosevelt’s	own	election	as	governor	of	New	York.68	Though	their	correspondence	over	the	next	few	years	would	diminish	as	Roosevelt	served	as	governor	and	Welles	took	a	series	of	unofficial	assignments	in	Latin	America,	the	future	of	their	political	collaboration	was	already	being	planned.	“[N]ewspapers,	politicians,	and	private	citizens,	many	of	whom	do	not	know	you	and	have	not	heard	of	you”	Welles	wrote	Roosevelt	on	10	November,	“are	all	saying	that	if	there	is	any	man	who	can	hold	the	Democratic	Party	together	and	prevent	the	schism	which	now	exists	from	becoming	permanent,	that	man	is	yourself.	More	power	to	you!”69		By	1931	Welles’	participation	in	Roosevelt’s	entourage	had	advanced	to	include	discussions	of	political	strategy.	Over	a	dinner	at	Hyde	Park	in	February																																																									65	Linda	Lotridge	Levin,	The	Making	of	FDR:	The	Story	of	Stephen	T.	Early,	America’s	First	Modern	Press	
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1931,	Roosevelt	shared	with	Welles	his	concerns	about	the	difficulty	of	winning	the	Democratic	nomination.	Roosevelt	openly	discussed	that	he	was	worried	about	Al	Smith	“becom[ing]	jealous	of	the	latter’s	[Roosevelt’s]	increasing	national	prominence”	and	the	possibility	of	Smith	orchestrating	a	re-nomination	for	himself	in	the	event	of	a	deadlocked	convention.70	Welles	traveled	to	Hyde	Park	at	least	three	more	times	in	1931,	participating	in	high-level	strategy	discussions	with	some	of	Roosevelt’s	closest	advisors.	At	a	meeting	attended	by	Eleanor	Roosevelt,	Louis	Howe,	and	Samuel	Rosenman	(“an	extraordinarily	able	Hebrew	of	Texas	origin,”	according	to	Welles),	Roosevelt	“went	over	the	whole	political	situation	…	in	the	frankest	possible	way”	with	Welles	and	the	others.71	The	discussion	was	a	highly	detailed	account	of	Roosevelt’s	strengths	in	various	states,	and	among	different	ethnic	groups	and	power	blocs,	indicating	the	kind	of	information	Roosevelt	was	comfortable	sharing	with	Welles	at	this	time.	The	wider	implications	of	the	burgeoning	relationship	between	Welles	and	Roosevelt	were	evident	within	weeks	of	Roosevelt’s	election.	As	soon	as	Roosevelt’s	landslide	victory	occurred,	Welles	began	to	attract	attention	from	those	who	wished	to	have	an	audience	with	the	president,	hoping	that	Welles	might	arrange	a	meeting	with,	or	at	the	very	least	pass	on	a	message	to	the	president-elect.	One	of	the	first	and	most	significant	instances	of	this	pattern	emerged	over	the	subject	of	American	recognition	of	the	Soviet	Union.		Relations	between	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	United	States	had	deteriorated	after	the	Bolshevik	victory	in	the	Russian	Civil	War,	ending	completely	with	a	policy	of	non-recognition	during	the	Harding	administration.72	However,	“by	1930	the	arguments	against	recognition	of	the	Soviet	Union	by	the	United	States	were	definitely	weakening.”73	The	longevity	of	the	Soviet	regime	had	sunk	in	and	the	rapid	expansion	of	the	Soviet	economy,	particularly	in	contrast	to	the	floundering	American	one,	had	forced	a	reconsideration	of	non-recognition.	For	his	part,																																																									70	‘Sumner	Welles	Journal’,	18	February	1931,	SWP,	Box:	265.	71	‘Sumner	Welles	Journal’,	November	1931,	SWP,	Box	265.	72	Peter	G.	Boyle,	American-Soviet	Relations:	From	the	Russian	Revolution	to	the	Fall	of	Communism	(New	York:	Routledge,	1993),	18-19.	73	Norman	E.	Saul,	Friends	or	Foes?:	The	United	States	and	Soviet	Russia,	1921-1941	(New	York:	University	of	Kansas	Press,	2006),	254.	
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Roosevelt	felt	“’sentimental	prejudice	against	the	USSR’	[was]	nonsense”	that	was,	in	the	words	of	his	wife	Eleanor,	“not	in	keeping	with	American	traditions,	and	possibly	useful	in	blocking	aggression	and	aiding	recovery.”	74		However,	with	the	possibility	of	a	backlash	from	non-recognition	proponents	who	were	still	dominant	in	the	State	Department,	and	with	the	Depression	dominating	political	affairs,	Roosevelt	stayed	mum	on	the	subject	through	his	1932	election	campaign.	Thus	it	was	through	proxies	for	Roosevelt	that	proponents	of	recognition	first	attempted	to	raise	the	issue;	one	of	the	first	solicitations	came	through	Welles.	On	12	January	1933	Welles	sent	Roosevelt	a	letter	describing	how	he	had	been	contacted	by	a	Mr.	Skvirsky,	identified	by	Welles	as	“the	unofficial	representative	of	the	Soviet	Government”	in	Washington.75	Skvirsky	had	contacted	Welles	on	the	recommendation	of	Professor	Stephen	Duggan,	a	prominent	lawyer	at	Columbia	University.	At	the	meeting	Skvirsky	explained	to	Welles	“the	reasons	which	…	made	desirable	the	recognition	of	the	Russian	Government	by	this	country	when	your	Administration	came	into	power.”76	Skvirsky	did	not	especially	impress	Welles.	“His	arguments”	he	wrote	Roosevelt	“were,	in	general,	those	which	have	repeatedly	been	made	by	spokesmen	for	the	Russian	Government”	with	the	promise	of	commercial	benefits	leaving	Welles	“far	from	convinced.”77		Nonetheless	the	meeting	was	a	significant	step	forward	for	American-Soviet	relations.	It	was	the	first	documented	case	of	a	representative	of	the	Soviet	government	reaching	out	to	Roosevelt	over	the	issue	of	recognition	after	Roosevelt’s	victory.	It	was	the	starting	point	for	a	nearly	yearlong	process	of	delicate	talks	that	culminated	in	the	opening	of	negotiations	between	the	two	countries	on	the	basis	of	recognition.	Beyond	its	diplomatic	angle,	the	meeting	was	a	significant	indicator	of	the	dynamics	of	the	relationship	between	Welles	and	Roosevelt	as	well	as	the	salience	of	that	relationship	within	domestic	and	international	political	circles.	Skvirsky	did	not	choose	Welles	to	relay	his	message	by	accident.	It	was	a	deliberate																																																									74	Mary	E.	Glantz,	FDR	and	the	Soviet	Union:	The	President's	Battles	over	Foreign	Policy	(Lawrence:	University	of	Kansas	Press,	2005),	18;	Edward	M.	Bennett,	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	and	the	Search	for	
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attempt	to	solicit	an	audience	with	the	president-elect	through	a	trusted	and	intimate	advisor.	Welles	was	neither	the	most	prominent	foreign	policy	expert	attached	to	Roosevelt’s	campaign	nor	the	most	powerful.	However,	he	was	the	one	who	could	be	counted	on	to	have	Roosevelt’s	ear	and	carry	weight	with	his	opinion.		
	
Presidential	Patronage:	The	FDR-Welles	Connection	Asserts	Itself			 The	ramifications	of	the	unique	bond	between	Roosevelt	and	Welles	were	not	limited	to	the	creation	of	policy.	Roosevelt’s	fondness	for	Welles,	and	Welles’	own	ambition,	inspired	changes	to	the	bureaucratic	hierarchy	of	the	State	Department,	specifically	the	position	Welles	would	occupy	within	it.	Twice	during	the	mid-1930s	Welles	made	a	play	for	advancement	within	the	State	Department,	both	times	relying	on	his	close	relationship	with	Roosevelt	to	help	secure	him	the	position	he	desired.	Welles’	efforts,	and	Roosevelt’s	reaction	to	them,	reflected	the	anomalous	position	of	Welles	within	Roosevelt’s	entourage	and	the	bond	of	mutual	sympathy	they	shared	forged	out	of	respective	social	marginalization.			 The	first	of	these	episodes	transpired	during	the	interregnum	between	Hoover	and	Roosevelt’s	presidencies	in	early	1933.	Along	with	dozens	of	other	supporters	of	Roosevelt,	Welles	hoped	to	receive	an	appointment	to	a	preferred	government	post,	specifically	Undersecretary	of	State.	Welles’	candidacy	for	Undersecretary	was	tied	to	the	race	for	the	position	of	Secretary	of	State.	Welles	was	close	with	one	of	the	frontrunners,	Norman	Davis.	The	two	men	were	long-time	friends,	having	first	collaborated	during	the	Harding	administration.	They	met	frequently	in	January	and	February	of	1933	to	discuss	the	unfolding	political	machinations	regarding	the	selection	of	cabinet	and	subcabinet	officials.	As	early	as	11	January	1933	Davis	and	Welles	had	agreed	that	if	the	former	were	selected	as	Secretary	of	State,	the	latter	would	be	recommended	as	Undersecretary.78		Such	an	eventuality	looked	likely	in	the	early	months	of	1933,	with	Roosevelt	“without	saying	so	in	so	many	words,	that	he	was	at	present	trying	to	make	up	his																																																									78	Sumner	Welles	Journal,	11	January	1933,	SWP,	Box:	265.		
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mind	whether	to	offer	the	Secretaryship	of	State	definitely	either	to	him	[Davis]	or	to	Senator	Walsh	of	Montana.”79	However,	events	quickly	turned	against	Davis	and	Welles	as	their	unofficial	plans	to	get	appointed	to	the	two	top	jobs	in	the	State	Department	attracted	a	jealous	counterattack	from	fellow	Roosevelt	acolyte	Raymond	Moley.		Moley,	a	central	figure	in	the	Brain	Trust	and	one	of	Roosevelt’s	top	speechwriters,	was	also	gunning	for	the	position	of	Undersecretary	of	State.	Although	they	had	worked	together	on	Roosevelt’s	campaign,	there	was	no	love	lost	between	Moley	and	Davis.	Davis	believed	Moley	lacked	“the	remotest	understanding	of	the	practical	nature	of	international	questions”	and	was	wholly	unsuited	to	any	work	in	the	State	Department.80	For	his	part,	Moley	identified	Welles	and	Davis	as	his	primary	competitors	and	went	after	them	with	a	vicious	campaign	of	character	attacks	in	the	press.	In	January,	Moley	orchestrated	the	leak	of	documents	pertaining	to	a	botched	land	deal	in	Cuba	made	by	Davis	thirty	years	earlier	that	had	ended	in	a	messy	court	battle.	The	documents	were	hardly	scandalous,	and	to	Welles	showed	nothing	more	than	that	“[Davis]	had	unwisely	depended	upon	the	representations	made	to	him”	by	an	adviser	and	“a	lack	of	discretion;”	but	they	did	mar	Davis’	reputation	and	hurt	his	chances	for	the	Secretaryship.81		Welles	and	Davis	responded	to	the	attacks	in	kind.	In	February	1933,	Welles	passed	a	letter	to	Louis	Howe	“containing	the	details	of	[an]	incident	which	took	place	at	a	talk	…	with	some	newspaper	men,	in	which	Moley	had	spoken	disparagingly”	of	Davis.82	Welles	and	Davis’	efforts	were	evidently	more	successful	than	Moley’s,	as	Davis	reported	to	Welles	that	Roosevelt	indicated	he	“had	no	intention”	of	appointing	Moley	to	the	State	Department	and,	furthermore,	that	Cordell	Hull	had	stated	that	if	he	were	appointed	Secretary	of	State	it	would	be	conditional	on	Moley	not	being	appointed	Undersecretary.83	
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The	significance	of	these	developments	became	apparent	within	weeks	of	Welles’	successful	campaign	against	Moley.	Late	in	February	1933	Welles	caught	wind	of	an	alleged	attempt	to	procure	information	about	his	dismissal	from	the	State	Department	in	1925	that	was	“unfavorable.”84	The	information	in	question	was	related	to	a	memorandum	about	Welles’	dismissal	and	how	it	had	been	prompted	by	President	Coolidge’s	revulsion	at	Welles’	divorce	from	Esther	Slater	and	his	subsequent	marriage	to	Mathilde	Townsend.	Not	long	after,	Norman	Davis	reported	to	Welles	that	Cordell	Hull	was	concerned	about	the	“very	strong	opposition”	to	his	appointment	as	Undersecretary	and	that	this	was	serious	enough	to	jeopardize	his	confirmation	in	the	Senate.85	Unhappily	for	Welles,	congressional	resistance	combined	with	Cordell	Hull’s	ambivalence	proved	too	great	an	obstacle.	By	mid-March	it	became	clear	that	Welles	would	not	be	selected	as	Undersecretary	of	State.		Yet,	unlike	in	1925,	rumours	about	Welles’	violating	traditional	norms	of	social	propriety	did	not	terminate	his	career	ambitions.	Only	two	weeks	after	the	circulation	of	the	memorandum	implicating	Welles,	speculation	in	the	press	turned	to	the	likelihood	of	an	ambassadorial	post,	most	likely	in	“Germany,	Belgium,	or	a	South	American	capital.”86	In	fact,	Roosevelt	had	decided	to	name	him	Ambassador	to	Cuba,	one	of	the	most	prominent	and	politically	challenging	diplomatic	posts	in	the	Western	Hemisphere.	(Ironically,	this	development	was	still	disappointing	for	Welles,	as	he	had	categorically	denied	his	interest	in	being	Ambassador	to	Cuba	earlier	in	the	year.87)	The	Undersecretary	appointment	rigmarole	illustrated	a	key	aspect	of	Welles’	relationship	with	Roosevelt.	Despite	the	political	liability	posed	by	Welles’	past	violations	of	social	mores,	Roosevelt	was	not	willing	to	abandon	Welles.	Even	in	the	face	of	opposition	from	within	Roosevelt’s	inner	circle	and	from	outside	congressional	and	diplomatic	heavyweights,	Welles	was	able	to	draw	on	Roosevelt’s	respect	for	him	as	a	diplomat	and	a	friend	to	withstand	the	onslaught.	Although	Roosevelt	was	not	able	to	place	him	in	the	role	Welles	wanted,	the	position	he	got																																																									84	Sumner	Welles	Journal,	18	February	1933,	SWP,	Box:	265.	85	Sumner	Welles	Journal,	23	February	1933,	SWP,	Box:	265.	86	“Five	Appear	Sure	of	Foreign	Posts,”	New	York	Times,	3	March	1933,	Sec.	1,	A2	87	Sumner	Welles	Journal,	27	January	1933,	SWP,	Box:	265.	
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was	still	significant.	It	identified	Welles	as	someone	still	favoured	by	Roosevelt,	as	there	was	no	other	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	who	was	tasked	with	a	specific	foreign	policy	problem,	never	mind	one	as	prominent	as	Cuba,	where	American	investment	in	the	Caribbean	was	greatest.	It	also	left	open	the	possibility	of	promotion	as	soon	as	the	Cuban	episode	was	resolved.	It	was	an	indication	that	the	relationship	Welles	and	Roosevelt	had	developed	was	not	merely	one	of	political	expediency.		This	dynamic	was	underlined	four	years	later	when	the	episode	of	Welles’	attempt	to	procure	the	Undersecretaryship	for	himself	was	repeated.	In	the	absence	of	a	sex	scandal,	Welles	proved	remarkably	adept	at	flatfooting	his	opponents,	specifically	by	parlaying	his	close	relationship	with	Roosevelt	to	its	fullest	advantage.	In	late	1936	William	Phillips	resigned	as	Undersecretary	of	State	to	take	up	the	position	of	Ambassador	to	Italy.	The	move	caught	the	attention	of	many	in	Washington	and	the	State	Department,	including	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	for	Congressional	Affairs	R.	Walton	Moore,	Phillips’	ally	and	close	friend,	Ambassador	to	France	William	“Bill”	Bullitt,	and	Sumner	Welles.	Each	of	these	men	had	ambitions	for	higher	office	and	all	of	them	believed	that	they	had	the	upper	hand	in	the	situation	through	a	close	relationship	with	Franklin	Roosevelt.	In	reality,	none	of	these	men	had	a	monopoly	on	Roosevelt’s	affections,	though	Welles	did	have	the	advantage.			 R.	Walton	Moore	and	Sumner	Welles	shared	few	characteristics.	In	his	late	seventies,	Moore	was	one	of	the	oldest	members	of	the	State	Department	in	1937.	He	had	served	in	the	House	of	Representatives	for	over	a	decade,	where	he	had	struck	up	a	good	working	relationship	with	fellow	Representative	Cordell	Hull.	His	wife	was	distantly	related	to	Franklin	Roosevelt	and	he	“held	Roosevelt	‘in	high	regard’.”88	Having	been	selected	by	Hull	as	an	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	in	1933,	they	worked	closely	together.	They	also	shared	a	common	background	and	temperament.	They	were	methodical,	cautious,	and	conservative	in	mentality,	albeit	holding	liberal	views.	Moore	was	unlikely	to	upstage	Hull	by	being	too	dynamic	and																																																									88	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs,	42,	44.		
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he	fit	in	well	with	Hull’s	cautious	approach	to	foreign	policy,	as	opposed	to	Welles’	more	impulsive	methods.	Unsurprisingly,	Hull	preferred	Moore	for	Undersecretary.89		Moore	had	the	added	advantage	of	being	popular	with	Bill	Bullitt.	Bullitt	looked	up	to	Moore	with	almost	filial	devotion	and	in	the	spring	of	1937	became	his	most	fervent	advocate	for	the	Undersecretaryship.	Bullitt	ostentatiously	returned	from	Paris	for	a	week	in	March	1937	to	visit	a	vacationing	Roosevelt	in	Warm	Springs,	Georgia.90	With	Bullitt	at	his	back,	Moore	seemed	an	obvious	choice.	However,	Moore’s	candidacy	was	in	jeopardy	from	the	outset	and	he	quickly	found	himself	outmanoeuvred	by	the	more	agile	Welles.		As	he	did	against	Moley	during	the	early	stages	of	the	1933	battle,	Welles	embarked	a	campaign	of	political	subterfuge.	Welles	fed	stories	about	Moore	to	Drew	Pearson,	who	wrote	the	gossip	column	“Washington	Merry-Go-Round.”	In	three	columns	printed	in	March	1937,	Moore	was	attacked	for	his	age,	his	alleged	desperation	to	be	named	Undersecretary,	and	an	unauthorized	credit	made	by	Moore	as	Chairman	of	the	Export-Import	Bank.91	The	columns	came	at	a	critical	moment	during	Roosevelt’s	deliberations	over	the	Undersecretary’s	position	and	“’put	a	further	damper	on	Moore’s	chances’.”92	Further	diminishing	Moore’s	chance	was	his	unwillingness	to	lobby	for	the	job	himself.	Moore	opined,	“Mr.	Welles	is	a	heavy	fighter,	whereas	in	this	business	I	have	refrained	from	fighting.”93	Moore’s	pacifistic	approach	further	highlighted	the	dynamism	that	Welles	brought	to	the	fight,	and	presumably,	would	bring	to	the	job	as	well.		Welles	was	also	adept	in	counteracting	the	efforts	by	Bullitt	to	lobby	for	Moore.	On	16	March	1937	Welles	sent	a	testy	letter	to	Marvin	McIntyre,	the	president’s	personal	secretary,	insisting	that	he	be	given	a	chance	to	meet	in	person	
																																																								89	Cordell	Hull,	The	Memoirs	of	Cordell	Hull,	vol.	I	(New	York:	MacMillan	Company,	1948),	509.	90	Orville	H.	Bullitt	ed.,	For	the	President	Personal	and	Secret:	Correspondence	Between	Franklin	D.	
Roosevelt	and	William	C.	Bullitt	(London:	Andre	Deutsch	Limited,	1973),	209.		91	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs,	130.	92	Ibid.,	quoting	“Washington	Merry-Go-Round,”	Mar.	3,	17,	and	26,	1937.		93	Moore	to	Bullitt,	20	May	1937,	Yale	University	Archives,	WCBP,	Group	112,	Series	I,	Box	58,	Folder	1436.	
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with	Roosevelt	despite	his	being	on	vacation	at	Warm	Springs.94	The	letter	drew	attention	to	the	fact	that	Welles	“ha[s]	never	taken	up	his	[the	President’s]	time	with	anything	but	essential	matters.”95	The	letter	closed	with	Welles	explaining	in	excruciating	detail	how	he	could	visit	Warm	Springs	and	return	to	Washington	quickly,	having	only	taken	up	an	hour	or	so	of	the	president’s	time.96	That	Welles	was	so	insistent	on	getting	additional	face	time	with	the	president	indicated	a	great	anxiety	on	his	part	to	press	his	case.	It	also	spoke	to	a	willingness	to	exercise	political	muscle	and	use	his	friendship	with	the	president	to	his	advantage.		The	resolution	of	the	struggle	between	Welles,	Hull,	Bullitt,	and	Moore	over	the	Undersecretary’s	position	did	little	to	stem	the	increasingly	rancorous	feelings	between	the	men	involved.	Caught	between	personal	allegiances	to	both	Welles	and	Moore	and	the	political	pressure	exerted	by	both	men’s	supporters,	Roosevelt	equivocated.	He	promoted	Welles	to	Undersecretary	and	simultaneously	revived	the	position	of	Counselor	of	the	State	Department,	which	had	been	eliminated	in	1923,	to	give	to	Moore.97	The	Counselor	position	was	equal	to	the	Undersecretary’s	in	rank	and	pay,	but	the	reality	was	that	Moore	had	been	sidelined;	he	would	not	be	involved	in	the	day-to-day	running	of	the	Department	and	had	no	delineated	powers	or	directive.	As	Moore	put	it	in	a	letter	to	Bullitt	soon	after	Welles’	confirmation	in	the	Senate:	“Mr.	Welles	has	won	his	fight	…	and	it	is	desired	that	I	shall	win	the	consolation	race.”98		 	
Conclusion:		 Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	partnership	was	a	unique	blend	of	cultural	affinity,	homosocial	patronage,	and	mutually	shared	experiences	of	social	marginalization.	It	was	unlike	any	other	relationship	Roosevelt	had	during	his	presidency.	Though																																																									94	Welles	to	McIntyre,	16	March	1937,	SWP,	Box:	149,	Folder:	8.	95	Ibid.		96	Ibid.		97	Graham	H.	Stuart,	American	Diplomatic	and	Consular	Practice,	Second	Edition	(New	York:	Appleton-Century-Crofts,	Inc.,	1952),	41.		98	Moore	to	Bullitt,	20	April	1937,	Yale	University	Archives,	WCBP,	Group	112,	Series	I,	Box	58,	Folder	1436.	
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Welles	was	not	the	closest	adviser	to	FDR	–	that	title	is	more	fitting	for	men	like	Harry	Hopkins	or	Louis	Howe	–	he	occupied	an	exceptional	place	in	his	inner	circle.	Welles	and	Roosevelt	could	relate	to	each	other.	They	commiserated	over	shared	experiences	in	childhood	and	empathized	with	setbacks	and	obstacles	faced	during	adulthood.	They	were,	to	some	degree,	mutually	dependent.	Welles	relied	on	Roosevelt	for	patronage,	access	to	political	power,	and	protection	from	jealous	colleagues.	In	turn,	Roosevelt	relied	on	Welles’	meticulous	mind	to	articulate	his	general	ideas	about	foreign	policy.	He	also	depended	on	Welles’	unflinching	loyalty	to	ensure	those	policies	were	carried	out	properly	by	the	State	Department,	of	which	Roosevelt	was	ever	mistrustful.		However,	although	political	expediency	was	never	far	from	the	surface,	the	bedrock	of	the	relationship	between	the	two	men	consisted	of	genuine	sympathy	and	mutual	respect	for	each	other	born	of	common	experiences.	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	shared	upbringing	in	the	Brahmin	elite	inculcated	them	with	certain	values	and	understandings	about	the	power	and	role	of	the	U.S.	in	the	world.	Moreover,	both	men	were	also	distanced	from	this	world	by	personal	circumstances	beyond	their	control	–	Roosevelt	by	polio,	Welles	by	his	sexuality.	The	shared	experience	of	marginalization	from	hegemonic	masculinity	gave	their	outlooks	a	unique	compatibility.		The	consequences	of	this	configuration	were	observable	and	significant,	particularly	for	those	seeking	Roosevelt’s	attention.	Welles	was	able	to	parlay	his	relationship	with	Roosevelt	into	political	power.	He	advised	Roosevelt	on	his	campaigns	for	governor	and	president	and	collaborated	with	Roosevelt	to	devise	policies,	chiefly	regarding	Latin	America	and	foreign	relations.	After	1932,	Welles	used	his	relationship	with	Roosevelt	to	seek	professional	advancement	within	the	State	Department.	Although	initially	unsuccessful	in	his	attempt	to	become	Undersecretary	in	1933,	Welles	was	still	able	to	count	on	Roosevelt’s	support	when	he	was	under	political	attack	and	use	his	close	relationship	with	Roosevelt	to	overcome	potential	rivals.	As	a	consequence,	Welles	assumed	a	commanding	position	in	the	State	Department	during	Roosevelt’s	administration,	with	significant	implications	for	U.S.	foreign	policy.		
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Chapter	Four:	
“Man-Of-All-Work	Welles”1:	Sumner	Welles	and	Latin	American	Policy	
	From	1933	to	1943	Sumner	Welles	held	an	integral	position	in	the	foreign	policy	making	apparatus	of	the	Roosevelt	administration.	His	influence	was	broad	and	deep,	expanding	across	the	globe	while	involving	minute	considerations	of	day-to-day	diplomatic	matters.		Though	by	the	time	of	his	resignation	his	remit	had	broadened,	his	first	focus	–	the	one	that	occupied	most	of	his	attention	and	the	one	closest	to	his	heart	–	was	Latin	America.	Latin	America	was	“Welles’s	special	preserve;”	“[n]one	held	center	stage	like	Welles”	did.2	Decades	after	Welles	resigned,	the	New	York	Times	wrote,	"it	is	no	exaggeration	to	say	that	Sumner	Welles	made	American	policy	toward	Latin	America	more	than	any	other	diplomat	or	official."3	As	a	consequence,	Latin	American	affairs	at	this	time	were	shaped,	in	part,	by	Welles’	beliefs,	prejudices,	and	his	particular	vision	for	American	power	in	the	Western	Hemisphere.		This	chapter	examines	Welles’	role	in	the	creation	and	implementation	of	U.S.	foreign	policy	in	Latin	America	during	the	Roosevelt	administration.	It	analyzes	Welles’	motives	and	tactics	as	he	crafted	the	policies	and	rhetoric	that	came	to	define	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy.	Specifically,	this	chapter	will	analyze	two	main	arenas	for	Welles’	actions:	his	posting	as	Ambassador	to	Cuba	from	April	to	December	1933,	and	his	conduct	at	various	inter-American	conferences	between	1936	and	1942.	Building	upon	the	analytical	framework	laid	out	in	Chapters	One,	Two,	and	Three,	this	chapter	will	demonstrate	the	salience	of	three	main	influences	on	Welles’	diplomatic	praxis	in	those	arenas:	his	paternalistic	idealism,	his	aversion	to	military	solutions	to	diplomatic	problems,	and	his	reliance	upon	the	patronage	of	Franklin	Roosevelt	to	achieve	his	policy	aims.	In	doing	so,	this	chapter	will	draw	
																																																								1	“The	Washington	Merry-Go-Round”	by	Drew	Pearson,	7	February	1942,	located	in	SWP,	Box:	186,	Folder:	8.		2	Morgan,	FDR:	A	Biography,	684;	Irwin	F.	Gellman,	Good	Neighbor	Diplomacy:	United	States	Policies	in	
Latin	America,	1933-1945	(London:	The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1979),	81.	3	Obituary	for	Sumner	Welles,	25	September	1961,	New	York	Times.		
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conclusions	about	the	ambiguous	legacy	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	and	the	degree	to	which	Welles’	unique	positionality	contributed	to	it.			
Cuba:	The	Good	Neighbor’s	Awkward	Introduction		
	 The	idiosyncratic	aspects	of	Welles’	policymaking	in	Latin	America	during	the	Roosevelt	administration	first	appeared	during	his	stint	as	Ambassador	to	Cuba	in	1933.	Relations	between	the	Cuba	and	the	United	States	had	never	been	easy.	Nearly	invaded	by	the	United	States	in	1868,	Cuba	was	occupied	during	the	Spanish-American	War	and	granted	its	independence	shortly	thereafter,	following	which	it	descended	quickly	into	political	chaos.	The	1901	Platt	Amendment,	passed	by	the	U.S.	Congress	in	response	to	growing	political	instability	in	Cuba,	gave	the	United	States	the	authority	to	“intervene	militarily	in	the	island’s	domestic	affairs,”	a	right	which	had	been	invoked	twice	in	the	three	decades	between	then	and	Welles’	arrival.4	This	situation	gradually	increased	tensions,	as	U.S.	interference	in	Cuban	politics,	combined	with	repeated	military	actions	to	quell	rebellions	on	the	island,	became	“[a]	source	of	enduring	injury	to	Cuban	national	sensibilities.”5		The	island	held	great	economic	importance	for	the	United	States.	U.S.	companies	invested	heavily	in	Cuban	agriculture	and	industry	while	simultaneously	supplying	a	market	for	Cuba’s	sugar	exports,	the	mainstay	of	the	country’s	economy.6	By	the	1920s	Cuba	had	become	the	linchpin	of	the	United	States’	presence	in	the	Caribbean,	a	strategic	base	for	guarding	the	Panama	Canal	and	a	conduit	for	investment	further	south.	Control	of	Cuba	ensured	open	access	to	the	country’s	resources	for	U.S.	companies	and	had	brought	a	measure	of	political	stability.	However,	as	one	historian	pointed	out,	“this	only	mean[t]	that	the	level	of	
																																																								4	Gellman,	Good	Neighbor	Diplomacy,	17.		5	Louis	A.	Perez	Jr.,	Cuba	and	the	United	States:	Ties	of	Singular	Intimacy,	Third	Edition	(Athens,	GA:	University	of	Georgia	Press,	2003),	176.		6	For	an	overview	of	Cuban-American	relations	see:	Jose	M.	Hernandez,	Cuba	and	the	United	States:	
Intervention	and	Militarism,	1868-1933	(Austin:	University	of	Texas	Press,	1933)	and	Jules	R.	Benjamin,	The	United	States	&	Cuba:	Hegemony	and	Dependent	Development,	1880-1934	(Pittsburgh:	University	of	Pittsburgh	Press,	1977).		
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political	violence	was	not	as	high	in	Cuba	as	elsewhere."7	In	fact,	U.S.	involvement	in	the	country’s	economy	had	bred	intense	resentment	among	Cubans.	Cuban	historian	Louis	Perez	wrote:			 "For	more	than	two	decades	the	United	States	had	endeavored	to	create	conditions	in	Cuba	in	which	North	American	interests	–	political,	economic,	strategic	–	could	flourish	and	prevail,	not	only	against	the	interests	of	other	foreigners	but	against	Cuban	ones	as	well."8		Cuban	nationalists	resented	the	U.S.	military	presence,	and	as	time	passed	Cuban	workers	of	all	classes	increasingly	resented	policies	designed	to	undermine	Cuban	economic	independence.		By	1933	Cuba	was	beset	by	profound	economic	and	political	problems	that	threatened	to	throw	the	island	into	chaos	once	again.	Gerardo	Machado	had	been	President	of	Cuba	since	1924,	when	he	was	elected	democratically.	But	his	rule	quickly	descended	into	dictatorship	and	political	terror.	Machado	was	pathologically	intolerant	of	opposition	and	fearful	that	the	restive	growing	working	class	of	Cubans	might	stage	a	revolution	and	overthrow	him.	Machado	responded	to	labour	agitation	with	“terrorist	tactics	…	murder,	torture,	disappearances.”9	His	re-election	in	1928,	in	contrast	to	that	of	1924,	was	also	marred	by	corruption.	Machado	bribed	all	the	major	parties	to	nominate	him	as	their	candidate	for	president,	then	forced	through	a	constitutional	amendment	extending	the	presidential	term	from	four	years	to	six.10	Political	opposition	to	Machado	was	driven	underground	and	became	increasingly	radicalized,	especially	through	the	growth	of	the	Communist	Party.11	"By	the	spring	of	1933,”	one	historian	wrote,	“Cubans	were	living	through	a	political	and	economic	crisis	where	numerous	bombings,	kidnappings,	mysterious	seizures	of	weapons	and	munitions,	and	urban	and	rural	protest	were	daily	occurrences."12																																																										7	Hernandez,	Cuba	and	the	United	States	160.		8	Perez	Jr.,	Ties	of	Singular	Intimacy,	170.	9	Ibid.,	179.	10	Ibid.,	180.		11	Robert	Whitney,	State	and	Revolution	in	Cuba:	Mass	Mobilization	and	Political	Change,	1920-1940	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2001),	81,	95.		12	Whitney,	State	and	Revolution	in	Cuba,	82	
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Padre	Sabe	Mejor:	Welles’	Paternalistic	Plans		 Drastic	and	immediate	action	was	needed	to	rectify	the	situation.	After	a	short	deliberation	over	whether	to	send	former	Undersecretary	of	State	Francis	White,	Roosevelt	decided	in	early	April	1933	to	appoint	Welles	to	Cuba	as	minister	plenipotentiary.13	Welles	arrived	in	Cuba	in	May	of	1933	armed	with	what	he	believed	to	be	an	airtight	plan	to	solve	Cuba’s	political,	economic,	and	social	problems.	The	plan	was	simple,	straightforward,	and	firmly	grounded	in	Welles’	experience	and	outlook.14	Machado	would	appoint	a	neutral	party	as	vice-president	to	serve	out	the	rest	of	his	term.	He	would	ask	the	congress	to	draft	a	new	electoral	law	shortening	congressional	terms	so	that	a	new	congress	would	be	elected	alongside	the	president	in	1935.	In	the	meantime,	negotiations	on	a	new	trade	agreement	with	the	United	States	would	continue	with	the	understanding	that,	once	the	new	government	was	elected,	it	would	be	signed.15			 Immediately	evident	in	Welles’	plans,	ostensibly	magnanimous	though	they	were,	was	a	transparently	paternalistic	approach	to	solving	the	Cuban	situation.	Despite	assurances	that	the	U.S.	and	Cuba	would	treat	each	other	as	equals,	Welles’	plans	made	clear	they	would	be	implemented	under	the	continued	auspices	of	the	existing	legal	structure	of	Cuban-American	relations	“by	[the]	rights	and	obligations	as	set	forth	in	the	first	five	articles	of	the	treaty	between	the	United	States	and	Cuba	signed	at	Havana	May	22,	1903;”	the	Platt	Amendment	would	not	be	abrogated	and	
																																																								13	Irwin	F.	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs:	Franklin	Roosevelt,	Cordell	Hull,	and	Sumner	Welles	(Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1995),	58;	Welles	was	confirmed	by	the	Senate	on	24	April	1933.	Summary	of	Congressional	Record,	Monday,	April	24,	1933,	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	Presidential	Library	(FDRL),	Sumner	Welles	Papers	(SWP),	Box	176,	Folder	2.		14	Bryce	Wood,	The	Making	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	(New	York:	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	1961),	59.		15	“The	Secretary	of	State	to	the	Appointed	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles),	1	May	1933,	U.S.	Department	of	State,	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States	(FRUS),	1933.	Vol.	V:	The	American	Republics,	(Washington,	D.C.:	GPO,	1952),	279-86.	
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the	U.S.	would	retain	the	right	to	set	terms	for	renegotiation	of	the	trade	agreement.16		Welles	also	employed	somewhat	sentimental	language	that	underlined	a	belief	that	the	plans	he	was	unilaterally	proposing	were	what	was	best	for	the	Cuban	people.	In	his	inaugural	statement	upon	his	appointment,	Welles	confessed	a	“peculiar	sympathy”	for	the	island	and	its	population.17	A	few	weeks	later	in	press	interview,	Welles	expressed	the	opinion	that	“the	Cuban	people	should	have	faith	in	themselves	and	that	unquestionably	there	were	evidences	of	impatience	and	impulsiveness	on	the	part	of	the	Cuban	people	at	the	present	time.”18	He	related	his	opinion	in	a	letter	to	his	friend	and	colleague	Laurence	Duggan	in	which	Welles	explained	how	a	prominent	Cuban	had	chided	him	for	this	attitude.	In	response,	Welles	somewhat	indignantly	told	Duggan	“I	should	think	in	this	connection	that	any	patriotic	Cuban	would	feel	…	that	they	should	have	enough	patience	and	enough	faith	in	their	own	capacity	to	attempt	to	work	out	a	solution	of	whatever	political	problems	they	might	be	concerned	with	in	an	orderly	and	peaceful	manner.”19	Meanwhile,	during	his	explanation	of	the	details	of	his	plans	for	resolving	the	political	crisis	to	President	Machado,	Welles	justified	his	approach	by	explaining		“I	was	under	the	very	positive	impression	that	not	only	the	eventual	benefits	to	be	derived	from	such	agreement	but	also	the	turning	of	the	attention	of	the	general	public	from	political	agitation	to	questions	of	economic	interest	to	every	Cuban	citizen	would	have	a	markedly	beneficial	psychological	effect.”20	Beyond	the	rhetoric	he	used	to	express	himself,	Welles’	characteristic	paternalistic	idealism	was	revealed	in	his	undue	optimism	about	Cuban	politics.	Welles	profoundly	misread	the	political	landscape,	particularly	with	regard	to	Machado.	During	his	first	months	in	Cuba	Welles	was	pleased,	as	his	plans	appeared	to	achieve	a	great	deal	of	success.	Machado	was	“very	obviously	impressed	with	the																																																									16	Benjamin,	Hegemony	and	Development,	91-2;	Instructions	to	Welles	from	Hull,	1	May	1933,	SWP:	Box	176,	Folder	2.		17	Statement	by	Mr.	Sumner	Welles,	Assistant	Secretary	of	State,	20	April	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol.	V,	278.		18	Welles	to	Laurence	Duggan,	31	May	1933,	SWP:	Box	171,	Folder	2.	19	Ibid.	20	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	13	May	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol	V,	288.			
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declarations”	Welles	had	proposed	and	had	agreed	to	step	down	and	submit	to	new	elections	according	to	a	timetable	to	be	devised	by	Welles.21	Opposition	leaders,	initially	unwilling	to	even	sit	at	the	same	table	with	Machado,	were	gradually	coming	to	see	that	their	best	interests	lay	with	courting	Welles.	By	June,	the	only	holdouts	to	negotiation	were	fringe	ultranationalists	and	radicals,	whose	support	among	the	population	was	minimal.22		However,	this	comity	was	illusory.	In	July,	despite	initially	agreeing	to	Welles’	plans	for	his	eventual	removal	from	power,	Machado	gave	a	series	of	“rambling	and	at	times	almost	incoherent	speeches”	in	the	Senate	and	House	in	advance	of	a	debate	that	had	the	potential	to	undermine	Machado’s	grip	on	power.23	The	speeches	were,	in	Welles’	opinion,	“delivered	at	a	singularly	inopportune	moment	and	were	in	many	passages	most	unfortunately	worded.”24	Negotiations	fell	apart	and	a	crisis	was	soon	at	hand.	Welles	had	seriously	misjudged	Machado’s	character	and	it	led	to	a	serious	threat	to	the	success	of	Welles’	efforts.		Welles	compounded	this	miscalculation	by	adopting	an	unduly	optimistic	assessment	of	the	restlessness	of	the	Cuban	people.	Although	well	aware	of	the	political	instability	caused	by	Machado’s	campaign	of	terror	and	violence	over	the	previous	five	years,	Welles	did	not	fully	comprehend	the	depth	of	dissatisfaction	with	the	current	regime,	nor	did	he	appreciate	the	influence	of	more	radical	groups	on	the	Cuban	political	spectrum.	Despite	the	fact	that	they	were	highly	organized	and	led	by	eloquent	leaders,	Welles	was	unable	to	attach	very	much	importance	to	the	student	groups.	When	a	series	of	strikes	in	late	July	and	early	August	brought	Havana	to	a	standstill	Welles	downplayed	their	political	significance.25	Despite	having	evidence	that	the	government	was	trying	to	orchestrate	a	general	strike,	Welles	continued	to	hold	lengthy	meetings	with	government	and	opposition	members,	insisting	that	“[p]ractically	all	important	points	have	already	been	agreed																																																									21	Welles	to	Hull,	13	May	1933,	FRUS.	1933,	Vol.	IV,	288-9.		22	Louis	R.	Perez	Jr.,	Cuba	Under	the	Platt	Amendment	(London:	University	of	Pittsburg	Press,	1986),	308.		23	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Acting	Secretary	of	State,	27	July	1933,	FRUS.	1933,	Vol.	V,	330.		24	Ibid.	25	Benjamin,	Hegemony	and	Development,	99.		
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to.”26	Within	two	days,	Welles	was	forced	to	abandon	his	plans	and	compel	Machado’s	resignation.27		If	his	misplaced	confidence	in	Machado’s	statesmanship	and	the	Cuban	people’s	magnanimity	reflected	Welles’	undue	optimism,	his	actions	following	Machado’s	removal	underlined	the	condescending	nature	of	his	paternalistic	approach.	Upon	Machado’s	departure	for	Bahamanian	exile,	Welles	made	the	fateful	decision	to	select	Carlos	Manuel	de	Céspedes	y	Quesada	as	interim	President.	Céspedes	was	a	prominent	politician	and	diplomat	who	shared	a	close	relationship	with	Welles.	Welles	had	a	special	affinity	for	Céspedes,	having	worked	closely	with	him	during	his	posting	to	Cuba	in	1921.	At	that	time,	Welles	believed	“Céspedes	would	make	an	ideal	president	because	of	his	“'amenability	to	suggestions	or	advice	which	might	be	made	to	him	by	the	American	Legation,'"	suggesting	that	even	then	Welles’	priorities	had	never	entirely	centred	on	the	well	being	of	the	Cuban	people.28		However,	in	spite	of	–	and	to	some	extent	because	of	–	his	support	from	Welles,	Céspedes	was	incapable	of	leading	Cuba	effectively.29	Céspedes	possessed	a	“’weakness	of	character’.”30	He	was	"without	popularity,	without	a	party,	and	without	a	program,	and	all	at	once	he	inherited	a	cabinet,	a	constituency,	and	a	country	in	collapse."31	One	veteran	journalist	thought	him	“‘too	gentle	to	rule;	honorable	and	intellectual	–	but	indecisive.’”32	Future	Ambassador	to	Cuba	Spruille	
																																																								26	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Acting	Secretary	of	State,	5	August	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol.	V,	334;	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Acting	Secretary	of	State,	5	August	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol.	V,	335.		27	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	7	August	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol.	V,	336.		28	Lars	Schoultz,	“Blessings	of	Liberty:	The	United	States	and	the	Promotion	of	Democracy	in	Cuba”,	
Journal	of	Latin	American	Studies,	Vol.	34,	No.	2	May	(2002),	409,	quoting	Sumner	Welles,	‘Memorandum,’	1	March	1921,	837.00/2216,	NARA,	RG59	29	Welles	expressed	concerned	that	he	was	exercising	too	much	control	and	that	Cuban	politicians	were	beginning	to	resent	it.	This	prompted	a	request	to	Washington	that	he	be	recalled	during	August,	but	the	Department	insisted	he	stay	at	least	until	the	end	of	the	month.	See:	Robert	F.	Smith,	
The	United	States	and	Cuba:	Business	and	Diplomacy,	1917-1960	(New	York:	Bookman	Associates,	1960),	148.			30	Schoultz,	“Blessings	of	Liberty”,	409,	quoting	Crowder,	‘Recent	Cabinet	Crisis,’	21	April	1923,	837.00/85,	NARA,	RG59	31	Perez,	Platt	Amendment,	317.		32	Benjamin	Welles,	Sumner	Welles:	FDR’s	Global	Strategist:	A	Biography	(New	York:	MacMillan	Press,	1997),	167,	quoting	Ruby	Hart	Phillips,	Cuban	Sideshow,	(Havana:	Cuban	Press,	1935),	16.	
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Braden	believed	he	was	“a	‘boulevardier	and	gourmet	who	had	lived	and	entertained	in	Paris	and	was	more	European	than	Cuban’.”33		That	Welles	considered	such	a	person	to	be	a	good	choice	to	lead	Cuba	during	this	turbulent	period	spoke	to	both	his	misunderstanding	of	the	political	situation	and	his	inability	to	comprehend	why	his	handpicking	the	Cuban	leader	would	be	problematic.	By	appointing	a	close	friend	–	one	who	shared	Welles’	elitist	characteristics	and	cosmopolitan	profile	–	Welles	demonstrated	his	narrowness	of	vision	about	who	could	be	considered	respectable	and	authoritative.	In	Welles’	eyes,	Céspedes	was	an	acceptable	candidate	precisely	because	he	shared	those	paternalistic	qualities	he	himself	possessed.	Meanwhile,	to	many	Cubans	at	the	time	and	historians	since,	Céspedes	"represented	an	inoffensive	compromise	to	the	contentious	groupings	that	were	banded	together	into	a	provisional	government	…	It	neither	possessed	the	popularity	nor	promised	a	program.	And	it	lasted	only	three	weeks."34	On	the	night	of	5	September	a	group	of	non-commissioned	Cuban	army	officers	under	Sergeant	Fulgencio	Batista	joined	radical	student	groups	from	the	University	of	Havana	and	seized	power	in	a	bloodless	coup	known	as	the	‘Sergeant’s	Revolt’.	Céspedes	was	overthrown	and	replaced	with	a	Pentarchy	of	five	leaders	from	various	political	factions.	Within	a	week	they	had	selected	one	of	their	own	as	the	new	President,	Ramòn	Grau	San	Martin.		The	overthrow	of	a	second	Cuban	government	in	under	a	month	obviously	disrupted	Welles’	plans,	but	the	group	that	replaced	Céspedes	posed	an	even	greater	challenge.	The	Grauist	government	marked	a	significant	departure	for	Cuban	politics	up	to	that	point.	It	instituted	widespread	reforms,	introducing	labour	reform,	female	suffrage,	and	reduced	utility	rates,	and	initiated	land	reform.35	Most	significantly,	Grau	unilaterally	abrogated	the	Platt	Amendment,	a	longstanding	grievance	of	Cuban	nationalists,	a	sign	that	Grau	was	determined	to	chart	a	course	for	Cuba	that	was	free	from	undue	influence	by	the	United	States.	According	to	one	historian,	Grau	
																																																								33	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	167,		quoting	Spruille	Braden	transcript,	2916-2917,	Columbia	Oral	History	Project,	Columbia	University,	New	York.		34	Perez,	Ties	of	Singular	Intimacy,	193.		35	Perez,	Platt	Amendment,	322.		
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was	effectively	“dismantling	of	the	internal	structures	that	had	underwritten	and	institutionalized	U.S.	hegemony."36		Once	again,	Welles’	reaction	to	this	popular	uprising,	and	contravention	of	his	ostensibly	beneficent	plans,	was	to	dismiss	its	importance	and	deny	its	legitimacy.	Welles	denounced	the	Grauists	as	"the	unpatriotic	and	futile	obstinacy	of	a	small	group	of	young	men	who	should	be	studying	in	the	university	instead	of	playing	politics	and	of	a	few	individuals	who	had	joined	with	them	from	selfish	motives."37	The	people	exercising	influence	and	the	government	they	put	in	place	were	“frankly	communistic.”38	Dismissing	the	legitimacy	of	the	Grauists	wholesale,	Welles	insisted	the	toppling	of	Céspedes	as	"not	…	in	any	sense	responsive	to	a	social	movement"	nor	"directed	against	Cespedes	or	his	cabinet.”"39	Accordingly,	Welles	advised	Roosevelt	to	withhold	recognition	based	on	the	Wilson-era	policy,	which	Welles	had	championed,	of	not	recognizing	governments	in	Latin	America	that	came	to	power	via	unconstitutional	means,	and	requested	the	destroyer	U.S.S.	Richmond	remain	in	Havana	harbor	as	a	precaution.40		Evidence	to	back	up	such	assessments	was	minimal.	Grau’s	government	had	at	least	as	much	viability	and	public	support	as	the	now-defunct	Céspedes	government,	which	Welles	had	recognized	almost	immediately	upon	its	formation	only	weeks	earlier.	Grau	had	the	support	of	the	army	and	“social	unrest	and	violence	were	no	greater	than	under	Céspedes.”41	Welles’	reaction,	then,	was	less	a	reaction	to	conditions	on	the	ground	and	more	a	response	to	his	own	outlook	and	prejudices	about	who	was	behind	the	revolution.	“As	far	as	Welles	was	concerned	the	only	groups	of	any	importance	outside	of	the	army	were	the	upper-class	political	and	business	elements,”	groups	who	were	not	represented	in	any	meaningful	way	by	the	
																																																								36	Perez,	Platt	Amendment,	323.		37	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	4	October	1933,	FRUS	1933.	Vol.	V,	471.	38	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	5	September	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol.	V,	382;	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Acting	Secretary	of	State,	7	December	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol.	V,	535.		39	Perez,	Platt	Amendment,	330,	quoting	Welles	to	Hull,	October	16,	1933,	837.00/4206,	DS/RG	59.		40	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	8	September	1933,	FRUS,	1933,	Vol.	V,	403.		41	Benjamin,	Hegemony	and	Development,	151.		
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Grauist	government.42	Roosevelt	himself	acknowledged	this	in	a	memorandum	sent	to	Francis	White,	the	Acting	Secretary	of	State,	when	he	mentioned	how	Welles	“seems	to	have	had	excellent	support	from	all	Americans	in	Cuba,	regardless	of	the	fact	that	they	have	been	almost	all	put	out	of	business.”43	In	a	broader	context,	Welles’	objections	channelled	long	held	prejudices	in	the	United	States	against	Cuban,	and	more	generally	Latin	American,	aspirations	for	independence	and	autonomy	that	had	informed	U.S.	policy	toward	Latin	America	during	the	pre-Good	Neighbor	era.	Reactions	in	the	U.S.	to	Cuban	demands	for	greater	autonomy	had	always	been	looked	on	with	great	suspicion.	Many	in	the	U.S.	“could	not	understand	opposition	to	[American]	influence	by	Cuba	as	other	than	immaturity	or,	at	the	end,	alien	subversion."44	Indeed,	during	Welles’	posting	there	were	“[s]ome	American	interests	in	Cuba”,	traditional	supporters	of	intervention,	who	were	uneasy	about	the	reforms	being	introduced	by	the	new	government	and	fearful	of	the	prospect	of	social	revolution,	for	“armed	protection	due	to	labor	violence”.45		However,	Welles’	objections	to	Grau	were	not	based	on	economic	self-interest	or	resentment	of	Cuban	nationalism,	per	se,	but	on	his	belief	in	the	inherent	instability	and	unconstitutionality	of	the	Grauist	regime.	“None	of	the	established	political	parties,	none	of	the	commercial	or	business	interests,	no	responsible	labor	organization,	and	only	a	few	of	the	members	of	the	professional	classes	supported	the	government,”	Welles	later	explained.46	It	“appeared	to	be	completely	incapable	of	maintaining	even	a	semblance	of	public	order.”47	The	policy	he	pursued	toward	Grau	was	a	product	of	his	paternalistic	belief	that	the	plans	he	had	devised	for	the	Cuban	people	for	an	orderly	transition	from	dictatorship	to	democracy	was	the	greatest	priority	of	the	Cuban	people	and	that	the	only	people	who	could	do	so	were	
																																																								42	Smith,	The	U.S.	and	Cuba:	Business	and	Diplomacy,	155.		43	Memorandum	from	the	President	for	the	Acting	Secretary	of	State,	27	November	1933,	FDRL:	President’s	Official	File,	Box	25,	OF470	Sumner	Welles,	1933-45.	44	Benjamin,	Cuban	Revolution,	4.	45	Smith,	The	U.S.	and	Cuba:	Business	and	Diplomacy	,	151.		46	Sumner	Welles,	The	Time	For	Decision	(New	York:	Harper	&	Brothers	Publishers,	1944),	198.		47	Ibid.		
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those	members	of	the	elite	whom	Welles	had	favoured.48	Deviation	from	his	carefully	laid	plans,	which	were	premised	on	the	intention	of	conferring	constitutional	legitimacy	on	a	preselected	elite,	was	all	the	evidence	he	needed	to	dismiss	Grau’s	takeover	as	illegitimate	and	refuse	recognition.			
Trump	Card:	The	Roosevelt-Welles	Connection		 If	Welles’	paternalistic	idealism	laid	the	shaky	foundations	for	his	plans	to	help	Cuba,	then	his	characteristic	response	to	adversity	–	appealing	to	higher	authority	–	hastened	its	collapse.	Welles’	close	relationship	with	Roosevelt	added	a	destabilizing	factor	to	Welles’	time	in	Cuba.	By	forcing	him	into	the	situation	in	the	first	place	and	by	offering	to	him	the	ability	to	pursue	extraordinary	measures	to	redress	setbacks	of	his	carefully	laid	plans,	Welles’	patronage	by	Roosevelt	inadvertently	complicated	an	already	difficult	situation.	In	so	doing,	it	led	to	some	of	the	most	dramatic	and	perplexing	moments	in	Welles’	career,	ones	that	become	easier	to	understand	when	analyzed	in	the	context	of	Welles’	relationship	with	FDR	and	the	bedrock	of	shared	sympathy	and	trust	it	was	built	on.		 Welles’	selection	for	the	Cuban	post	was	not	inevitable,	but	it	was	foreordained	by	the	close	relationship	he	shared	with	the	man	who	appointed	him:	Franklin	Roosevelt.	Welles	had	been	advising	Roosevelt	on	Latin	American	affairs	for	five	years.49	Welles’	extensive	knowledge	of	the	region	was	a	valuable	asset	in	its	own	right,	but	he	was	also	familiar	with	Cuba	specifically,	having	established	personal	contacts	on	the	island	during	a	brief	posting	in	1921-1922.50	Welles	was	also	familiar	with	the	delicate	process	of	playing	midwife	to	emerging	Caribbean	democracies,	having	overseen	the	transfer	of	power	from	military	to	civilian	authorities	in	the	Dominican	Republic,	Haiti,	and	elsewhere.		
																																																								48	Benjamin,	Hegemony	and	Development,	149.		49	Gellman,	Roosevelt	and	Batista,	13.	50	For	an	account	of	Welles’	first	posting	to	Cuba,	see:	Gail	Hanson,	“Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System:	The	United	States	in	the	Caribbean,	1920-1940”	(Ph.D.	Dissertation.	State	University	of	New	York	at	Stony	Brook,	1990),	137-74.			
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Perhaps	more	importantly,	Roosevelt	trusted	Welles	to	handle	the	situation	by	enacting	specific	policies	that	were	in	line	with	the	general	guidelines	he	had	set	out.	After	nearly	five	years	of	correspondence	and	collaboration	on	political	affairs,	Roosevelt	had	grown	to	trust	Welles’	abilities	and	gave	him	his	unflinching	confidence.	He	could	rely	on	Welles	to	take	care	of	matters	in	Cuba	without	having	to	pay	close	attention	to	what	was	going	on.	Roosevelt	had	good	reason	to	delegate	this	affair	to	someone	else,	as	he	was	faced	with	the	extraordinary	economic	and	financial	crises	that	beset	the	nation	in	early	1933.	Indications	of	this	line	in	Roosevelt’s	thinking	emerged	shortly	after	Welles	arrived	in	Cuba.	In	June	1933,	Roosevelt	cabled	Welles	for	the	first	time	since	April,	contritely	admitting	it	was	because	he	had	“been	so	taken	up	with	the	European	situation.”	Significantly,	Roosevelt	excused	his	silence	by	explaining	“all	I	have	been	able	to	do	in	regard	to	Cuban	affairs	has	been	to	read	your	dispatches	and	dismiss	them	from	my	mind	for	the	very	good	reason	that	you	seemed	to	be	getting	the	situation	under	control	and	to	have	the	confidence	of	the	people	who	count.”51	Roosevelt’s	explanation	was	a	tacit	admission	that	he	had	more	important	things	to	deal	with,	but	it	was	also	an	indication	that	the	bond	he	had	formed	with	Welles	over	the	years	was	strong	enough	to	implicitly	trust	him.		However,	Roosevelt’s	trust	in	Welles	to	carry	out	his	policy	with	aplomb	unwittingly	injected	a	destabilizing	force	into	the	Cuban	situation	by	ignoring	one	crucial	factor:	Welles	did	not	want	to	go.	By	all	accounts,	Welles	was	not	at	all	enthusiastic	about	going	to	Cuba.	In	the	months	before	his	assignment,	Welles	had	repeatedly	expressed	his	hope	to	be	appointed	Undersecretary	of	State	or,	barring	that,	being	given	a	desk	job	in	Washington	that	would	allow	him	to	craft	policy	on	a	regional	or	hemispheric	level.	Perhaps	subconsciously	realizing	that	whomever	was	assigned	there	would	face	significant	challenges,	Welles	even	specifically	called	out	an	assignment	to	Cuba	as	“out	of	the	question.”52	Welles’	feelings	were	no	secret,	either.	When	his	appointment	was	announced	Maryland	governor	Albert	Ritchie,	a	contact	of	Welles’,	wrote	with	surprise	“I	thought	that	your	recent	appointment	[as																																																									51	Roosevelt	to	Welles,	24	June	1933,	FDRL,	President’s	Official	File,	Box	25,	Folder	OF	470.	52	‘Welles	Diary’,	27	January	1933,	SWP,	Box	265.	
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Assistant	Secretary	of	State	for	Latin	American	Affairs]	meant	that	you	were	not	in	the	field	for	anything	else.”53	Perhaps	because	he	felt	he	could	not	refuse	for	fear	of	short-circuiting	his	revived	diplomatic	career,	or	perhaps	out	of	a	sense	of	obligation	to	his	benefactor,	Welles	accepted	the	job.	Nevertheless,	his	disappointment	was	palpable.	He	took	pains	to	explain	that	he	intended	to	stay	in	Cuba	only	a	few	months,	just	until	a	stable	transition	of	power	had	been	completed.	In	a	letter	to	Maryland	senator	Millard	Tydings	Welles	insisted	“I	would	like	to	let	you	know	confidentially	that	my	mission	is	to	be	only	a	relatively	brief	one	and	that	I	am	eventually	to	return	to	the	Department	in	my	present	position,	but	on	account	of	the	peculiar	political	situation	in	Havana	no	official	intimation	to	that	effect	will	be	given	out	here.”54	Once	he	arrived	Welles	was	impatient	to	leave.	Over	his	first	four	months	in	Cuba	he	repeatedly	asserted	that	his	return	to	Washington	was	imminent.	In	a	July	communication	to	Roosevelt,	Welles	estimated	that	he	would	be	able	to	return	to	the	U.S.	by	the	end	of	September.55	A	month	later	he	expressed	his	to	return	to	Washington	as	soon	as	possible	to	help	with	preparations	for	the	upcoming	Inter-American	Conference	in	Montevideo	that	December.56		However,	as	noted	above,	events	conspired	to	prevent	Welles	from	leaving	on	time.	The	overthrow	of	Machado	upended	Welles’	initial	plans	for	an	orderly	constitutional	transition	and	the	weakness	of	the	Céspedes	regime	threatened	to	plunge	Cuba	back	into	chaos	at	any	moment.	With	his	carefully	laid	plans	falling	to	pieces	Welles’	haste	to	depart	was	magnified,	and	his	instinctive	reaction	was	to	appeal	to	Roosevelt	for	deliverance.	Sensing	that	his	presence	was	becoming	harmful	to	the	new	Céspedes	government	Welles	requested	he	be	recalled	to	Washington	before	the	end	of	the	month.57	Though	his	cables	went	through	
																																																								53	Albert	Ritchie	to	Sumner	Welles,	24	April	1933,	SWP:	Box	171,	Folder	1.		54	Sumner	Welles	to	Millard	Tydings,	21	April	1933,	SWP:	Box	176,	Folder	2.		55	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Acting	Secretary	of	State,	8	July	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol.	V,	319.		56	Welles	to	Roosevelt,	17	July	1933,	FDRL,	President’s	Official	File,	Box	25/1:	OF	470	Sumner	Welles	et.	al.,	Folder:	Sumner	Welles	1933-1945.		57	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	19	August	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol.	V,	368.	
		 144	
Undersecretary	William	Phillips	and	Hull	the	State	Department,	Roosevelt	was	the	one	who	took	the	decision,	agreeing	to	Welles’	request	but	insisting	he	stay	until	at	least	15	September.58	Through	this	special	appeal,	and	by	dint	of	presidential	authority,	Welles’	prayers	seemed	to	have	been	answered.	However,	on	the	night	of	4-5	September	a	revolutionary	cabal	of	students	and	non-commissioned	army	officers	overthrew	Céspedes.	Only	a	few	days	from	freedom	and	increasingly	out	of	touch	with	the	prevailing	sentiments	in	both	Havana	and	Washington	D.C.,	Welles	threw	up	his	hands.	In	an	extraordinary	departure	from	administration	policy,	and	from	the	criteria	he	had	set	down	for	U.S.	intervention	in	Latin	America	nine	years	before,	Welles	cabled	the	State	Department	and	recommended	“landing	of	a	considerable	force	at	Habana	and	lesser	forces	in	certain	of	the	more	important	ports	of	the	Republic.”59	He	insisted	his	proposed	invasion	“should	be	construed	as	just	as	much	a	friendly	act	as	the	facilitating	of	a	loan."60	Welles	even	suggested	that	a	military	intervention	would	"most	decidedly	be	construed	as	well	within	the	limits	of	the	policy	of	the	'good	neighbor'."61		To	say	the	least,	Welles’	opinion	was	not	widely	shared.	Observers	across	the	United	States	and	Latin	America	were	flabbergasted	by	Welles’	request.	Hull	received	warnings	through	his	Ambassador	to	Mexico	of	concerns	among	that	country’s	leadership	that	an	intervention	in	Cuba	would	“destroy	the	Montevideo	conference”	being	planned	for	later	that	year.62	Roosevelt	received	similar	warnings	from	interested	non-governmental	officials	like	Raymond	Leslie	Buell	of	the	Foreign	Policy	Association.63	Latin	American	leaders	were	incredulous	about	Welles’																																																									58	Stephen	Early	to	Cordell	Hull	Telegram,	28	August	1933,	FDRL,	POF,	Box	25/1:	OF	470	Sumner	Welles,	et.	al.,	Folder:	Sumner	Welles,	1933-1945;	The	Under	Secretary	of	State	(Phillips)	to	the	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles),	21	August	1933,	FRUS.	1933,	Vol.	V,	369.		59	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	7	September	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol.	V,	397;	For	Welles’	criteria	for	U.S.	intervention	in	Latin	America	see	Sumner	Welles,	“Is	America	Imperialistic?,”	The	Atlantic	Monthly,	September	1924,	421.		60	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	8	September	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol.	V,	407.		61	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	7	September	1933,	FRUS,	1933,	Vol.	V,	398.	62	Long	Distance	Telephone	Conversation	Between	Secretary	Hull	at	Washington	and	Ambassador	Daniels	at	Mexico	City,	1:00	O’Clock	P.M.,	Library	of	Congress,	The	Papers	of	Cordell	Hull,	Reel	21.		63	Buell	to	the	Pres.	At	Warm	Springs,	24	November	1933,	FDRL,	President’s	Official	File,	Box:	2961-2933,	Folder:	Welles,	Mathilde	(Mrs.	Sumner	Welles)	
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justification	for	his	proposed	intervention.	At	the	Montevideo	conference	a	few	months	later	Alberto	Giraudy	sarcastically	quipped	“If	Ambassador	Welles’	propagating	the	revolution	…	is	not	intervention	…	if	upholding	a	minority	group	against	the	wishes	of	the	people	is	not	intervention,	if	surrounding	the	island	with	warships	is	not	intervention	–	then	the	United	States	has	never	intervened	in	Cuba!.”64	Welles’	proposals	were	considered	in	high-level	meetings	between	Roosevelt,	Cordell	Hull,	and	other	members	of	the	State	Department.	Hull	was	adamant	that	“there	is	not	the	slightest	intention	of	intervening	or	interfering	in	Cuba’s	domestic	affairs.”65	Hull’s	resistance	was	built	upon	his	full	knowledge	of	the	diplomatic	ramifications	of	a	military	intervention	in	Cuba	as	well	as	fealty	to	the	policy	that	he	and	Roosevelt	had	worked	out	months	earlier,	of	which	Welles	was	fully	aware,	not	to	intervene.	Indeed,	Roosevelt	had	emphasized	to	Welles	during	his	posting:	“it	should	of	course	be	made	clear	that	request	for	any	assistance	[from	the	U.S.]	…	originates	from	Cuban	Government	and	people	and	is	not	suggested	in	first	instance	by	Washington.”66	Welles	tried	to	work	around	this,	leveraging	his	relationship	with	Roosevelt	as	best	he	could.	He	bent	over	backwards	to	make	it	seem	like	the	Cuban	government	had	asked	for	the	intervention	(which	it	had	not)	and	requested	specifically	that	the	president	send	him	instructions	on	how	to	proceed.67	But	Welles	was	at	a	disadvantage	in	that	he	did	not	have	face-to-face	contact	with	Roosevelt	to	plead	his	case,	as	Cordell	Hull	and	the	other	opponents	of	intervention	did.	Ultimately,	Welles’	appeals	to	Roosevelt	could	not	overcome	the	new	institutional	resistance	to	intervention,	his	recommendation	was	rejected,	and	he	was	forced	to	remain	in	Cuba	for	another	three	and	a	half	months.		However,	it	was	not	the	last	time	he	appealed	to	Roosevelt	to	bolster	his	efforts.	Thwarted	in	his	attempt	to	remove	Grau,	Welles	spent	the	remainder	of	his	time	in	Cuba	trying	to	isolate	the	regime.	His	main	tactic	in	doing	so	was	to	withhold																																																									64	Gellman,	Roosevelt	and	Batista,	76,	quoting	Miami	Herald	14	December	1933.		65	Hull	to	Certain	Diplomatic	and	Consular	Missions,	11	September	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol.	V,	422.		66	Phillips	to	Welles,	21	June	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol.	V,	311.		67	The	Ambassador	in	Cuba	(Welles)	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	7	September	1933,	FRUS,	1933.	Vol.	V,	396-8.		
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U.S.	recognition	of	the	Grauist	government,	thus	ensuring	it	would	eventually	lose	the	support	of	the	military	and	business	interests.	In	late	November,	with	calls	for	Grau’s	recognition	growing,	Welles	again	called	on	Roosevelt	for	help.	Having	learned	from	his	first	attempt	to	use	his	relationship	with	Roosevelt	to	enact	a	policy	suggestion,	Welles	this	time	traveled	in	person	to	meet	the	president	at	his	retreat	in	Warm	Springs,	Georgia.68	Cannily,	he	waited	until	after	Cordell	Hull	had	left	to	attend	the	Inter-American	Conference	in	Montevideo	before	requesting	a	face-to-face	meeting	with	Roosevelt,	thus	ensuring	a	captive	and	undivided	audience	for	his	appeal.69	The	resulting	Warm	Springs	Declaration	reiterated	Welles’	preferred	policy	of	non-recognition	for	Grau,	and	gave	additional	time	to	the	anti-Grau	forces	to	coordinate.70	Observers	later	recalled	rumours	that	Roosevelt	had	wanted	to	recognize	Grau	but	“said	he	did	not	see	how	he	could	recognize	Grau	San	Martin	because	Welles	did	not	like	him.”71	Three	weeks	later,	only	a	few	days	after	Welles	left	Cuba,	Grau	was	removed	from	office	and	a	new	government	under	Carlos	Mendieta,	and	eventually	Fulgencio	Batista,	was	installed.		Welles’	experience	in	Cuba	revealed	the	awkwardness	of	the	United	States’	position	with	regard	to	that	country,	and	in	Latin	American	generally,	as	it	attempted	to	reinvent	itself	as	the	Good	Neighbor.	By	forcing	Machado	to	resign,	installing	a	preferred	candidate	in	his	place,	and	threatening	American	intervention	when	that	candidate	was	himself	overthrown,	Welles	abandoned	any	pretence	of	operating	within	the	spirit	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy.	Paradoxically,	and	unintentionally,	in	doing	so	Welles	occasioned	a	full-throated	and	public	demonstration	of	U.S.	commitment	to	the	non-intervention,	thereby	laying	the	groundwork	for	over	a	decade	of	improvement	in	hemispheric	relations.		At	the	crux	of	this	apparent	contradiction	were	the	attitudes	and	behaviour	of	Welles	himself.	Had	someone	besides	Welles	been	assigned	to	Cuba	in	1933	–	Francis	White,	for	instance	–	the	policies	devised	and	the	response	to	changing																																																									68	The	Acting	Secretary	of	State	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	at	Sea,	20	November	1933,	FRUS.	1933,	Vol.	V,	523	69	Ibid.		70	Statement	for	the	Press,	24	November	1933,	SWP,	Box:	176,	Folder:	2.		71	Diary	Entry,	7	April	1939,	Harvard	University,	Houghton	Library,	William	R.	Castle	Diaries,	Vol.	37,	148.	
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events	as	they	occurred	would	have	been	substantially	different.	An	ambassador	with	fewer	illusions	about	Cuba	and	the	beneficence	of	the	United	States,	and	whose	attention	was	not	distracted	by	the	prospect	of	immediate	reassignment,	likely	would	have	seen	more	clearly	the	depth	of	the	difficulties	facing	Cuba	at	that	point	and	the	length	of	time	it	would	take	to	solve	them.	Any	diplomat,	save	Welles,	would	have	had	less	access	to,	and	greater	reservations	about	confronting	Roosevelt	about	how	to	enact	or	change	policy	as	they	saw	fit.	The	unique	combination	of	access	to	power	and	paternalistic	idealism	imprinted	Cuban	policy	with	an	idiosyncratic	mark,	leaving	an	indelible	Wellesian	imprint	on	the	record	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	and	Cuban	history	as	a	result.			
The	Brotherhood:	Welles’	Hemispheric	Idealism	and	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy		
	 Though	his	assignment	in	Cuba	ended	in	December	1933	with	Welles’	eager	departure,	the	experience	had	left	a	profound	mark	on	him	and	his	reputation.	One	contemporary	of	Welles,	looking	back	at	the	Cuban	episode,	later	recalled	how:			“[Welles]	…	had	made	one	of	the	great	diplomatic	failures	of	our	history,	a	failure	that	the	Administration	had	been	busily	trying	to	get	around	in	its	South	American	policy	for	all	the	years	since.	So	now	Sumner	goes	to	the	other	extreme,	afraid	that	he	will	not	be	believed	unless	his	is	very	violent	in	his	change	of	heart.”72			 Whether	or	not	this	was	an	accurate	assessment	of	Welles’	psyche,	the	subsequent	stage	of	Welles’	career	showed	a	marked	shift	toward	policy	planning	on	a	wider	scale	and	policy	content	that	underlined	his	commitment	to	non-intervention.	With	the	Cuban	assignment	behind	him,	Welles	was	in	a	position	to	pursue	the	diplomatic	endeavours	that	he	had	envisioned	during	his	years	in	the	political	wilderness.	For	the	next	ten	years	Welles	methodically	constructed	much	of	what	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	and	Welles	himself,	would	become	famous	for.	As	in	
																																																								72	Diary	Entry,	6	April	1939,	Harvard	University,	Houghton	Library,	William	R.	Castle	Diaries,	Vol..	37,	147.	
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Cuba,	this	process	was	shaped	by	Welles’	paternalistic	idealism	and	his	reliance	on	FDR	for	political	support;	however	the	addition	of	external	threat	to	U.S.	hegemony	activated	another	aspect	of	Welles’	worldview:	his	aversion	to	militarism	and	a	preference	for	constitutional	and	multilateral	solutions	to	diplomatic	problems.		Historical	assessments	about	Welles’	role	in	crafting	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	have	analyzed	his	motives,	the	wisdom	of	the	policies	he	enacted,	and	the	impact	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	on	Latin	American	relations	overall.	Little	consensus	has	been	reached.	One	school	of	thought	has	portrayed	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	as	a	progressive,	altruistic,	and	generally	successful	modification	in	U.S.	behaviour	in	Latin	America,	with	Welles	as	a	crucial	voice	in	the	process.	Welles	championed	an	“appreciation	of	Latin	American	sensitivities,”	and	a	belief	“that	only	through	mutual	understanding	and	tolerance	could	all	American	peoples	live	together,”	achieved	through	an	“open	and	candid	attitude	in	conversations	with	Latin	American	officials."73	His	attitude	informed	the	“anticipation	of	reciprocity”	upon	which	the	emblematic	policies	of	the	Good	Neighbor	(non-intervention	and	equality	of	sovereignty)	were	based.74	Welles	has	also	been	portrayed	as	a	representative	of	an	ascendant	school	of	thought	regarding	Latin	American	diplomacy	and	U.S.	foreign	policy	more	generally	during	this	time.	This	school	emphasized	a	“willingness	to	trust	in	the	consultative	system	and	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	in	order	to	right	all	wrongs.”75		Other	interpretations	of	Welles	and	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	have	been	less	generous,	questioning	the	sincerity	of	Welles’	and	the	United	States’	ideals.	In	Gail	Hanson	portrayal,	Welles’	enactment	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	“glossed	over”	the	imperialistic	rhetoric	and	attitudes	of	the	United	States.76	Meanwhile,	Benjamin	Jules	believed	Welles’	"main	interest	in	multilateralism	arose	from	the	conviction	
																																																								73	Frank	Warren	Graff,	“Strategy	of	Involvement:	A	Diplomatic	Biography	of	Sumner	Welles”	(Ph.D.	Dissertation.	University	of	Michigan,	1971),	120-1,	156,	146.	74	Wood,	The	Making	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	7.		75	Randall	Bennett	Woods,	The	Roosevelt	Foreign-Policy	Establishment	and	the	‘Good	Neighbor’:	The	
United	States	and	Argentina,	1941-1945	(Lawrence:	The	Regents	Press	of	Kansas,	1979),	24.			76	Hanson,”Sumner	Welles	and	the	American	System”,	477.		
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that	cooperation	might	transfer	to	other	Latin	American	states	some	of	the	opprobrium	attached	to	interventions."77		To	the	extent	that	there	is	any	acknowledgement	of	an	improvement	in	U.S.-Latin	American	relations	with	the	introduction	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	some	historians	have	disputed	how	much	credit	can	be	given	to	Welles	or	the	administration	he	worked	in.	Bryce	Wood,	in	his	seminal	work	The	Making	of	the	
Good	Neighbor	Policy,	questioned	the	novelty	of	Roosevelt’s	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	citing	similar	efforts	initiated	in	previous	Republican	administrations.78	In	this	view,	“three	administrations	[Coolidge,	Hoover,	and	Roosevelt]	each	played	a	part	in	transforming	the	peaceful	desires	of	the	people	of	the	United	States	into	policies	in	which	all	have	reason	to	claim	some,	if	different,	shares.”79		Regardless	of	when	the	process	started,	few	contest	the	fact	that	once	Welles	was	in	power	he	had	a	significant	impact.	Irwin	Gellman,	who	has	written	more	extensively	on	Welles	and	Latin	America	than	any	other	historian,	believed	Welles’	“main	attribute	was	finding	answers	to	complicated	questions,	and	…	fit	solutions	into	a	broad	political	framework	established	by	Roosevelt.”80	This	portrayal	chimed	with	Gellman’s	more	general	assessment	of	Welles	as	one	of	a	triumvirate	that	oversaw	all	aspects	of	U.S.	foreign	policy,	along	with	Hull	and	Roosevelt.81	Meanwhile,	for	Randall	Woods,	Welles	was	the	most	prominent	member	in	one	of	two	camps	in	the	State	Department	battling	over	the	shape	of	U.S.	foreign	relations:	Latin	Americanists	and	Internationalists.	The	former,	comprising	Welles,	Laurence	Duggan,	and	other	career	diplomats,	were	“concerned	almost	exclusively	with	the	development	of	hemispheric	policy”	while	the	latter	camp,	which	included	Hull,	Breckinridge	Long	and	others,	“were	old	Wilsonians”	who	“tended	to	view	United	States	relations	with	Latin	America	as	part	of	a	much	larger	whole.”82		
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The	effort	to	fit	Welles’	policies	into	particular	categories	has	helped	elucidate	broader	trends	in	U.S.	foreign	policy	and	the	processes	of	decision	making	that	fed	into	it.	However,	that	effort	has	also	had	the	tendency	to	overlook	Welles’	own	ideological	motivations	and	the	influence	of	his	personality	on	these	broader	forces.	Because	of	his	highly	personal	way	of	conducting	diplomacy	and	his	covetous	attitude	toward	Latin	American	affairs,	Welles’	idiosyncrasies	left	more	of	an	imprint	on	the	policies	he	crafted	and	enacted	in	Latin	America	than	would	a	typical	diplomat.	Welles	took	matters	in	Latin	America	personally	and	his	policies	reflected	that.	Thus,	in	order	to	understand	the	trajectory	and	contours	of	the	United	States’	policies	in	Latin	America	during	this	time	it	is	necessary	to	acknowledge	the	peculiar	motivations,	habits,	and	predilections	of	their	chief	architect	and	most	prominent	advocate.			 Perhaps	more	than	any	other	policymaker,	intellectual,	or	diplomat	concerned	with	Latin	American	affairs,	Sumner	Welles	infused	his	rhetoric	with	a	utopian,	almost	romantic,	sense	of	idealism.	Welles	cast	the	creation	of	good	will	among	the	nations	of	the	Western	Hemisphere	in	much	broader	terms	than	mere	pragmatic	collaboration.	Welles	spoke	of	his	desire	to	forge	“a	real	inter-American	public	opinion	which	will	be	a	common	heritage	throughout	the	Western	Hemisphere.”83	He	believed	that	because	“[h]istory	and	nature	have	inspired	a	feeling	of	continental	solidarity	among	the	republics	of	the	Western	Hemisphere	…	[i]t	behooves	us	to	foster	and	maintain	this	solidarity	and	to	develop	the	moral	and	spiritual	fiber	of	the	civilization	of	the	Americas.”84	“The	spiritual	potentialities	of	the	other	American	peoples,”	Welles	wrote	in	a	1940	speech	“are	extraordinary.”85	Welles’	rhetoric	distinguished	him	from	other	supporters	of	the	inter-American	system.	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull,	for	instance,	also	spoke	in	lofty	terms	about	the	nobility	of	inter-American	cooperation,	but	his	rhetoric	never	matched	Welles’	for	its	invocation	of	spirituality.	In	his	closing	address	at	the	Buenos	Aires	Conference	Hull	imagined	that:																																																										83	“Cultural	Aspects	of	the	Buenos	Aires	Conference”,	9	April	1937,	SWP,	Box:	194,	Folder:	10.	84	Ibid.		85	“The	Importance	of	Latin	America	to	the	United	States”	29	October	1940,	SWP,	Box:	195,	Folder:	1.		
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	 “the	very	fact	of	the	conference	itself	should	offer	to	other	quarters	of	the	world	an	impressive	demonstration	of	the	value	of	concert	and	cooperation.	Whenever	twenty-one	nations	can	foregather	in	such	a	spirit	and	for	such	purposes,	whenever	they	can	act	together	in	due	course	in	the	cause	of	peace,	all	other	nations	should	find	profit	in	their	example.”86		Though	ennobling,	Hull’s	speech	paled	in	comparison	to	Welles’	pronouncements,	both	in	its	imagery	and	its	sense	of	righteousness	about	inter-American	cooperation.		Welles’	sentimental	idealism	was	not	merely	for	rhetorical	flourish.	It	found	practical	application	in	the	policies	Welles	championed	that	became	the	infrastructure	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy.	He	emphasized	the	idea	that	the	Inter-American	conferences	were	a	manifestation	of	hemispheric	brotherhood	that	was	at	once	the	outgrowth	of	past	allegiance	and	the	harbinger	of	closer	ties	in	the	future.	As	Welles	put	it	in	a	speech	in	April	of	1936	referring	to	the	reaction	in	Latin	America	to	an	address	made	by	President	Roosevelt,	“there	had	already	existed	a	community	of	ideas	and	ideals	throughout	the	American	republics”	and	the	upcoming	conference	would	be	the	truest	expression	of	it.87	Welles	linked	all	aspects	of	inter-American	cooperation	to	this	mystical	bond	between	the	American	Republics.	In	a	speech	delivered	in	1936	in	which	he	reiterated	his	support	for	building	greater	transportation	links	in	Latin	America,	including	the	Pan	American	Highway,	Welles	hastened	to	add	that	“if	this	improvement	in	physical	means	of	communication	is	not	paralleled	by	an	improvement	in	our	spiritual	understanding	of	one	another,	the	results	will	necessarily	be	disappointing.”88	The	most	prominent	example	of	Welles’	infusing	Good	Neighbor	diplomacy	with	his	own	poetic	rhetoric	was	in	the	use	of	cultural	diplomacy	and	exchange.	Cultural	exchanges	had	been	part	of	Pan-American	diplomacy	since	the	late	nineteenth	century.	As	recently	as	1923	there	were	extensive	discussions	among	the	Latin	American	states	about	"public	health,	agricultural	and	cultural	cooperation,	
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rights	of	women,	census,	and	improvement	of	communications.”89	However,	as	with	much	of	U.S.	relations	with	Latin	America,	progress	in	this	field	had	stalled	during	the	1920s	under	the	Coolidge	and	Hoover	administrations.	Welles	sought	to	change	that.	Cultural	exchange,	in	Welles’	view,	held	great	potential	as	a	means	to	both	ameliorate	hostile	feelings	toward	the	United	States	in	Latin	America	and	to	foster	a	more	cooperative	attitude	among	his	fellow	countrymen.	In	a	speech	he	delivered	in	1936,	Welles	cited	“language	and	cultural	differences”	as	one	of	the	key	barriers	to	inter-American	cooperation	and	he	began	working	to	rectify	the	situation	soon	after.90			 Welles	saw	cultural	exchanges	like	this	as	an	integral	part	of	the	political	and	economic	ties	he	was	trying	to	forge	among	the	American	Republics.	As	he	wrote	in	1940,	“the	exchange	of	cultural	and	spiritual	values	…	are	a	necessary	concomitant	to	the	other	forms	of	relations,”	like	political	and	commercial	relations,	between	the	American	Republics.91	In	the	lead	up	to	the	1936	Inter-American	Conference	on	the	Maintenance	of	Peace	in	Buenos	Aires,	Welles	extolled	the	virtues	of	social	and	cultural	exchange	as	a	bulwark	against	war;	he	waxed	eloquent	about	the	cultural	impact	of	Miguel	de	Cervantes’	novel	Don	Quixote	and	its	transnational	appeal	in	a	speech	at	Columbia	University	in	1936.92	Welles	held	discussions	about	engaging	in	various	cultural	activities,	including	the	“commission	[of	a]	radiogram	to	invite	scholars	and	students	from	Argentina	to	the	United	States.”93	He	also	pushed	successfully	for	a	litany	of	culturally	oriented	conventions,	including	the	Convention	for	the	Promotion	of	Inter-American	Cultural	Relations,	the	Convention	Concerning	Artistic	Expression,	and	the	Convention	Concerning	Facilities	for	Educational	and	Publicity	Films.94	As	Undersecretary,	Welles	oversaw	the	implementation	of	these	proposals	in	the	U.S.	under	his	authority,	through	the	creation	of	such	agencies	as																																																									89	Frederico	G.	Gil,	Latin	American-United	States	Relations	(New	York:	Harcourt	Brace	Jovanovich,	1971),	151.		90	“’Good	Neighbor’	Policy	in	the	Caribbean,”	2	July	1935,	SWP,	Box:	194,	Folder:	8.		91	“The	Importance	of	Latin	America	to	the	United	States,”	29	October	1940,	SWP,	Box:	195,	Folder:	1.	92	Address	of	the	Honorable	Sumner	Welles,	Assistant	Secretary	of	State,	a	the	Institutio	de	las	Espanas,	Columbia	University,	on	the	Occasion	of	the	Fiesta	of	the	Dia	de	le	Lenga	and	the	Celebration	of	the	Fourth	Centenary	of	the	Founding	of	Buenos	Aires,	27	April	1936,	SWP,	Box:	194,	Folder:	9.	93	Stephen	Duggan	to	Sumner	Welles,	13	November	1936,	SWP,	Box:	29,	Folder:	8.	94	“Conference	Program”,	SWP,	Box:	184,	Folder:	6.	
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the	Division	of	Cultural	Relations	in	the	State	Department.95		 Welles’	emphasis	on	cultural	relations,	like	his	lofty	rhetoric	about	the	American	Republics	generally,	underlined	his	desire	to	stimulate	popular	appeal	for	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	as	a	means	of	ingraining	it	into	the	diplomatic	fabric	of	the	United	States’	Latin	American	foreign	policy.	But	the	push	for	cultural	cooperation	had	an	additional	dimension	that	was	more	than	a	canny	realization	of	the	efficacy	of	soft	power	in	ameliorating	relations	between	hitherto	hostile	nations.	It	was	a	reflection	of	the	ideas	that	had	undergirded	Welles’	approach	to	foreign	policy	since	he	began	his	diplomatic	career.	By	fusing	cultural	exchanges	with	economic	and	political	matters,	Welles	created	a	policy	framework	that	embodied	his	own	idealistic	and	paternalistic	views	toward	Latin	America.	His	belief	in	the	ineffable	unity	of	the	peoples	of	the	Americas,	and	the	righteousness	of	the	U.S.	taking	the	lead	in	devising	ways	to	promote	and	promulgate	that	unity	were	directly	descended	from	his	earlier	career	rhetoric	and,	in	turn,	his	formative	experiences	reconciling	belief	in	turn-of-the-century	American	imperialism	with	a	less	belligerent	mentality.	In	that	sense,	Welles’	enactment	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	was,	as	he	wrote	later	in	life,	a	playing	out	of	the	“convictions	which	[he]	had	reached	as	a	very	young	man”	on	a	hemispheric	scale.96		Because	of	Welles’	influence	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	was	more	than	a	reinvigoration	of	U.S.	efforts	to	seek	tranquility	in	Latin	America.	It	took	on	the	air	of	a	crusade	as	Welles	sought	to	use	his	idealism	to	construct	an	international	system	that	was	in	accordance	with	the	economic,	political,	and	diplomatic	interests	of	the	U.S.	In	this	manner,	Welles	infused	the	policymaking	of	the	Roosevelt	administration	in	Latin	America	with	a	set	of	principles	that	was	both	more	idealistic	and	more	pragmatic	than	hitherto	acknowledged.	Moreover,	it	anticipated	the	greater	salience	of	idealism	in	the	diplomatic	rhetoric	of	the	U.S.	as	it	confronted	the	Nazi	and																																																									95	Phillip	Leonard	Green,	Pan-American	Progress	(New	York:	Walter	Freese,	1942),	87;	“Remarks	of	the	Honorable	Sumner	Welles,	Under	Secretary	of	State,	as	Guest	Commentator	Over	the	WOL	Mutual	Broadcasting	System”,	27	July	1938,	NARA	II,	RG59,	Central	Decimal	File,	Decimal	File,	1930-1939,	Box:	216,	Folder:	111.16	Welles,	Sumner/16-33;	Welles	was	a	proud	defender	of	the	Division,	as	evidenced	by	a	terse	letter	he	sent	to	journalist	Drew	Pearson	defending	it	against	the	accusation	that	its	record	was	“minus	zero”,	See:	Welles	to	Pearson,	4	July	1940,	SWP,	Box:	63,	Folder	13.		96	Sumner	Welles,	Where	Are	We	Heading?	(London:	Hamish	Hamilton,	1947),	154.		
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Japanese	threats	as	well	as	the	conceptions	of	postwar	international	cooperation	that	Welles	himself	would	help	plan	in	coming	years.			
Preventative	Neutrality:	Hemispheric	Wartime	Policy		 Welles’	accomplishments	in	forging	inter-American	unity	through	cultural	exchanges	and	multilateralism	left	a	lasting	legacy	for	hemispheric	diplomacy	and	for	Welles	himself.	However,	as	the	1930s	progressed	Welles’	efforts	to	forge	solidarity	assumed	a	dual	purpose:	that	of	defending	U.S.	security	and	protecting	its	neutrality	against	the	aggression	of	the	Axis	powers.	Welles’	contributions	were	crucial.	Having	built	up	a	reservoir	of	goodwill,	Welles	could	coax,	cajole,	and	convince	various	countries	into	joining	the	United	States	in	its	opposition	to	the	Axis,	even	in	the	face	of	domestic	resistance	and	hostile	retaliation.	More	than	this,	Welles	brought	to	this	new	phase	of	Good	Neighbor	policymaking	his	idiosyncratic	anti-militarism.		Welles	sublimated	his	anti-militarist	predilections	into	a	practical	policy	goal,	that	of	hemispheric	collective	security.	Welles’	convictions	about	inter-American	cooperation	and	solidarity	had	always	envisioned	the	need	for	continental	defense,	but	Welles	tended	to	emphasize	the	deliberative	processes	to	prevent	internal	conflict	rather	than	the	virtues	of	martial	preparedness.	In	a	speech	from	Roosevelt’s	first	election	campaign,	Welles	explained	how	the	“defense	of	our	seaboard”	was	a	reason	for	maintaining	good	relations	with	the	republics	of	Latin	America.97	Later	in	the	speech,	in	a	prescient	anticipation	of	the	threat	to	the	Western	Hemisphere	that	would	be	posed	by	the	rise	of	Nazi	Germany	over	the	coming	decade,	Welles	asserted	“machinery	should	exist	which	would	make	possible	the	immediate	summoning	of	an	inter-American	conference,	at	which	the	republics	of	the	American	world	could	determine	…	what	policy	best	behooved	them	in	a	crisis.”98	Admittedly,	Welles	did	not	specify	which	countries	were	most	likely	to	threaten	the	interests	of	the	United	States,	but	his	warnings	reflected	a	worldview	in																																																									97	“Latin	American	Relations,”	6	October	1932,	SWP,	Box:	194,	Folder:	5.	98	Ibid.		
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which	the	best	way	to	defend	the	interests	of	the	United	States	was	to	engage	in	intensive	multilateral	cooperation.		Unsurprisingly,	the	vehicle	Welles	chose	to	enact	this	innovation	in	hemispheric	defense	was	the	inter-American	conference	system.	Beginning	with	the	1936	Inter-American	Conference	for	Maintenance	of	Peace,	Welles	methodically	constructed	a	legal	and	diplomatic	framework	through	which	the	U.S.	could	flex	its	political	power	in	the	hemisphere	and	bind	the	countries	of	Latin	America	closer	together	while	still	maintaining	its	neutrality	and	avoiding	outright	provocation	of	the	Axis.			 The	first	step	in	constructing	this	legal	framework	was	the	most	important:	the	Convention	for	the	Maintenance,	Preservation,	and	Re-establishment	of	Peace	signed	at	the	Buenos	Aires	conference	in	December	1936.	In	declaring	that	in	the	event	of	war	the	countries	of	the	Western	Hemisphere	would	“undertake	without	delay	the	necessary	mutual	consultations	[for]	…	a	method	of	peaceful	collaboration,”	the	convention	established	for	the	first	time	the	principle	of	collective	action	among	the	countries	of	Latin	America	in	the	face	of	external	aggression	and	laid	the	groundwork	for	a	diplomatic	apparatus	to	prepare	the	hemisphere	for	the	impact	of	war.99	Welles	had	been	instrumental	in	its	inception.	He	had	worked	assiduously	to	prepare	for	the	conference,	planning	negotiating	strategies	and	editing	draft	conventions,	often	with	meticulous	detail.	Welles	also	hashed	out	U.S.	proposals	about	the	“deceptive	use	of	neutral	flags,”	and	several	other	minute	but	important	details	that	ended	up	being	agreed	to	as	well.100	The	Buenos	Aires	conference	combined	Good	Neighbor	diplomacy	with	the	encroaching	demands	of	neutrality	and	hemispheric	defense	against	Axis	aggression;	its	success	stemmed	in	no	small	part	from	Welles’	talents	and	dedication.	In	the	words	of	one	historian,	the	conference	marked	a	new	phase	that	“converted	the	Monroe	Doctrine	from	a	unilateral	United	States	policy	into	a	multilateral	policy	in	which	all	states	shared	in	shaping	and	implementing	actions	to																																																									99	Convention	for	the	Maintenance,	Preservation	and	Re-	establishment	of	Peace,	SWP,	Box:	184,	Folder:	6.	100	Carlton	Savage	to	Cordell	Hull,	23	September	1936,	SWP,	Box:	183,	Folder:	7.	
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guard	peace	and	security	in	the	Western	Hemisphere.”101	However,	the	broader	significance	of	the	conference	arose	from	how	it	“gave	to	the	governments	of	all	Latin	American	countries	a	sense	of	participation	in	the	framing	of	certain	decisions	affecting	the	hemisphere	as	a	whole.”102		This	emphasis	on	mutual	respect	and	multilateral	collaboration	had	its	origins	in	Welles’	speeches	from	the	late	1920s	and	early	1930s	and	was	the	purest	expression	of	the	ideals	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	as	Welles	envisioned	them.	Moreover,	the	passive	and	reactive	nature	of	the	protocols	put	in	place	underlined	Welles’	predilection	to	avoid	militarism	wherever	possible.	By	erecting	a	system	of	collective	security	as	a	prophylaxis	against	war,	and	by	giving	primacy	to	a	diplomatic	framework	to	respond	to	any	acts	of	aggression,	Welles	infused	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	with	a	strain	of	anti-militarism	that	was	distinctively	his	own.		As	events	in	Europe	escalated	toward	the	end	of	the	decade,	Welles	worked	to	galvanize	inter-American	solidarity	and	build	on	the	agreements	already	made	to	address	problems	as	they	emerged.	The	regularly	scheduled	Eighth	Pan-American	Conference,	held	in	Lima,	Peru	in	December	1938,	just	two	months	after	the	Munich	Crisis,	focused	almost	exclusively	on	matters	of	neutrality	and	security.	The	conference	adopted	a	resolution	recommending	members	take	actions	“prohibiting	the	collective	exercise	within	their	territory,	by	resident	aliens,	of	political	rights	invested	in	such	aliens	by	the	laws	of	their	respective	countries.”103	It	also	established	protocols	for	subsequent	inter-American	conferences	to	be	convened	in	the	event	of	external	aggression.	It	would	be	under	these	protocols	that	three	more	conferences	would	be	held,	at	Panama	(1939),	Havana	(1940),	and	Buenos	Aires	(1942).104		Welles’	role	at	these	conferences	varied	depending	on	his	availability,	but	his	influence	was	always	felt.	For	the	Lima	conference,	which	Welles	could	not	attend,	he	still	managed	to	have	an	impact,	making	sure	the	composition	of	the	U.S.	
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delegation	was	to	his	liking.105	Welles’	involvement	was	prevalent	enough	in	this	case	for	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull,	who	did	attend	the	conference,	to	explain	to	a	companion	“I	had	nothing	whatsoever	to	do	with	the	selection	of	the	personnel	of	[the	Inter-American	Commission	on	Women	committee].	It	was	all	done	in	Washington	by	Mr.	Wells	and	handed	to	me	[sic].”106	At	the	Panama	conference	the	following	year,	held	in	response	to	the	German	invasion	of	Poland,	Welles	took	a	more	active	role.	He	"drafted	telegrams	calling	for	an	inter-American	consultative	meeting	at	Panama,”	in	order	to	reiterate	the	neutrality	of	the	American	republics	behind	the	stance	of	the	United	States.107	The	Panama	conference	resulted	in	three	major	agreements:	a	Resolution	on	Economic	Cooperation,	a	Joint	Declaration	of	Continental	Solidarity,	and	the	Declaration	of	Panama.	The	first	of	these,	designed	to	“protect	inter-American	commercial	and	financial	relations	against	the	immediate	difficulties	arising	out	of	the	war,”	was	an	effort	to	pre-emptively	combat	the	economic	disruptions	that	the	Western	Hemisphere	had	faced	after	the	onset	of	World	War	One.108	The	latter	two	declarations	established	a	neutrality	zone	in	the	Western	Hemisphere	and	stipulated	that	“so	long	as	[the	American	Republics]	maintain	their	neutrality,	a	war	in	Europe	…	should	not	jeopardize	their	right	to	self-protection.”109	All	of	these	agreements	shared	a	common	theme	of	trying	to	create	a	framework	for	cooperation	in	case	of	war	without	being	so	provocative	as	to	provoke	retaliation.		 Welles	played	a	critical	role	in	crafting	the	tone	and	content	of	these	agreements,	but	his	role	in	their	successful	implementation	went	beyond	his	tactful	negotiation	at	the	conferences	themselves.	Welles	was	instrumental	in	weaving	the	content	and	intent	of	these	proposals	into	the	larger	pattern	of	Roosevelt’s																																																									105	Welles	to	Messersmith,	28	November	1938,	SWP,	Box:	48,	Folder:	5.		106	A	revision	of	material	dictated	in	1951	entitled	“Hull”,	1-2,	Houghton	Library,	Harvard	University	Archives,	Papers	of	Doris	Stevens,	Box:	127.3,	Folder:	8th	International	Conference	of	American	States	–	Book	Notes,	1951-60.		107	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs,	168.		108	“Statement	by	the	Honorable	Sumner	Welles,	Under	Secretary	of	State,	Delegate	of	the	United	States	to	the	Meeting	of	the	Foreign	Ministers	of	the	American	Republics	for	Consultation	Under	the	Inter-American	Agreements	of	Buenos	Aires	and	Lima,	on	Arrival	in	New	York,	October	11,	1939,”	11	October	1939,	SWP,	Box:	186,	Folder:	7.	109	Ibid.		
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policymaking	in	the	run	up	to	war.	In	the	months	after	the	Panama	conference,	Welles	received	multiple	requests	from	the	British	and	French	governments	for	clarification	of	the	precise	terms	of	the	Declaration	of	Panama.	In	repeated	meetings	with	British	Ambassador	Lord	Lothian,	Welles	discussed	various	“hypothetical”	questions	such	as	the	procedure	for	“hot	pursuit”	of	enemy	vessels	into	the	zone,	exemptions	carved	out	for	British	military	operations	in	Canadian	waters,	and	the	“serious	question”	of	the	impounding	of	British	ships	in	the	zone.110	These	discussions	were	not	merely	academic,	as	the	engagement	off	the	coast	of	Uruguay	of	the	British	Navy	with	the	German	pocket	battleship	Admiral	Graf	Spee	on	13	December	had	made	clear.111	Discussions	with	the	French	Ambassador	were	of	a	similar	vein,	calling	attention	to	French	concerns	about	Latin	American	protests	against	violations	of	neutrality.112		On	one	level,	Welles’	role	in	crafting	the	apparatus	of	neutrality	in	the	Western	Hemisphere	contributed	to	Roosevelt’s	attempts	to	quarantine	war	to	belligerent	nations	while	simultaneously	preparing	the	United	States	for	the	failure	of	those	efforts	and	the	expansion	of	the	war	onto	the	United	States’	shores.	On	another	level,	Welles’	efforts	were	a	reflection	of	a	lifelong	preference	for	policy	options	that	downplayed	the	role	of	the	military	and	militarism	in	diplomatic	matters,	even	in	the	face	of	war.	Building	on	his	experiences	forging	compromise	and	averting	conflict	in	the	Caribbean	during	his	early	career,	Welles	approached	hemispheric	defense	and	neutrality	policy	with	plans	for	multilateral	consultative	negotiation.	His	preference	for	those	policies,	rather	than	ones	that	emphasized	militaristic	elements	of	hemispheric	defense,	reflected	a	longstanding	suspicion	about	aggression	and	force	as	a	means	of	addressing	diplomatic	problems.			
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The	Man	on	the	Ground:	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	Pivotal	Relationship			 The	final	attribute	of	Welles’	professional	idiosyncrasies	–	his	patronage	by	and	reliance	on	Franklin	Roosevelt	–	emerged	at	another	one	of	the	conferences	that	had	been	made	possible	by	Welles’	assiduous	policymaking,	specifically	Rio	de	Janeiro	in	January	1942.	The	Japanese	attack	on	Pearl	Harbor	on	7	December	1941	brought	to	a	climax	the	rising	tension	in	the	Western	Hemisphere	over	the	threat	of	war.	Faced	with	a	direct	attack	on	its	soil	by	a	foreign	power,	the	U.S.	sought	to	activate	the	mechanisms	of	collective	security	and	solidarity	from	the	Buenos	Aires,	Lima,	Panama,	and	Havana	conferences	and	bind	together	the	hemisphere	in	solidarity.	However,	the	divisions	between	different	countries	and	the	anxiety	over	the	impact	of	war	on	the	hemisphere	persisted.	Volatile	and	recalcitrant	forces	that	had	always	been	skeptical	of	U.S.	leadership	would	repeatedly	frustrate	Welles’	efforts	to	forge	consensus.	Welles	again	proved	his	value	as	a	negotiator	and	the	wisdom	of	his	investments	over	the	past	decade	in	fostering	goodwill	among	Latin	American	nations,	but	as	in	critical	moments	in	the	past	his	imprint	was	only	made	possible	by	leveraging	his	relationship	with	FDR	to	his	advantage.		Throughout	this	critical	episode	Welles’	overriding	concern	was	to	maintain	the	comity	and	cohesion	he	had	forged	over	the	preceding	eight	years.	Only	days	after	the	Pearl	Harbor	attack	Welles	began	preliminary	talks	to	hold	what	eventually	became	known	as	the	Emergency	Meeting	of	Foreign	Ministers	of	the	Americas.	Already,	Welles	took	steps	to	safeguard	an	atmosphere	of	goodwill,	specifically	by	ensuring	the	conference	would	be	held	in	friendly	territory.	Conveniently,	the	most	propitious	location	with	regards	to	U.S.	foreign	policy	objectives	was	also	the	one	that	had	been	selected	at	the	1940	Havana	Conference	for	the	next	inter-American	meeting:	Brazil.	Brazil	had	become	an	increasingly	reliable	ally	of	the	United	States	over	the	preceding	decade.	Welles	had	formed	a	close	working	relationship	with	President	Getúlio	Vargas	and	former	Ambassador	to	the	United	States,	now	Foreign	Minister,	Osvaldo	Aranha.	Brazil	was	also	the	South	American	country	most	exposed	to	Axis	attack,	Brazil’s	northeastern	coast	lying	only	a	few	thousand	kilometres	from	
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German-occupied	North	Africa.	As	a	result,	Brazil	had	a	vested	interest	in	cooperating	with	the	United	States.113		For	these	reasons,	Rio	de	Janeiro	offered	the	most	fertile	ground	for	forging	inter-American	solidarity	and	preventing	disunity,	a	possibility	Welles	was	keenly	aware	of.	As	Welles	explained	to	a	Salvadorian	diplomat	on	13	December	1941,	“it	would	be	inexpedient	to	suggest	any	change	in	that	decision,	[to	hold	the	next	inter-American	consultative	meeting	in	Rio	de	Janeiro]	since	I	knew	that	various	of	the	other	American	republics	would	suggest	that	the	meeting	be	held	in	another	capital	and	I	thought	that	the	only	safe	course	to	avoid	misunderstanding	and	bickering	was	to	abide	by	the	formal	decision	already	reached.”114		Standing	astride	Welles	and	his	plans	for	hemispheric	solidarity	was	Argentina.	Perennially	resentful	of	the	power	and	influence	of	the	United	States,	reticent	to	antagonize	its	immigrant	populations	from	Italy	and	Germany,	and	nervous	about	the	economic	effects	of	severing	ties	with	the	Axis,	Argentina	was	a	source	of	endless	difficulty	for	Welles	at	the	Rio	conference.	Again,	in	an	effort	to	stack	the	deck	in	favour	of	cooperation,	and	showing	a	command	of	Latin	American	affairs	that	had	become	typical	of	Welles	by	this	point,	he	had	anticipated	this	attitude	and	attempted	to	forestall	Argentine	recalcitrance	with	a	trip	to	Buenos	Aires	by	Assistant	Secretary	Francis	White	in	advance	of	Welles’	arrival	at	Rio.115		The	importance	of	Argentina’s	amenability	stemmed	from	a	desire	shared	among	many	in	the	State	Department	for	a	unanimous	response	by	the	countries	of	Latin	America	to	the	acts	of	aggression	by	Japan	and	the	declaration	of	war	by	Germany.	There	was	also	a	concern	that	any	show	of	disunity	might	provoke	a	domino	effect	and	scupper	the	entire	conference.116	An	obstinate	Argentina,	the	U.S.	
																																																								113	For	more	on	Welles’	reasoning	for	preferring	Brazil	in	this	instance	see:	Welles,	The	Time	For	
Decision,	220-2.		114	“Memorandum	of	Conversation”,	13	December	1941,	NARA,	RG	59,	Central	Decimal	File,	Office	of	American	Republic	Affairs,	Its	Predecessors,	and	Its	Successors,	Box	3:	Memorandums	of	Conversations	of	Under	Secretary	of	State	Sumner	Welles,	June	23,	1937	-	August	2,	1943,	April	22,	1940	to	Present.		115	For	Secretary	Morgenthau	from	White,	22	January	1942,	SWP,	Box:	187,	Folder:	4.		116	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	319.		
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feared,	might	raise	fears	in	Brazil	about	the	security	of	its	southern	border;	a	weary	Brazil	would	cause	other	countries	to	pull	out	as	well,	and	so	on.117		Ostensibly,	the	policy	of	the	United	States	was	clear.	“[M]ajor	emphasis,”	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull	insisted,	“should	be	placed	on	inducing	all	the	Republics	to	sign	a	joint	declaration	to	break	off	relations	with	the	Axis	Powers”	because	“if	they	would	take	this	step,	all	the	other	steps	necessary	to	make	the	hemisphere	a	composite	unit	in	opposition	to	the	Axis	would	come	more	easily.”118	Welles	concurred	with	this	assessment.	In	an	interview	with	journalist	Raymond	Clapper	prior	to	leaving	Washington,	Welles	stated	he	could	“shoot	for	all	Latin-American	countries	breaking	relations	with	the	Axis”	but	that	he	“[c]annot	go	for	declaration	of	war.”119	Such	a	declaration	from	the	Rio	conference,	ideally	proclaiming	a	breaking	of	ties	with	the	Axis,	would	enhance	the	prestige	of	the	United	States,	which	had	been	tarnished	by	the	succession	of	military	defeats	at	the	hands	of	the	Japanese	since	Pearl	Harbor.120			However,	once	Welles	was	on	the	ground	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	he	faced	unexpected	difficulties.	On	23	January,	after	spending	several	days	negotiating	a	unanimous	resolution	along	the	lines	outlined	by	Roosevelt,	Hull,	and	Welles,	the	Foreign	Minister	of	Argentina	suddenly	withdrew	his	support.121	The	conference,	in	Welles	estimation,	“was	thrown	into	a	state	verging	upon	chaos.”122	Acting	quickly	and	without	consulting	Washington,	Welles	negotiated	a	new	resolution	that	“recommended	the	rupture	of	their	diplomatic	relations”	as	opposed	to	a	call	for	an	outright	break.123	The	resolution	was	accepted	and	announced	to	the	press	later	that	day.	In	procuring	this	compromise	language	Welles	had,	in	effect,	managed	to	arrange	for	the	U.S.	to	have	its	cake	and	eat	it	too.	A	unanimous	agreement	had	been	reached	but	with	enough	caveats	built	in	to	make	it	clear	that	those	countries	that																																																									117	Welles,	The	Time	For	Decision,	234.	118	Cordell	Hull,	The	Memoirs	of	Cordell	Hull,	Vol.	II,	(New	York:	MacMillan	Company,	1948),	1143,	1143-4.	119	Memo,	“The	Welles	Latin-American	trip”,	5	January	1942,	Library	of	Congress.	Raymond	Clapper	Papers,	Personal	File:	Memoranda,	1942-43,	Box	23.		120	Welles,	The	Time	For	Decision,	224.		121	Gellman,	Good	Neighbor	Diplomacy,	124.		122	Welles	to	Roosevelt,	24	January	1942,	SWP,	Box:	151,	Folder	11.		123	Ibid.	Emphasis	added.	
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did	not	immediately	break	ties	with	the	Axis	(Argentina	and	Chile)	were	out	of	step	with	the	rest	of	the	hemisphere.124	Others,	however,	did	not	see	things	the	same	way.	Hull	was	livid.	Welles	“had	not	only	acted	without	consulting	me,”	Hull	wrote	in	his	memoirs,	“worse,	he	had	committed	his	Government	to	an	unwise	agreement.	He	had	compromised	the	all-important	issue.”125	He	demanded	Welles	revise	the	agreement.	In	his	diary	Adolf	Berle	concurred,	recalling	“[t]he	Secretary	was	a	thoroughly	angry	man.	He	indicated	that	he	thought	Sumner	had	been	undermining	him;	that	he	had	gone	over	his	head	to	the	White	House;	that	he	had	worked	up	the	Rio	Conference	without	getting	authority;”	Berle	also	agreed	with	Hull’s	assessment	that	the	compromise	had	given	away	too	much.126		The	dispute	between	Welles	and	Hull	came	to	a	climax	in	a	telephone	conversation	on	the	night	of	23	January.	After	Welles	refused	to	reopen	negotiations	on	the	resolution,	Hull	telephoned	Roosevelt	and	pleaded	with	him	to	force	Welles	to	reverse	himself.	Hull	later	explained	that	he	considered	what	Welles	had	done	to	be	“a	change	in	our	policy,	made	without	consulting	me,	and	equivalent	of	a	surrender	to	Argentina.”127	To	what	extent	Welles	had	overstepped	his	bounds	was	as	much	a	matter	of	perspective	as	of	litigiousness.		According	to	Berle,	“Sumner	ha[d]	been	running	the	Rio	Conference	pretty	much	on	his	own,	without	any	consultation”	up	to	that	point,	and	so	could	be	forgiven	for	not	asking	for	Hull’s	permission	before	making	such	an	adjustment.128	However,	it	was	clear	to	most	observers	in	Washington	that	Welles	had	not	accomplished	what	he	had	been	sent	to	do.	Former	Undersecretary	of	State	William	Castle,	for	instance,	believed	that	the	initial	newspapers	reports	of	a	“great	diplomatic	victory”	(prior	to	Argentina	pulling	its	support	for	the	first	draft)	were	premature.129																																																									124	Peru,	Ecuador,	Paraguay,	Bolivia,	Brazil,	and	Uruguay	all	broke	off	relations	with	the	Axis	within	days;	Chile	and	Argentina	followed	suit	over	the	next	two	years.	See:	Welles,	The	Time	For	Decision,	234.				125	Hull,	Memoirs	Vol.	II,	1149.		126	Memorandum,	24	January	1942,	FDRL,	Adolf	A.	Berle	Papers,	Box	213,	Diary	January	1942.		127	Hull,	Memoirs	Vol.	II,	1149.		128	Memorandum,	24	January	1942,	FDRL,	Adolf	A.	Berle	Papers,	Box	213,	Diary	January	1942.	129	Diary	Entry,	23	January	1942,	Harvard	University,	Houghton	Library,	William	R.	Castle	Diaries,	Vol.	43,	32.	
		 163	
What	was	unambiguous	was	the	resolution	to	the	standoff.	Facing	a	charge	of	insubordination	from	his	superior,	Welles	appealed	to	Hull’s	superior	for	clemency.	Over	the	telephone	on	the	night	of	the	twenty-third,	and	the	next	day	in	a	long	telegram,	Welles	explained	that	he	had	operated	under	the	assumption	that:			“the	two	main	objectives	at	the	conference	…	should	be	the	breaking	of	political,	commercial,	and	financial	relations	between	the	Axis	powers	and	the	American	Republics	which	had	not	yet	taken	such	action,	and	likewise	the	making	of	every	effort	to	prevent	the	breakdown	of	the	unity	of	the	Hemisphere”130		Furthermore,	Welles:		 “took	it	for	granted	that	so	long	as	the	desired	objectives	were	attained	and	so	long	as	the	policy	you	and	the	Secretary	of	State	had	approved	was	carried	out,	I	was	entitled	to	have	sufficient	confidence	…	to	make	it	possible	for	me	within	those	bounds	to	agree	upon	texts.”131		 According	to	Berle,	after	hearing	Welles’	take	on	the	matter	Roosevelt	believed	“the	best	thing	to	do	was	to	let	well	enough	alone	and	make	what	we	could	out	of	it.”132	According	to	Welles,	“President	Roosevelt,	without	hesitation,	…	made	the	following	statement:	‘I	am	sorry,	Cordell,	but	in	this	case	I	am	going	to	take	the	judgment	of	the	man	on	the	spot.’”133	“[A]	decision	had	already	been	reached,”	Hull	recalled,	and	Roosevelt	decided	to	trust	Welles.134	In	doing	so,	Roosevelt	also	ratified	Welles’	imprint	on	this	crucial	stage	in	Good	Neighbor	diplomacy.	Welles’	restrained	course	of	action	and	emphasis	on	solidarity	trumped	Hull’s	more	belligerent	desire	to	make	a	clean	break	with	the	Axis.	That	Welles	achieved	such	an	extraordinary	feat	over	the	direct	and	vituperative	objections	of	his	immediate	superior	was	a	testament	to	the	strength	of	the	bond	he	had	forged	with	Roosevelt	over	the	preceding	decades.	Roosevelt																																																									130	Welles	to	Roosevelt,	24	January	1942,	SWP,	Box:	151,	Folder	11.	131	Ibid.		132	Memorandum,	24	January	1942,	FDRL,	Adolf	A.	Berle	Papers,	Box	213,	Diary	January	1942.	133	Sumner	Welles,	Seven	Decisions	That	Shaped	History	(New	York:	Harper	&	Brothers	Publishers,	1951),	117.		134	Hull,	Memoirs	Vol.	II,	1149.	
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trusted	Welles	as	he	had	when	he	(unwisely)	sent	Welles	to	Cuba	in	1933.	Their	bond,	in	fact,	seemed	to	be	growing	stronger,	with	Roosevelt	now	willing	to	overrule	his	chief	diplomat	in	favour	of	Welles.	Even	after	nine	years	in	office	collaborating	together,	that	level	of	trust	and	collaborative	symbiosis	was	remarkable.	It	was	a	clear	sign	that	the	relationship	Welles	and	Roosevelt	had	forged	in	mutual	exile	years	earlier	was	now	having	an	impact	on	the	foreign	policy	of	the	United	States.			
Conclusion:		
	 	
	 Welles’	effort	to	forge	better	relations	between	the	United	States	and	Latin	America	were	animated	in	large	part	by	the	idiosyncratic	characteristics	of	his	policymaking	that	stemmed	from	his	unique	positionality	in	his	formative	years	and	his	experiences	as	a	young	diplomat.	Through	paternalistic	idealism,	aversion	to	militarism,	and	reliance	on	FDR	for	political	support,	bilateral	relations	between	the	United	States	and	Cuba,	and	the	creation	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	were	influenced	in	a	quintessentially	Wellesian	fashion.		In	Cuba,	Welles’	paternalistic	idealism	largely	led	him	astray.	Welles’	idealism	foundered	on	the	uncertainties	and	infelicities	of	Depression-era	political	unrest	and	political	shortsightedness	on	his	part.	Blinded	by	his	sentimental	optimism	about	Cuba	and	its	people,	he	ignored	the	rising	political	tensions	around	him.	When	Machado	was	overthrown	Welles	naïvely	believed	that	the	Cuban	people	would	accept	his	handpicked	replacement.	Similarly,	Welles	refused	to	accept	the	government	that	overthrew	that	replacement	because	it	did	not	conform	to	his	ideals	of	legitimacy.		He	also	overestimated	his	own	ability	to	forge	consensus,	leading	him	to	invoke	his	powerful	benefactor	to	come	to	his	rescue.	In	some	ways,	Welles’	relationship	with	Roosevelt	set	the	entire	Cuban	episode	in	motion.	Roosevelt	knew	he	could	count	on	Welles	to	take	care	of	a	difficult	situation	on	account	of	their	long	collaboration	and	deep	trust	of	one	another;	for	the	same	reasons	Welles,	by	contrast,	could	not	refuse	Roosevelt’s	request	that	he	go	to	Cuba,	despite	a	reluctance	to	take	the	post.	Out	of	these	two	factors	emerged	a	situation	wherein	
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Welles	opted	for	expediency,	to	complete	his	mission	as	quickly	and	smoothly	as	possible,	be	it	either	through	the	implementation	of	a	seamless	transition	plan	or	the	installation	of	a	ruler	via	U.S.	intervention.			In	Cuba	Welles	unwittingly	demonstrated	the	limitations	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	but	ironically,	even	as	he	violated	the	principles	he	was	sent	to	uphold,	Welles’	actions	allowed	Roosevelt	to	galvanize	those	principles	into	ironclad	components	of	U.S.	policy	in	the	Caribbean.	It	was	a	significant,	if	counter-intuitive,	contribution	to	the	formative	stages	of	Good	Neighbor	diplomacy	and	a	fitting	representation	of	how	Welles’	own	often-contradictory	personality	could	be	reflected	in	the	policies	he	enacted.			Apart	from	Cuba,	however,	Welles’	idiosyncratic	worldview	and	tactics	were	quite	successful	in	bringing	about	a	successful	Good	Neighbor	policy.	Welles’	paternalistic	idealism	infused	his	rhetoric	with	an	unctuous	quality	born	out	of	a	genuine	conviction	in	multilateral	collaboration	and	the	beneficence	of	U.S.	leadership.	Beginning	with	the	Buenos	Aires	conference	in	1936,	Welles	translated	those	convictions	into	a	functional	diplomatic	framework.	Fittingly,	that	framework	also	provided	the	context	for	the	other	major	part	of	Welles’	worldview,	his	aversion	to	militarism,	to	manifest.	Faced	with	the	rising	threat	of	war	in	Europe	and	the	Pacific,	Welles	used	the	inter-American	system	he	helped	create	to	enact	a	series	of	protocols	and	policies	to	defend	the	hemisphere	against	aggression	through	collective	security	and	economic	cooperation.	The	climax	of	this	effort	came	at	the	Rio	de	Janeiro	conference	in	1942,	where	Welles	again	demonstrated	the	importance	of	his	close	relationship	with	Roosevelt	to	his	political	career.				
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Chapter	Five:	
	“Sumner	Welles	seemed	cool.	War	or	peace,	he	will	remain	so”1:	Welles’	
Policymaking	in	Peace	and	War,	1937-1943		 	On	11	August	1941,	Sumner	Welles	appeared	on	the	cover	of	Time	magazine	as	the	subject	of	an	extensive	and	largely	flattering	profile	under	the	headline	“The	Diplomat’s	Diplomat.”2	Welles,	Time	wrote,	was	“the	chief	administrative	officer	of	U.S.	foreign	policy”	and	“a	field	marshal”	in	what	the	article	dubbed	the	“War	of	Brains”	in	which	the	United	States	was	then	engaged	in	its	quest	“to	exhaust	every	possible	means	of	avoiding	a	shooting	war.”3	Comparing	him	to	New	York	Giants	 	right	fielder	Mel	Ott,	Time	portrayed	Welles	as	the	acme	of	his	chosen	profession,	having	achieved	success	through	a	combination	of	“[p]residential	choice,	his	own	ability,	background	and	natural	stamina.”4	So	confident	in	Welles’	abilities	was	Time	that	it	prophesized	“the	only	surprises	left”	in	his	career	“are	those	of	destiny.”5		Although	somewhat	premature	in	its	prognostications,	Time’s	profile	of	Welles	was	an	accurate	assessment	of	the	stature	he	had	achieved	by	the	summer	of	1941.	Coincidentally,	his	appearance	on	the	front	of	one	of	the	country’s	most	widely	circulated	magazines	came	amid	Welles’	attendance	at	a	secret	meeting	between	President	Roosevelt	and	British	Prime	Minister	Winston	Churchill	at	Argentia	Naval	Base	in	Placentia	Bay,	Newfoundland.	Although	unintentional,	the	coincidence	of	an	article	expounding	on	Welles’	diplomatic	acumen	along	with	his	participation	in	high	level	negotiations	(in	the	absence	of	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull)	was	a	tacit	acknowledgement	of	Welles’	power	and	influence.		Since	becoming	Undersecretary	in	1937	Welles	had	assumed	an	ever-greater	role	in	the	decision-making	hierarchy	of	the	Roosevelt	administration,	“expanding	his	jurisdiction	until	…	he	cover[ed]	virtually	every	field,”	one	colleague	
																																																								1	“The	Diplomat’s	Diplomat,”	11	August	1941,	Time	2	Ibid.			3	Ibid.		4	Ibid.			5	Ibid.		
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remembered.6	Already	favoured	through	his	close	relationship	with	Roosevelt,	Welles	assumed	additional	responsibilities	as	the	U.S.	slipped	deeper	into	European	and	Asian	affairs	amid	rising	aggression	by	Germany,	Italy,	and	Japan.	Although	his	area	of	expertise	was	Latin	America,	Welles	became	involved	in	the	direction	of	wartime	diplomacy	as	the	crises	in	Europe	and	Asia	expanded	to	encompass	all	aspects	of	U.S.	foreign	policy.	Welles’	centrality	to	the	creation,	planning,	and	execution	of	U.S.	wartime	foreign	policy	grew	in	proportion	to	the	worsening	crises	abroad	and	the	need	of	the	United	States	to	respond	to	them	effectively.	Consequently,	the	influence	of	Welles’	personality	–	his	strengths	and	weaknesses,	peccadilloes	and	prejudices	–	expanded	into	policies	that	shaped	the	U.S.	response	to	the	approach	of	war	and	its	envisioning	of	the	world	once	it	was	over.			This	chapter	explores	Welles’	impact	on	U.S.	foreign	policy	leading	up	to	and	during	the	conduct	of	World	War	Two.	It	explores	how	the	key	aspects	of	Welles’	policymaking	–	aversion	to	militarism,	paternalistic	idealism,	and	a	reliance	on	the	patronage	of	Franklin	Roosevelt	to	achieve	his	aims	–	were	fundamental	to	Welles’	contributions	to	U.S.	diplomatic	efforts	during	this	time.	These	themes	appeared	across	multiple	policy	proposals,	decisions,	and	events	to	which	Welles	was	central	during	this	period:	his	abortive	attempts	at	a	peace	conference	in	1937	and	1938,	the	peace	mission	to	Europe	in	early	1940,	the	Argentia	conference	in	August	1941,	and	his	involvement	in	postwar	planning.	In	observing	the	prevalence	of	Welles’	unique	influence	on	these	matters	and	analyzing	its	effects,	this	chapter	draws	conclusions	about	the	objectives	and	intentions	of	U.S.	foreign	policy,	including	how	Welles’	influence	contributed	to	the	approach	that	characterized	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	diplomacy	before	war	and	to	the	enunciation	of	a	specific	vision	for	the	postwar	world	during	the	period	of	Welles’	greatest	influence.			 	
“A	very	definite	quietus”7:	Welles	Evades	War,	1937-1940																																																									6	Diary	Entry,	23	August	1937,	Houghton	Library,	Harvard	University	Archives	(HL),	Jay	Pierrepont	Moffat	diplomatic	papers,	Moffat	Diary,	1937.		7	‘The	Under	Secretary	of	State	(Welles)	to	President	Roosevelt,	26	October	1937,	U.S.	Department	of	State	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States	(FRUS),	1937.	Vol.	I:	General,	(Washingon,	D.C.:	GPO,	1954),	668.	
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		 From	his	promotion	to	Undersecretary	in	1937	until	the	end	of	the	‘Phony	War’	in	April	1940	Welles’	contributions	to	Roosevelt’s	foreign	policymaking	in	Europe	centred	on	his	pursuit	of	long-shot	efforts	at	peaceful	mediation	between	belligerent	powers.	Crucial	to	this	task	was	Welles’	experience	of	and	faith	in	seeking	multilateral	diplomatic	solutions	over	militaristic	ones	in	international	affairs.	Fully	aware	of	the	seemingly	inexorable	advance	of	aggression	across	the	world	as	well	as	the	reticence	of	his	fellow	Americans	to	become	involved	in	any	way,	Welles	developed	a	series	of	proposals	to	smother	the	militaristic	impulses	of	aggressor	nations	while	avoiding	the	sort	of	direct	confrontation	that	might	lead	to	war	or	a	domestic	isolationist	backlash.		Welles’	accession	to	Undersecretary	came	amid	steadily	worsening	conditions	in	international	affairs.	Several	months	earlier	the	Japanese	Empire	had	invaded	China,	launching	a	brutal	campaign	that	would	not	end	until	1945.8	Fears	mounted	that	Japan’s	increasingly	belligerent	actions,	stretching	back	to	the	invasion	of	Manchuria	in	1931,	would	sooner	or	later	bring	it	into	direct	conflict	with	the	U.S.9	Matters	in	Europe	were	no	better.	The	Spanish	Civil	War	that	started	the	previous	year	had	escalated	dramatically,	shocking	observers	with	the	carnage	wrought	by	aerial	warfare.10	Meanwhile,	efforts	to	restore	international	order	or	preserve	peace	floundered.	The	League	of	Nations	was	helpless	in	the	face	of	aggression	and	increasingly	sidelined	in	world	affairs,	not	least	because	of	the	withdrawal	of	powerful	aggressor	countries	like	Germany,	Japan,	and	Italy.11	The	final	collapse	of	the	Nine	Power	disarmament	talks	that	year	in	Brussels	–	one	of	the																																																									8	Dorothy	Borg,	The	United	States	and	the	Far	Eastern	Crisis	of	1933-1938:	From	the	Manchurian	
Incident	Through	the	Initial	Stage	of	the	Undeclared	Sino-Japanese	War	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1964),	282-3.		9	Ibid.,	See	also:	Ronald	H.	Spector,	Eagle	Against	the	Sun:	The	American	War	With	Japan	(Harmondsworth:	Viking,	1985);	William	R.	Nester,	Power	Across	the	Pacific:	Diplomatic	History	of	
American	Relations	with	Japan	(Basingstoke:	Macmillan,	1996);	Walter	LaFeber,	The	Clash:	A	History	
of	U.S.-Japan	Relations	(New	York:	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	1997);	Jonathan	G.	Utley,	Going	to	War	
with	Japan,	1937-1941	Knoxville:	University	of	Tennessee	Press,	1985).			10	For	a	fuller	discussion	of	American	attitudes	and	policies	toward	Spain	during	its	civil	war,	see:	Michael	E.	Chapman.	Arguing	Americanism:	Franco	Lobbyists,	Roosevelt’s	Foreign	Policy,	and	the	
Spanish	Civil	War	(Kent:	Ohio	State	University,	2011).	11	See:	F.	S.	Northedge,	The	League	of	Nations:	Its	Life	and	Times,	1920-1946	(Leicester:	Leicester	University	Press,	1986).	
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few	international	processes	the	U.S.	was	actually	involved	in	–	capped	off	a	seemingly	unstoppable	march	of	belligerence	and	aggression	at	the	expense	of	peace	making.12	Amid	these	growing	crises	Roosevelt	faced	a	dearth	of	possibilities	for	action.	The	U.S.	public	was	in	the	throes	of	a	surge	of	isolationist	opinion,	preventing	President	Roosevelt	from	taking	even	the	most	trivial	actions	to	address	the	worsening	crisis.13	Congressional	leaders	echoed	public	opinion,	passing	a	series	of	Neutrality	Acts	that	limited	presidential	authority	to	wage	war,	whether	by	supplying	arms	to	belligerent	nations	or	allowing	American	citizens	and	property	to	enter	war	zones.14	At	the	same	time	Roosevelt’s	own	political	capital	was	depleted	due	to	an	ill-conceived	proposal	to	pack	the	Supreme	Court	with	ideologically	friendly	justices.15	Even	if	public	opinion	had	supported	it,	the	U.S.	was	woefully	unprepared	for	any	sort	of	military	action.16		Because	of	these	reasons	Roosevelt	was	uncertain	about	what	role,	if	any,	the	U.S.	could	take	in	bringing	about	peace.	He	understood	the	depth	of	the	American	public’s	aversion	to	any	sort	of	military	conflict,	yet	he	knew	better	than	almost	all	of	them	just	how	much	of	a	threat	such	a	conflict	would	be	to	the	United	States.17	Initially	hopeful	for	some	sort	of	compromise	between	the	Axis	and	the	nations	who	opposed	them	(i.e.	the	U.K.	and	France),	his	optimism	faded	over	time	as	it	became	increasingly	apparent	that	a	general	war	was	inevitable.18	Historian	Mark	Lowenthal	perhaps	summed	it	up	best	when	he	called	this	period	“the	search	for	influence,”	a	time	when	Roosevelt	attempted	to	increase	public	awareness	of	
																																																								12	Andrew	Webster,	“The	Transnational	Dream:	Politicians,	Diplomats	and	Soldiers	in	the	League	of	Nations’	Pursuit	of	International	Disarmament,	1920-1938”.	Contemporary	European	History	Vol.	14,	No.	4,	(Nov.	2005),	516-7.		13	George	C.	Herring,	From	Colony	to	Superpower:	U.S.	Foreign	Relations	Since	1776	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2008),	502-7;	See	also,	Wayne	S.	Cole	Roosevelt	and	the	Isolationists	(London:	University	of	Nebraska	Press,	1983).		14	Herring,	From	Colony	to	Superpower,	505.		15	Ted	Morgan,	FDR:	A	Biography	(New	York:	Simon	and	Schuster),	478-9.		16	Steven	Casey,	Cautious	Crusade:	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt,	American	Public	Opinion,	and	the	War	against	
Nazi	Germany	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001),	43-4.		17	Ibid.,	13.		18	Ibid.,	8.		
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overseas	threats	in	a	way	that	did	not	harm	the	his	moral	or	political	standing	with	the	American	public.19		It	was	with	this	ambivalent	mindset	that	Roosevelt	turned	to	Welles	for	options.	Welles	had	paid	close	attention	to	the	worsening	international	situation	and	worried	about	it	openly	and	in	private.	Welles	fretted	about	“the	pitiful	spectacle	of	a	great	and	virile	race	…	torn	by	internal	warfare	and	rent	asunder”	in	reference	to	the	Spanish	Civil	War.20	Welles	recognized	the	gravity	of	the	situation,	seeing	the	threat	of	“fundamentally	antagonistic	dogmas”	currently	battling	in	Spain	as	“the	most	immediate	danger	to	the	peace	of	the	world.”21	He	worried	in	particular	about	Germany,	believing	“the	Germans	…	either	in	time	of	triumph	or	in	time	of	defeat	to	go	pieces	nervously,”	and	cautioned	against	instigating	a	war	of	words	with	them.22	Welles’	analysis	echoed	assessments	within	the	State	Department	that	saw	a	“basic	clash	of	ideologies”	in	Spain	and	elsewhere	that	portended	“a	reversion	to	the	doctrine	of	force	and	of	might	and	to	an	entirely	different	international	morality	than	that	which	has	slowly	and	painfully	been	built	up	in	the	last	centuries.”23	Conversely,	Welles	also	believed	that	the	U.S.	had	the	ability	to	restore	the	balance	to	the	international	system	that	the	belligerent	powers	had	undermined.	“It	is	apparently	but	too	little	recognized,	even	by	our	own	people,”	Welles	insisted	in	a	July	1937	speech	to	the	Institute	of	Public	Affairs	at	the	University	of	Virginia,	“that	during	these	past	years	this	Government	has	upon	repeated	occasions	held	aloft	and	proclaimed	…	a	broad	program	for	world	rehabilitation	which	…	will	restore	international	confidence	and	lay	those	foundations	of	normal	and	just	international	relationships	which	mean	peace.”24	As	Welles	explained,	it	was	the	efforts	to	seek																																																									19	Mark	M.	Lowenthal,	“Roosevelt	and	the	Coming	of	the	War:	The	Search	for	United	States	Policy	1937-42,”	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	Vol.	16,	No.	3,	The	Second	World	War:	Part	2,	July	(1981),	414.			20	Address	by	the	Honorable	Sumner	Welles	before	the	Institute	of	Public	Affairs	at	the	University	of	Virginia,	‘Present	Aspects	of	World	Peace’,	7	July	1937,	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	Presidential	Library	(FDRL),	Sumner	Welles	Papers	(SWP),	Box:	194,	Folder:	10.		21	Ibid.	22	Diary	Entry,	18	March	1938,	HL,	Jay	Pierrepont	Moffat	diplomatic	papers,	Moffat	Diary,	1938.		23	Messersmith	to	Hull,	11	October	1937,	National	Archives	and	Records	Administration	II,	College	Park,	Maryland	(NARA),	RG	59,	Subject	Files	1935-62,	Box:	165,	Folder:	Messersmith.	24	Address	by	the	Honorable	Sumner	Welles	before	the	Institute	of	Public	Affairs	at	the	University	of	Virginia,	7	July	1937,	‘Present	Aspects	of	World	Peace’,	SWP,	Box:	194,	Folder:	10.		
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cooperation	and	unity	among	the	nations	of	Latin	America	he	had	spearheaded	at	the	Buenos	Aires	conference	the	previous	year	that	offered	the	blueprint	for	how	the	U.S.	could	address	the	worsening	crises	in	Europe	and	Asia	without	risking	entangling	involvement	in	foreign	affairs	that	might	lead	to	war.25		It	was	with	this	in	mind	that	Welles	prepared	a	proposal	in	October,	1937	for	a	“Concerted	International	Effort	to	Reach	Common	Agreement	on	the	Principles	of	International	Conduct	to	Maintain	Peace.”26	The	details	of	Welles’	plan	called	for	a	conference	in	which	five	major	topics	would	be	discussed:	“The	basic	principles	which	should	be	observed	in	international	relations,”	“The	laws	and	customs	of	land	warfare;”	“The	laws	and	customs	of	naval	warfare;”	“The	rights	and	obligations	of	neutrals	both	on	land	and	at	sea;”	and	“The	right	of	freedom	of	access	on	the	part	of	all	peoples	to	raw	materials.”27	He	recommended	Roosevelt	call	the	world’s	ambassadors	to	the	White	House	on	Armistice	Day	(11	November	1937)	while	simultaneously	having	U.S.	diplomats	deliver	a	note	to	the	heads	of	government	around	the	world	calling	for	a	conference	along	the	lines	outlined.28		Welles’	memoranda	outlining	the	proposed	conference	revealed	the	degree	to	which	Welles’	personality	and	diplomatic	style	animated	his	policymaking.	The	suggestion	to	ostentatiously	announce	the	proposed	conference	by	surprise	to	an	assembly	of	all	credentialed	ambassadors	reflected	his	penchant	for	large	diplomatic	enterprises.	Likely,	Welles	was	trying	to	replicate	the	public	relations	success	of	the	Buenos	Aires	conference	the	previous	year,	where	Roosevelt’s	arrival	produced	rapturous	crowds	and	excellent	publicity	for	the	United	States.	Notably,	Hull	specifically	objected	to	this	aspect	of	the	plan	calling	it	“pyrotechnical”	because	of	the	possibility	that	such	a	large	spectacle	might	backfire.29	The	proposed	Armistice	Day	conference	also	reflected	Welles’	aversion	to	militaristic	solutions	for	diplomatic	problems.	Though	he	outlined	several	specific	points	of	discussion	for	the	proposed	conference,	the	thrust	of	Welles’	proposal	was																																																									25	Ibid.		26	Memorandum	by	the	Undersecretary	of	State	(Welles),	6	October	1937,	FRUS.	1937,	Vol.	I,	665.		27	Ibid.,	666.		28	Ibid.,	668.		29	Cordell	Hull,	The	Memoirs	of	Cordell	Hull,	vol.	1	(New	York:	MacMillan	Company,	1948),	548.		
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not	to	combat	aggression,	but	rather	to	bring	about	“an	improved	world	psychology.”30	Welles	asserted	“fundamental	standards	which	should	and	must	govern	the	relations	between	states”	were	lacking,	and	their	imposition	would	act	as	the	basis	for	“practical	agreements	necessary	to	re-establish	peace	in	the	world.”31	He	saw	his	conference	as	being	of	benefit	because	“the	mere	fact	that	the	nations	of	the	world	today	could	by	concerted	action	agree	upon	anything	of	vital	importance	would	in	itself	be	a	material	step	forward.”32	Though	hazily	defined,	the	goals	Welles	enunciated	in	his	draft	were	making	a	specific	kind	of	appeal	for	peace:	one	that	placed	primary	emphasis	on	the	engagement	of	diplomatic	machinery	as	an	antidote	to	war.		As	the	proposal	evolved,	Welles	shifted	the	focus	of	the	conference	more	toward	these	nebulous	goals	and	away	from	specifically	military	concerns.	When	Adolf	Berle	suggested	he	excise	the	discussion	of	“laws	and	customs	of	land	warfare”	and	“laws	and	customs	of	naval	warfare,”	(“nobody	believes	they	amount	to	anything	anyhow,”	Berle	lamented),	Welles	eagerly	took	it	on,	leaving	them	out	of	the	second	draft	of	the	proposal	he	showed	to	Roosevelt.33		Changes	to	the	second	draft	also	deemphasized	engaging	with	aggressor	nations.	Unlike	the	first,	the	second	draft	anticipated	Italy	and	Japan	were	unlikely	to	participate.34	The	focus,	rather,	was	to	“strengthen	the	hands	of	the	powers	that	are	seeking	to	avert	world	anarchy.”35	Though	he	did	not	specify	which	nations	those	powers	might	be,	Welles																																																									30	Memorandum	by	the	Undersecretary	of	State	(Welles),	6	October	1937,	FRUS,	1937.	Vol.	I,	666.	31	Welles	Memorandum	to	FDR,	6	October	1937,	FRUS,	1937.	Vol.	I,	665,	666.		32	Ibid.,	666.		33	See,	Ibid.,	666,	669;	Memoranda	dated	28	October	1937,	Berle	Diary,	FDRL,	Berle	Papers,	Box:	210,	Folder:	Diary	1937.	It	may	be	asked	why,	if	Welles	was	averse	to	militaristic	solutions,	he	proposed	discussing	naval	or	land	warfare	in	the	first	place.	The	answer	to	this	lies	in	Roosevelt’s	Quarantine	Speech,	which	instigated	Welles’	proposal.	In	it	Roosevelt	specifically	addressed	customs	of	naval	warfare	(“ships	are	being	attacked	and	sunk	by	submarines	without	cause	or	notice,”)	aerial	warfare	(“civilians	…	are	being	ruthlessly	murdered	with	bombs	from	the	air,”)	and	land	warfare	(“the	invasion	of	alien	territory	in	violation	of	treaties.”)	Thus,	Welles’	inclusion	of	these	points	demonstrated	his	awareness	of	military	issues	and	his	consideration	of	their	importance	insofar	as	they	were	of	clear	importance	to	the	intended	audience	for	his	proposal	(i.e.	Roosevelt).	See:	http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3310,	Accessed	1	October	2015.		34	Welles	Memorandum	to	FDR,	6	October	1937,	FRUS,	1937.	Vol.	I,	668;	In	an	earlier	draft	Welles	indicated	Germany	and	Italy	might	“find	it	to	their	advantage	to	cooperate”	but	was	adamant	Japan	would	not.	See:	Ibid.,	666.			35	The	Undersecretary	of	State	(Welles)	to	President	Roosevelt,	26	October	1937,	FRUS,	1937.	Vol.	I,	668	
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included	in	his	proposal	a	mechanism	that	would	use	a	“smaller	group	of	powers”	to	submit	proposals	to	the	whole,	leaving	open	the	possibility	for	nations	of	all	strengths	and	sizes	to	have	a	guiding	role.	He	later	reflected	that	Roosevelt	believed	the	proposed	conference	“would	in	itself	be	productive	of	practical	good	and		…	would	have	a	tonic	effect	upon	the	smaller	countries	of	Europe.”36		Furthermore,	the	scope	and	concept	behind	Welles’	proposed	conference	resembled	his	earlier	efforts	to	forge	peace	through	non-militaristic	means.		The	Conference	for	Disarmament	and	Maintenance	of	Peace	held	in	Washington	in	1921	offered	a	clear	precedent	for	Welles’	plans	in	1937.	Although	he	was	not	working	in	the	State	Department	at	the	time,	Welles	attended	the	inaugural	session.	Welles	wrote	of	Secretary	of	State	Charles	Evans	Hughes’	speech	during	the	“electrifying	inaugural	session”	and	the	“stupendous	accomplishment”	he	achieved	in	the	signing	of	the	Nine-Power	Treaty.37	When	recalling	the	conference	Welles	praised	Hughes’	approach	of	a	“gradual	but	steady	reduction	…	of	armaments”	that	“was	to	be	the	first	step	toward	the	negotiation	of	similar	agreements”.38	It	was	the	model	of	accretive	consultation	and	goodwill-inducing	agreement	from	this	previous	conference	that	appealed	to	Welles	and	that	he	sought	to	emulate	in	1937.	Welles	saw	his	plan	as	a	stepping-stone	to	greater	cooperation	and	agreement	between	nations,	albeit	with	a	more	nebulous	definition	of	progress	than	the	strict	guidelines	set	out	in	the	1922	Washington	Naval	Treaty.		The	Buenos	Aires	conference	of	1936	offered	a	further	conceptual	blueprint	for	Welles’	European	peace	proposals.	He	had	actually	discussed	the	possibility	of	disarmament	agreements	among	the	nations	of	the	Western	Hemisphere	with	Roosevelt	as	early	as	1933,	but	the	first	concrete	proposals	on	the	subject	came	from	Welles	at	Buenos	Aires	in	1936.39	At	Buenos	Aires,	Welles	had	successfully	pushed	for	agreements	on	the	“codification	of	international	law”	and	“moral	
																																																								36	Sumner	Welles,	The	Time	For	Decision,	(New	York:	Harper	&	Brothers	Publishers,	1944),	66.		37	Ibid.,	43		38	Ibid.,	44.	39	“The	Monroe	Doctrine	Problem”,	15	April	1933,	SWP,	Box:	194,	Folder:	6	
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disarmament,”	with	specific	emphasis	on	the	benefits	of	trade,	anticipating	the	language	he	used	in	his	1937	memos.40			 Ultimately,	Welles’	proposed	conference	did	not	get	off	the	ground.	After	initially	proposing	it	in	October	1937	Roosevelt	told	Welles	to	shelve	it;	a	brief	resurrection	in	1938	during	negotiations	with	the	British	led	to	a	similar	dead	end.	However,	the	degree	to	which	Welles’	proposal	carried	with	it	a	distinctive	strain	of	anti-militarism	was	detectable	in	the	manner	of	its	rejection.	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull,	for	instance,	thought	Welles’	proposed	conference	was	“illogical	and	impossible”	and	“wholly	impractical.”41	He	specifically	cited	the	extent	of	Germany	and	Japan’s	rearmament	as	a	reason	for	why	Welles’	plan	was	impractical.	He	compared	the	idea,	retrospectively,	to	the	doomed	neutrality	policies	of	the	Netherlands	and	Belgium	as	well	as	to	the	policy	of	appeasement	by	the	British	government.42	Worse	still,	Hull	argued,	would	be	how	the	proposed	conference	would	“lull	the	democracies	into	a	feeling	of	tranquility”	when	they	should	have	been	rearming.43	It	was,	then,	specifically	the	lack	of	a	military	dimension	to	Welles’	plans	that	Hull	found	most	troubling.		Placed	in	the	wider	context	of	contemporaneous	State	Department	opinion,	the	novelty	of	Welles’	negotiation-heavy,	confrontation-averse	approach	was	ever	more	apparent.	Writing	at	almost	the	same	time	as	Welles,	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	George	Messersmith	wrote	Hull	a	long	memo	about	U.S.	peace	aims	with	a	decidedly	graver	and	more	foreboding	subtext	than	Welles’	plan.	Noting	the	extraordinary	rearmament	programs	of	the	Axis	powers	and	the	imminent	threat	they	posed	to	the	U.S.,	Messersmith	called	for	“a	long	range	policy”	insisting	“our	non-involvement	in	war	must	be	the	formulation	of	a	policy	which	does	not	make	that	war	practically	inevitable	in	the	end.”44	Although	Messersmith	declared	“[t]he	policy	of	the	United	States	is	definitely	one	of	peace”	he	warned	Hull	that	“if	the	democracies	…	are	not	willing	to	defend	their	political,	social,	and	economic	views																																																									40	“Program	of	the	Conference,”	SWP,	Box:	184,	Folder:	6.	41	Hull,	Memoirs	Vol.	I,	(New	York:	MacMillan	Company,	1948),	547.		42	Ibid.,	547-8.		43	Ibid.,	547.		44	Messersmith	to	Hull,	11	October	1937,	NARA,	RG	59,	Subject	Files	1935-62,	Box:	165,	Folder:	Messersmith.	
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now	by	all	peaceful	methods	at	their	command,	it	is	only	a	question	of	time	when	they	shall	have	to	defend	them	with	force.”45	Messersmith’s	dire	warning	contrasted	with	Welles’	paean	for	peace	both	in	tone	and	in	its	willingness	to	consider	force	as	a	necessary	and	possibly	inevitable,	albeit	undesirable,	option.			Ambassador	to	Japan	Joseph	Clark	Grew	was	even	more	pessimistic.	Grew	decried	the	entire	effort	to	negotiate	new	peace	treaties	because	“it	seems	to	me	that	the	whole	structure	of	international	contracts	in	general	and	the	peace	machinery	in	particular	are	weakened	by	constantly	planning	to	erect	new	machinery	when	the	machinery	already	existing	is	ample	if	respected.”46	Adding	that	he	believed	contemporary	human	nature	to	be	“primitive”	and	similar	to	“that	of	a	cave	man,”	Grew	lamented	“international	treaties	and	acts	and	contracts	must	be	regarded	as	‘scraps	of	paper’	until	they	are	implemented	…	[n]ew	peace	machinery	is,	in	my	opinion,	dangerous.”47	Like	Messersmith,	Grew	arrived	at	the	same	diagnosis	about	the	growing	belligerence	and	anarchy	in	international	affairs	but	both	men	differed	from	Welles	in	their	suggested	remedy.		As	war	seemed	more	and	more	inevitable,	Welles’	efforts	to	avoid	militaristic	options	persisted.		A	few	weeks	before	the	Munich	crisis	began,	British	Ambassador	to	the	U.S.	Lord	Lothian	proposed	to	Welles	“the	setting	up	of	an	international	committee	…	[to]	examine	the	damage	caused	by	air	raids	on	civilian	population	[sic]	with	a	view	to	determining	whether	a	military	objective	had	or	had	not	existed.”48	Welles	“was	convinced	that	the	idea	was	utterly	impractical”	citing,	among	other	reasons,	the	impossibility	of	determining	what	a	military	target	might	be.49	Lothian’s	suggestion,	Welles	rightly	reasoned,	had	the	potential	to	involve	the	U.S.	in	the	military	side	of	diplomatic	disputes	during	what	was	still	technically	a	period	of	peace	between	the	major	belligerent	nations.	This	hesitance	to	commit	to	anything	beyond	non-belligerence	returned	in	early	1939	when	Lord	Lothian																																																									45	Messersmith	to	Hull,	11	October	1937,	NARA,	RG	59,	Subject	Files	1935-62,	Box:	165,	Folder:	Messersmith.	46	Diary	Entry,	24	May	1937,	HL,	Joseph	Clark	Grew	Papers,	Diary	1937,	3197-8.		47	Ibid.,	3198.		48	Diary	Entry,	4	and	5	June	1938,	HL,	Jay	Pierrepont	Moffat	diplomatic	papers,	Moffat	Diary,	1938.	49	Ibid.	Conversely,	Jay	Pierrepont	Moffat,	who	recorded	this	deliberation	in	his	diary,	considered	the	British	offer	“to	be	on	the	surface	an	invitation	to	join	in	a	purely	humanitarian	effort.”	
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pleaded	with	Welles	over	dinner	that	British	survival	depended	on	American	aid.	Welles	insisted,	“American	aid	must	be	diplomatic”	and	asserted	somewhat	optimistically	“that	the	strong	position	taken	by	the	President	during	the	last	two	or	three	weeks	has	certainly	checked	Italian	and	German	aggression	even	if	it	has	not	halted	them.”50	Not	even	the	outbreak	of	war	dissuaded	Welles	from	his	instinct	to	separate	military	matters	from	diplomatic	ones.	Upon	returning	from	his	mission	to	Europe	in	1940,	Welles	relayed	to	Ambassador	to	Germany	Hugh	Wilson	a	“radical	solution”	consisting	of	a	proposal	that	“bombers	should	be	abolished	and	that	land	forces	shall	be	equipped	only	with	such	weapons	as	a	horse	or	a	man	can	carry	twenty	miles	in	twenty-four	hours.”51		That	Welles	proposed	such	eccentric	solutions	likely	spoke	more	to	the	extremity	of	the	situation	than	to	his	belief	in	their	efficacy.	However,	it	fit	the	broader	pattern	of	Welles’	thinking	over	the	preceding	three	years.	Throughout	the	prewar	and	Phoney	War	periods	Welles	demonstrated	a	clear	and	persistent	pattern	of	avoiding	military	solutions	to	diplomatic	problems.	This	aversion	emerged	in	different	ways	in	response	to	changing	circumstances	but	was	nevertheless	a	consistent	theme.	It	infused	Welles’	policymaking	during	this	period,	distinct	from	the	more	belligerent	ideas	emanating	from	more	cynical	or	aggressive	policymakers	and	diplomats.	It	was	an	integral	part	of	Roosevelt’s	cautious	effort	to	sway	public	opinion	on	foreign	affairs	and	to	seek	a	role	in	averting	a	world	war.			
The	President	Prefers	Welles:	Personal	Dynamics	in	Roosevelt’s	Policymaking	
		 As	the	U.S.	edged	closer	to	war	Welles’	value	to	Roosevelt	for	technical	experience	and	as	a	diplomat	and	policymaker	increased.	However,	Welles’	growing																																																									50	Diary	Entry,	4	and	5	February	1939,	HL,	Jay	Pierrepont	Moffat	diplomatic	papers,	Moffat	Diary,	1939.	51	Diary	of	Hugh	Wilson,	16	April	1940,	Herbert	Hoover	Presidential	Library	(HPL),	Hugh	R.	Wilson	Papers,	Box:	4,	Folder:	Wilson,	Hugh	R.	–	Diary,	1940;	Adolf	Berle	remembered	the	details	differently.	According	to	him,	Welles’	idea	consisted	of	“an	international	police	force,	based	on	a	European	regional	line,	and	occurring	after	complete	disarmament.”	20	April	1940,	Berle	Diary,	FDRL,	Berle	Papers,	Box:	211.	See	also:	J.	Simon	Rofe,	“Pre-war	Post-war	Planning:	The	Phoney	War,	the	Roosevelt	Administration,	and	the	Case	of	the	Advisory	Committee	on	Problems	of	Foreign	Relations,”	
Diplomacy	&	Statecraft,	Vol.	23,	No.	2,	2012,	269.		
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significance	in	Roosevelt’s	plans	was	also	based	on	the	symbiotic	understanding	of	one	another’s	views	that	they	had	developed	over	the	preceding	decade.	The	closeness	of	their	relationship	shaped	Roosevelt’s	foreign	policymaking	–	both	its	development	and	its	implementation	–	in	the	lead	up	to	and	over	the	course	of	World	War	Two.	In	particular,	Welles’	representation	of	Roosevelt	on	extraordinary	foreign	missions	and	at	high	profile	diplomatic	negotiations	infused	the	course	of	those	events	with	the	dynamics	of	Welles’	and	Roosevelt’s	relationship	and	shaped	their	outcomes.	Furthermore,	the	conspicuity	of	Welles’	position	engendered	rivalries	among	his	colleagues,	planting	the	seed	for	future	conflicts	that	would	have	greater	significance	still.		The	first	and	foremost	example	of	this	dynamic	came	in	the	form	of	Welles’	peace	mission	to	Europe	in	February	and	March	1940.	Though	the	mission’s	objectives	varied	and	its	chance	of	success	was	murky	at	best,	one	factor	was	constant	to	the	mission	once	it	came	together:	the	presence	of	Sumner	Welles.52	Welles’	selection	by	Roosevelt	to	be	his	eyes	and	ears	automatically	instilled	the	mission	with	the	dynamics	of	their	personal	relationship,	shaping	what	the	mission	was	and	how	it	proceeded.	Prior	to	announcing	the	mission	Roosevelt	had	considered	a	number	of	potential	emissaries,	including	prominent	industrialist	Myron	C.	Taylor	and	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	Adolf	Berle	among	others,	before	deciding	to	send	Welles.53	Though	Roosevelt	left	no	specific	record	as	to	why	he	ultimately	chose	Welles,	the	decision	seems	to	have	been	taken	privately	between	the	two	men,	underlining	the	salience	of	their	collaboration	in	devising	the	mission	and	its	objectives.54	In	his	memoirs	Welles	cryptically	explained	how	“[f]or	various	reasons,	the	President	believed	that	I	was	the	most	available	person	within	the	
																																																								52	The	aims	and	objectives	of	the	Welles	Mission	have	been	meticulously	explored	in	Simon	Rofe’s	2007	book	Franklin	Roosevelt's	Foreign	Policy	and	the	Welles	Mission.	In	short,	Rofe	argued	the	Welles	Mission	had	an	overlapping	and	evolving	set	of	objectives	–	to	prolong	the	Phoney	War,	to	preserve	Italian	neutrality,	and	to	gather	firsthand	information	about	the	belligerents’	war	aims	–	and	that,	more	broadly,	"the	longer-term	motivations	for	the	mission	have	precedents	in	the	foreign	policy-making	practice	of	the	Roosevelt	Administration."	See:	Simon	Rofe,	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	Foreign	Policy	
and	the	Welles	Mission	(New	York:	Palgrave	MacMillan,	2007),	9,	5		53	Rofe,	The	Welles	Mission,	78.		54	Ibid.,	79.		
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government”	for	the	position.55	What	‘available’	meant	was	not	clear,	but	it	nonetheless	pointed	to	the	cloistered	way	the	decision	was	reached.	Cordell	Hull	concurred,	noting	parenthetically	in	his	memoirs	how	“[s]ome	time	later	the	President	expressly	stated	to	me	that	Welles	had	come	to	him	secretly	on	several	occasions	and	pleaded	to	be	sent	abroad	on	special	missions.”56	Relatedly,	shortly	after	announcing	Welles’	mission,	rumours	spread	that	Hull	“had	not	been	consulted”	about	Welles’	trip	and	that	he	was	“irate”	about	being	left	out.57	The	rumours	were	dismissed	by	those	in	the	know,	but	Adolf	Berle	wrote	in	his	diary	that	although	“[t]here	is	not	much	in	it	[the	rumours].	I	think	the	President	probably	decided	it	on	his	own	account,”	again	indicating	that	the	decision	was	taken	by	a	very	tight	circle	around	Roosevelt.58		The	sequestered	nature	of	the	decision	to	send	Welles	was	reinforced	once	the	mission	was	underway.	According	to	Adolf	Berle,	Welles	communicated	his	updates	to	the	President	in	a	cipher	to	which	Secretary	Hull	was	not	granted	access.59	Breckinridge	Long	echoed	this	sentiment,	noting	Roosevelt	“‘was	the	only	person	who	knew	why	Welles	had	been	sent	abroad	…	and	he	was	the	only	person	who	would	know	what	Welles	had	to	say,	unless	he	thought	it	advisable	that	other	persons	should	be	informed.’”60	Outsiders	picked	up	on	this	dynamic,	as	well,	in	the	form	of	“press	stories	about	Welles	having	a	more	intimate	contact	in	the	White	House	than	the	Secretary”	at	the	time	of	the	mission.61	However	much	Welles’	selection	as	Roosevelt’s	emissary	was	a	function	of	the	two	men’s	close	relationship,	the	fact	that	Welles	was	willing	to	participate	in	such	a	mission	at	all	reflected	the	level	of	trust	and	support	the	two	men	had	developed.	In	virtually	every	assessment	of	the	Welles	mission	at	the	time	and	afterwards,	the	likelihood	of	its	success	was	considered	to	be	slim	at	best.																																																									55	Welles,	The	Time	For	Decision,	74.		56	Hull,	Memoirs	Vol.	I,		737.		57	‘The	Washington	Merry-Go-Round’,	19	February	1940,	SWP,	Box:	262,	Folder:	2.	58	Berle	Diary,	13	February	1940,	FDRL,	Berle	Papers,	Box:	211,	Folder:	Diary	January	-	March	1940	59	Berle	Diary,	18	March	1940,	FDRL,	Berle	Papers,	Box:	211,	Folder:	Diary	January	-	March	1940	60	J.	Simon	Rofe,	“Pre-war	Post-war	Planning:	The	Phoney	War,	the	Roosevelt	Administration,	and	the	Case	of	the	Advisory	Committee	on	Problems	of	Foreign	Relations,”	Diplomacy	&	Statecraft,	Vol.	23,	No.	2,	2012,	258.		61	Berle	Diary,	5	March	1940	FDRL,	Berle	Papers,	Box:	211,	Folder:	Diary	January	-	March	1940	
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Ambassador	to	the	Court	of	St.	James	Joseph	Kennedy	believed	the	mission	had	a	“one	in	ten	thousand”	chance	to	succeed.62	According	to	Welles,	Roosevelt	gave	“one	in	a	thousand”	chance	for	being	able	to	effect	any	change	during	this	time.63	Ambassador	to	Germany	Hugh	Gibson	was	slightly	more	optimistic,	giving	it	“one	chance	in	twenty.”64	That	Roosevelt	felt	comfortable	sending	Welles	on	such	a	seemingly	futile	mission	(and	that	Welles	was	willing	to	accept	it)	spoke	to	the	depth	of	trust	between	the	two	men.	Formed	on	the	bedrock	of	their	decade-long	friendship	as	well	as	the	sympathy	and	each	had	of	the	other’s	strengths	and	weaknesses,	the	Welles	mission	demonstrated	the	strength	of	the	connection	between	Roosevelt	and	Welles	and	how	that	connection	could	make	an	impact	on	U.S.	foreign	policy.			Despite	the	odds,	the	fact	of	Welles’	participation	improved	the	chances	for	success	in	the	eyes	of	some	observers.	Hugh	Wilson	believed	whatever	possibility	of	success	the	mission	had	was	directly	due	to	Welles.	“Sumner	is	no	Dorothy	Thompson	in	temperament,”	Wilson	wrote	in	February	1940,	referencing	the	famous	journalist.65	“He	has	a	wise	head	and	a	cool	one	on	his	shoulders,”	Wilson	added,	praising	Welles	because	“he	can	keep	his	mouth	shut”	and	“he	won’t	commit	the	United	States	one	inch.”66	Tellingly,	Wilson	also	noted	that	given	the	long	odds,	the	only	real	object	of	the	mission	was	to	“satisfy	himself	and	the	President	that	there	is	nothing	that	can	be	done	usefully	at	the	present	moment.”67	Wilson’s	observation	explicitly	linked	Roosevelt’s	propensity	for	long-shot	diplomatic	gestures	and	the	integral	role	Welles	played	in	orchestrating	and	enacting	them	while	tacitly	acknowledging	that	the	dynamics	of	their	relationship	were	what	was	driving	the	mission’s	objectives.		
																																																								62	Rofe,	The	Welles	Mission	153,	n.91.	Quoting	Kennedy	Memoirs	PJL,	p.578	63	Welles,	The	Time	For	Decision,	73.	64	Wilson	Diary,	12	February	1940,	HPL,	Hugh	R.	Wilson	Papers,	Box:	4,	Folder:	Wilson,	Hugh	R.	-	Diary,	1940.	65	Ibid.	Dorothy	Thompson	was	known	as	‘the	first	lady	of	American	journalism’.	66	Ibid.	67	Wilson	Diary,	12	February	1940,	HPL,	Hugh	R.	Wilson	Papers,	Box:	4,	Folder:	Wilson,	Hugh	R.	-	Diary,	1940.	
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As	the	focus	shifted	from	planning	to	implementation	Roosevelt	and	Welles	used	the	dynamics	of	their	relationship	to	their	advantage	in	pursuing	the	mission’s	objectives.	In	letters	drafted	to	each	foreign	leader	Welles	visited,	Roosevelt	introduced	his	emissary	by	invoking	the	notoriety	of	Welles’	proximity	to	power	as	a	way	to	ingratiate	Welles	to	the	various	leaders.	“My	old	friend	Mr.	Sumner	Welles	…	will	give	you	this	when	he	has	the	privilege	of	being	received	by	you,”	Roosevelt	wrote	to	Benito	Mussolini	in	a	telegram	dated	14	February	1940.68	Roosevelt	informed	French	President	Albert	Le	Brun	Welles	was	his	“boyhood	friend;”	to	British	Prime	Minister	Neville	Chamberlain,	Welles	was	“an	old	boyhood	friend.”69	That	Roosevelt	felt	it	necessary	or	useful	to	refer	to	his	childhood	association	with	Welles,	which	was	in	some	ways	less	directly	relevant	to	their	political	partnership	than	their	later	collaborations,	demonstrated	the	salience	of	the	personal	dimension	in	Roosevelt	and	Welles’	policymaking	partnership	during	the	execution	of	the	Welles	mission.			 Perhaps	the	clearest	indication	of	how	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	close	collaboration	inflected	the	Welles	mission’s	diplomacy	was	in	the	criticism	Welles	incurred	from	his	colleagues.	Almost	immediately	after	learning	(via	the	press)	about	Welles’	trip,	Ambassador	to	France	William	“Bill”	Bullitt	excoriated	the	move.	Harold	Ickes	remembered	Bullitt	“did	not	relish	the	idea	of	Welles’s	going	over	and,	in	effect,	superseding	the	regularly	accredited	diplomatic	representatives;”	Joseph	Kennedy	seemed	to	feel	the	same	way.70	After	Welles	departed	Europe	in	April,	Bullitt	sent	a	personal	message	to	Roosevelt	lamenting	that	he	“hoped	the	repercussions	caused	here	by	Welles’	trip	would	have	died	down	completely	before	my	return.”71	Bullitt’s	jealousy	had	a	further	significance	beyond	what	it	revealed	about	the	provenance	of	the	Welles	mission.	Bullitt’s	anger	toward	Welles	over	the																																																									68	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	to	Signor	Mussolini,	Copy	of	Longhand	Letter,	14	February	1940,	FDRL,	Presidential	Secretary’s	File	(PSF),	Box	76,	Folder:	State:	Welles,	Sumner:	January	-	May	1940.	69	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	to	Chamberlain,	Copy	of	Longhand	Letter,	14	February	1940.	FDRL,	PSF,	Box	76,	Folder:	State:	Welles,	Sumner:	January	-	May	1940.	70	Harold	L.	Ickes,	The	Secret	Diary	of	Harold	L.	Ickes,	Vol.	III:	The	Lowering	Clouds,	1939-1941	(London:	Weidenfeld	and	Nicolson,	1955),	138;	Michael	R.	Beschloss,	Kennedy	and	Roosevelt:	The	
Uneasy	Alliance	(New	York:	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	1980),	204.		71	Bullitt	to	FDR,	18	April	1940,	PSF,	B-43,	quoted	in	Will	Brownell	and	Richard	N.	Billings,	So	Close	to	
Greatness:	A	Biography	of	William	C.	Bullitt	(New	York:	MacMillan	Publishing	Company,	1987),	248.		
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alleged	usurpation	of	his	ambassadorial	prerogatives	amplified	his	resentment	toward	Welles	left	over	from	the	battle	for	the	Undersecretaryship	with	R.	Walton	Moore	in	1937.	By	some	accounts,	Bullitt’s	intense	hatred	for	Welles	began	in	earnest	only	after	this	episode	in	1940.72	Bullitt’s	jealousy	was	as	much	a	reflection	of	his	personality	than	anything	else,	but	his	observation	reflected	the	increasingly	tightknit	quality	to	Roosevelt’s	policymaking	during	this	time,	and	Welles’	centrality	to	it.	 That	aspect	of	Roosevelt’s	policymaking	complemented	the	highly	personalized	nature	of	his	diplomacy	during	World	War	Two.	Throughout	his	presidency,	but	especially	after	the	start	of	World	War	Two,	Roosevelt	designated	close	aides	to	serve	as	his	special	emissary	abroad.	The	most	famous	of	these	was	Harry	Hopkins	who	made	a	foray	to	the	U.K.	for	an	extended	period	in	1941	to	confer	and	coordinate	with	the	British	government	about	the	United	States’	growing	effort	to	arm	and	supply	the	Allies,	chiefly	in	the	form	of	the	soon-to-be	passed	Lend-Lease	program.73	Though	this	had	much	to	do	with	Roosevelt’s	physical	limitations	and	the	hazards	of	wartime	travel,	the	selection	of	men	like	Welles	and	Hopkins	for	these	missions	was	a	clear	indication	of	membership	in	an	exclusive	circle	around	Roosevelt	where	many	of	the	most	important	decisions	were	taken.		However,	although	Welles	and	Hopkins	were	both	anointed	in	this	fashion,	they	fulfilled	very	different	objectives	for	Roosevelt;	their	respective	relationships	with	the	president	influenced	the	roles	they	the	played	and	the	kind	of	diplomacy	Roosevelt	assigned	them	to	practice.	Comparing	Hopkins’	mission	to	Britain	with	Welles’	mission	to	Europe	reveals	this	dynamic	and	provides	clues	as	to	the	nature	of	Welles’	particular	relationship	with	Roosevelt	and	the	role	he	played	in	Roosevelt’s	policymaking	priorities.		Welles’	and	Hopkins’	respective	sojourns	to	Europe	reflected	the	degree	to	which	they	filled	different	niches	in	Roosevelt’s	policymaking	ecology	and	his	personal	entourage.	Welles	and	Roosevelt	planned	the	former’s	trip	to	Europe	for																																																									72	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	245.		73	David	L.	Roll,	The	Hopkins	Touch:	Harry	Hopkins	and	the	Forging	of	the	Alliance	to	Defeat	Hitler	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	78-98.		
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several	weeks	before	he	departed,	going	through	several	drafts	of	the	announcement	to	the	press	and	deliberating	on	specific	objectives.74	Hopkins,	by	contrast,	was	not	informed	he	was	going	on	a	trip	until	after	Roosevelt	announced	it,	and	departed	two	days	later.75	Hopkins	was	given	no	formal	title	and	Roosevelt	specifically	denied	he	had	“any	special	mission;”	conversely,	Welles’	trip	was	specifically	designated	a	“special	mission.”76	Roosevelt’s	instructions	for	Hopkins,	as	he	related	them	to	the	press	during	a	press	conference,	were	“to	maintain	…	personal	relations	between	me	and	the	British	Government”	and	“to	say	‘How	do	you	do?’	to	a	lot	of	my	friends!”77	Conversely,	Welles	was	tasked	with	“advising	the	President	and	the	Secretary	of	State	as	to	present	conditions	in	Europe”	but	“to	make	no	proposals	or	commitments.”78		Yet	while	Welles	adhered	scrupulously	to	his	instructions,	Hopkins	evidently	felt	more	comfortable	pushing	the	envelope.	During	his	1941	stay	in	Britain	Hopkins	made	several	gestures	indicating	his	sympathies	and	preferences.	He	was	a	mini-celebrity	upon	his	arrival	and	made	warm	and	lasting	impressions	on	virtually	everyone	he	met.79	He	circulated	freely	with	members	of	the	British	government	and	civilians.80	In	a	stirring	show	of	support	for	British	resolve	Hopkins	quoted	from	the	Book	of	Ruth	to	assure	Winston	Churchill	of	Roosevelt’s	intention	to	provide	support.81	Welles,	by	contrast,	deliberately	kept	his	distance	with	foreign	leaders,	and	specifically	shunned	audiences	with	local	officials	who	had	not	been	authorized	to	speak	for	their	government.82	The	epithets	the	two	men	earned	reflected	this	dynamic,	too.	Impressed	with	his	ability	to	convey	information	in	an	efficient																																																									74	Memorandum	dated	9	February	1940,	FDRL,	PSF,	Box	76,	Folder:	State,	Welles,	Sumner	January	–	May	1940.		75	Robert	E.	Sherwood,	Roosevelt	and	Hopkins:	An	Intimate	History	(New	York:	Harper	&	Brothers,	1948)	231.			76	Sherwood,	Roosevelt	and	Hopkins,	231;	Report	by	the	Under	Secretary	(Welles)	on	His	Special	Mission	to	Europe,	26	February	1940,	U.S.	Department	of	State	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States	
(FRUS),	1940.	Vol.	1,	(Washington	D.C.,	GPO:	1959),	21.		77	Sherwood,	Roosevelt	and	Hopkins,	231.	78	The	Secretary	of	State	to	the	Chargé	in	France	(Murphy),	9	February	1940,	FRUS.	Vol.	1,	4.		79	Frank	Costigliola,	“Broken	Circle:	The	Isolation	of	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	in	World	War	II.”	
Diplomatic	History	Vol.	2,	No.	5,	November	2008,	697-8.		80	Ibid.		81	Roll,	The	Hopkins	Touch,	89.		82	Diary	Entry,	28	February,	HL,	Jay	Pierrepont	Moffat	diplomatic	papers,	Moffat	Diary,	1940.		
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manner	Winston	Churchill	dubbed	Hopkins	“Lord	Root	of	the	Matter,”	much	to	Hopkins	delight.83	Welles’,	by	contrast,	was	referred	to	by	frustrated	journalists	as	“’Sumner	the	Silent’,”	implying	precisely	the	opposite	of	an	ability	to	convey	information.84			Though	undoubtedly	the	objectives	of	the	respective	missions	were	different	because	they	came	at	different	points	in	the	war	and	in	Roosevelt’s	understanding	of	what	the	U.S.	could	or	should	do,	the	form	these	missions	took	was	a	direct	function	of	the	individual	Roosevelt	had	dispatched	to	perform	it.	Hopkins	was	the	proxy	for	the	charismatic	and	informal	interpersonal	dimension	of	Roosevelt’s	diplomacy,	while	Welles	was	the	proxy	for	the	cautious	and	calculating	side	of	Roosevelt’s	strategic	mind.	Hopkins’	mission	was	specifically	devised	to	help	advance	U.S.	national	security	interests	by	facilitating	the	arming	of	the	British,	whereas	Welles’	was	clearly	more	about	feeling	out	U.S.	diplomatic	strategy	amid	the	onset	of	war.	That	Welles	occupied	such	a	niche	was	a	clear	indication	of	a	close	relationship	with	the	president,	but	it	also	pointed	to	the	symbiotic	quality	of	their	collaboration	and	how	that	symbiosis	shaped	U.S.	policymaking	during	these	crucial	years.	Welles’	channelling	of	Roosevelt’s	desire	to	act	while	still	keeping	his	options	open	produced	an	idiosyncratic	eponymous	long	shot	peace	mission	with	multifaceted	aims	and	goals,	concocted	by	the	two	men	in	private	and	that	drew	directly	on	their	long	relationship	to	facilitate	its	launch.	As	with	Hopkins	serving	as	Roosevelt’s	inimitable	hail-fellow-well-met	avatar	in	London,	the	Welles	mission	could	only	have	happened	the	way	it	did	because	of	the	unique	relationship	shared	by	the	president	and	the	man	assigned	to	carry	out	the	mission.			
Cooperative	Competition:	Welles’	Postwar	Planning	and	the	British			 As	U.S.	involvement	in	World	War	Two	grew	the	niche	Welles	occupied	in	Roosevelt’s	policymaking	circle	assumed	greater	significance.	Starting	as	early	as	1939	Welles	began	drafting	political	objectives,	sketching	out	settlements	and																																																									83	Sherwood,	Roosevelt	and	Hopkins,	607.	84	Rofe,	The	Welles	Mission,	114.	
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designing	diplomatic	architecture	for	the	postwar	world.85	In	drawing	up	these	plans	Welles	drew	upon	his	now	considerable	experience	in	constructing	diplomatic	machinery	to	facilitate	multilateral	cooperation	under	the	aegis	of	U.S.	leadership.	Welles’	influence	on	these	plans	(while	he	was	in	office	to	enact	them)	was	considerable	and	as	a	consequence	they	reflected	his	longstanding	philosophical	and	ideological	views	about	American	power	and	its	place	in	the	world.	As	in	Latin	America	during	the	1920s	and	1930s,	Welles	brought	to	his	policymaking	in	the	1940s	a	distinct	blend	of	paternalistic	idealism,	with	significant	consequences	for	U.S.	diplomacy.			 The	first	main	event	in	Welles’	efforts	at	global	planning	came	in	August	1941	when	he	was	invited	to	accompany	Roosevelt	to	a	secret	meeting	with	Churchill	at	Placentia	Bay,	Newfoundland.	Here	Welles’	desire	for	a	beneficent	American	hegemony	manifested	itself	in	a	form	that	recalled	his	diplomatic	experiences	in	Argentina	twenty	years	earlier,	namely	in	confronting	the	British.	Anglo-American	relations	during	the	war	have	been	described	as	a	process	of	“competitive	cooperation.”86	The	process	of	creating	the	Atlantic	Charter,	and	the	postwar	global	institutions	that	grew	out	of	it,	has	similarly	been	described	as	“an	attempt	to	internationalize	an	Anglo-American	vision	of	using	institutions	to	entrench	and	extend	order,	prosperity,	and	legitimacy.”87	Perhaps	no	one	embodied	these	portrayals	better	than	Welles.	Although	he	was	dedicated	to	supporting	Britain	and	resisting	the	Nazis	by	all	available	means,	Welles	was	inclined	to	view	cooperation	with	the	British	with	a	jaundiced	eye.	Welles	“shared	little	of	the	president’s	ease	with	the	nation’s	ally”	and	“remained	consistently	impervious	to	Churchill’s	charms,”	wrote	one	historian.88	Beyond	personal	incompatibility,	Welles	saw	Britain	as	a	competitor	to	American	postwar	hegemony:	“Welles’s	vision	of	an	American-led	
																																																								85	Christopher	D.	O’Sullivan,	Sumner	Welles:	Postwar	Planning	and	the	Quest	for	a	New	World	Order	
1937-1943.	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2009),	33.	86	See:	David	Reynolds,	The	Creation	of	the	Anglo-American	Alliance,	1937-1941:	a	Study	in	Competitive	
Cooperation	(New	York:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1981).		87	Elizabeth	Borgwardt,	A	New	Deal	for	the	World:	America’s	Vision	for	Human	Rights	(London:	Harvard	University	Press,	2005),	5.		88	O’Sullivan,	Postwar	Planning,	105.		
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new	world	order	depended	upon	the	steady	diminution	of	Great	Britain	as	a	world	power.”89			 Unsurprisingly,	then,	when	the	conference	began	on	8	August,	and	Welles	was	assigned	by	Roosevelt	to	confer	with	Undersecretary	for	Foreign	Affairs	Alexander	Cadogan	over	a	draft	statement	that	would	encapsulate	the	joint	aims	of	the	British	and	U.S.,	Welles	persistently	challenged	British	policies	and	prerogatives.	After	amicably	discussing	strategic	matters	over	which	there	was	no	disagreement	–	the	status	of	Brazil	and	Portugal,	avoiding	a	war	in	the	Pacific	with	the	Japanese	–	Welles	prodded	Cadogan	over	the	seeming	incongruity	between	the	attitude	of	the	Ministry	of	Economic	Warfare	and	Cadogan	himself	over	U.S.	policy	toward	contingency	plans	regarding	Vichy-occupied	French	West	Africa.	Welles	decried	the	“carping	criticism”	of	the	British	government	and	press	and	asked	Cadogan	to	explain	his	government’s	position.90	Despite	Cadogan’s	assurances	that	the	British	response	was	motivated	by	a	desire	not	to	offend	the	French,	Welles	complained,	“the	British	Government	could	at	least	avoid	the	appearance	of	British	official	criticism.”91		 Later	in	the	same	meeting	Welles	persisted	in	confronting	Cadogan	with	prickly	matters.	He	reminded	Cadogan	that	a	letter	sent	by	Roosevelt	to	Churchill	six	weeks	earlier	asking,	among	other	things,	for	assurances	that	the	British	would	“make	no	secret	commitments,”	had	not	yet	been	answered.92	Without	skipping	a	beat,	Welles	then	shifted	to	a	discussion	of	“the	terms	of	the	Lend-Lease	Act.”93	Somewhat	disingenuously	promising	“there	was	no	need	…	to	undertake	a	dissertation”	on	the	matter,	Welles	used	the	occasion	to	launch	into	a	detailed	outline	of	the	economic	order	he	envisioned	for	the	postwar	world.94	Commencing	a	line	of	thought	that	he	would	press	ever	more	forcefully	for	the	rest	of	the	conference	and	his	career,	Welles	insisted	that	the	postwar	world	must	include	“the																																																									89	O’Sullivan,	Postwar	Planning,	107.		90	Memorandum	of	Conversation	with	Sir	Alexander	Cadogan	and	The	Under	Secretary,	9	August	1941,	FDRL,	SWP,	Box:	151,	Folder:	8.		91	Ibid.		92	Ibid.	93	Ibid.	94	Ibid.		
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freest	possible	economic	interchange	without	discrimination,	without	exchange	controls,	without	economic	preference	utilized	for	political	purposes	and	without	all	of	the	manifold	economic	barriers”	that	he	saw	as	being	the	main	cause	of	the	war.95	He	insisted	the	U.S.	and	Britain	could	not	“possibly	undertake	divergent	policies”	on	these	matters,	before	cannily	concluding	by	bringing	up	the	sensitive	matter	of	British	debt	to	the	U.S.	over	the	preceding	decades	and	the	improved	policy	now	in	place	because	of	Lend-Lease.96		Welles’	treatise	on	free	trade	explicitly	criticizing	British	economy	policy	encapsulated	his	beliefs	in	the	efficacy	of	liberal	trade	policy	and	its	alleged	benefits.	It	was	also	a	shrewd	negotiating	tactic.	By	linking	trade	policy	with	Lend-Lease	and	preceding	it	with	discussion	of	the	much	criticized	secret	agreements	of	the	British	after	World	War	One,	Welles	pressed	the	strategic	advantage	of	the	U.S.	at	these	negotiations	in	order	to	undermine	Cadogan	and	Churchill’s	ability	to	preserve	British	economic	dominance.	Although	Cadogan	admitted	during	the	meeting	that	he	personally	disagreed	with	the	imperial	preference	system	set	up	by	the	1931	Ottawa	Agreements,	his	discomfiture	with	Welles’	line	of	attack	was	evident.	Commenting	later,	Cadogan	said	of	Welles	it	was	a	“pity	that	he	swallowed	a	ramrod	in	his	youth.”97		 Welles’	effort	to	pinion	the	British	reached	a	climax	on	the	final	day	of	the	conference.	Having	agreed	to	release	a	joint	declaration	of	aims	and	mutual	support,	later	dubbed	the	Atlantic	Charter,	Welles,	Roosevelt,	and	the	rest	of	the	U.S.	delegation	tussled	with	Churchill	and	his	staff	over	the	precise	wording	of	the	various	clauses.	Welles’	initial	draft	of	the	fourth	clause	of	the	Charter	specifically	called	on	the	U.S.	and	Britain	to	seek	“the	elimination	of	any	discriminations”	on	imports	as	well	as	to	grand	“access	on	equal	terms”	to	raw	materials.98	When	this	language	proved	unacceptable	to	the	British,	Roosevelt	instructed	Welles	to	amend	it	to	focus	only	on	raw	materials	and	to	excise	the	portion	about	eliminating	trade																																																									95	Memorandum	of	Conversation	with	Sir	Alexander	Cadogan	and	The	Under	Secretary,	9	August	1941,	FDRL,	SWP,	Box:	151,	Folder:	8.	96	Ibid.		97	David	Dilks,	ed.	The	Diaries	of	Sir	Alexander	Cadogan	O.M	1938-1945	(London:	Cassell,	1971),	399.	98	Handwritten	note	and	attached	draft,	Roosevelt	to	Welles,	11	August	1941,	FDRL,	SWP,	Box:	151,	Folder:	8.	
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discrimination.99	When	Welles’	amendments	still	proved	too	much	an	assault	on	the	Ottawa	Agreements,	which	Welles	admitted	the	clause	was	intended	to	do,	Churchill	litigiously	invoked	the	need	to	consult	the	Dominions	over	any	such	commitment	to	alter	trade	relations,	a	manoeuvre	that	would	take	days	to	do	and	would	likely	scupper	any	agreement.	Seeking	to	avoid	such	a	catastrophic	outcome,	Harry	Hopkins	suggested	a	further	redrafting	of	the	offending	clause.	Now	Welles	took	a	stand.	“[F]urther	modification	of	that	article,”	Welles	declared,	“would	destroy	completely	any	value	in	that	portion	of	the	proposed	declaration.”100	“[I]t	was	a	question	of	vital	principle”	and	that	if	they	could	not	agree	to	address	“one	of	the	greatest	factors	in	creating	the	present	tragic	situation	in	the	world”	then	“they	might	as	well	throw	in	the	sponge.”101		Such	dramatic	proclamations	were	unusual	for	Welles,	particularly	in	diplomatic	negotiations	where	he	cultivated	a	reputation	for	coolness.	It	was	a	sign	of	Welles’	depth	of	commitment	to	free	trade,	to	be	sure,	as	well	as	his	tacit	understanding	of	the	high	stakes	of	what	he,	Roosevelt,	Churchill,	and	the	rest	of	those	assembled	were	doing;	Eliot	Roosevelt,	the	president’s	son,	who	was	in	attendance	at	the	conference,	wrote	later	that	“Welles	was	the	man	who	worked	hardest	on	the	Charter	…	[i]t	was	his	baby.”102	But	the	roots	of	Welles’	uncharacteristically	passionate	denunciation	of	the	British	lay	in	his	longstanding	conviction	pertaining	to	the	beneficence	of	U.S.-style	economic	hegemony	and	the	link	between	that	objective	and	the	larger	process	of	postwar	planning	he	was	undertaking	at	the	time.	Undermining	the	British	imperial	preference	system	was	a	necessary	prerequisite	to	the	U.S.	displacing	Britain	as	the	preeminent	global	power,	and	a	stepping-stone	to	the	wider	transformation	of	global	politics	Welles	sought.	For	Welles,	a	tariff-free	world	was	not	merely	an	economic	doctrine.	It	was	entwined	with	his	belief	in	the	efficacy	and	beneficence	of	American	power	and	the																																																									99	Memorandum	of	Conversation	with	Sir	Alexander	Cadogan	and	The	Under	Secretary,	11	August	1941,	FDRL,	SWP,	Box:	151,	Folder:	8.	100	Memorandum	of	Conversation	with	The	President,	the	British	Prime	Minister,	Sir	Alexander	Cadogan,	Harry	Hopkins,	The	Under	Secretary	of	State,	11	August	1941,	FDRL,	SWP,	Box:	151,	Folder:	8.	101	Ibid.	102	Elliott	Roosevelt,	As	He	Saw	It	(New	York:	Duell,	Sloan	and	Pearce,	1946),	39.		
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necessity	of	displacing	competing	systems,	like	the	British	imperial	preference	system,	in	order	to	establish	its	hegemony.	Welles	all	but	acknowledged	this	in	his	subsequent	analysis	and	reflections	on	the	Argentia	conference.	In	an	address	to	the	National	Foreign	Trade	Convention	two	months	after	the	conference	closed,	and	later	reprinted	in	Welles’	1943	book	
The	World	of	the	Four	Freedoms,	Welles	specifically	addressed	the	fourth	clause	of	the	charter.103	Despite	assuring	his	listeners	that	the	clause	“requires	no	interpretation”	Welles	proceeded	to	interpret	its	“meaning	and	significance”	for	the	audience.104	“The	basic	conception,”	Welles	explained,	was	to	make	“restrictive	and	unconscionable	tariffs,	preferences,	and	discriminations	…	things	of	the	past.”105	Trade	would	no	longer	be	“throttled	by	…	bilateral	practices.”106	Furthermore,	Welles	conceded	this	desire	“to	promote	the	economic	prosperity	of	all	nations	…	is	a	purpose	which	does	not	have	its	origin	primarily	in	altruistic	conceptions”	but	rather	an	acknowledgement	that	“no	nation	can	prosper	by	itself	or	at	the	expense	of	others	and	that	no	nation	can	live	unto	itself	alone.”107	The	following	year	Welles	elaborated	further,	noting	about	that	same	clause	“[t]he	access	to	raw	materials	of	which	the	Charter	speaks	is	access	for	the	purposes	of	peace	…	Access	means	the	right	to	buy	in	peaceful	trade,	and	it	exists	whenever	that	right	is	effective	and	secure.”108	In	later	years	Welles	would	continue	to	criticize	the	maintenance	of	British	imperial	preference	as	a	“regional	…	national,	segregation”	and	contend	that	its	continuation	meant	“there	will	be	no	hope	for	the	…	liberal	and	non-discriminatory	trade	policies	which	are	the	only	foundation	upon	which	a	healthy	and	expanding	international	trade	can	be	built.”109		
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Without	directly	naming	them,	Welles’	‘interpretation’	of	clause	four	of	the	Atlantic	Charter	lumped	together	the	imperial	and	autarkic	economic	systems	of	the	prewar	world,	implicitly	casting	them	in	opposition	to	the	multilateral,	open	trading	world	led	by	the	U.S.	that	he	envisioned.	Thus,	his	confrontations	with	the	British	were	not	the	product	of	a	hard-nosed	realist	seeking	to	expand	his	country’s	power	at	all	costs;	Welles’	idealism	and	belief	in	the	righteousness	of	American	leadership	were	genuine.	Nor	was	Welles	motivated	purely	by	a	belief	in	bringing	about	a	postwar	Wilsoninan	utopia;	Welles	had	clear	priorities	about	who	should	lead	the	world	and	with	what	values.	Welles’	conviction	that	he	knew	what	was	best	for	the	world,	and	that	what	was	best	for	the	U.S.	was	best	for	everyone,	underlay	the	complex	machinations	of	his	postwar	planning.			
Paternalistic	Regionalism:	Welles’	Postwar	Planning		Free	trade	and	antagonizing	the	British	was	the	beginning,	not	the	end,	of	Welles’	paternalistic	vision	for	the	postwar	world.	Until	his	resignation	in	1943	Welles	devoted	considerable	time	and	energy	to	deliberations	about	postwar	planning,	particularly	the	creation	of	a	new	world	organization.	Here,	too,	Welles	infused	discussions	with	his	particular	worldview,	drawing	directly	on	his	paternalistic	policymaking	in	Latin	America	over	the	preceding	decades	for	inspiration.	Specifically,	Welles’	postwar	planning	was	characterized	by	an	emphasis	on	regionalized	systems	of	international	diplomacy.	As	in	Latin	America,	Welles’	attempt	to	group	smaller	countries	into	semi-federated	regional	systems	was	directly	tied	to	his	twin	beliefs	in	the	nobility	of	U.S.	leadership	and	the	maintenance	of	its	power.		The	locus	of	Welles’	policymaking	was	his	position	on	the	Advisory	Committee	on	Postwar	Foreign	Policy	in	the	State	Department.	As	the	vice-chairman	of	the	overall	committee,	as	well	as	the	chairman	of	its	sub-committee	on	Political	Problems,	Welles	was	in	a	commanding	position	to	influence	discussion	and	
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promulgate	his	views.110	Among	the	many	suggestions	entertained	during	these	meetings	was	Welles’	vision	for	a	postwar	world	organization	based	on	the	establishment	of	several	regional	sub-groups	that	would	coordinate	the	day-to-day	operations	of	the	world	organization	in	those	areas	as	well	as	serving	as	a	mouthpiece	and	arbiter	for	the	sub-region’s	individual	nations	in	international	disputes	or	affairs.111	As	Welles	explained	it,	the	regional	structure	would	ensure	that	local	disputes	were	dealt	with	by	interested	parties,	rather	than	meddlesome	outside	powers.112	It	would	also	have	the	benefit	of	being	able	to	draw	on	local	expertise	and	awareness	of	the	idiosyncrasies	of	a	given	region,	thus	avoiding	inadvertent	cultural	clashing.113		Yet,	despite	Welles’	ostensibly	pragmatic	and	altruistic	portrayal,	the	regionalized	structure	he	envisioned	reflected	the	same	paternalistic	idealism	he	had	advocated	in	Latin	America	for	nearly	two	decades.		These	parallels	were	clearest,	unsurprisingly,	when	he	discussed	plans	for	the	Latin	American	sub-region	itself.	In	a	speech	delivered	on	Armistice	Day	1942	Welles	made	explicit	the	link	between	the	structures,	and	more	importantly	the	values,	of	the	inter-American	system	and	the	global	reordering	he	was	undertaking.	In	the	speech	he	praised	the	inter-American	system	as	“the	only	example	in	the	world	today	of	a	regional	federation	of	free	and	independent	peoples,”	that	was	“[b]ased	…	on	sovereign	equality,	on	liberty,	on	peace,	and	on	joint	resistance	to	aggression.”	This	system,	Welles	believed,	“lightens	the	darkness	of	our	anarchic	world”	and	“should	constitute	a	cornerstone	in	the	world	structure	of	the	future.”114	The	peace	being	sought,	Welles	continued,	“must	assure	the	sovereign	equality	of	peoples	throughout	the	world	as	well	as	in	the	world	of	the	Americas.”115	By	invoking	‘sovereign	equality’	as	a	unifying	theme,	one	that	he	had	been	advocating	in	his	
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dealings	with	Latin	America	since	the	1920s,	Welles	aligned	the	goals	of	postwar	peace	with	the	values	of	the	inter-American	system.		However,	as	with	his	Good	Neighbor	diplomacy	the	‘sovereign	equality’	of	which	Welles	spoke	was	less	a	tool	for	empowering	the	peoples	of	the	world	than	a	procedural	straightjacket	to	restrain	countries	from	acting	too	independently.	The	manifestation	of	this	approach	was	sometimes	counterintuitive.	Speaking	to	an	audience	at	the	New	School	for	Social	Research	in	1944,	Welles	dismissed	the	idea	of	the	U.S.	taking	“retaliatory	action”	against	various	unnamed	South	American	countries	(almost	certainly	Argentina	and	Chile)	for	“not	whole-heartedly	cooperating	in	the	common	effort	of	the	United	Nations	to	defeat	the	Axis	powers.”116	Though	such	action	would	be,	Welles	said,	“by	no	means	difficult”	he	insisted	it	would	be	foolhardy,	not	least	because	“foreign	imposition”	and	“interference”	would	inevitably	produce	negative	results.117	Furthermore,	because	“the	inter-American	system	as	it	was	conceived	…	[was]	based	upon	the	full	equality	of	sovereignty	of	each	member	of	the	American	fraternity”	it	“precluded	the	assumption	of	the	right	on	the	part	of	any	American	nation,	or	of	any	group	of	American	nations,	because	of	superior	strength	or	power,	to	influence	or	determine	the	foreign	or	domestic	policy	of	any	other	American	nation.”118	On	the	surface	it	would	seem	that	Welles	was	advocating	a	radical	form	of	non-intervention,	denying	any	possibility	of	the	U.S.	to	take	action	against	a	recalcitrant	fellow	American	republic.	However,	Welles’	prescription	for	the	correct	course	of	action	revealed	that	was	not	the	case.	He	called	for	a	“kind	of	leadership	…	which	will	further	the	permanent	consecration	of	those	tried	principles	of	international	democracy	upon	which	the	inter-American	system	was	originally	founded”	to	rectify	the	reticence	of	the	uncooperative	countries	in	question.	“[O]nly	by	the	common	determination	of	the	peoples	of	all	of	the	Americas,”	Welles	insisted,	“can	the	way	be	prepared	to	make	effective	the	tremendous	contribution	which	the	New	World	can	offer	toward	the	creation	of	an	order	throughout	the	earth	capable																																																									116	“The	Inter-American	System,”	FDRL,	SWP,	Box:	196,	Folder:	8.		117	Ibid.		118	Ibid.		
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of	bringing	lasting	peace.”119	Rejecting	outright	coercion,	Welles	envisioned	a	strategy	in	which	the	diplomatic	machinery	of	a	regional	system	would	stymie	uncooperative	powers	through	suffocating	multilateralism	and	smothering	idealism,	with	the	unspoken,	but	unavoidable,	assumption	that	this	would	occur	under	the	watchful	eye	of	the	more	powerful	nations,	particularly	the	U.S.	The	regional	system	Welles	envisioned	would	serve	as	the	conduit	for	the	expansion	of	American	power	in	the	postwar	world.	In	the	same	speech	quoted	above	“[t]hat	basic	principle	[of	regional	cooperation	and	collective	action]	to	me	is	equally	applicable	to	any	regional	system	which	may	be	created.”120	Accordingly,	his	plans	were	replicated	in	discussions	of	similar	schemes	elsewhere	in	the	world.	In	Europe,	Welles	envisioned	a	sub-regional	organization	comprising	the	nations	of	Eastern	Europe	(Poland,	the	Baltic	States,	Czechoslovakia)	and	the	Danube	River	basin	(Yugoslavia,	Austria,	Hungary,	Romania,	Bulgaria).121	Welles	foresaw	the	need	for	no	fewer	than	four	sub-regional	groups	in	Africa	and	the	possibility	of	two	overlapping	clusters	in	the	Middle	East	and	the	Levant.122	In	all	these	cases,	the	regional	subgroups	were	to	be	self-policing	as	much	as	possible,	“agree[ing]	upon	the	manner	in	which	they	will	make	force	available,	should	it	be	required	to	prevent	the	outbreak	of	war	within	that	area.”123	Exactly	how	this	would	happen	Welles	did	not	explain,	but	his	forecast	for	how	events	would	transpire	in	extraordinary	situations	indicated	his	assumption	that	these	regional	systems	would	operate	within	the	bounds	of	what	the	U.S.	found	to	be	acceptable	behaviour.	Though	regional	sub-groups	were	to	decide	on	how	and	when	to	apply	force,	Welles	left	open	the	possibility	that	the	U.S.	would	have	to	get	involved	when	matters	escalated.	He	specifically	envisioned	the	possibility	that	the	armed	forces	of	the	U.S.	could	be	employed	outside	the	Western	Hemisphere	“when	regional	machinery	to	enforce	peace	broke	down,	or	when	such	action	by	this	government	was	necessary	to	prevent	the	outbreak	of	major	wars	which	threatened	the	maintenance	of	world																																																									119	“The	Inter-American	System,”	FDRL,	SWP,	Box:	196,	Folder:	8.	120	Ibid.		121	O’Sullivan,	Postwar	Planning,	203.		122	Ibid.,	161,	156.			123	Welles,	The	Time	For	Decision,	382.		
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peace	and	consequently	the	security	of	this	country.”124	Thus,	Welles’	regional	system	for	world	government	was	never	as	deferential	to	local	conditions	or	smaller	countries	as	he	let	on.	For	Welles,	the	watchful	eye	of	the	U.S.	would	always	be	upon	the	smaller	nations	of	the	world	to	ensure	they	acted	in	accordance	with	their	own,	and	the	United	States’,	best	interests.	Troublingly,	Welles’	paternalistic	regionalization	incorporated	another	aspect	of	his	policymaking	in	Latin	America	from	earlier	in	his	career:	his	racial	prejudices.	In	his	plans	for	what	to	do	with	the	soon-to-be-former	colonies	of	the	British,	French,	Spanish,	and	Portuguese	in	Africa	and	South	America,	Welles	invoked	a	racial	hierarchy	to	justify	continued	lordship	by	a	U.N.O.	designated	body.	For	sub-Saharan	Africa,	Welles	recommended	a	slow	path	to	independence	due	to	underdevelopment	and	the	fact	that	“the	Negroes	are	in	the	lowest	rank	of	human	beings.”125	Similarly,	in	discussions	about	Latin	America	Welles	observed	“the	colored	races	in	the	Guianas	were	as	unfit	for	self-government	as	anywhere	in	the	Western	Hemisphere.”126	Such	attitudes	were	not	uncommon	in	the	State	Department	or	the	U.S.	generally	at	the	time,	but	Welles’	comfort	with	utilizing	them	to	justify	policy	decisions	belied	his	ostensibly	magnanimous	intentions	for	the	postwar	world	and	betrayed	a	vision	for	the	postwar	world	order	that	was	clearly	not	wholly	based	on	‘sovereign	equality’.		Yet,	despite	the	stereotyping	of	the	inhabitants	of	certain	parts	of	the	world,	Welles’	postwar	planning	was	preponderantly	progressive	and	humanistic.	Infused	in	Welles’	seemingly	dry	vision	for	a	regionalized	constitutional	postwar	world	order	was	a	passionate	idealism	rooted	in	the	same	instincts	he	had	applied	in	Latin	America.	For	instance,	Welles	envisioned	a	postwar	system	that	addressed	not	just	the	issues	of	peace	and	war	between	nations,	but	also	matters	of	economic,	commercial,	and	cultural	exchange.	In	speeches	Welles	delivered	between	1941	and	1943,	he	outlined	some	of	the	proposals	he	envisioned	a	postwar	organization	might	take.	Echoing	his	opening	address	at	the	Buenos	Aires	Conference	in	1936,	Welles																																																									124	Welles,	The	Time	For	Decision,	380.			125	O’Sullivan,	Postwar	Planning,	161.		126	Ibid.,	162.		
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called	for	“the	United	Nations	…	to	set	up	machinery	for	the	purpose	of	assembling	and	studying	all	international	aspects	of	problems	under	the	general	heading	of	freedom	from	want,”	a	study	that,	he	predicted,	would	address	“the	controversies	and	conflicts	of	policy	which	have	so	long	embittered	relations	in	the	international	economic	field,	and	therefore	generally,	might	largely	disappear.”127	He	saw	these	plans	as	a	direct	response	to	the	“autarchic	commercial	and	financial	policies”	of	the	prewar	period	that	had	been	so	destructive,	particularly	for	the	countries	in	Latin	America	tied	to	the	Axis.128			
Conclusion:			 Welles	was	instrumental	in	guiding	U.S.	diplomatic	affairs	through	the	crucible	of	war.	His	involvement	in	wartime	policy	was	evident	at	all	levels,	from	policymaking,	to	negotiation	with	foreign	representatives,	to	public	relations.	Similarly,	the	prevalence	of	his	idiosyncratic	worldview	and	diplomatic	style	–	the	paternalistic	idealism,	aversion	to	militarism,	and	close	relationship	with	FDR	that	could	be	traced	back	all	the	way	to	his	formative	years	–	was	inescapable.		The	Armistice	Day	conference	carried	all	the	hallmarks	of	Welles’	diplomatic	praxis.	It	was	an	idealistic	attempt	to	appeal	to	the	better	angels	of	the	rest	of	the	world’s	nature.	It	was	almost	entirely	the	product	of	Welles	and	Roosevelt’s	collaboration.	But	most	importantly,	it	reflected	Welles’	instinct	to	subordinate	military	concerns	to	diplomatic	ones	when	crafting	foreign	policy.	While	the	specific	details	and	conceptual	foundation	of	the	Armistice	Day	conference	corresponded	to	a	great	degree	with	Welles’	own	experience	they	also	fit	into	the	broader	context	of	Roosevelt’s	thinking	about	foreign	policy	at	the	time.	Welles	articulated	a	vision	for	U.S.	foreign	policy	under	Roosevelt	that	elided	the	constraints	placed	by	domestic	public	opinion	and	a	darkening	international	horizon.	The	abortive	plans	had	drawn	Welles	closer	to	Roosevelt	in	the	latter’s	efforts	to	devise	a	global	strategy	for	peace																																																									127	‘Address	of	the	Honorable	Sumner	Welles,	Under	Secretary	of	State,	at	the	Convocation	of	the	University	of	Toronto’,	26	February	1943,	FDRL,	SWP,	Box:	196,	Folder:	1.		128	‘Address	of	the	Honorable	Sumner	Welles,	Under	Secretary	of	State,	at	the	Commencement	Exercises	of	the	North	Carolina	College	for	Negroes’,	31	May	1943,	FDRL,	SWP,	Box:	195,	Folder:	9.		
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that	could	thread	the	needle	of	public	opinion.	In	this	manner,	Welles’	anti-militarism	contributed	to	Roosevelt’s	characteristic	caution	and	prevarication	in	the	execution	of	U.S.	foreign	policy.		Welles’	increasing	prominence	in	Roosevelt’s	peace	efforts	would	become	more	apparent	as	the	crisis	in	Europe	exploded	into	war.	In	his	extraordinary	mission	to	Europe	Welles	demonstrated	the	salience	of	his	relationship	to	Roosevelt	as	both	a	generative	and	a	formative	influence	on	U.S.	foreign	policy.	The	Welles	mission	in	its	inception	was	a	product	of	the	close	collaboration	between	Roosevelt	and	Welles,	which	was	itself	only	possible	due	to	the	deep	well	of	trust	and	accord	the	two	men	had	developed	over	the	previous	two	decades.	Moreover,	the	relationship	they	shared	influenced	how	the	mission	unfolded,	infusing	Welles’	reception	with	a	personal	dimension.	It	also	laid	bare	the	unique	position	in	Roosevelt’s	firmament	to	which	Welles	had	risen	by	1940.	Possessing	Roosevelt’s	confidence	and	trust,	Welles	now	served	as	Roosevelt’s	proxy	and	confidant	on	diplomatic	matters.	In	contrast	to	Harry	Hopkins,	who	was	also	close	to	the	president,	Welles	provided	Roosevelt’s	haphazard	plans	with	an	air	of	consistency	and	gravitas;	he	filled	a	niche	that	Roosevelt	required	to	plan	and	enact	his	efforts	to	get	the	U.S.	through	World	War	Two.		Welles’	value	as	a	high-level	strategic	visionary	was	visible	in	his	efforts	at	postwar	planning,	beginning	with	the	Argentia	conference.	Even	before	the	U.S.	became	involved	in	fighting	Welles	set	his	mind	to	crafting	a	postwar	world	order	based	in	part	around	his	priorities.	A	fervent	believer	in	the	righteousness	of	U.S.	leadership,	Welles	sought	to	remake	the	world	in	which	the	global	economic	and	political	order	reflected	his	interpretation	of	American	interests	and	values.	His	desire	to	seek	U.S.	economic	hegemony	brought	him	into	conflict	with	the	British	at	Placentia	Bay	insofar	as	the	British	imperial	preference	system	did	not	fit	in	his	idealistic	postwar	vision.	Conversely,	Welles’	belief	in	the	beneficence	of	U.S.	leadership	led	him	to	fashion	plans	for	a	postwar	political	order	that	echoed	his	paternalistic	efforts	to	seek	U.S.	dominance	in	Latin	America.	In	both	cases,	Welles’	unique	style	of	paternalistic	idealism	infused	his	policymaking	and	guided	U.S.	postwar	planning,	giving	it	a	more	multilateral	and	less	confrontational	tenor.		
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As	a	result	of	his	position,	Welles’	idiosyncratic	perspectives	became	ingrained	into	the	overall	policies	pursued	by	the	United	States,	guiding	these	policies	as	he	went	along.	Ranging	from	a	latent	sense	of	Anglophobia	left	over	from	the	earliest	days	of	his	career	to	his	paternalistically	idealistic	vision	of	a	postwar	world,	Welles’	beliefs	shaped	the	approach	of	the	United	States	to	its	wartime	alliance	relations,	and	ultimately	the	way	in	which	the	United	States	approached	the	conduct	of	the	war	itself.	However,	because	Welles’	views	were	so	idiosyncratic,	they	were	conditional	on	his	continued	presence	in	the	State	Department.	When	he	was	Undersecretary	and	close	to	Roosevelt	Welles	exerted	a	gravitational	pull	on	policy,	a	fact	that	made	his	removal	in	1943	all	the	more	significant.				
		 197	
Chapter	Six:	
	Queer	in	Everything	He	Did:	Welles’	Sexuality	and	Resignation,	1943	
	 One	of	the	most	striking	features	of	Sumner	Welles’	resignation	in	August	1943	was	the	number	of	reasons	given	for	it.	Among	State	Department	officials,	reporters,	Washington	socialites,	and	other	onlookers,	a	multitude	of	explanations	were	provided	for	the	sudden	departure	of	the	State	Department’s	most	prominent	employee.	The	Miami	Herald	noted	the	State	Department	had	been	“immobilized	because	of	the	cleavage	between	Hull	and	Welles”,	which	the	latter’s	resignation	would	end.1	Muckraking	journalist	Drew	Pearson	contended	that	it	was	an	ideological	purge	by	“the	conservative	or	Southern	wing	of	the	Democratic	Party”	of	“the	most	important	and	liberal	pillar	in	the	State	Department.”2	In	his	diary	Adolf	Berle	blamed	“the	matter	of	a	Senate	investigation	of	a	couple	of	unpleasant	incidents	that	I	find	it	impossible	to	believe	–	but	whose	fame	has	been	industriously	spread	by	[former	Ambassador	to	France	William	C.]	Bullitt	to	others	of	Sumner’s	enemies.”3	According	to	one	account,	Welles	had	left	to	care	for	his	infirmed	wife	Mathilde.	However,	the	wife	of	Francis	Mayer,	a	friend	of	former	Undersecretary	of	State	William	Castle,	found	this	explanation	wanting,	and	quipped	that	she	knew	"what	is	the	matter	with	Mrs.	Welles.	She	is	suffering	from	the	Wells	of	Loneliness."	[sic]4			 Mrs.	Mayer’s	exquisite	wit,	linking	Welles	with	Radclyffe	Hall’s	notorious	1928	book	depicting	a	lesbian	relationship,	underscored	the	furtive	nature	of	the	means	by	which	Welles	was	forced	to	resign.	In	the	absence	of	hard	evidence,	jokes,	rumours,	gossip,	and	innuendo	were	used	to	destroy	Welles’	reputation	and	
																																																								1	‘Welles	‘Resignation’,	Miami	Herald,	August	1943,	cited	in	SWP,	Scrapbooks/Clippings,	Box	249:	Scrapbook,	1943.		2	‘Washington	Merry	Go	Round’,	Washington	Post,	Drew	Pearson,	26	August	1943.		3	”Memorandum”,	1	September	1943,	FDRL	Adolf	A.	Berle	Papers,	Box	215:	Adolf	A.	Berle	Diary;	April,	1943	-	April	1944,	Diary	August	-	September	1943.	Despite	this,	Berle	expressed	a	naïve	optimism	about	Welles’	prospects	in	facing	the	oncoming	scandal,	believing:	“there	would	be	a	week	of	unpleasant	and	difficult	comment	then	complete	obscurity”.		4	‘Diary	Entry,	13	October	1943,	Houghton	Library.	William	R.	Castle	Diaries,	Vol.	46,	310.		
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undermine	his	political	power.	It	also	pointed	to	how	sexuality	had	become	the	battleground	on	which	the	political	campaign	against	Welles	was	being	waged.		Welles’	resignation	was,	to	be	sure,	a	symptom	of	many	problems:	bureaucratic	dysfunction,	ideological	confrontation,	and	personal	rivalry.	But	the	catalyst	and	engine	for	Welles’	removal	from	office	was	his	sexuality	and	the	discourses	that	surrounded	it.	Opponents	of	Welles	who	were	in	the	know,	whether	ideological	or	personal,	fixated	on	his	sexuality	as	a	reason	for	his	disqualification	from	office.	Contemporary	observers	and	historians	alike	focused	on	the	supposedly	“lurid	nature”	of	Welles’	personal	life	to	explicate	the	conspiracy	that	was	launched	against	him.5	In	the	process,	a	mythos	was	born	that	would	associate	sexual	non-conformity	with	political	subversion,	obfuscating	the	context	of	Welles’	own	actions	and	whitewashing	the	homophobia	of	his	opponents.			 This	chapter	explores	the	causes,	context,	and	process	of	Welles’	removal	from	office	in	1943.	In	recounting	the	events	that	led	to	his	resignation	and	analyzing	their	social	and	sexual	significance,	this	chapter	places	Welles’	sexuality	in	the	context	of	1940s-era	mores	about	sexuality	generally	and	the	codes	and	habits,	of	the	queer	subculture	of	that	era.	It	demonstrates	how	specific	cultural	and	social	circumstances	relating	to	sex,	race,	and	status	helped	germinate	the	investigation	into	Welles’	sexuality	that	eventually	precipitated	his	removal	from	office.	It	traces	the	efforts	by	Welles’	enemies	to	conspire	against	Welles,	spreading	rumours	about	him	and	using	his	sexuality	as	a	cudgel	to	besmirch	his	reputation	and	destroy	his	bases	of	political	support	in	Washington,	especially	with	Franklin	Roosevelt.	This	chapter	also	examines	the	ramifications	of	Welles’	scandal	on	his	political	career	and	the	wider	social	and	political	history	of	the	United	States.	It	shows	how	the	rumours	about	Welles	undermined	his	political	stature	while	in	office	and	sullied	his	reputation	thereafter.	More	broadly,	this	chapter	shows	how	Welles’	scandal	became	a	touchstone	for	a	political	discourse	that	equated	sexual	nonconformity	with	subversion,	reflecting	short-term	and	long-term	changes	in	American	attitudes	toward	sex,	power,	and	politics	in	mid-century	America.	Incorporating	the	analysis																																																									5	Christopher	D.	O’Sullivan,	Sumner	Welles:	Postwar	Planning	and	the	Quest	for	a	New	World	Order	
1937-1943	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2009),	x.	
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begun	in	Chapters	One,	Two,	and	Three,	this	chapter	demonstrates	how	sexuality	played	a	definitive	role	in	shaping	Welles’	career	and	how	that	process	influenced	U.S.	social,	political,	and	diplomatic	history.			
Transportation	and	Transgression:	Social	and	Cultural	Contexts	of	Welles’	Sexuality		 The	events	that	set	in	motion	Welles’	eventual	removal	from	office	occurred	on	the	night	of	17-18	September	1940.	In	brief,	during	the	early	hours	of	18	September,	after	staying	up	late	discussing	foreign	affairs	over	drinks	with	Federal	Works	Administrator	John	Carmody,	Welles	“inquired	of	one	of	the	colored	waiters	as	to	whether	he	wanted	to	make	$15.”6	Welles	invited	the	waiter	to	his	room,	told	him	to	lock	the	door,	and	then	propositioned	him	for	sex.	The	porter	in	question,	a	Pullman	porter	named	John	Stone,	refused	Welles’	advances	and	left	the	room.7	Undeterred,	Welles	summoned	another	porter	to	his	room	to	proposition	him,	and	then	another,	and	another,	each	time	being	refused,	until	he	finally	gave	up.8	News	of	Welles’	behaviour	spread	quickly	among	the	crew.	According	to	one	of	the	porters,	the	“morale	of	the	dining	car	crew	was	very	much	upset	and	disturbed”	by	Welles’	behaviour.9	White	House	Secret	Serviceman	Dale	Whiteside	told	the	train	staff	to	remain	quiet	about	the	incident.10		Additionally,	a	week	after	Welles	solicited	the	porters	on	the	Bankhead	train,	Welles	took	another	train,	from	Washington	D.C.	to	Cleveland,	on	which	he	behaved																																																									6	Memorandum,	3	January	1941,	NARA,	RG	65,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972.	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[1	of	2]	7	Memorandum,	30	January	1941,	NARA,	RG	65,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[2	of	2]	8	Memorandum,	NARA,	RG	65,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover,	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	30	January	1941,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[1	of	2]	9	Memorandum	for	the	Director,	23	January	1941,	NARA,	RG	65,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover,	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[1	of	2]	10	Memorandum	for	the	Director,	22	January	1941,	NARA,	RG	65,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover,	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[2	of	2]	
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in	a	manner	nearly	identical	to	that	of	the	Bankhead	train.	According	to	the	Cleveland	train’s	staff,	Welles	boarded	the	train	at	night	and	consumed	“three	or	four	scotch	and	sodas”	before	retiring	to	his	room.11	Soon	after,	Welles	“wanted	to	see	a	boy	in	Drawing	Room	A.”12	As	on	the	Bankhead	train,	he	offered	various	members	of	the	crew	money	for	sex,	or	as	Welles	put	it	in	this	case	“’screwing	purposes’.”13	Welles	was	again	unsuccessful	and	the	porters	involved	were	again	told	to	keep	quiet.			 Although	these	events	have	been	recounted	in	several	historical	works,	most	notably	in	Benjamin	Welles’	biography	of	his	father,	Irwin	Gellman’s	Secret	Affairs,	and	in	exceptionally	close	detail	in	Douglas	Charles’	2015	book	Hoover’s	War	on	
Gays,	there	has	never	been	a	systematic	analysis	of	Welles’	actions,	what	they	indicated	about	his	personality,	the	social	context	in	which	they	took	place,	or	what	significance	these	factors	held	for	the	political	scandal	that	grew	out	of	these	incidents.14	As	such,	crucial	insights	about	Welles,	the	social-sexual	world	he	inhabited,	and	the	evolution	of	the	scandal	that	destroyed	him	have	been	overlooked.	A	close	examination	refutes	the	contention	that	Welles’	non-heterosexual	contacts	were	incidental	aberrations;	also,	a	broader	understanding	of	the	context	of	Welles’	encounters	in	1940	reveals	clues	as	to	why	and	how	these	specific	incidents	metastasized	into	a	political	scandal.		To	begin	with,	Welles’	solicitation	of	sex	might	more	accurately	be	called	a	negotiation.	Welles	began	his	proposition	to	the	porters	with	a	seemingly	innocuous	
																																																								11	Testimony	of	William	Goins,	16	January	1941,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[2	of	2],	NARA,	RG	65,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972.	12	Testimony	of	Thomas	Williams,	17	January	1941,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[2	of	2],	NARA,	RG	65,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972.	13	Testimony	of	Edorn	Boston,	17	January	1941,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[2	of	2],	NARA,	RG	65,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972.	14	See:	Benjamin	Welles,	Sumner	Welles:	FDR’s	Global	Strategist:	A	Biography	(New	York:	MacMillan	Press,	1997),	1-3;	Irwin	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs:	Franklin	Roosevelt,	Cordell	Hull,	and	Sumner	Welles	(Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1995),	219-20,	391-2,	397-8;	Douglas	M.	Charles,	
Hoover’s	War	on	Gays:	Exposing	the	FBI’s	‘Sex	Deviates’	Program	(Lawrence,	KS:	University	of	Kansas	Press,	2015),	36-68.		
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question:	“Did	[you]	want	to	make	twenty	dollars?”15	A	positive	reply	would	prompt	Welles	to	ask	the	porter	to	“take	off	[their]	clothes	and	stay	for	20	minutes.”16	Welles	repeated	this	tactic	ad	nauseum,	offering	ever-greater	amounts	–	up	to	$100	according	to	one	account.17	Welles	also	made	not-so-subtle	gestures	that	announced	the	subtext	of	his	requests	and	the	contact	he	sought.	Welles	was,	by	one	account,	half	naked	upon	the	arrival	of	the	porter,	having	“on	no	clothing	excepting	the	pants	of	his	pajamas.”18	If	the	porter	in	question	entered	Welles’	room	Welles	“got	up,	closed	the	door	and	locked	it,”	a	gesture	both	subtle	enough	to	imply	the	need	for	privacy	and	unusual	enough	for	it	the	porters	to	mention	it	in	their	accounts.19		This	coy	approach	was	characteristic	of	the	furtive	manoeuvring	employed	by	men	seeking	same-sex	sexual	contact	during	this	era.	Born	out	of	fears	of	police	entrapment,	the	difficulty	of	identifying	potential	partners,	and	the	potential	for	violent	rejection,	gay	men	of	this	era	developed	“tactics	that	allowed	them	to	identify	and	communicate	with	one	another	without	alerting	hostile	outsiders	to	what	they	were	doing.”20	Employing	a	series	of	“codes	and	subterfuges”	men	seeking	sexual	contact	with	other	men	during	this	time	had	”attentiveness	to	the	signals	that	might	identify	like-minded	men”	through	“styles	of	clothing	a	grooming,																																																									15	Testimony	of	Samuel	C.	Mitchell,	9	January	1941,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[2	of	2],	NARA,	RG	65,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972;	In	the	various	testimonies	collected	by	the	FBI,	Welles’	opening	offer	to	the	porter	varied,	usually	in	the	$10-$20	range.			16	Memorandum	for	the	Director,	23	January	1941,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[1	of	2],	NARA,	RG	65,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972.	17	Memorandum	for	the	Director,	22	January	1941,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[2	of	2],	NARA,	RG	65,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972.	18	Testimony	of	Samuel	C.	Mitchell,	9	January	1941,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[2	of	2],	NARA,	RG	65,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972.	19	Testimony	of	Luther	A.	Thomas,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[2	of	2],	NARA,	RG	65,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972.	20	George	Chauncey,	Gay	New	York:	Gender,	Urban	Culture,	and	the	Making	of	the	Gay	Male	World	
1890-1940	(New	York:	BasicBooks,	1994),	187.	See	also,	Allan	Bérubé,	Coming	Out	Under	Fire:	The	
History	of	Gay	Men	and	Women	in	World	War	Two	(New	York:	The	Free	Press,	1990),	107.		
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mannerisms,	and	conventions	of	speech”	to	facilitate	their	encounters.21	Gay	men	also	“made	use	of	a	number	of	utterly	conventional	gestures	…	the	most	common	simply	involved	asking	for	a	match	or	for	the	time	of	day.”22	Welles’	behaviour	on	the	Bankhead	and	Cleveland	trains	replicated	these	tactics,	indicating	both	Welles’	knowledge	of	them	and	his	confidence	in	improvising	variations	on	them	in	the	moment.		Although	Welles’	deployment	of	these	tactics	were,	in	this	case,	not	directed	at	other	gay	men	(as	well	as	unsuccessful),	their	use	indicated	his	familiarity	with	them.	Between	this	familiarity,	the	apparent	frequency	of	Welles’	encounters,	and	further	evidence	of	his	efforts	to	seek	same-sex	intimacy	(discussed	below),	it	becomes	clear	that	Welles’	desire	for	same-sex	sexual	contact	was	not	an	aberration.	Rather	than	being	a	louche	display	of	alcoholic	excess,	as	other	authors	have	implied,	Welles’	actions	were	at	the	very	least	well	rehearsed	and,	in	light	of	evidence	presented	earlier	in	this	thesis,	a	sign	that	he	had	been	pursuing	these	sorts	of	contacts	for	decades.23		Welles’	behaviour	was	consistent	with	the	intricate	world	of	cruising	and	illicit	contact	engaged	in	by	other	men	of	this	period.	Yet,	in	important	ways	Welles’	behaviour	deviated	from	the	patterns	of	gay	subculture	observed	by	authors	studying	this	period	in	U.S.	history.	These	deviations	were	specific	to	Welles	and	the	peculiarities	of	the	situation	in	which	he	was	placed	on	the	Bankhead	and	Cleveland	trains.	Upon	closer	analysis,	these	deviations	reveal	clues	about	why	Welles’	behaviour	on	these	trains	(which,	as	stated	above,	were	likely	not	the	only	times	Welles	sought	these	sort	of	contacts)	exploded	into	a	scandal.			
																																																								21	Chauncey,	Gay	New	York,	180,	188.		22	Ibid.,	188.		23	For	Welles’	earlier	signs	of	same-sex	desires,	see	Chapter	One;	Both	Christopher	O’Sullivan	and	Irwin	Gellman	directly	linked	Welles’	pursuit	of	same-sex	intimacy	with	his	consumption	of	alcohol.	Benjamin	Welles	implied	the	same	while	adding	that	stress	was	a	likely	cause	of	Welles’	behaviour	as	well.	Numerous	other	authors,	in	brief	summaries	of	this	episode	of	Welles’	career,	have	echoed	this	analysis.	See:	O’Sullivan,	x.	Gellman,	56.	Welles,	2.	There	is	the	further	issue	of	the	judgmental	language	used	by	these	authors,	carrying	the	implication	(however	unintentional)	that	same-sex	intimacy	is	undesirable.	This	is	a	further	avenue	for	historiographic	rehabilitation	of	Welles	but	it	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	thesis.		
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The	most	significant	deviation	of	Welles’	behaviour	from	the	more	typical	encounters	of	gay	men	seeking	sex	in	this	period	was	in	the	location	Welles	chose	for	his	encounter.	In	general,	gay	men	of	this	era	“made	tactical	decisions	about	the	safest	places	to	meet,”	usually	places	that	were	sufficiently	well	trafficked	so	that	potential	partners	were	plentiful	but	the	anonymity	of	the	crowd	was	maintained.24	Welles,	clearly,	did	not	employ	this	tactic.	He	chose	a	confined	and	highly	conspicuous	space	to	pursue	his	desires	–	an	overnight	train	carriage	carrying	the	president	of	the	United	States.		The	reasons	for	this	were	manifold	and	they	were	by-products	of	the	unique	positionality	Welles	occupied	on	account	of	his	aristocratic	background,	his	wealth,	and	his	stature	as	a	public	figure.	As	a	prominent	diplomat	–	he	was,	in	1940,	Acting	Secretary	of	State	-	Welles	occupied	an	exceptionally	elite	position	in	American	social	hierarchy.	This	placed	additional	obstacles	between	Welles	and	his	ability	to	seek	same-sex	intimacy.	His	notoriety	prevented	him	from	attending	parties	or	frequenting	establishments	that	were	specifically	for	queer	people.			Conversely,	Welles	was	also	limited	in	his	ability	to	seek	more	discreet	locations.	Within	the	subculture	of	gay	men,	those	who	occupied	a	higher	social	rank	often	found	certain	avenues	closed	to	them.	As	George	Chauncey	noted,	"[s]ome	men,	particularly	those	who	were	professionally	successful	in	jobs	that	required	them	to	pass	as	straight,	found	it	astonishing	that	anyone	in	their	circles	would	risk	going	to	a	tearoom	[a	public	bathroom	used	for	sex],	given	the	threat	of	arrest	and	the	availability	of	alternatives	to	men	highly	integrated	into	gay	society."25	However,	for	Welles	such	integration	into	gay	society	was	also	impossible.	As	a	public	official,	it	was	far	more	difficult	–	and	even	more	important	–	for	Welles	to	maintain	the	anonymity	on	which	many	same-sex	sexual	encounters	were	based	during	this	time.	Thus,	the	choice	of	a	railway	carriage	staffed	by	porters	renowned	for	their	discretion	and	obsequiousness,	with	the	protection	of,	but	not	direct	oversight	by,	the	Secret	Service,	was	not	an	altogether	bad	idea.		
																																																								24	Chauncey,	Gay	New	York,	189.		25	Ibid.,	199.	Emphasis	original.		
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However,	the	location	Welles	chose	and	the	manner	in	which	he	pursued	his	desires	contained	countervailing	dynamics	that	simultaneously	offered	Welles	his	opportunity	and	exposed	him	to	danger;	those	dynamics	would	also	initiate	the	process	by	which	Welles’	behaviour	became	a	scandal.	The	Pullman	porters	who	were	the	objects	of	Welles’	desire	on	the	Bankhead	and	Cleveland	trains	were	not	the	typical	1940s-era	railway	employees.	Pullman	porters	were	extraordinarily	well	trained,	particularly	if	they	were	a	“private	car	porter”	assigned	to	“special	cars	and	assignments,	such	as	serving	presidents,	visiting	dignitaries,	entertainers,	charter	groups,	and	the	like.”26	For	the	trains	used	to	carry	Franklin	Roosevelt,	special	porters	were	specifically	assigned	for	their	loyalty,	professionalism,	and	discretion	(“[p]orters	who	served	on	FDR’s	train	…	knew	how	crippled	he	was	long	before	the	public	did,”	historian	Larry	Tye	astutely	observed).27	Between	the	years	of	service,	the	127-page	training	manual	issued	to	them,	and	the	higher-than-average	wages	(plus	tips)	they	received,	“Pullman	porters	also	climbed	near	the	top	of	the	Negro	social	ladder	…	the	aristocrats	of	Negro	labor.”28	These	unique	attributes	of	the	Pullman	porter	–	professionalism	and	discretion	–	operated	at	cross	purposes	when	they	came	in	contact	with	Welles	on	the	Bankhead	and	Cleveland	trains.	In	some	respects,	it	is	understandable	why	Welles	believed	that	he	would	be	able	to	proposition	the	Pullman	porters	with	the	expectation	of	getting	what	he	desired	and	with	no	repercussions.	Pullman	porters	were	renowned	for	their	obsequiousness	and	their	willingness	to	perform	extra	tasks	for	requested	by	customers.29	“Porters	worked	for	tips:	they	had	to	hustle	and	force	themselves	to	swallow	a	thousand	and	one	indignities	a	day	and	worse.	For	this	they	were	lampooned	as	Uncle	Toms.”30	Porters	also	regrettably	endured	countless	minor	humiliations	at	the	hands	of	their	passengers,	including	“being																																																									26	David	D.	Perata,	Those	Pullman	Blues:	An	Oral	History	of	the	African-American	Railroad	Attendant	(Ruthven,	IA:	David	D.	Perata	Studios,	1996),	xx.		27	Larry	Tye,	Rising	from	the	Rails:	Pullman	Porters	and	the	Making	of	the	Black	Middle	Class	(New	York:	Henry	Holt	and	Company,	2004),	76-7,	183.	Memorandum	for	the	Director,	22	January	1941,	NARA	II,	RG	65,	Box	24,	Folder:	Wells,	Sumner	(deceased)	[2	of	2]	28	Tye,	Rising	from	the	Rails,	77.		29	Tye,	Rising	from	the	Rails,	93	30	Jack	Santino,	Miles	of	Smiles,	Years	of	Struggle:	Stories	of	Black	Pullman	Porters	(Chicago:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	1989),	70.		
		 205	
asked	to	bark	like	a	dog	or	let	a	young	boy	ride	him	like	a	horse.”31	Beyond	this,	the	circumstances	and	style	of	the	Pullman	porters	lent	itself	to	exploitative	and	intimate	interactions	while	underscoring	the	expectation	of	discretion.	Several	former	Pullman	porters	and	historians	writing	about	them	have	commented	upon	the	antebellum	plantation	aspect	to	porters’	treatment	as	well	to	the	fact	that	the	porter	“was	friend	and	confidant	to	a	class	of	wealthy	white	passenger,	and	at	the	very	least,	he	witnessed	their	behaviour,	their	sins	and	indiscretions,	and	sometimes	their	tragedies.”32	For	all	these	reasons,	Welles	might	have	had	a	reasonable	expectation	of	success	in	pursuing	a	clandestine	sexual	contact	through	payment	and	stealth.		However,	unbeknownst	to	Welles,	the	Pullman	porters	were,	in	fact,	the	most	hazardous	potential	partners	to	solicit	for	a	clandestine	rendezvous.	One	aspect	of	the	Pullman	Company’s	employee	discipline	and	training	included	the	use	of	“undercover	agents”	(also	called	“spotters”	or	“spies”)	to	observe	and	test	the	porters’	work	performance.33	Usually	their	focus	was	on	standards	of	service	such	as	cleanliness	or	taking	of	fares,	but	“[m]any	were	of	a	sexual	nature:	female	spotters,	for	example,	would	attempt	to	lure	unsuspecting	porters	into	their	drawing	room.”34	Furthermore,	as	Pullman	porters	tended	to	be	highly	trained	and	well	regarded	within	the	black	community	–	“[p]aragons	of	the	community	[and]	sophistication”	in	one	historian’s	estimation,	they	were	less	likely	to	risk	their	jobs,	even	for	an	exceptional	tip.35	As	one	Pullman	(not	on	the	Cleveland	nor	the	Bankhead	trains)	remembered,	“this	job	is	business	to	me,	I	gotta	wife	and	two	children	and	I	know	if	I	steal,	if	I	fuck	around	with	the	women,	I’m	gonna	get	fired.	What	I’m	gonna	tell	my	wife?”36	Add	to	this	the	habit	of	Pullman	porters	gossiping	among	themselves	about	passengers,	and	the	likelihood	of	Welles	being	exposed	for	making	such	an	advance	grew	substantially.		
																																																								31	Tye,	Rising	from	the	Rails,	93.		32	Santino,	Miles	of	Smile,		81.	Perata,	Those	Pullman	Blues,	xiii.		33	Tye,	Rising	from	the	Rails,	103.	See	also,	Santino,	Miles	of	Smiles,	27.		34	Perata,	Those	Pullman	Blues,	xxiii.		35	Tye,	Rising	from	the	Rails,	77.		36	Perata,	Those	Pullman	Blues,	97.	
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The	dynamics	elaborated	above	were	reflected	in	the	F.B.I.	investigation	into	the	Bankhead	and	Cleveland	train	incidents.	On	both	trains,	news	of	Welles’	behaviour	spread	quickly	among	the	train	staff.37	On	both	occasions	the	train	conductor	and	the	Pullman	conductor	(two	separate	individuals	with	separate	jobs	on	Pullman	trains)	were	informed,	all	but	guaranteeing	a	report	would	be	made	to	their	superiors	at	the	journey’s	conclusion.38	The	incredulity	and	skittishness	of	the	porters	was	also	reflected	in	the	testimonies	of	the	porters	on	the	Bankhead	and	Cleveland	trains	whom	Welles	propositioned.	When	one	porter	who	had	been	propositioned	by	Welles	was	“’kidded’”	by	the	train’s	baggage	master	for	having	“turned	down	fifty	dollars	to	suck	a	nice,	clean	dick,”	the	porter	in	question	“replied	that	he	would	not	accept	five	thousand	dollars	to	do	such	a	thing.”39		Thus,	faced	with	the	porters’	baseline	objection	to	having	gay	sex,	the	oddness	and	gossip-fuelling	notoriety	of	Welles’	offer,	their	extensive	training	and	awareness	of	Pullman-employed	‘spies’,	the	fear	of	professional	repercussions,	and	the	conspicuity	of	serving	on	a	presidential	train,	Welles’	attempt	to	procure	sex	from	Pullman	porters	in	September	1940	confronted	an	exceptionally	formidable	wall	of	opposition	and	suspicion.	The	fact	that	these	conditions	existed	when	Welles	solicited	the	Pullman	porters	all	but	guaranteed	that	his	relatively	well-practiced	and	furtive	approach	would	not	be	held	in	confidence	behind	a	screen	of	Pullman	porter	discretion.	In	the	weeks	and	months	after	the	incidents,	stories	about	Welles	became	part	and	parcel	of	Pullman	porter	lore	and	were	passed	up	the	chain	of	command.	When	the	F.B.I.	started	its	investigation	of	Welles	and	began	accumulating	the	documents	that	would	become	the	political	weapons	of	Welles’	enemies	as	they	conspired	to	remove	him	from	office,	they	had	plenty	of	testimony	to	draw	upon.		As	reports	about	Welles	trickled	back	to	government	officials	in	the	White	House	and	the	military,	Roosevelt	launched	an	investigation	into	Welles,	the	results																																																									37	Memorandum	for	the	Director,	22	January	1941,	Testimony	of	Dale	B.	Whiteside,	NARA	II,	RG	65,	Box	24,	Folder:	Wells,	Sumner	(deceased)	[2	of	2];	Testimony	of	William	Goins,	16	January	1941,	NARA	II,	RG	65,	Box	24,	Folder:	Wells,	Sumner	(deceased)	[2	of	2]	38	Ibid.		39	Memorandum	for	the	Director,	23	January	1941,	Testimony	of	Elmer	C.	Stephens,	NARA	II,	RG	65,	Box	24,	Folder:	Wells,	Sumner	(deceased)	[1	of	2]	
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of	which	F.B.I.	Director	J.	Edgar	Hoover	delivered	personally	to	Roosevelt	in	January	1941.	After	consulting	with	Hoover	and	members	of	the	army	tasked	with	presidential	security,	Roosevelt	agreed	to	assign	a	bodyguard	to	Welles	to	keep	him	from	repeating	his	actions.40	Satisfied	that	Welles	behaviour	was	not	likely	to	be	repeated	the	report	was	returned	to	Hoover’s	Personal	and	Confidential	File	for	safekeeping	and	was	quietly	buried.			
Enter	Bullitt:	A	Scandal	Begins		 Had	the	knowledge	about	Welles’	behaviour	and	the	F.B.I.	report	been	kept	within	the	confines	of	the	Oval	Office	and	the	highest	echelons	of	the	F.B.I.	and	military,	the	course	of	Welles’	career	and	of	American	foreign	policy	might	well	have	been	very	different.	Instead,	information	about	the	incident	fell	into	the	hands	of	someone	dedicated	to	destroying	Welles’	career.	Over	the	course	of	the	next	two	and	a	half	years	a	conspiracy	grew	that	revealed	not	just	the	personal	animosity	felt	by	many	toward	Welles,	and	the	depth	of	the	fissures	that	had	plagued	the	State	Department	since	Welles’	arrival,	but	also	the	portentous	gravity	of	wartime-era	Washington	D.C.	politics	and	the	salience	of	discourses	about	sexuality	within	that	context	and	in	Welles’	professional	life.		The	central	figure	in	the	conspiracy	to	oust	Welles	was	former	Ambassador	to	France	William	C.	Bullitt.	Bullitt	was	a	career	diplomat	with	a	list	of	accomplishments	longer	and	more	distinguished	than	any	other	figure	in	the	State	Department,	save	Welles	and	Hull.	He	had	served	as	an	attaché	to	Colonel	Edward	M.	House	during	the	Paris	Peace	Conference	in	1919,	during	which	he	was	dispatched	to	Russia	to	assess	“possibilities	with	the	Bolsheviks	for	ending	the	war	
																																																								40	Undated	Report,	Yale	University	Archives,	William	C.	Bullitt	Papers	(WCBP),	Series	VI,	Box	210,	Folder	218		
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in	Russia.”41	He	spent	the	1920s	abroad,	touring	in	France	and	Germany,	and	writing	a	psychoanalytical	biography	about	Woodrow	Wilson	with	Sigmund	Freud.42		Like	Welles,	Bullitt	was	a	polarizing	figure.	He	was	popular	with	some	groups,	particularly	abroad.	A	French	editorial	in	1936	praised	his	“youth,	finesse,	cosmopolitan	experience	and	vast	knowledge	of	European	affairs.”43	Others	disliked	his	pomp	and	arrogance.	Adolf	Berle	once	commented	that,	“‘[h]e	had	a	great	deal	of	ego	in	his	cosmos’”	while	Henry	Stimson	called	him	a	“wretched,	selfish,	disloyal	man.”44	He	was	introduced	to	Roosevelt	through	Colonel	House,	who	recommended	that	Bullitt	work	on	Roosevelt’s	campaign	as	a	foreign	policy	adviser.45	Bullitt’s	contributions	consisted	of	a	few	policy	notes	on	European	politics	and	a	$1000	donation.46	Nevertheless,	he	was	valued	enough	by	Roosevelt	to	be	selected	as	the	first	American	ambassador	to	the	Soviet	Union	following	recognition	of	the	regime	in	1934.		Welles	and	Bullitt	were	acquainted	through	mutual	contacts	in	the	State	Department	and,	after	Welles’	appointment	as	Undersecretary,	through	diplomatic	and	personal	correspondence.	In	the	early	years	of	their	acquaintanceship,	Welles	and	Bullitt’s	interactions	were	outwardly	cordial.	They	exchanged	pleasantries	and	personal	information	as	freely	as	if	they	were	old	friends.	They	helped	each	other	in	personal	matters,	including	Bullitt’s	arranging	for	Welles’	son	to	spend	six	weeks	in	France	learning	French.47	They	even	exchanged	personal	gifts,	notably	a	collection	of	rare	plants	and	seeds	(both	men	were	avid	gardeners).48		
																																																								41	Michael	Cassell-Blackburn,	The	Donkey,	the	Carrot,	and	the	Club:	William	C.	Bullitt	and	Soviet-
American	Relations,	1917-1948	(London:	Praeger,	2004),	35.	42	Sigmund	Freud	and	William	C.	Bullitt,	Woodrow	Wilson:	A	Psychological	Study	(New	Brunswick,	N.J.:	Transaction	Publishers,	1999);	for	a	fuller	account	of	Bullitt’s	activities	during	the	years	1919-1933,	see:	Will	Brownell	and	Richard	N.	Billings,	So	Close	to	Greatness:	A	Biography	of	William	C.	
Bullitt	(New	York:	Macmillan	Publishing	Company,	1987),	103-38	43	Brownell	and	Billings,	189,	quoting	L’Europe	Nouvelle,	17	October	1936.	44	Jordan	A.	Schwarz,	Liberal:	Adolf	A	Berle	and	the	Vision	of	an	American	Era	(London:	Collier	Macmillan	Publishers,	1987),	30;	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs,	310.	45	Orville	H.	Bullitt	ed.,	For	the	President	Personal	and	Secret:	Correspondence	Between	Franklin	D.	
Roosevelt	and	William	C.	Bullitt	(London:	Andre	Deutsch	Limited,	1973),	17.		46	Bullitt	to	Roosevelt,	14	September	1932,	Yale	University	Archives,	WCBP,	Series	I,	Group	112,	Box	70,	Folder	1780.	47	Bullitt	to	Welles,	5	August	1938,	WCBP,	Series	I,	Box,	88,	Folder	2265.	48	Welles	to	Bullitt,	30	October	1939,	SWP,	Box:	51,	Folder:	2.	
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Despite	this	outward	display	of	probity,	Bullitt	grew	increasingly	resentful	of	Welles’	rising	prominence.	Bullitt’s	dislike	of	Welles,	according	to	historians	Will	Brownell	and	Richard	Billings,	“grew	in	proportion	to	his	frustrated	ambition;”	over	time	events	conspired	to	aggravate	that	frustration	substantially.49		After	being	reassigned	to	Paris	following	Roosevelt’s	re-election	in	1936,	Bullitt	found	himself	increasingly	marginalized.	Partially,	this	was	a	function	of	Welles’	newfound	influence	over	Roosevelt	as	Undersecretary.	Bullitt,	like	Welles,	had	grown	accustomed	to	going	over	the	heads	of	his	superiors	in	the	State	Department	to	appeal	to	Roosevelt	directly.	Bullitt’s	insubordination	was	no	more	appreciated	by	Hull	and	others	in	the	Department	than	Welles’	was,	but	it	was	tolerated	as	Roosevelt	valued	Bullitt’s	insight.50	However,	Welles’	access	to	the	president	trumped	Bullitt’s	influence,	and	when	the	former	became	Undersecretary	the	latter	was	overruled.		Welles’	anointment	as	the	president’s	favourite,	and	Bullitt’s	resentment	of	that	fact,	was	reinforced	by	his	close	relationship	with	former	Counselor	of	the	State	Department	R.	Walton	Moore.	Bullitt	nursed	a	grudge	against	Welles	for	being	promoted	to	Undersecretary	over	Moore	in	1937.	Bullitt’s	loss	of	this	bureaucratic	fight	was	a	personal	blow	as	well	as	a	professional	one.	Besides	being	a	political	ally,	Moore	was	a	personal	friend	and	his	being	outmaneuvered	by	Welles	compounded	Bullitt’s	antipathy.	Bullitt’s	anger	reached	fever	pitch	in	1941	with	the	sudden	death	of	Moore	and	the	bequeathing	to	Bullitt	by	Moore	all	information	he	had	obtained	regarding	Welles	and	the	Bankhead	train	incident,	supplementing	information	he	had	obtained	from	the	Southern	Railway	on	his	own.51		Bullitt’s	efforts	to	discredit	and	ultimately	destroy	Welles	with	his	knowledge	of	the	incident	initially	failed.	This	was	in	part	due	to	his	lack	of	evidence,	but	also	because	of	the	amount	of	protection	still	provided	to	Welles	by	the	president	through	their	close	relationship,	Bullitt	found	it	impossible	to	gain	traction	for	his																																																									49	Brownell	and	Billings,	So	Close	to	Greatness,	293.	50	Ibid.	190.		51	Ibid.,	295;	Memo	entitled	‘Typed	Copy	of	Judge	Moore’s	Handwriting’,	undated,	Yale	University	Archives,	WCBP,	Series	VI,	Box	210,	Folder	218.	Exactly	how	Moore	became	aware	of	the	Bankhead	Train	incident	is	unclear.	See:	Brownell	and	Billings,	So	Close	to	Greatness,	294.	
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campaign.	Possessing	only	Moore’s	notes	on	the	matter,	Bullitt	met	Roosevelt	in	April	1941	to	make	the	case	that	Welles’	actions	made	him	susceptible	to	blackmail	and	could	be	an	embarrassment	to	the	administration	if	they	ever	got	out,	but	Roosevelt	rebuffed	him.52	Welles	was	already	under	surveillance	to	protect	him	from	being	blackmailed,	Roosevelt	reported,	and	according	to	Bullitt,	“he	did	not	believe	that	any	newspaper	would	publish	any	information	about	this	matter.”53	In	a	subsequent	meeting,	Roosevelt	added	that	he	needed	Welles	and	that	having	Welles	and	Hull	work	together	was	beneficial.54	“Cordell	Hull	and	Welles	made	a	good	team,”	Roosevelt	insisted	to	Bullitt.	Bullitt	was	not	sympathetic.	He	said	Welles	was	“subject	to	blackmail”	and	implored	Roosevelt	to	“remove	him	from	a	position	in	which	he	was	familiar	with	all	the	secrets	of	the	Government	of	the	United	States.”55	To	cap	it	off,	Bullitt	ominously	warned	that	“Welles’	criminal	activities	were	known	to	most	of	the	officers	and	many	of	the	clerks	and	even	messengers	in	the	Department	of	State	…	and	that	it	turned	the	stomachs	of	decent	men	to	be	under	the	orders	of	such	a	person.”56	However,	despite	Bullitt’s	plea,	Roosevelt	did	nothing.	For	the	time	being,	Roosevelt’s	favour	protected	Welles	from	Bullitt’s	attack.	Without	outside	support,	Bullitt	was	unable	to	penetrate	the	protective	shield	provided	by	Roosevelt	and	the	stature	of	high	office.		Undeterred,	Bullitt	set	about	attacking	Welles	by	other	means.	Over	the	next	two	years,	Bullitt	participated	in	a	stealth	campaign	of	hearsay,	spreading	the	rumours	about	Welles	as	widely	as	possible.	Although	it	took	some	time	to	come	to	fruition,	Bullitt	eventually	succeeded	in	corralling	enough	power	behind	him,	in	the	form	of	cabinet	officers	and	senators	who	were	made	aware	of	the	rumours,	to	force	Welles’	resignation.	Bullitt	was	aided	by	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull,	whose	antipathy	for	Welles	had	grown	since	the	row	over	the	Joint	Declaration	at	the	Rio	Conference	in	1942.	Hull	had	been	made	aware	of	reports	about	Welles	as	early	as	
																																																								52	Brownell	and	Billings,	So	Close	to	Greatness,	295.	53	Ibid.	54	Supplement	to	Memorandum	of	a	Conversation	with	the	President	on	November	18th	dictated	November	22nd.	3	December	1941,	Yale	University	Archives	,	WCBP,	Series	VI,	Box	210,	Folder	217.		55	Ibid.		56	Ibid.		
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November	1940	through	R.	Walton	Moore,	but	he	never	acted	upon	the	information	until	Bullitt	provided	an	opportunity	to	attack	Welles	indirectly.57	Bullitt’s	campaign	began	to	show	results	by	early	1943.	In	January	1943	Bullitt	received	word	from	Cordell	Hull	that	“a	number	of	Senators	were	talking	about	this	scandal	and	a	number	of	Senators’	wives	had	talked	to	Mrs.	Hull	about	it.”58	That	same	month,	Bullitt	reported	to	Hull	that	Senators	Walter	George	of	Georgia	and	Josiah	Bailey	of	North	Carolina	were	aware	of	the	rumours	about	Welles	and	were	prepared	to	approach	Senator	Tom	Connally	of	Texas,	a	major	figure	in	the	Senate,	to	raise	the	matter	on	the	Senate	floor.59	Attorney	General	Francis	Biddle	added	fuel	to	the	fire	by	telling	Bullitt	and	Hull	“J.	Edgar	Hoover	had	told	the	President	that	it	was	dangerous	to	the	safety	of	the	United	States	to	have	in	high	office	…	this	man	who	was	open	to	blackmail	and	that	he	knew	that	Welles	was	being	blackmailed.”60		 Armed	with	new	political	muscle	and	approaching	a	critical	mass	of	dissemination,	Bullitt	made	a	breakthrough	in	April	1943	when	Senator	Ralph	Owen	Brewster	of	Maine	met	with	F.B.I.	Director	Hoover	and	had	a	lengthy	discussion	about	Welles.61	As	a	member	of	the	powerful	Committee	on	Appropriations	as	well	as	the	Special	Committee	to	Investigate	the	Defense	Program,	also	known	as	the	Truman	Committee,	Brewster	quietly	made	preparations	for	a	formal	Senate	investigation.62	By	June,	Hull	had	issued	the	president	an	ultimatum	insisting	that	Welles	had	to	go,	citing	Welles’	“degeneracy,”	the	possibility	of	blackmail,	and	the	likelihood	that	any	postwar	agreement	would	founder	in	the	Senate	so	long	as	Welles	was	still	employed.63																																																										57	Memo	entitled	‘Typed	Copy	of	Judge	Moore’s	Handwriting’,	undated,	Yale	University	Archives,	WCBP,	Series	VI,	Box	210,	Folder	218.	58	Bullitt	Memorandum,	5	January	1943,	Yale	University	Archives,	WCBP,	Series	VI,	Box	210,	Folder	219.		59	Bullitt	Memorandum,	15	January	1943,	Yale	University	Archives,	WCBP,	Series	VI,	Box	210,	Folder	219.	60	Bullitt	Memorandum,	5	January	1943,	Yale	University	Archives,	WCBP,	Series	VI,	Box	210,	Folder	217.	Emphasis	original.		61	Bullitt	Memorandum,	27	April	1943,	Yale	University	Archives,	WCBP,	Series	VI,	Box	210,	Folder	219.		62	Welles,	FDR’s	Global	Strategist,	344-345.		63	Bullitt	Memorandum,	2	June	1943,	Yale	University	Archives,	WCBP,	Box	210,	Folder	218.	
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Crucially,	Welles	lacked	any	ability	to	combat	the	spread	of	the	rumours	against	him.	Confined	as	he	was	to	the	State	Department,	Welles	had	made	few	friends	in	Congress	who	would	vouch	for	his	character	and	refute	Bullitt’s	claims.	Possessing	in	the	president	all	the	political	support	he	needed,	Welles	had	never	cultivated	a	deep	well	of	goodwill	or	support	that	he	could	draw	upon	when	his	character	was	impugned.	The	only	ostensible	defense	of	Welles	came	from	sympathetic	members	of	the	press	who	pushed	back	against	the	reports	of	trouble	in	the	State	Department	by	lauding	Welles	and	castigating	Hull.	Drew	Pearson,	for	example,	defended	Welles	and	attacked	Hull	and	Bullitt	in	his	weekly	political	column,	“Washington	Merry-Go-Round”	Pearson	attacked	Hull	for	his	jealousy	of	Welles,	his	plodding	style,	and	for	attributing	Welles’	removal	to	Roosevelt’s	acquiescence	to	the	“conservative	or	Southern	wing	of	the	Democratic	Party.”64	Though	some	of	these	accusations	gained	traction,	they	were	insufficient	to	blunt	the	attacks	on	Welles	or	save	his	political	career.		The	escalating	scandal	around	Welles	laid	bare	the	harsh	realities	about	the	power	 dynamics	 in	 the	 Roosevelt	 administration	 during	 this	 time.	 It	 also	demonstrated	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 Roosevelt	 had	 become	 isolated	 and	 politically	weakened	by	1943.	Exhausted	by	over	a	decade	in	the	Oval	Office,	demoralized	by	a	poor	showing	in	the	previous	year’s	midterm	election,	drained	by	over	two	years	of	intense	pressure	dealing	with	World	War	Two,	and	facing	an	unprecedented	fourth	term,	Roosevelt	was	physically	and	emotionally	worn	out	by	1943.	Within	a	year	he	would	 begin	 showing	 aggravated	 symptoms	 of	 heart	 disease. 65 	He	 was	 also	increasingly	 isolated	 emotionally	 as	 members	 of	 his	 inner	 circle,	 including	 Missy	LeHand,	 Harry	 Hopkins,	 and	 others,	 had	 died	 or	 moved	 on.66 	The	 increasing	pressure	over	Welles	came	at	the	precise	moment	when	Roosevelt	was	least	able	to	muster	the	strength	to	defend	him,	and	 ironically,	at	 the	moment	when	he	needed	loyal	allies	 like	Welles	the	most.	As	knowledge	of	the	rumours	surrounding	Welles	slowly	 crept	 through	 the	 corridors	 of	 power	 in	Washington,	 it	 created	 an	 aura	 of																																																									64	26	August	1943,	Drew	Pearson,	“The	Washington	Merry-Go-Round”,	Washington	Post	65	See	Frank	Costigliola,	“Broken	Circle:	The	Isolation	of	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	in	World	War	II”,	
Diplomatic	History.	Vol.	32,	No.5,	708.		66	Ibid.,	679.		
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scandal,	even	though	the	details	were	neither	fully	known	nor	possible	to	publically	acknowledge.	 As	 the	 rumours	 spread,	 they	 laid	 bare	 the	 existing	 divisions	 in	 the	State	 Department	 and	 reinforced	 the	 polarization	 that	 Welles	 had	 engendered	throughout	his	tenure.			
Escalation:	Social	Washington	and	the	Rumour	Mill			The	insidious	growth	of	the	rumour	mill	that	was	the	engine	of	this	growing	scandal	had	a	palpable	impact	on	the	social	and	political	world	of	Washington	D.C.	and	had	a	detectable	impact	on	Welles’	ability	to	do	his	job.	Throughout	his	career,	but	especially	since	his	elevation	to	the	post	of	Undersecretary	of	State,	Welles	had	always	kept	a	lavish	social	calendar.	Possessing	access	to	the	highest	levels	of	government	on	a	daily	basis	he	was	familiar	with	the	most	important	people	in	Washington	D.C.	and	could	draw	these	people	together	almost	at	whim.	Such	a	social	standing	had	important	implications	for	Welles’	political	power.	It	created	a	captive	audience	through	which	Welles	could	promulgate	his	political	plans,	forge	alliances,	and	ostracize	opponents.	It	also	reinforced	and	combined	existing	impressions	about	Welles	as	a	political	operator.		As	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	and	later	Undersecretary	Welles	organized	high	profile	social	events	several	times	a	year.	The	guest	list	would	typically	include	members	of	the	cabinet,	congressional	leadership,	senior	sub-cabinet	officials,	Welles’	allies	in	the	State	Department,	high	level	members	of	the	press,	businessmen,	and	so	forth.67	For	anyone	else,	such	a	guest	list	would	be	found	only	for	evenings	with	the	president	or	a	foreign	head	of	state;	however	this	kind	of	guest	list	was	quite	common	for	Welles’	parties.	In	addition	to	the	parties	he	threw,	Welles	was	a	central	figure	in	a	quasi-official	group	of	senior	government	officials	known	as	
																																																								67	Dinner	-	The	Honorable	Sumner	Welles,	Assistant	Secretary	of	State,	in	Honor	of	Members	of	the	Official	Commission	of	the	Social-Economic	League	of	Cuba,	August	12,	1935,	NARA,	RG	59,	Records	of	the	Chief	of	Protocol,	Box	1:	Social	Functions;	Social	Functions	Given	by	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull,	1933-44.	
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the	‘little	cabinet’,	a	veritable	who’s	who	of	government	power	brokers;	Welles	was	one	of	its	most	active	members.68			The	impact	of	the	rumour	campaign	against	Welles	that	occasioned	his	resignation	had	a	dramatic	and	negative	impact	on	the	social	events	he	held	or	attended.	Prior	to	August	of	1943,	which	is	to	say	prior	to	the	time	when	Welles’	behaviour	on	the	Bankhead	and	Cleveland	trains	became	grist	for	the	rumour	mill,	the	social	functions	Welles	hosted	were	high-powered	and	well	attended.	Cabinet	officials,	ambassadors	from	major	allies,	high	ranking	military	figures,	and	at	times	even	the	president	or	vice-president	had	attended	the	events	Welles	planned.	Guest	lists	for	these	events	were	kept	by	the	Social	Secretary	of	the	State	Department,	who	kept	meticulous	notes	of	who	was	invited,	who	attended,	and	who	declined	the	invitation	–	or	in	the	lexicon	used	by	the	secretary,	sent	their	“regrets.”69	Any	absences	were	diligently	recorded	and	occasionally	profusely	excused	with	notes	and	personal	calls	of	apology.	Before	1943	the	average	rate	of	acceptances	to	declinations	for	events	hosted	by	Welles	was	4:1.70		However,	as	Welles’	scandal	began	to	spread	the	picture	changed.	The	number	of	“regrets”	sent	steadily	climbed	through	early	1943,	before	rising	sharply	in	August	1943,	with	nearly	half	the	invited	guests	declining	the	invitation.71	Moreover,	the	guests	who	declined	included	all	the	highest-level	officials	in	Washington,	in	particular	members	of	the	U.S.	Senate,	who	were	most	likely	to	be	
																																																								68	See:	SWP,	Box:	46,	Folder:	9:	Little	Cabinet	Dinner,	1938.		69	“Suggested	List	of	Guests	to	be	Invited	to	the	Luncheon	to	be	Given	by	the	Under	Secretary	of	State	in	Honor	of	the	Minister	for	Foreign	Affairs	of	Panama	–	Pan	American	Room,	Mayflower	Hotel,	Tuesday	June	8th.	At	1	P.M.”	NARA,	RG	59,	Records	of	the	Chief	of	Protocol,	Box	5:	Social	Functions;	Social	Functions	Given	by	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull,	1933-44	70	This	figure	was	arrived	at	by	calculating	all	the	accepts/regrets	data	from	a	set	of	sixteen	guest	lists	that	were	identifiably	connected	to	events	hosted	by	Welles.	The	source	material	for	this	data	can	be	found	in	NARA	RG	59,	Records	of	the	Chief	of	Protocol,	Box	1,	Box	3,	and	Box	5.		71	“List	of	Guests	Invited	to	the	Dinner	to	be	Given	by	the	Under	Secretary	of	State	in	Honor	of	the	Visiting	Delegation	from	Emergency	Advisory	Committee	for	Political	Defense,	of	Montevideo,	On	Friday	Evening,	August	6,	1943	at	the	Mayflower	Hotel”,	NARA,	RG	59,	Records	of	the	Chief	of	Protocol,	Box	1:	Social	Functions;	Social	Functions	Given	by	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull,	1933-44;	“List	of	Guests	Invited	to	the	Dinner	to	be	Given	by	the	Under	Secretary	of	State	in	Honor	of	Major	General	Eurico	Gaspar	Dutra,	Minister	of	War	of	Brazil,	On	Friday,	August	20,	1943,	at	the	Mayflower	Hotel”,	NARA,	RG59,	Records	of	the	Chief	of	Protocol,	Box	3:	Social	Functions;	Social	Functions	Given	by	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull,	1933-44.	
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privy	to	the	rumours	of	the	impending	Senate	investigation	of	Welles.72	Welles’	social	calendar	for	the	remaining	weeks	of	his	tenure	was	drastically	curtailed.	His	formerly	lavish	and	lively	parties	became	hollow	affairs,	weighted	down	by	the	silent	implications	of	Welles’	impending	political	exile.	The	RSVP	lists	showed	Welles	descending	from	a	social	hub	to	a	pariah.		Welles’	social	life	and	professional	life	existed	in	a	reciprocal	relationship,	each	providing	an	indicator	of	the	other.	The	extent	of	Welles’	success	was	evident	in	the	frequency	and	opulence	of	his	social	functions.	Conversely,	the	centrality	of	these	functions	to	Welles’	professional	life	was	demonstrated	by	the	reaction	in	social	circles	to	the	rumours	about	Welles	in	1943.	The	rumours	destabilized	the	apparatus	of	Welles’	political	power	by	undermining	the	medium	that	he	had	utilized	to	his	advantage	since	the	beginning	of	his	career.	In	that	sense	it	was	ironic	that	the	same	interplay	political	power	that	helped	Welles	master	the	Washington	D.C.	social	circle	also	led	to	his	downfall.		
Climax:	Welles	Resigns				 Through	late	1942	and	early	1943	the	rumours	about	Welles	spread	from	person	to	person	in	the	State	Department	and	the	rest	of	the	federal	government.	Breckinridge	Long	was	told	of	the	rumours	as	early	spring	1942.	Welles	stated	they	were	a	“malicious	lie”	and	Long	professed	to	believe	him.	But	according	to	Long’s	account,	the	rumours	persisted	and	took	hold	before	Welles	or	Roosevelt	could	get	a	handle	on	them	again.73	Long	wrote	that	Welles	“was	accused	of	a	highly	immoral	bit	of	conduct”	that	has	caused	“the	Administration	…	the	White	House	…	the	State	Department”	to	suffer.74	However,	despite	having	knowledge	of	the	incident	in	1942,	Long	made	no	mention	of	the	issue	until	August	of	1943.	According	to	Bill	Bullitt,	by																																																									72	“List	of	Guests	Invited	to	the	Luncheon	to	be	Given	by	the	Under	Secretary	of	State	in	Honor	of	his	Excellency	Senor	Dr.	Don	Leon	DeBayle,	Ambassador	of	Nicaragua,	On	Monday,	June	14,	1943,	in	the	Carlton	Room	of	the	Carlton	Hotel	at	1:15	P.M.”,	NARA,	RG	59,	Records	of	the	Chief	of	Protocol,	Box	5:	Social	Functions;	Social	Functions	Given	by	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull,	1933-44	73	Fred	L.	Israel,	ed.,	The	War	Diary	of	Breckinridge	Long:	Selections	from	Years	1939-1944	(Lincoln:	University	of	Nebraska	Press,	1966),	324,	325.	74	Ibid.,	324,	325.	
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April	1943	“practically	everybody	in	Washington	did	know	it	[the	rumours]”	and	Cordell	Hull	had	called	on	Roosevelt	to	“get	rid	of	Welles.”75	Pressure	continued	to	mount	on	Roosevelt	over	the	summer	while	rancour	toward	Welles	reached	a	crescendo.76	When	Welles’	resignation	finally	came	on	16	August	1943	it	was	something	of	an	anti-climax.	So	widely	had	the	rumours	spread,	and	so	effectively	had	Welles’	political	power	been	undermined,	Welles’	departure	was	all	but	foreordained.	Although	Roosevelt	had	offered	Welles	a	roving	ambassadorship,	beginning	with	a	special	mission	to	Moscow,	Welles’	political	career	was	effectively	over.	Moreover,	the	reasons	for	Welles’	resignation	were	by	this	point	an	open	secret.	Adolf	Berle	mourned	the	loss	of	Welles	whose	departure	was	“occasioned	by	Mr.	Hull.”77	Rexford	Tugwell	found	himself	in	a	“depression”	over	Welles’	departure	and	later	expressed	a	hope	that	Welles	would	give	“useful	pointers”	to	anyone	writing	a	book	critical	of	Hull.78	Edward	Stettinius,	Welles’	successor,	was	more	discreet	when	he	wrote	in	his	diary	that	he	and	Hull	had	discussed	Welles’	“very	personal	private	situation”	during	a	meeting	shortly	after	Welles’	resignation.79	Meanwhile,	in	a	private	conversation	with	Bill	Bullitt,	Hull	gloated	to	him	“[n]o	matter	how	much	either	of	us	suffer,	neither	of	us	ever	did	a	more	righteous	act	or	a	greater	public	service	than	kicking	that	son	of	a	bitch	into	the	open	spaces.”80	The	rumours	about	Welles	eventually	spread	outside	of	the	Washington	D.C.	bubble.	In	the	weeks	leading	up	to	Welles’	departure	the	F.B.I.	became	aware	of	discussions	by	senior	congressmen	pertaining	to	Welles’	status	vis	à	vis	the	USSR.	A																																																									75	Unsigned	Memoranda,	25	April	1943,	Yale	University	Archives,	WCBP,	Series	VI,	Box:	210,	Folder:	219.		76	In	an	account	by	Bill	Bullitt	of	a	conversation	between	him,	Cordell	Hull,	and	Mrs.	Cordell	Hull,	Mrs.	Hull	was	reported	to	have	said	“All	you	men	are	terrible.	You	protect	each	other	even	when	you	commit	crimes.	I	don’t	see	why	you	or	Cordell	hasn’t	had	this	man	put	in	jail	or	shot	him.”	Unsigned	Memoranda,	25	April	1943,	Yale	University	Archives,	WCBP,	Series	VI,	Box:	210,	Folder:	219.	77	Diary	entry,	April,	1943-	April	1944,	FDRL,	Adolf	A.	Berle	Papers,	Box	215.	78	Letter,	Rexford	Tugwell	to	Welles,	29	October	1943,	FDRL,	Rexford	Tugwell	Papers,	Cont.	29,	General	Correspondence	We-Z;	Letter,	Tugwell	to	Welles,	5	October	1951,	FDRL,	Rexford	Tugwell	papers,	Cont.	29,	General	Correspondence	We-Z.		79	Thomas	M.	Campbell	and	George	C.	Herring,	eds.,	The	Diaries	of	Edward	R.	Stettinius,	Jr.	1943-
1946(New	York:	New	Viewpoints,	1975),	9.	80	Memorandum	of	Bill	Bullitt,	21	June	1944,	Yale	University	Archives,	WCBP,	Series	VI,	Box:	210,	Folder:	219.		
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memo	signed	by	J.	Edgar	Hoover	related	the	spread	of	rumours	about	Welles’	removal	from	office	among	individuals	at	the	Warner	Brothers	Studio	in	Hollywood	who	had	allegedly	been	informed	by	a	Los	Angeles	police	officer	who	had,	in	turn,	heard	the	story	from	an	“eastern	Senator”	(almost	certainly	Owen	Brewster	of	Maine).81	According	to	one	of	Hoover’s	agents,	the	discussion	of	removing	Welles	had	come	up	“as	a	result	of	various	demands	being	made	by	Russia”	and	that	“Russia	had	Welles	sewed	up.”82	The	subsequent	letter	from	Hoover	to	General	Edwin	Watson	recounted	and	allegation	that	“Communist	sympathizers”	in	Los	Angeles	with	connections	in	Washington	had	heard	of	the	Welles	story.83	Although	it	was	unlikely	these	supposed	sympathizers	were	genuinely	connected	to	the	Communist	Party,	or	that	Russian	agents	had	any	plans	to	use	any	knowledge	of	Welles	they	may	have	had	as	leverage,	the	fact	that	these	claims	were	made	by	members	of	the	federal	government	demonstrated	the	power	and	influence	of	the	rumour	mill	in	Welles’	downfall	and	the	ability	for	a	scandal	to	escalate	far	beyond	the	bounds	of	anyone	to	control	it.		The	Bankhead	Train	incident	had	not	only	ended	Welles’	career,	but	it	also	begat	broader	changes	in	how	scandal	was	dealt	with	in	Washington	thereafter.	By	the	time	Welles	had	resigned	all	the	protections	and	etiquette	that	had	worked	to	his	advantage	beforehand	had	collapsed.84	Even	in	the	press,	hints	about	the	nature	of	Welles’	scandal	emerged,	albeit	obliquely.	An	article	in	the	Washington	Times	
Herald	catalogued	the	various	official	reasons	for	Welles’	departure,	dismissing	each	of	them	in	kind.	The	article	concluded,	however,	with	a	quotation	from	Danton																																																									81	Memorandum	for	the	Attorney	General,	14	September	1943,	NARA	RG	65,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[1	of	2]	82	Untitled	Memorandum,	2	September	1943,	NARA	RG	65,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[1	of	2].	83	Hoover	to	General	Watson,	14	September	1943,	NARA	RG	65,	Box	24:	File	156,	Washington	Field	Division	--	Misc.	Info	to	File	164,	Wiretapping,	Use	of	in	FBI,	Office	of	the	Director,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	Official	and	Confidential	Subject	Files,	1924-1972,	Hoover	O+C	Files	#157	Wells,	Sumner	(Deceased)	[1	of	2].	84	For	more	on	the	changing	social	and	sexual	mores	of	wartime	Washington	and	their	intersections	with	the	Federal	Government,	see	Margot	Canaday,	The	Straight	State:	Sexuality	and	Citizenship	in	
Twentieth-Century	America	(Princeton:	Princeton,	University	Press,	2009),	137-73.		
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Walker,	a	Washington	journalist,	who	said	"[w]hatever	printed	reasons	are	given	for	the	Sumner	Welles	'resignation'	one	thing	definitely	is	certain,	and	that	is,	the	inside	story	will	never	come	out.”85	Cornelius	Vanderbilt	made	similarly	sly	references	in	a	gossip	column	to	the	nature	of	the	Welles	scandal	and	the	degree	of	distortion	it	had	undergone	as	news	of	it	disseminated.	Vanderbilt,	in	a	column	titled	“Our	Town	Seems	Tranquil	But	Gayer”	found	it	"amazing	how	many	people	who	actually	know	nothing	about	the	inside	facts	claim	to	know	all.	I	even	hear	a	well-known	dowager	say	it	was	a	case	of	'cherchez	la	femme'	which	everyone	in	Washington	knows	it	isn't."86	A	Washington	political	gossip	columnist	writing	under	the	name	Cholly	Knickerbocker	made	the	clearest	reference	to	the	resignation’s	sexual	back-story.	Knickerbocker	wrote	that "[i]n	the	social	salons	from	Newport	to	Palm	Beach	it's	no	secret	that	'Bill'	Bullitt,	in	connivance	with	State	Secretary	[sic]	Cordell	Hull	brought	about	Welles'	downfall.	But	the	inside	story	is	s-o-o-o-	hot	that	it	would	burn	the	paper	on	which	it	was	printed."87		Such	(relatively)	direct	reference	to	the	sexual	dimension	of	Welles’	resignation	was	unprecedented	in	Washington	D.C.	at	the	time.	It	marked	a	shift	in	how	the	media	interacted	with	the	politicians	they	covered	and,	more	importantly,	how	sexuality	was	discussed.	The	explosive	potential	of	the	Welles’	scandal,	not	totally	realized	as	Welles	resigned	before	it	could	fully	come	out,	opened	a	crack	in	the	decorum	that	had	hitherto	suppressed	discussion	of	sexuality	and	power	in	a	frank	way.	It	opened	the	door	to	a	more	rigorous	and	vigilant	perspective	on	sexuality	in	government	and	laid	the	groundwork	for	a	far	wider	investigation	into	sexuality	in	government	later	in	the	decade	during	the	Lavender	Scare.																																																														85	‘What	Are	the	Real	Facts	In	The	Welles	Case?’	Washington	Times	Herald,	2	September	1943,	cited	in	‘Scrapbook,	1943’	SWP,	Box:	249,	Scrapbook,	1943.	Emphasis	original.		86	‘Sampling	N.Y.	After	D.C.’	by	Cornelius	Vanderbilt,	New	York	Post,	31	August	1943,	cited	in	‘Scrapbook,	1943’	SWP,	Box:	249,	Scrapbook,	1943.	87	“Cholly	Knickerbocker	Observers”,	SWP,	Box:	249,	Scrapbook,	1943.		
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The	Final	Curtain:	Welles’	Lavender	Legacy		 The	conspiracy	that	removed	Welles	from	office	ended	with	Welles’	resignation,	but	the	rumour	mill	that	had	been	its	modus	operendi	had	considerably	greater	longevity.	After	a	brief	period	of	popularity	as	a	public	intellectual,	Welles’	downward	spiral	accelerated	in	the	final	years	of	the	1940s,	spurred	by	personal	misfortune	and	the	virulent	reappearance	in	Washington	political	circles	of	the	rumours	that	had	led	to	his	resignation.	However,	unlike	in	1943	Welles	had	no	political	cover	or	friends	in	powerful	places	to	defend	him	against	the	attacks.	As	the	1940s	progressed	attitudes	toward	sexuality	and	masculinity	in	the	United	States	began	to	shift.	Following	a	decade	of	economic	uncertainty	and	political	instability	in	which	men	in	particular	found	their	status	challenged	and	undermined	by	broader	forces,	Americans’	views	about	sexuality	and	masculinity	started	to	ossify.	As	historian	Douglas	Charles	put	it:			"If	during	the	1930s	gays	were	regarded	as	threats	to	home,	family,	and	society	at	large	amid	the	Great	Depression	and	advent	of	the	New	Deal,	that	perceived	threat	was	refocused	and	magnified	during	the	1940s	and	wartime.	Gays	were	no	longer	perceived	as	simply	a	criminal	or	societal	threat	but	now	a	national	security	threat,	and	concerns	mounted	that	enemies	of	the	United	States	were	working	to	disrupt	the	country	from	within."88		Previously	accepted,	or	at	least	tolerated,	transgressions	of	norms	of	gender	and	sexuality	were	now	placed	under	intense	scrutiny.	Even	the	smallest	hint	of	sexual	abnormality	became	suspect.89			By	the	late	1940s	political	winds	had	changed	and	the	political	context	in	which	Welles	operated	became	considerably	more	hostile	to	him	personally	as	well	as	to	what	he	represented.	As	a	prominent	former	member	of	the	Roosevelt																																																									88	Charles,	Hoover’s	War	on	Gays,	36.		89	Evidence	of	this	change	in	attitudes	can	be	found	even	in	the	investigations	of	the	Bankhead	Train	incident.	When	questioned	as	to	why	he	had	turned	down	Welles’	proposition	for	sex,	one	Pullman	porter	allegedly	replied,	“You	have	to	work	three	years	to	become	a	carpenter	or	a	bricklayer	but	it	takes	only	one	suck	to	make	a	cock-sucker.”	Testimony	of	John	S.	Kissock,	Memorandum	for	the	Director,	23	January	1941,	NARA	II,	RG	65,	Box	24,	Folder:	Wells,	Sumner	(deceased)	[1	of	2].		
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administration	and	the	State	Department,	and	as	a	figure	whose	reputation	had	been	tarnished	by	accusations	of	sexual	impropriety,	Welles	engendered	enormous	suspicion.	In	an	atmosphere	in	which	even	a	hint	of	abnormality	was	interpreted	as	subversion,	Welles	became	a	large	and	conspicuous	target.	The	combination	of	these	suspicions	and	political	discourses	pushed	Welles	out	of	the	public	sphere	completely	and	rendered	him	a	virtual	pariah	in	Washington	D.C.	for	the	rest	of	his	life.		 The	first	major	episode	occurred	in	December	of	1948,	when	Welles	nearly	died	of	exposure	after	collapsing	in	a	field	near	his	house.	Welles	was	seriously	injured,	losing	several	toes	and	fingers	to	frostbite,	and	spent	several	months	recuperating.	The	event	was	widely	reported	and	covered	by	the	New	York	Times	and	the	Washington	Post,	among	others.	The	Post	devoted	two	pages	to	describing	Welles’	ordeal,	the	circumstances	of	his	collapse,	and	the	final	years	of	his	service	in	the	Department	before	his	resignation.90			 The	coverage	was	notable	for	its	attention	to	detail	as	well	as	a	subtext	of	intrigue	and	ambiguity.	All	the	papers	that	covered	the	event	published	multiple,	often	conflicting	explanations	of	what	had	transpired.	The	New	York	Times	reported	that	“there	were	indications	that	[Welles]	…	had	had	a	heart	attack.”91	The	
Washington	Post	also	speculated	about	a	heart	attack,	but	paid	more	attention	to	Welles’	suffering	from	insomnia	and	his	habit	of	taking	“customary	nocturnal	walks.”92	The	Post	further	added	that	Welles	was	conspicuously	far	from	his	home	when	the	accident	occurred,	publishing	a	helpful,	albeit	crude,	drawing	of	the	area	to	illustrate.93		Many	outlets	speculated	about	a	political	motive	to	Welles’	accident.	Drew	Pearson,	Welles’	friend	and	a	syndicated	columnist,	dubbed	the	episode	“Hull’s																																																									90	‘Sumner	Welles	Found	Unconscious	In	Field;	Toes,	Fingers	Frozen’,	Washington	Post,	27	December	1948.	Cited	in	FDRL,	FDR	Memorial	Foundation,	Series	I,	Box	27:	IV.A.4.	–	Welles,	Sumner	to	IV.A.6.	–	Yalta	Conference,	Folder:	IV.A.4	–	Welles,	Sumner.		91	‘Welles,	Stricken,	Lies	in	Field	of	Hours	in	Icy	Weather’	by	Jay	Waltz,	27	December	1948,	The	New	
York	Times.		92	‘Sumner	Welles	Found	Unconscious	In	Field;	Toes,	Fingers	Frozen’,	Washington	Post,	27	December	1948.	Cited	in	FDRL,	FDR	Memorial	Foundation,	Series	I,	Box	27:	IV.A.4.	–	Welles,	Sumner	to	IV.A.6.	–	Yalta	Conference,	Folder:	IV.A.4	–	Welles,	Sumner.	93	Ibid.		
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‘Revenge’,”	noting	that	Welles	had	had	“a	bottle	of	sleeping	pills	in	his	pocket”	at	the	time	of	the	accident.94		All	the	major	papers	mentioned	the	suicide	of	Lawrence	Duggan,	one	of	Welles’	closest	allies	in	the	State	Department,	which	had	occurred	only	a	week	before,	although	no	explicit	connection	was	made	between	the	two	events	at	the	time.	However,	a	little	under	a	year	later	the	Chicago	Tribune	tied	Welles’	accident	to	Duggan’s	suicide	as	well	as	the	deaths	of	Harry	Dexter	White	and	Walter	Marvin	Smith	and	the	disappearance	of	Noel	Field	–	all	prominent	figures	in	the	trial	of	Alger	Hiss,	at	which	Welles	testified	as	an	expert	witness.95	Reading	between	the	lines,	it	was	clear	that	there	were	doubts	as	to	the	veracity	of	Welles’	account	of	the	evening,	and	although	it	could	not	be	printed,	there	was	something	suspicious	about	the	whole	affair.			 Less	reputable	news	outlets	seeking	to	discredit	the	New	Deal	by	ad	hominem	attacks	on	its	proponents	explored	more	bluntly	what	those	suspicions	were	at	the	time	and	in	years	after.	Unburdened	by	journalistic	integrity,	several	tabloid	publications	depicted	Welles’	accident	as	a	homosexual	tryst	gone	awry.96	One	account	purported	that	Welles	“almost	died	of	exposure	when	a	Negro	farm	hand,	jealous	because	of	his	attention	to	another,	slugged	him.”97	Another	salacious	report,	published	several	years	later,	blamed	Welles’	accident	his	being	“in	search	of	forbidden	satisfaction”.98	Unlike	the	reporting	of	the	accident	at	the	time,	these	accounts	were	graphic	and	unrestrained	in	their	descriptions	of	Welles	as	a	homosexual.	It	was	part	of	a	trend	that	would	see	Welles	being	invoked	by	authors	as	an	example	of	the	infiltration	of	the	State	Department	by	“powerful	homosexual	diplomats.”99																																																											94	The	Washington	Merry-Go-Round,	‘Welles’	Mishap	Hull’s	‘Revenge’	by	Drew	Pearson,	Washington	
Post,	1	January	1949.	Cited	in	FDRL,	FDR	Memorial	Foundation,	Series	I,	Box	27:	IV.A.4.	–	Welles,	Sumner	to	IV.A.6.	–	Yalta	Conference,	Folder:	IV.A.4	–	Welles,	Sumner.	95	‘Strange	Deaths	Weave	Pattern	in	Hiss	Spy	Case’	by	Walter	Trohan,	Chicago	Tribune,	13	December	1949.		96	Though	there	is	no	evidence	to	indicate	these	outlets	were	aware	of	the	fact,	just	under	two	years	earlier	the	FBI	received	information	during	a	“routine	investigation	at	the	State	Department”	that	Welles	had	attempted	to	proposition	a	soldier	who	was	based	near	his	Oxon	Hill,	Maryland	home.	Memorandum	from	Guy	Hottel	to	the	Director,	3	February	1947,	FBI	Subject	File:	Sumner	Welles.			97	Jack	Lait	and	Lee	Mortimer.	Washington	Confidential.	(New	York:	Crown	Publishers,	1951),	97	98	‘We	Accuse	Sumner	Welles’,	p.63,	Confidential	Magazine,	Vol.	4,	No.	2,	May	1956	99	Johnson,	The	Lavender	Scare,	67.		
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Welles	was	prominently	featured,	though	not	by	name,	in	the	book	length	exposé	Washington	Confidential	in	1950	as	a	“high	State	Department	official	[who]	was	a	notorious	homo.”100	Washington	Confidential	was	the	bestselling	book	in	a	series	published	by	the	muckraking	journalists	Jack	Lait	and	Lee	Mortimer	detailing	lurid	accounts	of	the	underworlds	of	New	York	City,	Chicago,	and	Washington	D.C.101	They	described	Washington	D.C.	as	“the	dizziest	–	and	this	will	amaze	you,	as	it	did	us,	the	dirtiest	–	community	in	America.102	The	city	was	“a	cesspool	of	drunkenness,	debauchery,	whoring,	homosexuality,	municipal	corruption	and	public	apathy,	protected	crime	under	criminal	protection,	hoodlumism,	racketeering,	pandering	and	plundering,	among	anomalous	situations	found	nowhere	else	on	earth.”103	They	impressively	catalogued	the	queer	geography	of	D.C.	before	turning	their	attention	to	Welles.	Lait	and	Mortimer	accurately	recounted	the	Bankhead	Train	incident	in	detail	as	well	as	the	successful	suppression	of	information	about	it	by	FDR.	Even	though	it	had	been	ten	years	since	the	incident	took	place	and	seven	years	since	Welles’	resignation,	information	about	the	Bankhead	Train	incident	was	still	widely	disseminated	and	had	now	passed	into	the	realm	of	popular	lore.	Welles’	reputation	was	taking	on	mythical	proportions.	The	re-emergence	of	rumours	about	Welles’	sexuality	coincided	with	the	advent	of	widespread	fear	among	politicians	in	Washington	D.C.	about	homosexuals	in	government.	It	was	spurred	on	by	sensational	reports	about	high-ranking	government	employees	–	notably	Alger	Hiss	and	Klaus	Fuchs	-	passing	sensitive	documents	to	the	Soviets,	and	a	desire	by	newly	empowered	congressional	Republicans	to	embarrass	the	Democrats	and	President	Truman.	A	wide	ranging	investigation	of	‘subversion’	in	the	U.S.	government	began	in	1947	as	fears	about	sexual	nonconformity	fused	with	anxieties	about	“fortifying	the	American	
																																																								100	Jack	Lait	and	Lee	Mortimer,	Washington	Confidential,	(New	York:	Crown	Publishers,	1950,	1951),	97.	101	http://www.librarything.com/bookaward/New+York+Times+bestseller,	Accessed	28	August	2014.		102	Lait	and	Mortimer,	Washington	Confidential,	ix.	103	Ibid.		
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‘character’”	to	uphold	their	new	role	as	the	“torchbearers	for	Western	civilization.104	Among	the	targets	for	this	crusade	were	members	of	the	State	Department	who	were	alleged	to	be	pro-Soviet	or	otherwise	possessed	unsavoury	characteristics.			 As	the	investigation	into	‘disloyalty’	in	the	State	Department	metastasized	into	a	full-blown	witch-hunt,	Welles	was	indirectly	fingered	as	the	originator	and	cause	of	the	“‘rottenness’.”105	Welles’	scandal	was	remembered	widely	enough	to	be	invoked	by	columnists	and	congressional	investigators	as	they	attempted	to	cast	aspersions	on	existing	State	Department	employees.	“‘Blame	is	on	the	permission	of	one	man	to	rig	a	whole	hierarchy	of	misfits	in	the	State	Department’,”	alleged	columnist	Robert	Ruark,	while	another	columnist	wrote	of	“‘an	old	family	friend	of	Roosevelt’s’”	who	was	to	blame	for	the	recent	problems.106	Welles’	persona	was	invoked	as	the	acme	of	the	stereotypical	‘subversive’	character	that	was	presently	denoted	as	suspicious:	an	elite,	East	Coast,	wealthy	aristocrat,	willing	to	negotiate	(with	the	Soviets)	rather	than	take	a	hard	line.107	Lingering	memories	about	Welles	may	also	have	spurred	a	major	alteration	of	the	U.S.	Constitution.	According	to	one	account,	during	the	drafting	of	the	twenty-fifth	amendment,	the	decision	to	place	the	Secretary	of	State	further	down	the	list	of	presidential	succession	was	taken	in	part	out	of	after-the-fact	resentment	about	how	close	Welles	had	been	to	president	Roosevelt,	and	how	his	elevation	to	Secretary	of	State	would	have	put	him	second	in	line	under	the	previous	system.108	Thus,	the	legacy	of	Welles’	scandal	had	lasting	impacts	on	the	political	discourse	in	the	United	States,	specifically	around	the	subjects	of	sexuality,	loyalty,	and	the	State	Department.		In	1956	came	a	bizarre	codicil	to	the	ongoing	saga	of	Welles’	sexuality	as	a	matter	of	public	consumption.	Eight	years	after	his	accident	and	thirteen	years	after	his	resignation,	Welles	was	featured	on	the	front	page	of	a	salacious	political	tabloid,	
																																																								104	Naoko	Shibusawa,	“The	Lavender	Scare	and	Empire:	Rethinking	Cold	War	Antigay	Politics,”	
Diplomatic	History,	Vol.	36,	No.	4,	(September	2012),	751.		105	David.	K.	Johnson,	The	Lavender	Scare:	The	Cold	War	Persecution	of	Gays	and	Lesbians	in	the	
Federal	Government.	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2004),	67,	quoting	Robert	C.	Ruark,	
Washington	Daily	News,	March	23	and	23,	1950.		106	Ibid.,	67,	quoting	Westbrook	Pegler,	Washington-Times	Herald,	March	26,	1950.		107	Ibid.,	67.	108	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs,	392-3.	
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Confidential.	Entitled	“We	Accuse	Sumner	Welles”	the	article	described	how	Welles	was	“a	man	who	would	now	be	classified	as	a	security	risk,	came	to	dominating	[sic]	American	foreign	policy.”109	Though	inconsistent	with	details,	the	article	was	the	most	direct	connection	ever	made	between	Welles	and	the	Lavender	Scare.	It	explicitly	cited	Welles	as	the	first	instance	of	queer	people	as	security	threats	infiltrating	the	State	Department.	Furthermore,	the	article	was	an	implicit	sign	of	the	political	potency	of	such	accusations,	coming	as	it	did	during	a	presidential	election	year	when	a	former	ally	of	Welles,	Adlai	Stevenson,	was	on	the	Democratic	ticket.	However,	by	the	time	of	Dwight	Eisenhower’s	re-election	campaign	Welles	was	already	a	bygone	figure.	The	feverish	atmosphere	of	the	Lavender	Scare	had	ruined	Welles’	public	reputation	all	over	again,	only	more	completely	and	with	more	lasting	effects.	Welles	lost	his	contract	broadcasting	for	the	Herald	Tribune.	His	publisher	refused	to	accept	any	more	manuscripts	from	him	and	his	speaking	schedule	was	reduced	to	a	few	intermittent	appearances	at	Zionist	organizations.	Despite	the	passage	of	time	since	his	removal	from	public	office,	Welles	could	not	escape	the	legacy	of	the	scandal	that	forced	his	resignation.	Rumours	about	Welles’	sexuality	dogged	him	for	the	rest	of	his	life	and	took	their	toll	on	his	public	standing	as	well	as	his	physical	and	mental	health.	His	body	failing	him,	Welles	retired	permanently	to	private	life,	spending	his	last	years	in	obscurity	until	his	death	in	1961.			
Conclusion:		 Welles	tendered	his	resignation	to	Roosevelt	on	16	August	1943.	He	thanked	Roosevelt	for	his	patronage	and,	notably,	for	the	“friendship	and	kindness	you	showed	me	in	our	last	talk.”110	Roosevelt	had	little	option	but	to	accept	Welles’	resignation,	in	light	of	the	ultimatum	issued	by	Hull	and	the	political	reality	of	the	situation.	It	was	a	stunning	turnaround	for	Welles	and	marked	a	sudden	and	definitive	end	to	his	career	in	public	service.																																																										109	‘We	Accuse	Sumner	Welles’,	p.14,	Confidential	Magazine,	Vol.	4,	No.	2,	May	1956.	110	Letter,	Welles	to	FDR,	16	August	1943,	SWP,	Box:	152,	Folder:	4.		
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	 However,	while	the	crescendo	of	events	that	led	to	Welles’	resignation	stemmed	from	an	extraordinary	sequence	of	improbable	events,	the	circumstances	surrounding	it	were	not	altogether	surprising.	Throughout	his	career	Welles	attracted	attention,	some	of	it	positive	but	much	of	it	negative,	about	his	sexuality.	From	explicit	incidents	of	sexual	indiscretion	such	as	his	first	divorce,	to	subtler	but	no	less	persistent	commentary	on	his	manner	of	dress,	speech,	comportment,	attitude,	and	professional	demeanour,	discourses	about	sexuality	pervaded	Welles’	career.	Long	before	stories	of	the	Bankhead	Train	incident	became	semi-public	knowledge,	colleagues	and	enemies	of	Welles	connected	criticisms	of	Welles	to	his	sexuality,	infusing	Welles’	actions	with	a	subtext	of	sexual	non-conformity.	Remarkably,	Welles	internalized	these	discourses	about	sexuality	and	deployed	them	to	his	advantage.	This	strategy	shaped	how	he	interacted	with	allies	and	adversaries	in	the	department.	It	garnered	him	the	attention,	admiration,	as	well	as	the	enmity	of	many	of	his	colleagues	and	it	would	have	a	profound	effect	on	his	career,	ultimately	leading	to	its	end.			 The	saga	of	Welles’	sexuality	intersected	with	some	of	the	most	significant	aspects	of	American	politics	during	this	time.	Roosevelt’s	efforts	to	protect	Welles	by	burying	his	scandal	showed	the	extent	and	the	limitations	of	his	political	influence,	notwithstanding	their	close	bond	and	Roosevelt’s	sympathy	for	Welles’	situation.	The	dynamics	of	Roosevelt’s	hold	over	Washington	were	also	evident,	as	Welles’	increasing	vulnerability	to	attack	came	as	a	result	of	Roosevelt’s	declining	capabilities,	both	political	and	physical.	Welles’	scandal	reopened	the	harsh	divisions	in	the	State	Department	that	had	been	fomented	over	a	decade.	In	his	single-minded	effort	to	destroy	Welles,	Bill	Bullitt	gave	testament	to	the	level	of	enmity	Welles	could	engender	in	those	whom	he	had	outwitted	or	overruled	in	his	quest	for	power.	Bullitt	and	Hull’s	efforts	to	undermine	Welles	slowly	through	back	channels	revealed	another	little-understood	aspect	of	wartime	Washington:	the	power	of	informal	networks,	particularly	those	of	spouses,	was	real	and	widely	felt.			 The	Bankhead	Train	incident	was	a	flashpoint	in	Welles’	career	and	the	catalyst	for	the	much	wider	persecution	of	queer	people	by	the	federal	government	
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during	the	Lavender	Scare.111	With	Welles’	departure,	the	State	Department	lost	one	of	its	most	prominent	and	erudite	members.	The	policies	Welles	stood	for	–	broadly	internationalist	idealism,	hemispheric	solidarity,	and	cooperation	with	the	Soviets	–	went	into	eclipse.	The	impact	on	Roosevelt	himself	was	profound	as	well.	Roosevelt	lost	the	only	member	of	the	State	Department	he	truly	liked	or	trusted.	Without	Welles’	counsel,	Roosevelt’s	execution	of	foreign	affairs	became	even	more	single-handed,	a	workload	which	he	was	unable	to	maintain	as	his	health	deteriorated.	Welles’	departure	also	foreshadowed	a	substantial	shift	in	attitudes	toward	the	State	Department	and	the	influence	of	men	like	Welles	in	it.	Within	a	few	years,	as	foreign	policy	setbacks	mounted	and	World	War	turned	to	Cold	War,	the	State	Department	became	the	focus	of	an	intense	campaign	to	root	out	suspected	‘deviants’	be	they	ideological	or	moral.	Welles’	scandal	had	laid	the	groundwork	for	this	purge	and	Welles	himself	unwittingly	provided	the	straw	man	for	it.			
																																																								
111	Johnson,	The	Lavender	Scare,	65-7.				
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Chapter	Seven:	
	Fading	Luminary:	Welles’	Post-Resignation	Career	
		 In	1947	journalist	John	Franklin	Carter	published,	under	the	pseudonym	Jay	Franklin,	a	book	with	the	alliterative	title	The	Catoctin	Conversation.1	It	imagined	a	deep	and	meandering	conversation	between	Franklin	Roosevelt,	Winston	Churchill,	and	Ernst	Hanfstaengl,	a	German	émigré	who	worked	as	an	intelligence	agent	for	the	Allies	during	World	War	Two.2	The	fictional	conversation	explored	topics	ranging	from	American	war	aims	to	German	national	psychology.	The	book	was	written	as	a	cheeky	repartee	between	the	participants	that	bore	only	passing	resemblance	to	the	figures	themselves	or	any	conversations	they	ever	had.	Nevertheless,	it	was	popular.	The	recounting	of	recent	world	events	struck	a	chord	with	an	American	public	still	trying	to	figure	out	the	ramifications	of	their	wartime	experiences	and	what	kind	of	world	they	now	inhabited.			 The	book’s	success	and	whatever	air	of	legitimacy	it	possessed	were	due	at	least	in	part	to	the	forward	written	by	former	Undersecretary	of	State	Sumner	Welles.	Four	years	after	his	resignation	Welles	was	a	prominent	public	intellectual.	His	broadly	internationalist	and	avowedly	Rooseveltian	take	on	inter-American	cooperation,	US-Soviet	relations,	the	United	Nations	Organization	(U.N.O.),	and	the	creation	of	a	Jewish	national	homeland	was	in	high	demand.	His	own	bibliography	included	four	books,	The	Time	for	Decision,	Where	Are	We	Heading?,	World	of	the	
Four	Freedoms,	An	Intelligent	American’s	Guide	to	the	Peace,	and	a	fifth,	We	Need	Not	
Fail,	was	about	to	be	completed.	Welles’	books	sold	well,	with	The	Time	for	Decision	reaching	the	top	place	on	the	New	York	Times	bestseller	list.3	Additionally,	since	his	resignation	Welles	had	delivered	dozens	of	lectures,	radio	addresses,	and	speeches	on	a	variety	of	foreign	policy	topics.	The	Catoctin	Conversation,	though	technically	fiction,	fit	nicely	into	the	niche	Welles	had	carved	out	for	himself:	an	ardent																																																									1	Jay	Franklin,	The	Catoctin	Conversation	(New	York:	Charles	Scribner’s	Sons,	1947).		2	Steven	Casey,	“Franklin	D.	Roosevelt,	Ernst	‘Putzi’	Hanfstaengl	and	the	‘S-Project’,	June	1942-1944,”	
Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	Vol.	35,	No.	3,	July	(2000),	339.				3	‘Book	awards:	New	York	Times	bestseller’.	http://www.librarything.com/bookaward/New+York+Times+bestseller.	Accessed	24	August	2014.		
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internationalist,	still	closely	associated	with	the	policies	and	ethos	of	Franklin	Roosevelt,	expounding	on	“the	probable	nature	of	…	post-war	relations.”4		However,	within	another	few	years	Welles’	reputation	would	again	be	in	tatters	and	the	views	he	espoused	on	American	foreign	policy	increasingly	eclipsed	by	the	rising	tensions	of	the	Cold	War.	This	transition	reflected	a	profound	shift	in	Americans’	attitudes	toward	their	foreign	relations.	It	signalled	the	end	of	a	brief	period	in	American	history	where	an	unprecedentedly	wide	variety	of	options	for	how	to	conduct	the	nation’s	foreign	policy	were	considered.5	Welles’	marginalization	was	both	indicative	of	and	fuelled	by	a	reactionary	trend	that	indicted	liberals,	queer	people,	and	anyone	associated	with	the	Roosevelt	administration	for	alleged	weakness,	disloyalty,	and	subversion.	As	he	stood	at	the	nexus	of	those	identities,	Welles	came	in	for	particularly	vehement	abuse.	The	consequences	for	Welles’	career	at	the	time,	and	for	the	evolution	of	American	political	and	diplomatic	history,	were	significant.			 Nevertheless,	before	he	faded	entirely	from	the	public	spotlight,	Welles	made	a	significant	contribution	to	the	political	discourse	in	the	United	States	over	the	shape	and	trajectory	of	postwar	U.S.	foreign	policy.	His	observations	and	arguments	provided	a	uniquely	well-informed	glimpse	into	the	tumultuous	challenges	that	the	U.S.	faced	as	the	country	transitioned	from	World	War	to	Cold	War.	Welles’	attitudes	reflected	the	changing	circumstances	of	the	time	as	well	as	the	long-held	principles	that	had	informed	his	actions	while	he	was	still	in	public	service.	His	observations	and	recommendations	revealed	a	great	deal	about	his	own	thinking	as	well	as	that	of	those	around	him,	particularly	Franklin	Roosevelt,	whose	death	in	April	1945	left	many	unanswered	questions	about	U.S.	foreign	policy	intentions.	Before	a	second	round	of	public	humiliation	pushed	him	permanently	into	private	life,	Welles	outlined	a	view	of	the	postwar	world	that	was	in	some	ways	similar	to	yet	nonetheless	distinct	from	the	policies	pursued	by	U.S.	government.	As	a	result,	Welles’	works	comprised	a	notably	comprehensive	catalogue	of	points	of																																																									4	Franklin,	The	Catoctin	Conversation,	xiii.		5	Frank	Costigliola.	Roosevelt's	Lost	Alliances:	How	Personal	Politics	Helped	Start	the	Cold	War	(New	York:	Princeton	University	Press,	2012),	421.		
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comparison	and	contrasts	with	extant	policy	decisions	and	an	intriguing	counterfactual	take	on	U.S.	foreign	policy	in	the	early	Cold	War	era.		This	chapter	gives	a	detailed	account	of	Welles’	post-resignation	professional	activities.	Returning	to	the	themes	addressed	in	Chapters	Two,	Three,	Four,	and	Five,	this	chapter	identifies	how	Welles’	paternalistic	idealism,	aversion	to	militarism,	and	reliance	on	FDR	influenced	his	political	thinking	and	writing	during	these	final	years	of	his	career.	Specifically,	this	chapter	examines	the	gradual	marginalization	of	Welles	and	his	ideas	as	the	U.S.	transitioned	from	World	War	to	Cold	War	in	the	1940s	and	1950s.	It	shows	Welles’	declining	influence	on	policymaking	and	public	debate	because	of	his	removal	from	office	and,	after	April	1945,	the	death	of	Franklin	Roosevelt.	It	explores	how	Welles’	paternalistically	idealistic	vision	for	Latin	America	and	the	U.N.O.,	which	he	had	pursued	doggedly	throughout	his	career,	was	overshadowed	by	a	more	aggressive	and	confrontational	approach	to	foreign	affairs.	Finally,	this	chapter	shows	how	Welles’	collaboration-focused,	militarism-averse	policymaking	became	increasingly	anachronistic	as	relations	with	the	Soviet	Union	deteriorated,	and	how	Welles	attempted	to	adapt	to	the	massively	transformed	international	situation	around	him.			
Departing	Giant:	Welles’	Resignation	and	American	Public	Opinion		Welles’	post-resignation	career	is	the	least	studied	area	of	his	professional	and	personal	life.	In	the	seven	scholarly	accounts	of	Welles’	life	and	career,	comprising	hundreds	of	pages,	a	total	of	thirty-six	pages	are	devoted	to	Welles’	career	after	1943,	the	longest	being	the	penultimate	chapter	in	Benjamin	Welles’	biography	of	his	father.	According	to	the	younger	Welles,	this	period	in	his	father’s	life	was	"initially	marked	by	success	as	an	author,	syndicated	columnist,	radio	broadcaster	and	lecturer”	when	his	“views	were	widely	sought	and	his	prestige	was	intact."6	Other	authors	largely	concurred	with	this	assessment.	Irwin	Gellman	noted	Welles’	many	radio	broadcasts,	his	emergence	as	a	strong	proponent	of	the	U.N.O.																																																									6	Benjamin	Welles.	Sumner	Welles:	FDR’s	Global	Strategist:	A	Biography	(New	York:	MacMillan	Press,	1997),	357.	
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and	a	Jewish	national	homeland.7	Christopher	O’Sullivan	underlined	the	importance	of	Welles’	first	book,	The	Time	For	Decision,	as	an	example	of	his	enduring	popularity.8	All	three	authors	also	acknowledged	the	persistence	of	scandal,	rumour,	and	character	assassination	in	Welles’	post-resignation	life,	in	particular	the	duelling	memoirs	between	Welles,	Cordell	Hull,	and	Bill	Bullitt.9	However,	as	with	many	periods	of	Welles’	career,	over-emphasis	of	the	personal	tragedies	that	befell	Welles	have	glossed	over	the	persistence	of	key	themes	in	Welles’	professional	thinking	and	praxis.	In	particular,	Welles’	post-resignation	career	highlighted	the	salience	of	those	themes	that	had	animated	his	entire	career	–	paternalistic	idealism,	anti-militarism,	and	a	reliance	on	FDR	for	political	patronage.		In	the	aftermath	of	his	resignation	from	the	State	Department,	Welles	entered	a	new	phase	of	his	professional	life.	Although	he	left	under	a	cloud	of	suspicion	and	amid	extensive	gossip	among	the	Washington	D.C.	political	elite,	Welles	quickly	found	his	footing	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	his	resignation.	After	a	brief	recuperation	at	his	home	in	Bar	Harbor,	Maine,	Welles	stayed	true	to	the	workaholic	tendencies	he	demonstrated	while	in	the	State	Department,	keeping	up	a	dizzying	pace	of	public	engagements	and	radio	broadcasts	while	publishing	several	books	on	international	relations.		The	continued	verve	in	Welles’	public	appearances	and	profile	during	these	years	can	be	attributed,	in	part,	to	the	outpouring	of	support	he	received.	As	soon	as	the	news	of	his	departure	was	announced,	hundreds	of	letters	from	every	corner	of	the	country	began	to	pour	into	the	White	House,	praising	Welles	“the	only	real	brains”	in	the	State	Department,	demanding	his	reinstatement,	and	castigating	President	Roosevelt	for	allowing	Welles	to	resign.10	Welles	drew	support	from	a	wide	array	of	sources:	doctors	and	lawyers,	farmers	and	labourers,	Democrats	and	Republicans,	ordinary	Americans	and	prominent	officials.	The	letters	in	support	of	Welles	outweighed	the	negative	responses	twenty	to	one	and	were	matched	by	an																																																									7	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs,	389-91.		8	Christopher	D.	O’Sullivan,	Sumner	Welles:	Postwar	Planning	and	the	Quest	for	a	New	World	Order	
1937-1943	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2009),	228.	9	Welles,	367-9,	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs,	391-4,	O’Sullivan,	229-32.		10	Mr.	and	Mrs.	L.F.	Norris	to	Welles,	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	Presidential	Library	(FDRL),	Sumner	Welles	Papers	(SWP),	Box:	95,	Folder:	2.		
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overwhelming	chorus	of	praise	for	Welles	among	the	country’s	editorial	pages,	even	among	those	supportive	of	Hull.11		Many	saw	Welles’	dismissal	as	a	victory	for	conservatives,	“southern	reactionaries,”	and	for	Cordell	Hull’s	“elderly	and	petty	meddling.”12	Echoing	the	media	coverage	of	Welles’	resignation,	particularly	editorials	in	the	New	York	Times	and	Washington	Post,	concerned	citizens	speculated	about	a	conspiracy	to	silence	liberal	voices	in	the	administration,	citing	the	recent	confrontations	between	the	president	and	prominent	liberals	like	Henry	Wallace	and	Milo	Perkins.13	Some	letters	even	included	suggestions	for	Welles	to	pursue	political	office,	by	returning	as	Secretary	of	State	or	through	a	run	for	congress,	specifically	as	Senator	for	Maryland.14	The	support	was	undoubtedly	a	welcome	boost	to	Welles’	bruised	ego	during	this	difficult	adjustment.	Evident	in	the	letters	supporting	Welles,	and	even	in	some	of	those	opposing	him,	was	the	degree	to	which	Welles	and,	more	importantly,	his	ideals	commanded	respect	among	the	U.S.	public.	The	breadth	and	depth	of	support	for	Welles	expressed	in	his	fan	mail	reflected	the	high	stature	Welles	had	in	the	public	eye	at	the	time,	as	well	as	the	popularity	of	his	foreign	policy	beliefs	among	a	broad	swath	of	Americans.	Besides	praising	him	for	his	work	ethic	and	patriotism,	those	supporting	Welles	singled	him	out	for	embodying	the	ideals	of	the	Atlantic	Charter	and	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy.	There	was	a	widespread	feeling	of	respect	and	admiration	for	the	former	Under	Secretary	of	State.	Welles’	supporters	praised	his	abilities	as	an	individual	but	placed	specific	emphasis	on	the	causes	that	he	championed,	in	particular	the	creation	of	a	postwar	world	organization.	In	general,																																																									11	FDRL,	President's	Official	File	(OF),	Box:	16	OF	Department	of	State,	OF	Resignation	of	Sumner	Welles	(Pro);	‘Mr.	Hull	Under	Fire’,	The	Wall	Street	Journal,	31	August	1943;	‘Keep	Welles,	Mr.	President!’,	New	York	P.M.,	26	August	1943;	‘Why	Was	Sumner	Welles	Fired?’,	St.	Louis	Post-Dispatch,	30	August	1943;	‘Sumner	Welles’,	The	New	York	Times,	27	September	1943.	All	sourced	in	SWP,	Box	249:	Scrapbook,	1943.		12	H.A.	Overstreet	to	Franklin	Roosevelt,	26	August	1943,	FDRL,	OF,	Box:	16,	Folder:	OF	20	Resignation	of	Sumner	Welles	(Con)	“O”;	Mrs.	A.C.	Cartwright	to	Franklin	Roosevelt,	27	August	1943,	FDRL,	OF,	Box:	16,	Folder:	OF	20	Resignation	of	Sumner	Welles	(Con)	“C”.	13	Mrs.	Alice	Hawthorne	to	Franklin	Roosevelt,	7	September	1943,	FDRL,	OF,	Box:	16,	Folder:	OF	20,	Resignation	of	Sumner	Welles	(Con)	“H”;	Bryan	Marin	to	Franklin	Roosevelt,	29	August	1943,	FDRL,	OF,	Box:	16,	Folder:	OF	20,	Resignation	of	Sumner	Welles	(Con)	“M”.	14	Jerome	Robinson	to	Welles	27	August	1943,	SWP,	Box:	95,	Folder	5.	
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Welles	embodied	much	of	the	wartime	optimism	among	some	in	the	U.S.	public	toward	cooperation	with	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	creation	of	a	more	peaceful	world	at	the	war’s	end.	The	outrage	over	Welles’	dismissal,	and	the	outpouring	of	support	for	him,	tapped	into	a	small	but	growing	constituency	that	wanted	to	see	the	foreign	policies	of	the	United	States	redirected	towards	a	more	internationalist	view.	For	one	prominent	advocate	of	this	point	of	view,	Clark	Eichelberger,	Welles’	resignation	was	particularly	disappointing.	"[T]he	worst	news	coming	out	of	Washington	for	the	internationalists,”	historian	Andrew	Johnstone	wrote	of	Eichelberger’s	outlook	at	this	time,	“was	the	resignation	of	Sumner	Welles;”	as	"one	of	the	most	eloquent	and	committed	internationalists	in	the	State	Department”	his	departure	was	“a	great	loss	to	the	movement."15		Perhaps	because	he	perceived	the	significance	of	his	departure	to	the	cause	of	the	internationalists,	Welles	spent	much	of	his	post-resignation	career	promoting	and	promulgating	the	internationalist	views	for	which	he	was	famous.	Particularly	in	the	first	two	years	after	his	resignation,	Welles	was	in	high	demand.	He	gave	an	average	of	one	or	two	major	speeches	each	month	in	1944	and	1945,	typically	to	prominent	social	clubs	on	the	east	coast	and	in	the	Midwest,	and	occasionally	to	universities	and	civic	associations.	Beginning	in	1946	he	delivered	weekly	radio	addresses	for	the	Harold	Tribune	as	well	as	occasional	speeches	on	the	Blue	Network,	and	WJW	Enterprises.	On	top	of	this,	Welles	managed	to	publish	several	monographs	on	world	affairs,	including	his	best	selling	quasi-memoir	The	Time	for	
Decision,	which	Time	magazine	called	“a	sprightly	prose”	that	“plant[ed]	himself	flat-footedly	on	the	issues	which	he	holds	to	be	important.”16	Welles	also	published	two	collections	of	speeches,	and	edited	an	encyclopedic	almanac	cataloguing	every	country	in	the	world	and	its	postwar	status	entitled	An	Intelligent	American’s	Guide	
to	the	Peace.		
																																																								15	Andrew	Johnstone,	Dilemmas	of	Internationalism:	The	American	Association	for	the	United	Nations	
and	US	Foreign	Policy,	1941-1948	(Burlington:	Ashgate	Publishing	Limited,	2009),	74.		16	‘Books:	The	Welles	Plan’,	Time,	24	July	1944.		
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	Such	opinions	about	Welles	and	U.S.	foreign	policy	in	general	were	only	one	voice	among	many	in	the	final	months	of	World	War	Two.17	But	the	outpouring	of	support	for	Welles	upon	his	resignation	was	a	clear	sign	of	the	receptiveness	of	the	U.S.	public	to	ideas	about	internationalism,	cooperation	with	the	Soviet	Union,	and	other	policies	that	Welles	had	become	emblematic	of.	It	revealed	the	readiness	among	a	surprisingly	broad	cross	section	of	Americans	for	a	dramatic	reorientation	of	their	country’s	relationship	with	the	outside	world,	particularly	in	comparison	to	the	isolationist	sentiments	of	the	preceding	decade.	It	also	indicated	the	U.S.	public’s	expectations	about	what	kind	of	peace	settlement	would	be	reached	upon	the	conclusion	of	hostilities.	Besides	being	a	supporter	of	the	wartime	alliance,	Welles	had	been	the	preeminent	advocate	of	a	postwar	settlement	that	would	embody	the	ideals	spelled	out	in	the	Atlantic	Charter,	the	‘Four	Freedoms’	speech,	and	elsewhere.	Welles’	departure	was	one	of	the	first	signals	that	the	rosy	optimism	of	the	wartime	alliance	might	not	long	endure	after	the	cessation	of	hostilities.	Moreover,	it	indicated	that	the	postwar	world	might,	despite	the	best	of	intentions,	not	correspond	to	the	idealistic	hopes	that	had	launched	the	wartime	effort	in	the	first	place.			
	
Ever	thy	Good	Neighbor:	Welles	on	Inter-American	Policy	After	1943		Although	he	touched	on	a	wide	variety	of	topics	in	his	post-resignation	writing	and	speeches,	there	were	several	themes	in	Welles’	writings	that	reoccurred	persistently.	Three	subjects	in	particular	–negotiations	over	the	postwar	settlement,	inter-American	cooperation,	and	relations	with	the	Soviet	Union	–	dominated	Welles’	commentary.	He	touched	on	all	three	topics	in	his	first	public	address	following	his	resignation,	delivered	on	16	October	1943.	To	an	audience	at	the	Foreign	Policy	Association	of	New	York	City	Welles	called	for	“the	British,	Soviet,																																																									17	See	Steven	Casey,	Cautious	Crusade:	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt,	American	Public	Opinion,	and	the	War	Against	Nazi	Germany	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001),	162-210;	for	broader	context	on	the	breadth	of	opinion	in	the	United	States	about	foreign	policy	during	the	closing	months	of	World	War	II;	See	also:	Wilson	D.	Miscamble,	From	Roosevelt	to	Truman:	Potsdam,	Hiroshima,	and	the	Cold	War	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2007);	Patrick	J.	Hearden,	Architects	of	Globalism:	Building	
a	New	World	Order	During	World	War	II	(Fayetteville:	The	University	of	Arkansas	Press,	2002).	
		 234	
Chinese,	and	United	States	governments	[to]	arrive	jointly	at	a	clear-cut	and	specific	agreement	in	the	near	future	upon	certain	basic	principles	…	within	the	framework	of	the	Atlantic	Charter.”18	Such	an	agreement	would	entail,	“the	formation	of	an	Executive	Council	composed	of	representatives	of	the	United	Nations,	which	should	remain	in	permanent	session,	with	power	to	resolve	such	political	or	other	questions	as	may	be	referred	to	it	by	the	United	Nations.”19	Commensurate	with	that,	Welles	recommended	“we	must	imperatively	strive	to	secure	…	that	full	measure	of	understanding	with	the	Russian	people	and	their	government.”20	Finally,	Welles	insisted,	“it	is	likewise	indispensable	that	if	we	are	to	achieve	our	own	security	every	nation	of	the	Western	Hemisphere	must	also	obtain	the	same	ample	measure	of	assurance	as	ourselves	in	the	world	of	the	future.”21	On	this	point,	he	added,	“I	am	a	convinced	believer	in	the	efficacy	and	in	the	need	for	the	permanent	continuance	of	the	existing	inter-American	regional	system	which	has	been	brought	into	being	by	the	free	will	of	the	twenty-one	sovereign	American	Republics.”22		Welles’	opinions	and	criticisms	of	Latin	American	policy	reflected	two	aspects	of	his	post-resignation	career:	the	persistence	of	his	paternalistic	idealism	about	that	critical	region	and	the	frustration	he	felt	now	that	he	was	no	longer	part	of	making	U.S.	policy	toward	it.	Welles’	speeches	about	Latin	America	took	on	a	conspicuously	egocentric	and	melodramatic	tone.		At	every	opportunity,	Welles	exalted	the	inter-American	system	that	he	had	set	up	during	the	1930s	as	"by	far	the	most	highly	perfected	and	most	soundly	conceived	regional	system	which	has	existed	in	modern	times."23	Although	not	crediting	himself	by	name	for	its	success,	Welles	proclaimed	that	that	inter-American	system	had	kept	the	Western	Hemisphere	safe	during	the	escalating	crises	in	Europe	during	the	late	1930s	and	had	created	a	consensus	ideal	of	“a	democratic	form	of	government	…	will	guarantee	to	[the	countries	of	Latin	America]	precisely	the	same	individual	liberties	as	those																																																									18	‘Address	by	the	Honorable	Sumner	Welles	at	the	Twenty-Fifth	Anniversary	Luncheon	of	the	F.P.A’,	16	October	1943;	SWP,	Box:	196,	Folder:	4.	19	Ibid.	20	Ibid.		21	Ibid.	22	Ibid.		23	‘Speech	at	the	New	School	for	Social	Research’,	29	May	1944;	SWP,	Box:	196,	Folder:	8.	
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which	we	today	enjoy	here	in	the	United	States."24	"As	we	all	know,”	Welles	crowed	about	the	inter-American	system,	“it	had	the	added	advantage	of	being	a	system	which	worked."25	Welles’	praise	for	the	inter-American	system	bordered	on	the	histrionic.	In	a	speech	delivered	in	1946,	Welles	claimed	that	by	1943	"every	inter-American	controversy,	as	well	as	every	cause	for	controversy,	had	either	been	solved,	or	was	in	process	of	peaceful	solution."26	At	the	root	of	such	rhetoric	was	Welles’	intense	frustration	with	the	direction	being	taken	by	his	successors	in	the	State	Department	with	regards	to	Latin	American	diplomacy.	When	Welles	left	the	State	Department	in	1943	Latin	American	affairs	were	in	a	delicate,	but	tenable	situation.	Every	country	except	Argentina	had	declared	war	or	broken	off	diplomatic	relations	with	Germany.27	Welles’	last	minute	compromise	at	the	Rio	de	Janeiro	conference	in	January	1942	had	preserved	inter-American	cooperation	and	helped	ensure	that	local	conflicts	between	the	American	Republics	were	settled	by	negotiation,	or	at	least	put	on	the	back	burner.		However,	within	a	few	months	of	Welles’	resignation	tensions	among	the	countries	of	the	Western	Hemisphere	and	with	the	United	States	began	to	grow.	A	military	coup	in	Argentina	in	early	1944	brought	to	power	a	pro-fascist	president	whose	renewed	avowal	of	neutrality	was	taken	by	the	State	Department	as	a	virtual	declaration	of	allegiance	with	the	Axis.28	Tensions	mounted	further	when	the	United	States	instituted	a	series	of	economic	sanctions	and	trade	restrictions	on	Argentina	and	unsuccessfully	attempted	to	get	the	British	to	do	the	same.29	The	State	Department	also	rebuffed	Argentina’s	attempts	to	have	the	Governing	Board	of	the	Pan-American	Union	call	for	“an	inter-American	meeting	in	order	to	consider																																																									24	‘Speech	at	Lafayette	College,	Easton,	PA’,	Speech,	24	June	1944,	SWP,	Box:	196,	Folder:	9.	25	‘Address	at	Annual	Dinner	of	the	Americas	Foundation’,	12	October	1944,	SWP,	Box:	196,	Folder	11.	26	‘Address	to	the	Pan	American	Association’,	May	24,	1946,	SWP,	Box:	198,	Folder:	4.	27	Gaddis	Smith,	American	Diplomacy	During	the	Second	World	War:	1941-1945	(New	York:	John	Wiley	and	Sons,	Inc.,	1966),	29-30.	28	Ibid.,	30.		29	Randall	Bennett	Woods,	The	Roosevelt	Foreign-Policy	Establishment	and	the	"Good	Neighbor":	The	
United	and	Argentina	1941-1945	(Lawrence:	The	Regents	Press	of	Kansas),	144-150;	Arthur	P.	Whitaker,	The	United	States	and	Argentina	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1954),	130.		
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Argentina’s	situation	in	relation	to	the	rest	of	the	hemisphere”	in	October	1944.30	The	State	Department’s	justification	for	this	refusal	was	tied	to	its	desire	not	to	upset	the	upcoming	United	Nations	Conference	of	International	Organization,	but	it	was	also	an	attempt	to	keep	Argentina	diplomatically	isolated.	For	his	part,	Welles	attempted	to	push	back	against	the	worsening	situation	by	“presid[ing]	over	a	secret	meeting	of	Latin	American	officials	at	his	home	in	Bar	Harbor,	Maine”	in	September	1944	to	discuss	“the	need	for	an	inter-American	conference	on	postwar	problems	and	on	the	state	of	Argentine-American	relations.”31	Sadly	for	Welles,	his	criticisms	and	appeals	fell	on	deaf	ears.	The	idealism	that	Welles	had	brought	to	U.S.-Latin	American	relations	through	the	inter-American	system	was	quickly	dissipating.			 The	death	of	Franklin	Roosevelt	on	12	April	1945	created	further	distance	between	Welles	and	the	policymaking	world	inside	the	State	Department.	Despite	the	extent	and	virulence	of	the	rumour	campaign	that	had	forced	him	to	resign,	Welles	continued	to	harbour	hope	that	he	might	be	reinstated	into	the	State	Department	at	some	later	date	and	had	carried	on	occasional	correspondence	with	Roosevelt.32	But	with	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	death,	Welles’	only	advocate	and	conduit	to	power	was	eliminated.	Compounding	the	difficulty	was	Welles’	distant	relationship	with	the	incoming	president,	Harry	Truman.	Welles	and	Truman	were	acquainted	but	seemed	to	share	a	mutually	low	opinion	of	each	other.	Writing	of	Truman	in	1947,	Welles	observed	how	FDR	was	“replaced	by	sincerity,	a	devoted	patriotism,	and	the	best	of	intentions,	but	these	were	backed,	unfortunately,	by	neither	knowledge,	experience	nor	strength.”33	Truman’s	view	of	Welles	was	unclear,	but	like	most	prominent	officials	in	Washington	he	was	at	least	aware	of	the	real	circumstances	behind	Welles’	resignation.	Truman,	in	fact,	was	likely	better	informed	about	certain	aspects	of	Welles’	resignation,	as	it	had	been	the	Senate	committee	he	chaired	which	had	begun	preparations	to	investigate	Welles	at	the	
																																																								30	Woods,	The	Roosevelt	Foreign-Policy	Establishment,	160-1.		31	Woods,	The	Roosevelt	Foreign-Policy	Establishment,	159.		32	See:	SWP,	Box:	152,	Folder:	5.		33	Sumner	Welles,	Where	Are	We	Heading?	(London:	Hamish	Hamilton,	1947),	287.		
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behest	of	Cordell	Hull.	Whatever	the	reason,	Truman	rebuffed	any	suggestion	that	Welles	might	return	to	government	service.34		Thus,	within	less	than	two	years	of	his	resignation	two	of	the	key	pillars	of	Welles’	policymaking	had	crumbled.	Without	the	access	to	power	that	had	facilitated	his	influence	on	policymaking,	Welles’	idealistic	belief	in	maintaining	harmony	among	the	American	Republics	was	superseded	by	the	necessity	of	maintaining	a	united	front	against	the	Nazis,	and	with	it	a	more	confrontational	attitude	toward	nations	that	did	not	immediately	comply	with	U.S.	wishes.	Welles’	overriding	sense	of	duty	and	leadership	toward	the	countries	of	the	Western	Hemisphere	was	eclipsed	by	an	attitude	that	was	more	transactional	and	based	on	a	narrower	conception	of	U.S.	interests	in	Latin	America.	Welles’	frustration,	then,	was	understandable,	as	his	departure	had	occasioned	a	dramatic	reorientation	of	U.S.-Latin	American	relations.			
The	World	We	Have	Won:	Welles	on	the	United	Nations	Organization			 A	similar	pattern	of	alienation	was	mirrored	in	the	second	major	topic	on	which	Welles	focused	during	his	post-resignation	public	speeches	–	the	formation	and	constitution	of	the	postwar	world	organization.	As	with	his	pronouncements	on	Latin	America,	Welles’	speeches	on	the	U.N.O.	revealed	his	attempt	to	continue	promulgating	his	particular	paternalistically	idealistic	view	of	the	world,	while	simultaneously	acknowledging	the	need	to	adapt	to	the	changing	circumstances	around	him.	Specifically,	Welles	sublimated	his	idealism	into	overtly	patriotic	appeals	while	also	advocating	for	a	pragmatic	approach	to	the	construction	and	constitution	of	a	new	postwar	organization.		As	a	committed	internationalist	and	an	acolyte	of	Franklin	Roosevelt,	Welles	had	especially	high	hopes	for	the	potential	of	a	world	organization.	Because	of	his	involvement	in	the	early	planning	stages,	and	his	idiosyncratic	penchant	for	erecting																																																									34	Truman	received	several	letters	from	constituents	in	1945,	1946,	1948,	and	1951	suggesting	he	employ	Welles	in	some	capacity.	In	every	instance	Truman’s	secretary	politely	thanked	the	writer	for	their	letter	and	carefully	sidestepped	the	question	of	Welles’	suitability.	See:	Harry	S.	Truman	Presidential	Library	(HSTL),	Papers	of	Harry	S.	Truman,	Official	File,	Box	1520:	652-661,	Folder	661.		
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constitutional	structures	to	solve	international	disputes,	Welles	paid	particularly	close	attention	to	the	preparations	and	negotiations	that	took	place	during	1944	and	1945	that	eventually	led	to	the	creation	of	the	U.N.O.	Reflecting	his	longstanding	policymaking	preferences,	Welles’	initial	pronouncements	about	the	as-yet-uncreated	world	organization	centred	on	a	call	for	a	regional	structure.	In	his	perfect	world,	Welles	envisioned	a	United	Nations	that	operated	along	broadly	federalized	lines,	with	a	central	executive	presiding	over	a	handful	of	semi-autonomous	regional	organizations.	These	organizations	would	in	turn	do	the	hard	work	of	making	peace	and	settling	dispute.35	These	plans	were	essentially	the	same	as	those	that	he	had	devised	in	the	Advisory	Committee	on	Postwar	Foreign	Policy	in	the	State	Department,	which	he	chaired	from	1940-1943.		However,	after	his	resignation	Welles’	ability	to	actually	influence	policy	vanished	and	the	structure	of	the	U.NO.	took	a	very	different	form.	Increasingly	influenced	by	the	thinking	of	figures	like	Cordell	Hull,	the	proposed	postwar	international	organization	scrapped	the	idea	of	regional	security	organizations	operating	under	the	aegis	of	a	new	supranational	organization	championed	by	Welles.36		Notwithstanding	his	criticisms	about	its	structure,	once	the	basic	outline	of	the	U.N.O.	had	been	agreed	to	Welles	became	one	of	its	most	ardent	advocates.	Throughout	the	late	1940s	Welles	used	his	public	appearances,	addresses,	and	books	to	convince	Americans	to	see	the	U.N.O.	as	a	critical	component	of	U.S.	foreign	policy,	and	warned	against	the	pitfalls	of	withdrawing	from	international	affairs	as	the	country	had	done	following	World	War	One.	Tellingly,	Welles’	adopted	an	idealistic	rhetoric	of	consensus	building,	cooperation,	and	American	patriotism	to	make	the	U.N.O.	sound	as	inoffensive	and	unobjectionable	as	possible.		A	key	tactic	in	this	regard	was	to	portray	the	support	for	the	world	organization	in	the	most	ecumenical	way	possible.	In	many	of	Welles’	speeches	in	1944-1945,	Welles	explicitly	staked	out	a	position	of	self-proclaimed	impartiality,																																																									35	“Address	to	be	Delivered	by	Sumner	Welles	at	the	Meeting	of	the	United	Nations	Council	of	Philadelphia”	4	October	1944,	SWP,	Box:	196,	Folder	10.		36	Cordell	Hull,	The	Memoirs	of	Cordell	Hull,	vol.	II	(New	York:	MacMillan	Company,	1948),	1647.		
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non-partisanship,	and	moderation.	Recalling	the	Republican	opposition	to	Wilson	that	doomed	American	entry	in	the	League	of	Nations	in	1919,	Welles	placed	great	emphasis	on	achieving	bipartisan	support.		In	a	speech	in	May	1944,	Welles	cautioned	that	the	“gravest	mistake”	the	U.S.	made	after	the	previous	war	was	"to	permit	the	vital	question	of	whether	the	United	States,	in	its	own	interest,	should	participate	in	a	practice	form	of	international	organization,	to	become	a	question	of	party	politics."37	Somewhat	prematurely,	Welles	reported	a	few	months	later	that,	"[w]e	should	all	of	us	feel	satisfied	that	there	is	today	every	indication	that	these	basic	questions	which	involve	the	very	life	of	our	country	will	not	be	debated	on	any	partisan	grounds."38		Welles	deliberately	appealed	to	the	patriotic	instincts	of	his	listening	audience.	On	several	occasions,	Welles	invoked	the	debates	over	the	U.S.	Constitution	at	Philadelphia	as	an	example	of	how	the	work	being	undertaken	by	the	negotiators	at	Dumbarton	Oaks	and	San	Francisco	were	merely	the	first	step	in	a	long,	unfinished	process	to	create	a	functioning	world	order.	In	an	attempt	to	assuage	doubts	about	the	ability	of	the	major	powers	to	come	to	an	agreement	over	the	issue	of	equality	of	sovereignty	among	the	various	participants	of	a	new	world	organization,	Welles	insisted	that	the	problems	being	worked	out	were	"intrinsically	no	more	difficult	than	was	the	conciliation	of	similar	problems	which	arose	when	the	people	of	the	United	States	determined	to	pass	from	the	Articles	of	Confederation	to	our	present	constitutional	form	of	government"39			As	the	U.N.O.	Charter	began	to	take	shape,	and	teething	problems	with	the	organization	began	to	emerge,	Welles	blended	his	patriotism	with	pragmatic	appeals.	As	the	U.N.O.	Conference	approached	in	May	1945	Welles	liberally	invoked	the	memory	and	writings	of	the	Founding	Fathers	and	endorsed	the	concept	of	an	“International	Bill	of	Rights”,	which	was	part	of	the	discussion	during	the	early	
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stages	of	U.N.O.	Charter	negotiations.40	He	praised	a	proposal	by	Roosevelt	for	incorporating	the	"self-same	principles	of	democracy	as	those	which	we	have	proved	to	be	both	wise	and	feasible	in	our	own	national	federation."41	Yet,	at	the	same	time,	Welles	insisted	to	his	audience	that	it	was	“all	the	more	imperative	that	the	Charter	can	be	thrown	open	to	thorough-going	revision	in	the	not	distant	future.”42	These	uncharacteristically	broad	appeals	to	patriotism	underlined	Welles’	support	for	the	concept	of	the	U.N.O.	and	his	conviction	that	it	could	only	succeed	if	Americans	learned	to	accept	it	as	a	legitimate	tool	of	their	country’s	foreign	policy.	It	was	also	an	indication	of	the	degree	to	which	Welles	was	subtly	adapting	to	the	changing	circumstances	around	him.	As	it	had	in	previous	years,	Welles’	idealism	was	filtered	through	the	political	events	of	the	time,	in	this	case	emerging	as	a	more	robustly	patriotic	yet	pragmatic	form	of	internationalism.		Welles’	second	tactic	for	pragmatically	broadening	support	for	the	U.N.O.	was	to	call	out	those	opponents	whose	opinions	Welles’	found	to	be	odious	or	counterproductive.	Curiously,	these	opponents	were	not	necessarily	opponents	of	internationalism.		One	frequent	target	of	Welles’	criticism	was	the	so-called	world	organization	‘perfectionists’.43	These	‘perfectionists’,	in	Welles’	view:			"insist	that	it	would	be	better	for	this	nation	not	to	enter	any	International	Organization	unless	it	is	an	Organization	based	upon	their	own	projects.	It	is	these	individuals	who	may,	I	think,	at	this	critical	moment	be	most	likely	to	prevent	the	achievement	of	that	ultimate	end	which	they	themselves,	in	great	part,	sincerely	desire	to	attain	--	namely	international	cooperation"44			
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However,	in	a	telling	act	of	balancing	his	attacks,	Welles	spent	equal	time	attacking	isolationists.	"If	this	country	of	ours	is	to	survive,”	Welles	wrote	in	1944	“[i]t	must	obliterate	the	international	inferiority	complex	fatally	harmful	to	the	vital	interests	of	America	during	the	past	quarter	of	a	century	and	which	stems	from	our	deeply	rooted	and	traditional	isolationism.”45	He	equated	the	hard	line	anti-Soviet	voices,	then	gaining	traction	in	the	State	Department	and	in	the	public	sphere,	as	“old	time	isolationists.”	This	reflected	a	broader	re-evaluation	of	the	international	scene	in	the	postwar	world	that	Welles	would	develop	over	the	coming	years;	by	1947	he	would	boldly	declare:	“isolation	as	we	used	to	know	it	is	dead.”46		Tellingly,	Welles	placed	himself	between	these	two	extremes	on	the	spectrum	of	U.S.	foreign	policy	debate.	He	occupied	a	middle	ground	that,	Welles	believed,	enjoyed	widespread	public	support	and	would	permit	the	U.S.	to	take	a	leading	role	in	shaping	the	postwar	world	without	prompting	concerns	about	sacrificing	American	sovereignty	to	foreign	powers.	In	this	manner,	Welles	intuited	the	delicate	balancing	act	that	would	be	required	to	ensure	public	support	for	the	U.N.O.	Welles	understood	that	in	the	tumultuous	final	months	of	World	War	Two,	the	U.S.	public’s	view	on	international	affairs	was	highly	fragmented,	with	some	Americans	eagerly	anticipating	an	American-led	postwar	world	order,	some	others	receptive	to	new	ideas,	and	some	fearfully	recalcitrant	to	any	further	expansion	of	U.S.	involvement	abroad.	This	tension	between	overlapping	and	often	conflicting	constituencies	required	careful	manipulation	in	order	to	protect	the	U.N.O.	from	succumbing	to	the	same	lack	of	American	support	that	had	doomed	the	League	of	Nations.	Because	of	this	single-minded,	idealistic	dedication	to	seeing	a	successful	world	organization	created	with	broad	American	support,	Welles	adapted	his	beliefs	to	his	audience,	yet	the	underlying	motivations	remained	consistent	with	his	long-standing	idealistic	and	paternalistic	beliefs.			
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	In	addition	to	its	function	as	a	new	instrument	in	U.S.	foreign	policy	in	the	postwar	world,	Welles	also	saw	the	benefit	of	the	U.N.O.	in	its	ability	to	facilitate	good	relations	between	major	powers	in	the	postwar	world.	Like	many	observers	at	the	time,	Welles	understood	that	of	these	relations,	none	was	more	important	than	the	one	between	the	U.S.	and	the	Soviet	Union.	As	with	his	pronouncements	on	the	U.N.O.,	Welles’	assessment	of	U.S.-Soviet	relations	reflected	many	of	the	broader	trends	in	U.S.	foreign	policy	making	as	well	as	public	opinion.	Welles	began	his	post-resignation	career	as	an	ostensibly	pro-Soviet	voice.	However,	in	short	order	Welles	began	to	sour	on	the	Soviet	Union.	Welles	never	fell	clearly	into	the	camp	of	either	hardliners	or	Soviet	apologists,	once	again	staking	out	a	middle	ground	that	forecast	a	wider	shift	in	American	views	of	the	Soviet	Union.	But	Welles’	tentative	evolution	underlined	the	fungibility	of	opinions	about	the	Soviet	Union	among	liberal,	and	especially	Rooseveltian	voices,	at	the	time.	It	also	gave	clues	as	to	how	Welles	tried	to	adapt	himself	and	his	beliefs	to	a	rapidly	changing	world,	one	from	which	his	style	of	diplomacy,	with	its	preference	for	constitutional	solutions	over	militaristic	ones,	was	increasingly	alienated.		Despite	his	travels,	his	profession,	and	his	worldly	demeanor,	Welles	was	not	well	acquainted	with	Russia.	He	had	never	visited	the	country,	even	as	Undersecretary	of	State,	and	was	not	close	with	anyone	who	had	been	there.	Welles	had	the	misfortune	of	having	“poor	relations	with	the	State	Department’s	Russia	specialists.”47	Welles	was	responsible	for	eliminating	Robert	Kelley’s	post	during	a	departmental	reorganization	in	1937.48	The	only	other	major	State	Department	figure	with	experience	in	Russia	was	former	American	Ambassador	to	the	Soviet	Union	William	Bullitt,	a	man	who	also	felt	cheated	out	of	a	job	by	Welles.	Conversely,	according	to	Christopher	O’Sullivan,	Welles,	alongside	Eleanor	Roosevelt	and	Henry	Wallace,	formed	a	bloc	that	believed	“Washington	should	seek	better	relations	with	Moscow.”49	Alongside	them,	Welles	also	considered	Laurence	Duggan	to	be	a	close																																																									47	O’Sullivan,	Postwar	Planning,	181.	48	Ibid.	182.	49	Ibid.,	181-182.		
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ally,	whose	views	were	consistently	pro-Soviet;	(Duggan,	as	it	happened,	was	at	that	time	acting	as	an	agent	for	the	Soviet	government.)50	Thus,	Welles’	perceptions	of	the	Soviet	Union,	such	as	they	were,	were	founded	more	vague	impressions	than	firsthand	experience	while	his	second-hand	information	tended	to	come	from	voices	that	were	more	sympathetic	than	not	to	the	regime.		Beginning	in	1940,	Welles	became	more	closely	involved	with	Soviet-American	relations,	bringing	his	views	of	the	Soviet	Union	into	the	spotlight.	When	the	Molotov-Ribbentrop	Pact	was	signed	Welles	declared	it	“sheer	expediency,”51	and	warned	that	it	had	the	potential	to	seriously	undermine	the	security	of	the	United	States.	Welles	commented	on	the	disillusionment	many	Americans	felt	about	the	“extraordinary	volte	face	of	the	Communist	Press”	in	the	United	States	that	resulted	from	the	non-aggression	pact.52	Welles	also	expressed	outrage	over	Russia’s	annexation	of	the	Baltic	States	and	its	invasion	of	Finland	during	the	Winter	War.53		However,	Welles’	opinions	on	the	Soviet	Union	changed	as	the	exigencies	of	war	forced	the	two	countries	closer	together.	After	the	fall	of	France	in	June	1940,	Welles	opened	negotiations	with	Soviet	Ambassador	Oumansky	“to	offer	subtle	inducements	to	improve	relations	with	the	Russians	and	to	explore	further	the	relationship	between	Moscow	and	Berlin.”54	The	negotiations,	as	it	turned	out,	were	unfruitful,	but	reflecting	later,	Welles	believed	the	negotiations	“offered	the	Soviet	government	concrete	evidence	of	our	willingness	to	give	reasonable	consideration	to	their	point	of	view	and	to	bring	about	an	improvement	in	Soviet-American	relations”.55	This	was	something	of	an	understatement,	as	it	was	during	these	negotiations	that	Welles	revealed	to	the	Russian	minister	American	intelligence	about	Hitler’s	planned	invasion	of	Russia	in	June	1941.56	In	fact,	the	negotiations	can	
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rightly	be	seen	as	an	almost	desperate	attempt	to	engage	with	the	Soviet	government,	whose	friendship	might	one	day	be	used	to	counter	German	power	in	Europe.	Welles	recognized	the	awesome	power	of	the	U.S.S.R.	and	its	potential	–	indeed,	necessity	–	to	contribute	to	a	stable	world	order;	he	was	eager	to	court	that	potential	at	all	costs.	In	that	vein,	he	maintained	the	optimistic	belief	that	relations	with	the	Soviets	would	‘soften’	their	more	repressive	sensibilities,	and	so	pursued	negotiations	in	spite	of	repeated	rebuffing.		Welles’	professional	experience	with	Soviet-American	relations,	while	no	doubt	informative	for	him,	did	not	seem	to	provoke	any	newfound	interest	in	the	country	or	inspire	a	need	to	openly	re-evaluate	Soviet-American	relations.	He	emerged	with	largely	the	same	impressions	he	had	going	in,	seeming	to	learn	little	that	gave	him	any	better	insight	into	Soviet	intentions	or	motivations.	Welles	was	frustrated	with	Soviet	intransigence,	but	still	optimistic	about	future	relations.	Once	he	had	left	government	employment,	however,	a	more	fully	formed	view	of	the	Soviet	Union	began	to	emerge.		The	crux	of	Welles’	renewed	interest	in	the	Soviet	Union	came	over	Soviet	participation	in	the	postwar	world	organization.	Welles	acknowledged	that	relations	with	the	Soviets	were	critical	to	establishing	long-term	peace	in	the	postwar	world.	He	espoused	a	view	common	at	the	time,	and	to	which	he	attributed	to	Franklin	Roosevelt,	that:		“if	during	the	early	years	of	the	postwar	period	any	open	conflict	with	the	Soviet	Union	could	be	prevented,	if	the	United	Nations	was	given	the	opportunity	to	prove	its	efficacy,	and	if	peace	--	even	a	precarious	peace	--	could	thereby	be	maintained,	living	standards	in	the	Soviet	Union	would	rapidly	rise,	her	commercial	ties	with	the	outside	world	would	certainly	become	more	important	to	her,	the	present	walls	of	isolation	which	surround	Russia	would	gradually	be	broken	down,	cultural	and	intellectual	ties	with	the	West	would	steadily	grow,	and	the	Russian	people	themselves	would	eventually	recognize,	through	increasing	freedom	of	information,	what	the	real	intentions	of	the	American	people	are,	that	these	intentions	hold	no	shadow	of	a	threat	to	the	welfare	of	the	Russian	people,	and	that	the	true	
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interests	of	Russia	could	best	be	served	by	international	cooperation	…	time	would	be	on	the	side	of	world	peace”57		More	pragmatically,	Welles	admitted	that	the	Soviet	Union	would	be	militarily	dominant	in	large	sections	of	Europe	at	the	end	of	hostilities	and	saw	a	framework	for	ongoing	negotiation	and	consultation	as	the	best	mechanism	to	ensure	peace	and	enhance	the	likelihood	of	a	postwar	settlement	favourable	to	the	U.S.	 That	pragmatic	optimism	coloured	most	of	Welles’	initial	post-resignation	writings	about	U.S.-Soviet	relations.	For	most	of	1944	and	1945	Welles	consistently	portrayed	the	Soviet	Union	as	friendly,	noble,	and	trustworthy.	In	the	Soviet	Union,	Welles	wrote,	“the	Soviet	government	today	is	guided	by	the	popular	will”	and	its	“people	…	are	satisfied	that	their	government	is	devoted	to	the	popular	interest.”58	Welles	was	confident	that	“in	the	immediate	future	the	foreign	policy	of	the	Soviet	government	will	continue	to	represent	what	the	people	want.”59	However,	as	a	keen	observer	of	international	relations,	Welles	was	quick	to	develop	concern	over	perceived	changes	in	Soviet	behaviour.	Welles	became	concerned	over	the	failure	of	the	Soviets	to	adhere	to	the	commitments	they	made	at	Yalta	and	their	ignoring	of	the	authority	of	the	U.N.O.,	exemplified	in	incidents	such	as	the	dispute	over	oil	concessions	in	Iran	and,	more	prominently,	in	supporting	Communist	insurgents	in	Greece	and	Turkey.	The	increasing	tensions	that	resulted	from	these	incidents	challenged	Welles’	idealistic	outlook	and	complicated	his	view	of	the	postwar	world	built	on	cooperation	rather	than	renewed	militarism.	Welles	felt	these	actions	violated	the	letter	of	the	agreements	as	well	as	the	spirit	of	documents	such	as	the	Atlantic	Charter,	which	had	set	out	principles	for	international	behaviour,	yet	Soviet	disregard	of	these	principles	dampened,	but	did	not	extinguish,	Welles’	enthusiasm.	“I	regard	it	as	a	delusion	…”	Welles	wrote	in	1946:																																																										57	“American	Foreign	Policy	in	the	Postwar	World”,	16	May	1947,	SWP,	Box:	198,	Folder	10:	Phillips	Academy,	May	16,	1947.	58	Welles,	The	Time	for	Decision,	309.	59	Ibid.	
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“…	that	democracy	and	communism	cannot	simultaneously	exist	in	the	same	world,	provided	the	advocates	of	the	communist	form	of	government	are	willing	to	confine	the	enforcement	of	their	own	political	beliefs	within	their	own	sovereign	jurisdiction,	and	do	not	undertake	to	force	their	political	system	upon	peoples	who	are	unwilling	to	accept	them.”60		 This	relatively	benign	castigation	of	the	Soviets	reflected	a	reticence	to	confront	too	openly	the	country	Welles	still	believed	could	be	a	peaceful	partner.	Even	as	he	moved	toward	a	more	hardnosed	posture	vis	à	vis	the	Soviet	Union,	Welles	still	retained	some	of	the	optimism	of	his	earlier	years	keeping	open	the	possibility	of	avoiding	military	conflict.	As	late	as	1947	Welles	credited	the	leaders	of	the	Soviet	Union	with	“success	in	forming	and	in	controlling	public	opinion	within	Russia,”	to	which	he	attributed	the	inability	of	the	Soviet	leaders	to	comprehend	the	United	States’	foreign	policy	making	process.61	Despite	the	nation’s	evident	flaws	Welles	insisted,	“Soviet	Russia	represents	one	of	the	greatest	attempts	to	attain	human	betterment	that	the	world	has	ever	known.”62	He	praised	the	Soviet	government	for	giving	“health,	education,	economic	security,	and	the	hope	of	happiness	to	one	hundred	and	eighty	millions	of	human	beings	who	had	previously	known	only	misery.”63Anticipating	post-revisionist	historians	by	several	decades,	Welles	explained	in	his	1947	book	Where	Are	We	Heading?:		“Because	of	the	present	intransigence	of	the	Soviet	Union,	it	has	become	the	tendency	in	the	Western	world	to	place	the	entire	blame	for	the	tragic	collapse	in	peacemaking	at	the	door	of	the	Soviet	government.	It	would	seem	to	me	far	more	realistic	to	admit	that	the	blame	for	the	present	disaster	should	be	shared	by	the	government	of	the	United	States.”64			Welles	maintained	his	optimism	about	the	possibilities	for	world	peace,	even	as	his	optimism	about	the	Soviet	Union	faded.	In	this	way,	Welles	attempted	to	adapt	his	longstanding	aversion	to	militarism	to	the	rapidly	changing	global																																																									60	“The	English	Speaking	Democracies”,	21	October	1946,	quoted	in	Sumner	Welles,	The	Search	for	
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circumstances.	Welles’	shift	in	attitude	anticipated	the	formation	of	the	Cold	War	consensus	on	foreign	policy	that	dominated	American	politics	for	much	of	the	followed	four	decades.	Although	still	firmly	on	the	left	side	of	the	political	spectrum,	Welles	delineated	the	contours	of	what	liberal	attitudes	about	the	Cold	War	mindset	would	become:	hoping	for	cooperation	with	the	Soviets,	and	willing	to	work	for	it,	but	ultimately	unwilling	to	tolerate	continued	abuse	and	deceit	from	the	Soviet	government	in	foreign	affairs.		Welles’	assessment	of	the	early	Cold	War	period	was	not	only	a	proxy	for	broader	public	attitudes,	it	was	also	informed	by	his	peculiar	professional	and	political	circumstances.	These	were,	in	turn,	a	manifestation	of	the	impact	of	the	legacy	of	Franklin	Roosevelt	on	Welles,	and	on	U.S.	foreign	policy	making	in	general.	As	someone	who	had	been	part	of	the	Roosevelt	administration,	Welles	was	privy	to	many	of	the	high	level	negotiations	with	the	Soviets	during	World	War	Two.	He	was	aware	of	the	capacity	of	the	Soviets	for	cooperation	and	was	intimately	familiar	with	Roosevelt’s	opinion	that	the	Soviet	Union	could	be	tamed	through	persistent	negotiation.	Consequently,	when	the	Soviet	Union	reneged	on	various	agreements	and	became	implacable,	he	was	more	willing	than	most	other	liberals	to	voice	his	criticism.	Conversely,	his	exile	from	the	State	Department,	and	eventual	relegation	to	the	sidelines	of	Democratic	Party	politics,	rendered	him	an	outsider	to	the	Truman	administration,	and	more	willing	to	calling	out	the	administration	for	what	he	perceived	to	be	its	mistakes.		However,	as	tensions	over	postwar	settlements	increased	Welles	slowly	lost	all	hope	of	a	peaceful	coexistence	between	the	two	great	superpowers	and	his	longstanding	hope	for	a	less	belligerent	approach	to	U.S.	foreign	relations	became	increasingly	anachronistic.	In	1947	Welles	predicted	dire	consequences	from	an	agreement	to	allow	Soviet	access	to	the	Italian	port	of	Trieste.65	He	predicted	that	a	war	between	the	Soviets	and	the	United	States	would	“destroy	the	remnants	of	our	present	civilization.”66	Presciently,	he	outlined	how	he	believed	Soviet	and	American	relations	would	unfold	in	the	absence	of	any	improvement.	“The	result”	he	wrote																																																									65	Welles,	Where	Are	We	Heading?,	123.	66	Ibid.,	312.	
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“will	be	two	worlds	rather	than	one	…	compelled	to	engage	in	an	armament	race,	especially	in	the	fields	of	aviation,	of	atomic	weapons,	and	of	scientific	and	biological	warfare	…	The	United	States	will	head	a	bloc	of	Western	powers	…	opposed	by	an	ever	more	powerfully	armed	Soviet	Union	surrounded	by	her	satellites.”67		The	optimism	of	his	former	years	was	now	absent,	replaced	by	palpable	anxiety	about	the	course	of	international	affairs.	By	1951,	with	the	advent	of	the	Korean	War,	Welles’	attitudes	had	hardened	still	more	as	his	optimism	over	continued	great	power	cooperation	at	the	U.N.O.	vanished	completely.	Welles	now	conceived	of	Soviet-American	relations	as	“the	great	contest	that	is	being	waged	between	the	free	nations	who	would	preserve	human	liberty	and	the	Communist	tyranny	that	would	destroy	every	vestige	of	human	liberty.”68	In	a	drastic	change	of	course	from	previous	pronouncements,	Welles	ominously	cautioned	against	Americans	being	“timid,	hesitant,	and	confused,	weakened	by	divided	counsels,	and	unwilling	to	persevere	in	their	search	for	a	free	and	peaceful	world”.69	Meanwhile,	Welles’	found	himself	increasingly	alienated	from	domestic	supporters	of	cooperation	with	the	Soviet	Union.	He	scorned	Henry	Wallace’s	run	for	the	Presidency	as	a	radical,	defamatory	extension	of	FDR’s	New	Deal	vision.	In	the	weeks	leading	up	to	the	1948	election,	Welles	wrote	to	a	friend:	“the	non-communist	voter	who	votes	for	Henry	Wallace	must	be	a	low	grade	moron.”70		By	the	1950s	so	much	had	changed	for	Welles	in	the	time	since	his	resignation	that	he	could	be	forgiven	for	looking	back	wistfully	on	what	had	gone	wrong.	In	his	final	book	Welles	reflected	on	his	time	in	and	out	of	office	while	giving	prescriptions	for	the	United	States’	seemingly	endless	diplomatic	problems.	Speculating	on	what	might	have	been	he	briefly	set	out	“to	try	to	imagine	what	Franklin	Roosevelt	would	have	done	if	he	had	lived	out	his	final	term	as																																																									67	Ibid.,	312.	68	Sumner	Welles,	Seven	Decisions	that	Shaped	History	(New	York:	Harper	&	Brothers	Publishers,	1951),	231.	69	Ibid.	70	Welles	to	Pearson,	14	August	1948,	SWP,	Box:	147,	Folder:	2.	Welles	made	no	public	endorsement	in	the	1948	election.	He	expressed	his	belief	that	governor	Thomas	Dewey	would	defeat	Harry	Truman,	though	this	was	hardly	a	minority	opinion.	Welles	lamented	the	return	of	the	right	wing	that	Dewey’s	victory	would	inaugurate,	but	considered	him	a	superior	candidate	to	Truman	particularly	on	foreign	affairs.	
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President.”71	In	Welles’	opinion,	the	first	mistake	that	Roosevelt	would	have	avoided	was	the	withdrawal	of	American	forces	from	Eastern	Europe,	and	“fail[ing]	to	insure	unimpeded	access	to	Berlin.”72	Welles	implied	that	Roosevelt	would	have	used	this	leverage	to	obtain	a	lasting	postwar	accord	from	the	Soviets	at	the	Potsdam	Conference	in	July	1945,	which	Truman	failed	to	do.73	Additionally,	Welles	believed	Roosevelt	would	have	avoided	the	mistake	of	“permit[ing]	his	representative	in	China	to	pave	the	way	for	a	repetition	of	the	same	tactics	[used	in	Eastern	Europe]”	that	allowed	a	Communist	takeover	of	that	country.74	Notably	absent	from	Welles’	retrospective	prescriptions	is	any	mention	of	the	U.N.O.	With	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	Welles	could	see	no	active	role	for	the	institution	that	he	had	so	firmly	believed	in,	and	had	done	so	much	to	construct.	Faced	with	the	reality	of	Soviet	expansionism	and	unfaithfulness,	Welles’	prescription	was	a	tacit	repudiation	of	his	long-held	belief	that	a	world	organization	would	resolve	outstanding	disputes	between	the	U.S.	and	the	U.S.S.R.		The	omission	was	a	testament	to	how	prominently	the	idea	of	the	U.N.O.	had	figured	in	Welles’	thinking	prior	to	1945.	Whereas	in	1943	Welles	saw	an	international	federated	super-state	as	the	best	way	to	ensure	self-determination	in	Eastern	Europe,	in	1951	his	prescription	was	the	presence	of	American	troops.	The	“influence	of	the	Western	powers”	over	the	Soviets	was	now	dependent	on	reversing	the	“headlong	demobilization	of	the	American	armies	overseas”,	rather	than	by	negotiated	settlement.75	Welles’	aversion	to	militarism,	which	had	inspired	his	policymaking	for	decades	and	had	rendered	him	one	of	the	premier	voices	for	internationalism,	cooperation,	and	world	peace	during	his	time	in	office,	was	cast	off	amid	the	tumultuous	reordering	of	the	world	into	a	bipolar	Cold	War	confrontation.				
Conclusion:																																																										71	Welles,	Seven	Decisions,	202.	72	Ibid.	73	Welles,	Seven	Decisions,	202.	74	Ibid.,	217.		75	Ibid.,	204.		
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	 The	diminishing	returns	of	Welles’	post-resignation	career	made	clear	several	key	themes	in	Welles’	career	and	the	evolving	American	political	landscape	in	the	late	1940s.	Welles’	gradual	fading	into	obscurity	revealed	the	extent	to	which	he	had	relied	upon	the	patronage	of	Franklin	Roosevelt	and	the	trappings	of	that	the	office	for	his	power	and	influence.	Without	the	status	accorded	by	his	title,	Welles	was	unable	to	reach	an	influential	audience	or	generate	support	for	his	ideas.	Without	Franklin	Roosevelt	alive	to	advocate	for	the	ideals	they	shared,	Welles	was	increasingly	relegated	to	the	margins	of	political	discussion.			 Yet,	before	his	decline	was	complete,	Welles	illuminated	many	of	the	key	themes	that	had	guided	his	career	and	his	belief	system.	Once	he	was	free	to	speak	as	he	wished,	Welles	articulated	a	unique	and	compelling	vision	for	the	United	States	in	the	postwar	world.	His	initial	fervent	belief	in	the	U.N.O.	underlined	his	commitment	to	the	idealism	that	had	inspired	Roosevelt,	and	Wilson	before	him,	to	refashion	the	world	according	to	(supposedly	universal)	American	principles	of	democracy,	self-determination,	and	political	freedom.	His	curious	blend	of	Wilsonian	idealism	and	paternalistic	concern	for	Latin	American	concerns	offered	a	counterpoint	to	the	hardening	attitudes	of	emergent	cold	warriors	who	were	increasingly	fixated	on	U.S.-Soviet	relations.	On	those	relations,	Welles’	transition	from	a	sympathetic	proponent	of	cooperation	to	a	quasi-post-revisionist	placed	him	within	the	broad	spectrum	of	the	Cold	War	consensus,	although	with	greater	discomfiture	with	the	militarism	that	came	with	this	increasingly	confrontational	stance.	Where	Welles	ended	up,	vis	à	vis	his	contemporaries	indicated	the	direction	that	he	and	Roosevelt	envisioned	while	they	were	still	working	together	and	gave	some	clues	as	to	how	Roosevelt	might	have	acted	had	he	lived	longer.			However,	by	the	time	Welles	had	completed	his	transition	there	were	few	Americans	interested	in	listening	to	him.	Welles’	decline	in	power	coincided	with	the	rise	of	a	cacophony	of	opinion-makers	in	newspapers	and	journals	around	the	country	fixated	more	and	more	on	the	emerging	confrontation	between	the	U.S.	and	the	Soviet	Union.	As	tensions	with	the	Soviets	rose	Welles’	idealistic	rhetoric	carried	less	and	less	salience	in	public	debate.	Soon,	the	entire	edifice	of	Welles’	foreign	policy	thinking	and	the	assumptions	underlying	it	came	under	attack.	Rising	
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paranoia	and	suspicion	of	infiltration	cast	a	pall	over	Welles	and	the	legacy	of	his	time	in	the	State	Department.	As	the	U.S.	shifted	from	World	War	to	Cold	War,	Welles	found	himself	increasingly	relegated	to	the	fringes	of	political	debate	and,	eventually,	shunned	from	public	life.	
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Conclusion:			 In	an	editorial	published	shortly	after	his	death	on	24	September	1961	the	
New	York	Times	wrote	that	Sumner	Welles	“was	in	the	best	sense	a	diplomat	of	the	old	school,	when	diplomacy	was	personal	and	professional	…	There	is	no	fear	that	he	will	be	forgotten,	for	he	made	his	mark	on	the	history	of	the	twentieth	century.”1	Though	generous,	the	Times’	estimation	was	only	half	true	at	best.	Welles	had	made	his	mark	on	the	twentieth	century	but	he	did	so	as	much	in	spite	of	his	diplomatic	accomplishments	as	because	of	them.	The	Times	tacitly	acknowledged	as	much	in	the	two-page	obituary	of	Welles	it	published	the	same	day,	which	recounted	at	length	Welles’	bitter	feud	with	Cordell	Hull,	his	many	marriages,	his	cutthroat	competition	for	the	job	of	Undersecretary	of	State	in	1937,	and	his	nearly	fatal	1948	accident	alongside	his	career	highlights.2	To	the	extent	that	Welles	was	not	forgotten	over	the	ensuing	decades,	it	was	the	rumours	about	his	personality	and	sexuality	as	much	as	the	notoriety	of	his	professional	conduct	that	echoed	down	the	ages.		This	thesis	has	argued	that	sexuality	affected	Welles’	career	beyond	merely	helping	to	bring	about	its	end.	Through	exploration	of	Welles’	formative	years	this	thesis	has	shown	how	Welles’	sexuality	shaped	his	personality	and	his	interactions	with	the	wider	world.	This	had	specific	and	significant	implications	for	Welles’	emergent	worldview	and	the	processes	by	which	he	acquired	and	exercised	political	power	later	in	life.	Demonstrating	this	link	is	more	than	an	act	of	historical	rehabilitation	of	a	figure	too	long	castigated	because	of	his	sexuality.	It	provides	a	fresh	interpretation	and	explanation	of	the	motivations	and	attitudes	of	a	man	whose	personal	influence	on	U.S.	diplomacy	and	politics	for	over	a	quarter	of	a	century	was	substantial,	the	legacies	of	which	can	be	felt	to	this	day.		The	world	Welles	entered	at	birth	was	profoundly	suspicious	and	contemptuous	of	same-sex	sexual	attraction	and	non-normative	masculinity.	Besides	the	legal	prohibition	and	cultural	taboo	against	homosexuality,	Welles	was	confronted	from	an	early	age	with	a	hierarchy	of	masculine	identities	in	which																																																									1	‘Sumner	Welles’,	25	September	1961,	New	York	Times,	p.32.		2	‘Sumner	Welles,	69,	Diplomat,	Is	Dead’,	25	September	1961,	New	York	Times,	p.1.		
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aggression	and	competition	occupied	the	highest	rank.	These	values	were	inculcated	into	him	at	a	series	of	elite	educational	institutions,	most	prominently	Groton	Preparatory	School.	Groton’s	heady	mix	of	noblesse	oblige,	muscular	Christianity,	and	American	nationalism	presented	Welles	with	clear	guidelines	for	comportment	and	ironclad	values	to	live	by	as	well	as	infusing	him	with	a	haughty	sense	of	certitude.			However,	it	also	presented	him	with	a	dilemma,	for	Welles	was	incapable	of	living	up	to	the	exacting	standards	of	the	Grotonian	ideal.	Alienated	by	his	sexuality,	his	physical	frailty,	frequent	absences,	and	interest	in	less	stereotypically	robust	pursuits	like	art	and	lachrymose	poetics,	Welles	passed	through	Groton	on	the	margins	of	that	school’s	social	and	cultural	life.	Such	conspicuous	marginalization	at	such	an	early	age	complicated	Welles’	efforts	to	fashion	himself	in	the	mould	of	his	peers	and	their	idols	such	as	Theodore	Roosevelt.	Welles’	response	was	twofold.	On	a	personal	level	he	developed	an	austere	exterior	persona	to	insulate	himself	from	alienation	and	victimization	by	his	peers,	the	consequence	of	which	was	a	professional	persona	for	which	he	would	become	notorious	and	which	conveniently	placed	him	above	reproach	(until	1943).	Secondly,	Welles	developed	a	distinctive	outlook	by	embracing	the	Grotonian	ethos	of	noblesse	oblige	while	downplaying	its	jingoistic	and	pugilistic	aspects.	That	synthesis	was	the	germ	that	eventually	grew	into	the	paternalistic	idealism	and	aversion	to	militarism	that	would	come	to	define	Welles’	diplomatic	worldview	and	policymaking	for	the	next	half	century.		The	influence	of	Groton	and	the	broader	aristocratic	world	around	it	on	Welles,	as	well	as	the	influence	of	the	alienation	Welles	experienced	on	account	of	his	sexuality	while	inhabiting	that	world,	had	another	major	influence	on	the	course	of	Welles’	career:	it	occasioned	his	friendship	with	Franklin	Roosevelt.	Welles	and	Roosevelt	shared	a	specific	set	of	experiences	that	helped	them	forge	an	unusually	close	bond.	Each	was	raised	in	small	and	cloistered	aristocratic	world	with	strict	rules	of	comportment	that	few	outsiders	understood.	As	well,	while	inhabiting	this	rarefied	world	each	in	his	own	way	traversed	a	treacherous	path	along	the	margins	of	hegemonic	masculinity.	For	Welles,	it	was	his	sexuality;	for	Roosevelt,	his	disability.	By	coincidence,	major	steps	in	these	respective	journeys	occurred	only	a	
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few	years	apart;	Roosevelt’s	onset	of	polio	and	ensuing	paralysis	in	1921	came	just	three	years	before	President	Calvin	Coolidge	used	Welles’	divorce	from	his	first	wife	to	force	Welles	from	office,	prematurely	ending	his	diplomatic	career.		These	twin	tragedies	produced	circumstances	in	which	the	two	men	found	opportunity	and	sympathy	in	collaborating	to	bring	about	one	another’s	political	revival.	Welles	and	Roosevelt	filled	a	niche	in	one	another’s	professional	lives,	the	absence	of	which	would	have	dramatically	transformed	their	respective	fortunes.	Their	compatibility	came	from	their	complementarity	rather	than	their	similarity.	In	Welles’	“solemn	demeanor”	and	methodical	intellect	Roosevelt	found	a	useful	counterpoint	to	his	own	irreverence	and	effervescent	creativity.3	Conversely,	Roosevelt’s	charisma	and	perspicacity	supplemented	Welles’	tendencies	toward	rigidity	and	aloofness.	Together	they	made	a	formidable	team,	greater	than	the	sum	of	their	parts.	Welles’	relationship	with	FDR,	along	with	his	emergent	aversion	to	militarism	and	his	paternalistic	idealism,	comprise	three	distinct	identifiable	examples	where	sexuality	can	be	said	to	have	had	a	direct	influence	on	his	professional	life.	Combined	with	the	scandal	that	emerged	following	his	solicitation	of	sex	on	the	Bankhead	Train	in	September	1940,	and	the	legacy	it	begat	over	the	ensuing	years,	sexuality	clearly	had	a	significant,	enduring,	and	formational	influence	on	Welles’	career.	More	importantly,	acknowledging	the	role	sexuality	played	in	forming	Welles’	worldview	and	establishing,	and	then	destroying,	his	political	power,	is	essential	to	understanding	why	Welles’	career	unfolded	the	way	it	did,	the	motivations	behind	his	policymaking,	and	his	role	in	the	diplomatic	and	political	history	of	the	United	States	in	the	early	and	mid	twentieth	century.			
Paternalistic	Idealism:				 Welles	emerged	out	of	his	formative	years	with	general	attitudes	about	life	and	broad	parameters	of	action	that	had	been	influenced	by	his	sexuality	and																																																									3	Irwin	Gellman,	Secret	Affairs:	Franklin	Roosevelt,	Cordell	Hull,	and	Sumner	Welles	(Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1995),	68-9.		
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experience	on	the	margins	of	hegemonic	masculinity.	Groton	had	instilled	Welles	with	a	sense	of	noblesse	oblige	and	a	belief	in	the	righteousness	of	American	global	leadership	and	civilization.	However,	Welles’	confident	outlook	was	tempered	by	pathos	resulting	from	his	marginalization	on	account	of	his	sexuality;	out	of	this	dynamic	emerged	a	desire	to	seek	consensus	rather	than	confrontation.	This	would	eventually	evolve	into	a	worldview	that	sought	to	expand	American	power	through	the	most	beneficent	means,	employing	idealistic	and	utopian	rhetoric	to	gain	appeal.		However,	additional	inputs	were	required	before	they	galvanized	into	a	coherent	worldview.	These	inputs	came	into	play	during	the	first	decade	of	his	career	as	a	diplomat	after	joining	the	State	Department	in	1915.	Provided	with	a	front	row	seat	to	global	affairs	as	the	United	States	avoided,	entered,	and	emerged	victorious	from	World	War	One,	Welles	witnessed	his	country	assume	its	place	as	a	great	power	while	simultaneously	advocating	transformational	change	to	the	global	order	under	the	auspices	of	President	Woodrow	Wilson’s	Fourteen	Points.	Welles	embraced	these	changes	eagerly.	A	belief	in	the	beneficence	and	righteousness	of	American	leadership,	especially	in	Latin	America,	became	a	defining	feature	of	Welles’	worldview.			 The	manifestation	of	these	beliefs	was	filtered	through	Welles’	own	underlying	belief	system	and	the	idiosyncrasies	of	his	situation	at	the	time.	Relocated	by	choice	to	Latin	America,	Welles	interpreted	Wilson’s	call	for	a	world	organization	as	an	opportunity	to	activate	the	“almost	dormant	moral	force	which	is	contained	in	the	political	spirit	of	the	American	republics.”4	For	Welles,	the	Wilsonian	call	to	action	was	an	appealing	one	because	it	offered	a	less	belligerent	way	to	achieve	the	expansion	of	the	civilizing	leadership	of	the	U.S.,	especially	in	Latin	America.	Although	American	involvement	in	the	League	of	Nations	was	rejected,	Welles	preserved	the	spirit	behind	it	and	incorporated	it	into	his	later	policymaking.	His	abortive	attempts	to	play	midwife	to	a	union	of	Central	American	republics	in	1919-1921,	and	his	preference	for	establishing	constitutional	order	as	solutions	to	the	political	problems	in	the	Dominican	Republic,	Cuba,	and	elsewhere																																																									4	‘Welles	Diary’,	7	August	1919,	SWP,	Box:	167,	Folder:	3.		
		 256	
were	examples	of	the	Wilsonian	influence	on	Welles	being	filtered	through	his	own	experiences	and	attitudes.	Besides	illuminating	the	origin	and	formation	of	Welles’	beliefs,	observing	the	influence	of	Welles’	paternalistic	idealism	in	this	way	shows	the	mutability	of	Wilsonianism	in	its	early	years.	Welles	articulated	these	views	more	clearly	over	time.	This	process	began	with	Welles’	brief	collaboration	with	Charles	Evans	Hughes,	who	provided	a	professional	exemplar	and	a	rhetorical	reservoir	for	Welles’	own	diplomacy.	During	the	1920s,	under	Hughes’	guidance	until	1924	but	on	his	own	thereafter,	Welles’	worldview	began	to	crystallize.	Beginning	with	his	riposte	to	Samuel	Inman	in	his	1924	Atlantic	Monthly	article	‘Is	America	Imperialistic?’	and	continuing	through	his	speeches	and	writings	in	the	1920s	and	1930s,	Welles	articulated	his	view	of	U.S.	foreign	policy	based	around	a	paternalistic	attitude	toward	Latin	America	and	an	idealistic	belief	in	the	beneficence	of	U.S.	power.		Once	returned	to	a	policymaking	role	under	Franklin	Roosevelt	after	1933,	Welles’	paternalistic	attitudes	toward	Latin	America	assumed	greater	significance.	In	Cuba,	where	he	was	assigned	to	bring	about	the	end	to	a	political	crisis,	Welles’	idealism	begat	a	myopia	about	the	depth	of	unrest	on	the	island	and	a	naivety	about	the	solutions	he	proposed.	Handpicking	an	unsuitable	candidate	to	replace	President	Gerardo	Machado	for	little	reason	besides	his	eminence,	and	then	refusing	to	consider	recognizing	the	government	that	overthrew	him	only	three	weeks	later,	Welles	demonstrated	how	his	paternalistic	desire	to	do	what	he	thought	was	best	for	the	Cuban	people	could	too	easily	manifest	itself	as	patronizing	elitism,	with	disastrous	results	for	U.S.-Cuban	relations.			Yet,	despite	the	setback	in	Cuba	there	was	an	upside	to	the	certitude	of	Welles’	beliefs.	Provided	with	a	wider	stage	on	which	to	act	Welles’	idealism	took	a	form	more	in	line	with	the	beneficence	of	his	intentions.	From	1936	onwards	Welles	articulated	a	vision	for	inter-American	cooperation	more	optimistic	than	any	American	in	such	a	position	had	described	before.	It	undergirded	his	efforts	to	expand	U.S.	influence	in	the	region,	but	it	also	provided	the	foundation	for	the	reciprocity	and	collaboration	that	would	keep	Latin	America	within	the	orbit	of	the	Allies	before	and	during	World	War	Two.	Whatever	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy	did	to	
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improve	relations	between	the	countries	of	Latin	America	and	the	U.S.	was	due	in	large	part	to	the	collaboration,	respect,	and	goodwill	upon	which	Welles	based	his	policymaking.		Beyond	Latin	America,	Welles’	idealism	gave	definition	to	the	plans	he	drew	up	for	a	world	order	after	the	conclusion	of	World	War	Two.	Like	his	policies	for	various	parts	of	Latin	America	during	the	1920s	and	1930s,	Welles’	plans	for	a	postwar	world	were	based	on	creating	regional	organizations,	collaboration	between	smaller	powers	and	larger	ones,	and	high-minded	proposals	for	U.S.	stewardship	across	the	globe.	Welles’	postwar	plans	synthesized	his	belief	in	the	efficacy	of	U.S.	leadership	to	bring	about	peace	and	advancement	with	nationalism	as	fervent	as	that	of	Theodore	Roosevelt.	The	most	curious	manifestation	of	this	synthesis	came	in	the	development	of	a	notable	strain	of	Anglophobia	in	Welles’	diplomacy.	Jealous	of	British	prerogatives	in	Latin	America	and	envious	of	their	global	hegemony,	Welles	developed	a	distinctively	skeptical	view	toward	British	influence,	particularly	in	the	Western	Hemisphere.	This	view	complicated	negotiations	between	himself	and	his	British	counterpart	at	the	Argentia	conference	in	August	1941,	despite	the	spirit	of	cooperation	and	general	accord	between	the	two	country’s	respective	leaders	at	the	time.		Sadly,	Welles’	idealism	about	the	postwar	world	did	not	last.	Once	removed	from	the	State	Department	his	influence	on	Latin	American	policy	and	the	creation	of	a	world	organization	plummeted.	Although	he	kept	promulgating	his	views	in	books	and	radio	broadcasts,	his	ideals	seemed	increasingly	out	of	step	with	world	as	it	stumbled	from	World	War	to	Cold	War.		Viewed	through	the	lens	of	paternalistic	idealism,	Welles’	policymaking	for	the	postwar	world	and	in	Latin	America	takes	on	a	new	light.	Welles	was	more	than	a	pie-eyed	idealist.	His	vision	for	a	world	order	was	based	on	firm	convictions	about	U.S.	power	and	its	capacity	to	do	good	across	the	globe,	as	well	as	the	inherent	superiority	of	American	civilization.	The	paternalism	inherent	in	these	views	has	been	often	mistaken	as	cynicism	masquerading	as	goodwill;	Christopher	O’Sullivan	wondered	whether	it	was	“an	idealistic	smokescreen”	that	“camouflage[d]	his	real	
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aims.”5	O’Sullivan’s	metaphor	captured	the	essence	of	Welles’	beliefs	but	missed	the	mark	as	to	their	origins	and	intentions.	Rather	than	a	smokescreen,	Welles’	idealism	was	genuine,	but	ingrained	in	the	fabric	of	that	idealism	was	a	paternalistic	belief	that	Welles,	and	the	United	States,	knew	what	was	best	for	the	world	and,	given	the	opportunity,	had	every	right	to	take	action	to	bring	it	about.				
Anti-Militarism:	
		 Regardless	of	the	justifications	for	them,	Welles’	policymaking	throughout	his	career	was	based	on	a	belief	in	the	inherent	value	of	multilateral	institutions	and	collaborative	approaches	to	harmonize	diplomatic	relations	as	opposed	to	more	belligerent	and	militaristic	strategies.	The	clues	to	this	strand	of	Welles’	thinking	were	evident	in	his	early	life	and	career.	Conspicuous	in	his	isolation	during	youth	on	account	of	sexuality,	Welles	was	suspicious	of	macho	aggression.	More	inclined	to	artistic	and	academic	pursuits,	Welles	eschewed	the	muscular	Christianity	of	Groton	Preparatory	School	and	even	pursued	a	vaguely	bohemian	lifestyle	in	the	brief	period	between	graduating	from	university	and	joining	the	State	Department.6		Yet	even	after	Welles’	life	came	into	focus,	the	aversion	to	militarism	remained.	While	stationed	in	Japan	Welles	found	himself	unimpressed	with	the	increasingly	militaristic	rhetoric	of	the	Japanese.	Welles’	aversion	to	militarism	was	further	augmented	by	his	experiences	dealing	with	the	U.S.	military	in	the	Dominican	Republic.	Infuriated	by	the	obstinacy	and	bullheadedness	of	U.S.	military	governor	admiral	Samuel	Robison,	Welles	developed	an	abiding	suspicion	and	skepticism	of	the	capacity	of	military	officials	to	create	foreign	policy	or	conduct	diplomacy.	This	skepticism	laid	the	foundation	of	a	broader	critique	Welles	would	make	in	subsequent	years	about	the	inefficacy	of	U.S.	policies	in	Latin	America,	based	primarily	on	the	overutilization	of	military	power	at	the	expense	of	respectful	bilateral	and	multilateral	cooperation.																																																										5	Christopher	D.	O’Sullivan,	Sumner	Welles:	Postwar	Planning	and	the	Quest	for	a	New	World	Order	
1937-1943	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2009),	xiv.		6	Benjamin	Welles,	Sumner	Welles:	FDR’s	Global	Strategist	(New	York:	St.	Martin’s	Press,	1997),	26-9.		
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In	turn,	the	view	of	an	U.S.-Latin	American	relationship	devoid	of	military	intervention	that	Welles	developed	in	his	early	career	would	provide	him	with	the	tools	he	needed	to	help	the	U.S.	defend	its	interests	against	foreign	aggression	later	on.	As	the	threat	of	Nazi	infiltration	and	wartime	disruption	grew	during	the	late	1930s	Welles	assembled	the	nations	of	Latin	America	into	a	cooperative	system	of	overlapping	protocols,	directives,	and	procedures	to	help	them,	and	the	United	States,	avoid	being	drawn	into	unwanted	aggression.	At	a	series	of	conferences	he	attended	himself	or	influenced	from	Washington,	Welles	constructed	a	prophylactic	barrier	that	served	the	dual	purpose	of	institutionalizing	U.S.	leadership	in	the	hemisphere	while	protecting	against	fascist	interlopers	to	the	Americas.	The	collaborative	element	Welles	brought	to	this	effort	was	largely	his	own	doing,	but	it	fitted	perfectly,	as	well	as	helped	define,	the	cautious	tiptoeing	approach	to	wartime	foreign	policy	that	President	Roosevelt	adopted	during	the	awkward	years	prior	to	U.S.	entry	into	World	War	Two.		Outside	of	the	Western	Hemisphere,	however,	Welles’	aversion	to	militarism	encountered	rougher	seas.	A	passionate	desire	to	seek	a	peaceful	resolution	to	the	growing	belligerence	in	Europe	and	Asia	during	the	1930s,	which	was	shared	by	a	broad	swath	of	Americans	at	the	time,	led	Welles	to	entertain	ideas	with	little	chance	of	success.	Using	much	of	the	same	rhetoric	he	had	applied	with	success	in	Latin	America,	Welles	received	a	cool	reception	to	his	proposal	of	a	peace	conference	on	Armistice	Day	in	1937.	Throughout	the	State	Department	and	across	the	world	Welles’	optimistic	hope	for	bringing	about	an	“improved	world	psychology”	was	met	with	skepticism,	if	not	outright	derision.7		As	war	approached	Welles	grasped	at	ever	fewer	straws	with	increasingly	improbable	proposals	for	a	peaceful	settlement.	Undoubtedly	part	of	this	impetus	was	a	sensible	desire	to	explore	any	potential	option	to	avoid	a	war	that	nobody	wanted	to	happen.	But	detectable	in	the	pattern	of	Welles’	behaviour	was	a	repeated	unwillingness	to	entertain	militaristic	options	as	part	of	his	proposals.	In	this																																																									7	Memorandum	by	the	Undersecretary	of	State	(Welles),	6	October	1937,	U.S.	Department	of	State,	
Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States	(FRUS),	1937,	Vol.	I:	General,	(Washington,	D.C.:	GPO,	1954),	666.	
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respect,	Simon	Rofe’s	observation	of	"the	absence	from	Welles'	diplomatic	toolbox	of	the	ability	to	resort	to	the	use	of	military	force"	was	apt.8	In	Welles’	view,	use	of	the	military	was	simply	not	considered	viable	or	legitimate	in	proper	diplomatic	relations,	therefore	he	was	incapable	of	drawing	upon	it	as	a	means	to	achieve	his	ends.	It	is	worth	noting	that	in	the	sole	exception	to	this	rule	–	his	request	to	Franklin	Roosevelt	in	September	1933	for	a	military	intervention	in	Cuba	to	restore	Carlos	de	Céspedes	to	power	–	Welles’	attempt	to	use	military	force	was	both	disastrous	and	rejected	outright,	further	underlining	his	lack	of	aptitude	with	military	force.		Welles’	aversion	to	militarism	placed	him	in	an	awkward	position	once	the	U.S.	became	involved	in	global	conflicts	after	1941,	first	against	the	Axis	and	later	against	the	Soviet	Union.	With	the	thrust	of	U.S.	foreign	relations	shifting	from	diplomatic	negotiations	to	military	engagements,	Welles	along	with	the	rest	of	the	State	Department	took	something	of	a	back	seat	to	events	as	they	unfolded	during	the	early	years	of	the	war.	Because	Welles	was	removed	from	office	before	its	conclusion,	he	was	no	longer	in	a	position	to	translate	his	views	into	policy.	Nevertheless,	as	a	political	commentator	in	the	postwar	years	Welles	found	himself	marginalized	as	confrontation	with	the	Soviets	increased.	Unwilling	to	let	go	of	his	optimistic	hopes	for	a	postwar	world	organized	under	American	aegis,	he	insisted	the	U.S.	and	the	Soviet	Union	could	cooperate	and	that	to	the	extent	there	was	any	disagreement,	the	causes	were	to	be	found	on	both	sides.	Yet	even	Welles	was	unable	to	maintain	his	optimism	during	the	later	1940s,	reluctantly	acknowledging	the	need	for	military	preparedness	as	the	result	of	a	succession	of	failed	policies	and	lost	opportunities	following	the	death	of	Franklin	Roosevelt.		
Presidential	Patronage:				 That	Welles	focused	on	Roosevelt’s	death	as	the	catalyst	for	the	demise	of	peaceful	cooperation	in	the	postwar	world	held	special	significance,	for	it	had	been																																																									8	J.	Simon	Rofe,	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	Foreign	Policy	and	the	Welles	Mission	(New	York:	Palgrave	MacMillan,	2007),	17.		
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Roosevelt	who	had	been	the	lynchpin	of	Welles’	political	career.	Primed	by	their	shared	upbringing	and	respective	crucibles	in	adulthood	to	appreciate	one	another’s	inner	strength,	Welles	and	Roosevelt	operated	together	in	a	singular	fashion.	No	other	figure	in	Roosevelt’s	entourage	resembled	Welles	with	respect	to	the	longevity	of	their	partnership,	the	variety	of	their	collaborations,	or	the	unique	properties	of	their	personal	connection.	To	say	Welles	was	closer	to	Roosevelt	than	any	other	is	inaccurate;	to	the	extent	that	can	be	said	of	anyone,	other	examples	such	as	Harry	Hopkins	are	more	convincing.		However,	to	say	that	any	single	individual	was	close	to	Roosevelt	in	the	first	place	also	mischaracterizes	the	dynamics	at	work.	Throughout	his	life	–	as	an	only	child,	as	a	rising	political	star,	as	a	man	suddenly	curtailed	in	his	physical	capabilities	due	to	polio,	and	then	as	president	–	Roosevelt	invariably	assumed	a	position	of	supreme	centrality	in	the	universes	within	which	he	operated.	Around	him	circled	many	people	with	varying	degrees	of	proximity	dependent	on	time,	personality,	circumstance,	and	political	expediency.	Welles	was	one	of	these	satellites,	but	his	orbit	was	an	eccentric	one.	He	crossed	boundaries	and	violated	valence	circles	in	his	quest	for	greater	influence,	accumulating	power	–	and	enemies	–	the	closer	to	the	centre	he	got.			 With	their	political	careers	in	disarray,	Welles	and	Roosevelt	collaborated	together	in	the	1920s	to	make	a	mutual	comeback.	Here	Welles’	longstanding	familiarity	with	Roosevelt	and	their	shared	experience	of	exile,	due	directly	to	matters	of	physicality	and	masculinity,	occasioned	the	start	of	their	partnership.	Roosevelt	relied	on	Welles’	advice	and	counsel,	mostly	on	foreign	policy,	but	with	a	familiarity	that	indicated	Welles	occupied	a	unique,	if	not	privileged,	place	in	Roosevelt’s	entourage	alongside	members	of	the	Brains	Trust	and	long-time	contacts	like	Louis	Howe	and	William	Bullitt.	Once	in	office,	the	unique	properties	of	Welles’	position	translated	almost	immediately	into	political	competition,	fomented	by	Welles’	desire	for	promotion	and	Roosevelt’s	need	to	juggle	multiple	competing	interests	and	parties.	Foreshadowing	the	rest	of	Welles’	time	in	office,	his	close	relationship	with	Roosevelt	gave	him	access	to	power	over	and	above	what	he	could	have	expected,	but	also	left	him	exposed	to	jealous	counterattack.		
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	 With	respect	to	policymaking,	Welles’	relationship	with	Roosevelt	produced	mixed	results	inasmuch	as	there	was	policy	success	but	at	great	political	cost,	mostly	to	Welles.	In	Cuba	in	1933	Welles’	close	relationship	with	Roosevelt	left	him	little	option	but	to	accept	a	position	he	did	not	want	and	little	oversight	to	prevent	him	from	making	mistakes.	The	consequence	of	this	informality	was	a	disastrous	situation	in	which	Welles	violated	his	principles	and	his	instructions	by	making	a	request	to	Roosevelt	for	military	intervention	to	restore	the	Céspedes	regime.	Wisely,	Roosevelt	denied	Welles’	request,	though	he	did	acquiesce	later	to	a	request	from	Welles	to	deny	recognition	to	the	government	of	Ramòn	Grau	San	Martin	–	a	request	Welles	made	by	flying	in	person	to	Roosevelt’s	retreat	in	Warm	Springs,	Georgia.	Ironically	and	paradoxically,	Welles’	rash	behaviour	ended	up	giving	the	Roosevelt	administration	an	opportunity	to	demonstrate	beyond	a	doubt	that	its	pledge	to	no	longer	intervene	militarily	in	Latin	America	would	be	kept.		Welles’	reputation	suffered	temporarily	but	his	bond	with	Roosevelt	endured.	The	double-edged	nature	of	their	partnership	so	amply	demonstrated	in	Cuba	re-emerged	nine	years	later,	when	Welles	again	appealed	to	Roosevelt	for	acquiescence	on	a	policy	decision	at	the	Buenos	Aires	inter-American	conference	in	January	1942.	In	this	case	Welles’	opponent	was	Secretary	of	State	Cordell	Hull	and	the	consequences	far	more	damaging	to	Welles’	career.	In	appealing	to	Roosevelt	to	let	stand	the	last	minute	compromise	he	had	forged	at	the	conference,	Welles	demonstrated	how	the	trust	and	personal	connection	he	had	with	the	President	could	have	dramatic	results	for	U.S.	foreign	policy.	However,	it	was	also	the	watershed	for	Hull’s	final	push	to	purge	Welles	from	the	State	Department	on	account	of	Welles’	“disloyalty”	to	him.9		 	Hull’s	campaign	against	Welles	was	ultimately	successful	because	he	was	able	to	knock	out	the	central	pillar	of	his	political	support:	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	patronage.	With	Roosevelt’s	continued	willingness	to	protect	and	promote	him,	Welles	was	nearly	invincible.	Once	that	willingness	was	vanquished,	however,	Welles	was	helpless.	Despite	their	personal	fondness	for	one	another,	Roosevelt	was																																																									9	Cordell	Hull,	The	Memoirs	of	Cordell	Hull,	Vol.	II,	(London:	Hodder	&	Stoughton),	1230.		
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not	able	to	overcome	the	political	obstacles	that	had	been	built	up	in	part	by	the	favour	he	had	shown	Welles	over	the	years.	Once	Roosevelt	died,	Welles	was	precluded	forever	from	meaningful	political	influence	and	his	career	as	a	public	intellectual	withered	soon	after.			
Sexuality:				 Although	the	influence	of	sexuality	on	Welles’	political	career	could	be	traced	back	to	his	earliest	days,	the	flashpoint	came	at	the	end	in	the	aftermath	of	his	solicitation	of	sex	on	the	Bankhead	and	Cleveland	trains	in	1940.	The	investigation	of	Welles	that	stemmed	from	the	events	of	the	night	of	17-18	September	1940	revealed	characteristics	about	Welles	that	put	the	questions	about	his	sexuality	in	a	clearer	light.	Familiar	with	the	intricacies	of	cruising	as	well	as	the	habits	of	gay	men	of	this	period,	Welles’	same-sex	sexual	object	choice	was	evidently	the	manifestation	of	a	lifetime	of	experience.	Hardly	the	result	of	inebriation,	exhaustion,	weakness,	or	immorality,	Welles’	behaviour	on	the	Bankhead	and	Cleveland	trains	was	a	genuine	expression	of	a	desire	for	intimacy	from	a	man	whose	opportunities	to	seek	out	such	intimacy	were	practically	nonexistent,	given	his	personal	celebrity	and	general	public	disapproval	of	the	time.	Historians	writing	about	this	episode	in	Welles’	life	have	generally	portrayed	it	unsympathetically.	Writing	in	a	world	in	which	same-sex	relations	are	not	criminalized,	same-sex	marriage	is	widely	recognized,	and	opportunities	for	same-sex	intimacy	are	no	more	than	a	smartphone	application	away,	it	can	be	tempting	to	castigate	Welles	for	the	apparent	indiscretion	of	his	propositioning.	But	in	light	of	the	broader	societal	context	of	the	time,	Welles’	actions	should	more	properly	be	seen	as	the	act	of	a	desperately	lonely	individual	who	took	one	of	the	only	opportunities	available	to	him	to	seek	a	brief	moment	of	sexual	intimacy.				 Insofar	as	Welles’	actions	can	be	seen	as	a	consequence	of	improvident	inebriation,	it	is	in	the	physical	location	and	profession	of	his	chosen	objects	of	desire.	Though	Welles	was	likely	not	consciously	aware	of	this,	his	choice	of	Pullman	porters	was	an	especially	poor	one.	Trained	to	reject	such	advances,	and	to	report	
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any	such	irregularities	for	fear	of	negative	consequences,	the	Pullman	porters	Welles	propositioned	were	perfectly	positioned	to	preclude	the	possibility	that	Welles’	advances	would	remain	discrete.	Taken	together,	Welles’	familiarity	with	the	customs	of	gay	male	subculture	and	the	conspicuity	of	his	behaviour	to	the	highly	trained	staff	of	the	Pullman	porters	on	the	Bankhead	train	all	but	ensured	Welles’	actions	would	not	escape	notice.	These	specific	circumstances,	beyond	the	mere	fact	of	Welles’	queer	sexuality,	brought	the	genesis	of	the	report	that	would	be	used	by	Welles’	political	enemies	to	force	him	from	office.			 The	manner	in	which	that	forced	exile	proceeded	and	its	consequences,	revealed	the	peculiar	dynamics	of	the	intersection	of	sex,	power,	and	politics	in	Washington	D.C.	during	this	period.	Welles’	career	was	destroyed	not	by	the	publication	of	the	F.B.I.	investigation	report,	but	by	a	complex	web	of	rumour	and	innuendo	that	slowly	metastasized	into	an	irresistible	political	force.	The	growth	of	this	rumour	campaign	could	be	witnessed	in	the	retrospective	diaries	of	those	in	the	know	as	well	as	in	Welles’	own	job	performance;	Welles’	ability	to	remain	at	the	centre	of	the	political-diplomatic	social	nexus	he	had	crafted	for	himself	was	destroyed	by	the	rumour	campaign,	with	his	guest	lists	drying	up	almost	to	obscurity	by	July	1943.		Even	Welles’	resignation	could	not	stop	the	scandal’s	growth.	As	years	passed	and	Welles	remained	out	of	office,	fevered	accounts	of	what	had	happened	in	1943	to	remove	Welles,	and	of	the	misfortunes	that	befell	him	thereafter,	continued	to	surface.	So	deeply	ingrained	did	Welles’	scandal	become	in	Washington	that	it	emerged	as	a	blueprint	for	paranoid	conspiracies	about	subversive	infiltration	of	the	federal	government	during	the	Cold	War.	Though	never	acknowledged	publically,	Welles	himself	became	the	archetype	of	the	“cookie	pushers	in	striped	pants”	whose	presence	supposedly	threatened	the	integrity	of	the	U.S.	and	its	governmental	institutions.10	At	the	core	of	these	stereotypes	and	delusions	was	a	not-so-subtle	effort	to	posthumously	discredit	Franklin	Roosevelt	and	his	foreign	policy;	with																																																									10	David.	K.	Johnson,	The	Lavender	Scare:	The	Cold	War	Persecution	of	Gays	and	Lesbians	in	the	Federal	
Government	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2004),	65,	70,	quoting	Philip	Wylie,	Generation	of	
Vipers	(New	York:	Rinehart,	1942;	reprint,	New	York:	Pocket	Books,	1960),	232-60.	
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Roosevelt	dead	after	1945	it	was	both	impossible	and	unseemly	to	attack	him	directly.	Welles	provided	a	useful	alternative.			 Because	of	its	tragedies	and	its	ironies,	it	is	tempting	to	draw	comparisons	between	Welles’	story	and	those	of	others	who	faced	similar	prejudices.	An	obvious	analogue	can	be	found	in	the	case	of	British	cryptologist	Alan	Turing.	Like	Welles,	Turing	was	exceptionally	gifted	and	indefatigably	dedicated	to	his	chosen	profession.11	Both	men	undertook	significant	tasks	to	help	their	respective	countries	face	down	the	apocalyptic	challenge	of	Nazi	Germany	and	in	so	doing	took	some	of	the	first	trailblazing	steps	toward	envisioning	a	world	transformed	by	the	very	efforts	they	had	made.	Yet	the	most	salient	homology	came	from	the	shared,	albeit	separate,	experience	of	seeing	their	genius	and	sacrifice	disregarded	because	of	their	same-sex	attraction.		But	in	many	respects	Welles’	story	is	singular.	He	was	a	distinctly	queer	individual	in	his	outlook,	in	his	professional	demeanour,	and	in	the	way	he	transgressed	norms	of	gender	whilst	maintaining	a	fastidiously	austere	exterior.	His	sexuality	was	an	integral	part	of	his	personality.	Because	of	his	chosen	profession,	that	link	was	sublimated	into	foreign	policy	at	critical	moments	of	U.S.	diplomatic	history.	Analyzing	Welles’	sexuality	illuminates	aspects	of	the	complex	phenomena	that	lie	behind	the	creation	of	foreign	policies	in	a	specific	period	of	American	history	while	providing	greater	understanding	about	how	sexuality,	politics,	and	power	intersect	throughout	American	history.	For	that	reason	alone,	never	mind	his	enormous	contributions	to	his	country	and	his	dedication	to	his	job,	we	should	remain	grateful	to	Welles	for	having	lived	the	life	he	did.																																																																	11	See:	Andrew	Hodges,	Alan	Turing:	The	Enigma	(London:	Vintage,	1992).		
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